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Wordsworth and Coleridge constantly revised and altered their
works, therefore, unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from their
poetry and prose refer to the earliest complete version of the work
concerned. Later, revised editions are introduced to reveal subsequent
changes in their political thought.
It should be noted that there are three complete versions of
The Prelude by Wordsworth: a two-part version of 1799, the Thirteen
Book edition of 1805 and the revised Fourteen Book edition, which was
the first to be published in 1850 after the poet's death. In this thesis
most reference is made to the 1805 edition, although use is also made
of the 1799 version and is identified as such in the text or footnotes.
These two earlier versions of The Prelude are preferred to that of 1850
because they represent more accurately Wordsworth's political philosophy
during the period under review.
It should be further noted that there are two major editions of
Coleridge's journal The Friend: those of 1809/10 and 1818. There is
also an intermediary version of 1812 which includes minor changes. The
1809/10 edition was published as a regular journal, but it ceased
publication in March, 1810. In 1818 Coleridge re-published the entire
work in a three volume edition, when it was not only revised, but much
extended to include many new essays on morality and religion. Extensive
use is made of both these editions of The Friend and credited accordingly.
When the same passage occurs in both editions of the work, reference
is made to the earlier 1809/10 edition. When Coleridge's ideas are
changed for the 1818 edition, this is clearly stated.
ABSTRACT
In the early 1790s Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth
sympathised with the radical ideals of the French Revolution and
advocated a republican system of government. Nevertheless, by the
time they became close friends in 1797, they were becoming increasingly
disillusioned by the violent and despotic course of events in France.
It is generally-considered that, thereafter, they turned their backs on
republicanism and embraced more conservative principles, becoming firm
supporters of the 'Tory' administration in Britain.
This thesis explores this later transitional period which stretched
from 1797 until 1818. It argues that, in their collaborative and
individual work, the two writers shared an identity of political interests
and sympathies. Their ideological progress followed a broadly similar
course, as their philosophy developed in response to wartime events at
home and abroad. In the process, each writer evolved an analogous,
yet also distinctive, political philosophy. Although their thinking
undoubtedly became more conservative during this period, there was not
a simple.abandonment of radical beliefs in favour of conservative ones.
Instead, during this time of intense critical analysis, many of their
more liberal instincts from the 1790s remained alive and were to re-
emerge, after their war-time period of Tory nationalism, to be integrated
with their more conservative view of the world. Therefore, in response
to the post-war climate of depression and social unrest, Wordsworth had
developed, by 1818, a philosophy of paternalistic and humanitarian
conservatism, while Coleridge's beliefs had become more truly liberal-
conservative: the conservative and liberal elements living through
each and so forming one organic political philosophy.
(vi)
INTRODUCTION
Wordsworth and Coleridge first met in Bristol in September 1795
and made an immediately'favourable impression on each other. Wordsworth
remarked, a month later,
Coleridge was at Bristol part of the time I was
there. I saw but little of him. I wished indeed
to have seen more - his talents appear to me very
great.1
Coleridge was already acquainted with Wordsworth's verse and had
greatly admired it since 1793:
During the last year of my residence at Cambridge,
I became acquainted with Mr. Wordsworth's first
publication entitled "Descriptive Sketches"; and
seldom, if ever, was the emergence of an original
poetic genius above the literary horizon more
evidently announced.
Their mutual attraction, however, originated not just in their
admiration for each other's literary skills, but also in their shared
radical sympathies. This first meeting between the two poets in Bristol
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most probably occurred at a political debating society in the city.
Over the preceding months there, Coleridge had been delivering a series
of lectures on politics and religion.
Nevertheless, it was not until 1797 that their real friendship
commenced and they began to exert an influence on each other's views.
In March of that year Wordsworth visited Coleridge at Nether Stowey in
Somersetshire and, later in the Summer, decided to move with his sister,
Dorothy, into Alfoxden House a few miles away. As Dorothy Wordsworth
A
admitted, 'Our principal inducement was Coleridge's society'. Wordsworth
was becoming unsettled and disillusioned by the course of the French
Revolution and he found Coleridge's cheerful company comforting and
stimulating. Coleridge's views found a receptive audience and helped
to shape Wordsworth's philosophy at this crucial time. Coleridge,
himself, was even more in awe of his new neighbour. For the first few
years of their friendship, Coleridge worshipped Wordsworth and constantly
denigrated his own talents, despite the fact that his influence was
often the stronger. Desperate for approval and love, Coleridge attrib¬
uted all his best thoughts and feelings to Wordsworth and showed an
eager interest in all his friend's ideas. In a poem composed during
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their visit to Germany in 1798, he called Wordsworth 'my teacher, my
friend!' and concluded on a note which reveals the extent of his
dependency:
William, my head and my heart! dear William
and dear Dorothea! You have all in each other;
but I am lonely and want you!-'
By 1800 both writers had set up home in the Lake District:
Wordsworth at Grasmere, Coleridge at Kendal. They visited each other
frequently, travelled abroad together, maintained a constant corres¬
pondence when apart and, on many occasions, discussed their ideas and
opinions with each other. This close relationship was to last for
most of their lives, although it did temporarily, though noticeably, cool
after their quarrel and estrangement between 1810 and 1812.
This friendship sustained itself, in large part, on their shared
political interests and enthusiasms. In 1797 they both harboured doubts
about the warlike course of the French republic and feared that the
early principles of the Revolution were being abandoned. As these fears
were confirmed in succeeding years, they sought new political solutions
through mutual discussion and consultation, as well as by more independ¬
ent routes. In each other they recognised something of their own
reflection and, through each other, sought out new directions. The
Lyrical Ballads of 1798 is only the most famous example of this joint
enterprise. But even works under separate authorship, such as The Prelude
(1805) or the projected The Recluse, were discussed between them.
Wordsworth contributed pieces to Coleridge's journal, The Friend, and
the extensive work by both writers on the Peninsular War was developed
in collaboration. Throughout their poetry and prose there are countless
allusions to, and echoes of, each other's work.^ At every level the
two friends had a profound effect on each other's views; whether
aesthetic, moral or political.
Until 1818, however, current affairs and political ideas were the
predominant concern for both Wordsworth and Coleridge. Wordsworth
remarked to an American visitor, the Rev. Orville Dewey, that
although he was known to the world as a poet, he had
given twelve hours thought to the condition and
prospect of society for one to poetry.?
Coleridge was similarly preoccupied with politics and wrote even more
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extensively than Wordsworth on political and social problems. For much
of the middle period of his life he was a political correspondent for
the Opposition newspaper, The Morning Post, and then, after 1804, for
the Government newspaper, The Courier. Like Wordsworth he produced
political pamphlets, but he also wrote his own journals, The Watchman
(1796) and The Friend (1809-10). In the latter he expounded the principles
of his political philosophy and stated, in terms similar to Wordsworth's,
that he was,
an Author writing on subjects, to the investigation
of which he professes to have devoted the greater
portion of his life.®
In claiming this primary interest in politics, neither writer was
exaggerating. Most of their work between 1797 and 1818 was directly
or indirectly concerned with political issues and ideas, reflecting the
predominating influence that war-time and post-war public events had on
their own lives. It is also clear that Wordsworth and Coleridge were
not only interested in writing about politics, but also took a positive
part in political activity and debate. Wordsworth became involved in
the public controversy surrounding the Convention of CIntra agreement
and published a pamphlet on the issue in 1809. He also became an active
campaigner for the Tory candidate in the Westmorland election of 1818.
Coleridge was not only a newspaper columnist, but was also a writer of
pamphlets on post-war distress (the Lay Sermons) and was engaged by
Sir Robert Peel to support his Factory Bill in 1818, which he did
enthusiastically in articles, pamphlets and letters. Thus, the two
writers were not just theorists, but were actively engaged in the
political controversies of the age.
Both Wordsworth and Coleridge believed that they had an important
educative role to play in society, whether in the elucidation of
fundamental political and moral principles, or in drawing their readers'
attention to the pressing problems of the moment. As primarily creative
writers, they believed that they were best equipped to search for and
discover the true, ever-relevant principles and ideals which underlay
all human activity. They had a greater psychological insight into the
inner workings of society than historians or biographers, who, they
believed, were more concerned with the mere chronicling of everyday
g
events. Moreover, they were able to use their imaginative skills to
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enable readers to feel, as well as understand rationally, the truth
in the ideas they discussed. It will be argued that this educative
moral and political role, which they adopted, was regarded by them as
their most serious social duty.
The early, radical phase of Wordsworth and Coleridge's political
writings before they became friends, has come under close scrutiny in
the past years from both literary critics and historians.1^ A brief
preliminary sketch of these views must suffice here, as a preface to
later changes.
In the early 1790 s, Wordsworth and Coleridge were on the moderate,
middle class, and intellectual wing of radicalism. They never joined
the more Jacobinical societies, such as the London Corresponding Society,
nor did they ever formally join any political grouping. Wordsworth
visited France in the first few years after the Revolution and mixed in
Girondin circles. Coleridge, still a student of Cambridge, was involved
in the radical, dissenting group at the University. Although the principles
of the Revolution excited them with the prospect of a more perfect world,
neither poet showed much sympathy for violent revolution as a means of
translating their ideals into practice. They may have had republican
11
sympathies, but they were not radical revolutionaries. Indeed, one
of the most striking aspects of nearly all their early writing is a
strong revulsion over the use of violent methods to achieve politi cal
or social goals. Insofar as they ever countenanced revolution it was
only as a limited expedient, surgical in operation, undertaken in only
the most extreme circumstances, and appropriate to some foreign land
but not to Britain. Except in these precise, controlled conditions,
gradual political, social or educative means were always preferred.
None the less, although Wordsworth and Coleridge were not revolution-
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aries, they were committed republicans. Both writers favoured a more
rational political system grounded in the natural, inalienable rights
of the citizen and they extolled the virtues of freedom, equality and
brotherhood. They sought a democratic constitution with adult male
suff rage, frequent elections and less corruption; a society that was
more egalitarian, stripped of titles and distinctions, except the natural
rewards of merit. Wordsworth and Coleridge believed in the need for a
A
more caring government to help raise up the people and Coleridge, in
particular, was convinced that an improvement in the people's condition
was necessary before they could be entrusted with equal rights.
Wordsworth attacked the grossly unequal distribution of property and
Coleridge even planned to set up a community where property would be
held in common by all its members. The dawning of the French Revolution
seemed to hold out the promise that these liberal ideals would be vouch¬
safed to all humanity.
This early radical period of their political careers has attracted
most attention, yet it was in the years after 1797, when they became
close friends that their most productive political phase began. In
response to the failure of the Revolution and the course of the war
against France, and inspired by their shared interest, they wrote more
extensively and profoundly on political questions than ever before.
It will be argued that over the next twenty years it is possible to
discern three inter-related stages in the development of their political
ideas, as they departed from this radical base.
In Section I the period from 1797 until 1802 will be examined.
During these years, when they became increasingly dis illusioned by
the anarchy and the despotism to be found in France, Wordsworth and
Coleridge began to examine their early radicalism in a more critical
light. As the 'liberating' French armies invaded free, republican
Switzerland both writers examined the way in which the fine principles
of the revolution had become perverted. Still clinging to their
republican ideals they sought a new, securer political and social context
in which they could be planted. The early emphasis on natural rights
and the free exercise of individual reason had proved to be an insufficient,
unstable basis for a new republican system of government. Individual
rights had been promoted at the expense of necessary moral duties, and
selfish passions had become un-restrained. Moreover, this new system
had been imposed on traditional society with little regard for past
affections and customs, and without preparing the people to accept
these radical changes. The republic had proved to be impermanent
because it lacked firm, effective roots in existing social conditions.
Thus, Wordsworth and Coleridge sought out a more amenable context
for republican principles to grow and thrive. Changes in the system of
government had to be effected more gradually and to be adapted to
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existing society. Though the object was still a republican constitution,
this could not be imposed but had to develop in a more evolutionary
manner, and the people had to be prepared for accepting these changes.
Thus, republican forms had to be introduced pragmatically, with more
concern for tradition; they were to be based in moral law as well as
individual rights and in fellow feeling not just reason. In this
context, republicanism could not be achieved as quickly but it would
grow more surely, and be permanent. In this search for a new context
for republicanism,however; it was inevitable that the principles to which
they had once subscribed must also change and be re-defined. The radical
concept of abstract natural rights could hardly be imposed gradually,
So they also had to be re-interpreted in a new moral and historical
context. By 1802 it was not just the radical context of republicanism
that was being challenged, but also the fundamental rights which it
generated.
In section 31 the period between 1802 and 181A will be examined.
As France, under Napoleon, proved to be irredeemably despotic, as its
war aims became ever more acquisitive, Wordsworth and Coleridge began
to view Britain's war effort with patriotic sympathy. Britain now seemed
to represent the light of Christian virtue in a struggle against evil.
Republicanism, which had failed France so disastrously, now appeared
fundamentally flawed and both writers became more admiring of the
existing political system in Britain which seemed to serve society best.
The British constitution had grown out of tradition and was founded in
moral law. Although the mass of ordinary people had no direct say in
their own government, the will of the people was always respected and
their interests looked after in a more secure, moral fashion by the
propertied ruling classes. Such a constitution required only occasional
minor alterations to maintain its continuing vigour and relevance to
society. The influence of Burke, already apparent in their writings,
between 1797 and 1802, now dominated their thinking.
If their ideological journey had ceased at this point, the transition
of Wordsworth and Coleridge into the Tory camp would seem complete. In
the years after 181A however they were to qualify their judgements again
in the light of practical experience. The transition from war to peace¬
time conditions revealed flaws in the workings of the political system
they had admired. In Section III it will be argued that the distress of
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the poor and the increasing materialism of the upper classes caused
Wordsworth and Coleridge to question whether all the essential functions
of the constitution were in fact being performed. The ends of
government entailed a regard for the social welfare, morality and
education of the people. In Britain, these ends had not only been
neglected but, in the post-war years, seemed in danger of being swept
aside altogether. Faced with the mounting unrest of the people and a
resurgent radicalism, the government and most of its conservative
supporters advocated a policy of repression to avert revolution.
Wordsworth and Coleridge, while acknowledging the danger, treated the
people's grievances as real and promoted a policy of state intervention
to fulfil the social and moral ends of government. Wordsworth advocated
a more paternal, caring attitude towards the poor; Coleridge recommended
direct social reform. Both writers called vigorously for a programme
of national education which would not only improve the intellectual
understanding of the lower classes, but also provide for the moral
education of the whole of society. For Wordsworth, these changes were
essential to the continuing health of the constitution; Coleridge,
venturing beyond Burke, saw change as an essential condition of the
constitution itself. For him, the constitution was not a fixed form
in need of occasional modifications, but a completely organic process,
perpetually changing and living through society. As their political
philosophy assumes its definitive style in 1818, Wordsworth and Coleridge
emerge as conservative theorists, but their conservative defence of the
constitution is mediated on the one hand by a morality that is applied
in a paternal, humanitarian spirit and, on the other, by a morality
that is organic to the constitutional process itself.
Although these three sections deal with distinct phases in their
political writings, they are not self-contained; the progress from one
to the next did not occur suddenly or decisively. The process, though
clear, is, at times, contradictory and ambivalent. Indeed, the very
notion of reducing their ideas to a system of political belief goes
against the grain of much that they understood to be true. Both writers
emphasised that political beliefs only attained full meaning when
considered alongside the other principles which underpinned all of
human life: social, economic, religious. Coleridge, in particular,
saw life as one organic whole where each part, though distinct, depended
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on all the other parts for life and meaning. In this context, the
systematisation of only one aspect, like politics, was fundamentally
false to the whole. Thus, in attempting to elucidate the development
of their political theory, more attention than normal will be paid to
their general view of society, economics and morality. Indeed, moral
considerations came to dominate their political thinking to such an
extent that the constitution itself seemed only one of the more
pragmatic ways of realising Christian tenets of belief.
In tackling the years after 1797 one is dealing with the death of
a revolution - the way in which former sympathisers coped with the
ineluctable destruction of their ideals. In Britain, where the revolution
had a mainly limited and ideological import, it is perhaps easiest to
examine this demise and discover how principles were modified, survived
or were jettisoned completely. Some supporters of the Revolution, such
as Fox or Hazlitt, continued to sympathise with the French and they
resisted the nationalistic fervour in Britain. Some, such as James
Mackintosh, effected a quick change into the Tory ranks. But Wordsworth
and Coleridge are representative of many radicals in this period, tugged
three ways by innate patriotism, disillusionment with the French and by
republican sympathies. In the years prior to 1802 they tried to
reconcile these feelings, but, thereafter, they followed the vast
majority of their fellow countrymen in aligning themselves behind
Britain in the war and supporting the existing constitution. During
this long, painful process they kept alive the ideological debate on
politics into the new century. Their work affords with a detailed
exposition and paradigm of how early radicalism was first modified and
then crumbled into conservatism. Perhaps in no other political writers
of the time can this geological shift in ideas be observed with such
precision. Wordsworth and Coleridge, however, are not just represent¬
ative of wider movements in thought, but are also profound, often
original, political theorists in their own right. They did not just
revert to the old, eighteenth century defence of the constitution, but
carried over from the 1790's something of the popular impetus of
radicalism that was to re-emerge in their thoughts in a new type of
conservatism which was not afraid of change or state interventionism
to promote the welfare of the people. In redefining conservative
thought in this way they prefigured the change to 'liberal' Tory policies
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in the 1820's and ' 30's and they looked forward to some of the
social concerns of the Victorian era. In this way they reconciled
and fused together the thought of Burke to that of a new era of
resurgent radicalism and populism, where the social demands and
grievances of the people could no longer be ignored or placated.




THE RETREAT FROM RADICALISM, 1797-1802
CHAPTER I
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
Although Wordsworth and Coleridge were greatly influenced by the
major political philosophers of their own day, principally Godwin and
Burke, the form and direction of their ideology was, to a large extent,
pragmatically determined. The key turning points of the war in
Britain and Europe had a profound effect on their thinking. In this
chapter we shall examine how the writers responded to the changing
nature of the Revolutionary War, focussing particularly on the years
after 1797 when their disaffection with the French became manifest.
It will be argued that the events of these years finally distanced
Wordsworth from France and prepared him to accept a more nationalistic
view of politics. Coleridge's hopes for France were severely dented,
but survived and grew again. Ideologically this was to place him nearer
to the Foxite Opposition which sympathised with the French and sought
peace. On a more general level it will be shown, in later chapters,
how the events of 1797 - 1802 caused Wordsworth and Coleridge to
scrutinise and question all their republican beliefs.
It was the outbreak of war between Britain and France in 1793,
rather than the idealism of the Revolution itself, which propelled
Wordsworth and Coleridge into writing on politics. Now, Britain was
directly affected by events abroad and the early acceptance of the
revolution, even in government circles, had evaporated. Thus, their
political writing was born out of the need to justify republican ideals
to the public, and to themselves, at the very point when those ideals
had become identified with the national enemy and the appeal to patriotism
was being heard throughout the land. From the start of their political
careers Wordsworth and Coleridge were, therefore, on the defensive,
trying to justify their beliefs in an increasingly hostile climate, but
also entertaining real personal doubts about supporting a cause which
ran counter to their natural patriotic feelings and the mood of the
country at large. It was a dilemma which faced all radicals at the
time. All their political writing was built on this tension between
rational belief and innate feeling, between aspiration and practical
realities. It forced them to look more critically at their political
beliefs and at the actions of France. Indeed, as we shall see, all
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their political work is a search to find the political system which
best reconciles these seemingly opposite principles. If the outbreak
of war first produced this tension, the events of the next few years
were to intensify their sense of unease and their doubts about France
and its political aims.
Despite later claims that they had supported the French armies and
hoped for victory over Britain1, neither Wordsworth nor Coleridge were
ever very enthusiastic about war as a medium for the promotion of
libertarian principles. Although they sympathised with the French aim
of spreading freedom throughout Europe, they felt that war was a
regrettable means to such a worthy end. War could only be countenanced
as a limited, defensive measure and reformist methods of change were
always preferable. In The Female Vagrant (1791-94), Wordsworth tried
2
to show 'the calamities of war as they affect individuals'. Just at
the point when the war was at its most popular in Britain, Wordsworth
reminded people of the horrors that accompanied war and argued that its
evils always bore most heavily on the poor. The latter were enticed
to enlist in the armed forces in order to escape the misery of their
present state but they were only rewarded by greater pains and the
neglect of an uncaring government. In a stanza which he deleted in 1802
(when he no longer believed a peaceful solution was possible or desirable),
the depth of Wordsworth's anti-war sentiment becomes clear.
Oh! dreadful price of being to resign
All that is dear _in being! better far
In Want's most lonely cave till death to pine,
Unseen, unheard, unwatched by any star;
Or in the streets and walks where proud men are,
Better our dying bodies to obtrude,
Then dog-like, wading at the heels of war,
Protract a curst existence, with the brood ^
That lap (their very nourishment!) their brother's blood!
War was an unnatural, bestial act, severing man from all his finer,
moral feelings. It could never fulfil the French desire to extend
liberty to oppressed peoples because war itself enslaved man. Every
war was a civil war, pitting brother against brother. Thus, it could
never spread the universal, fraternal principles of republicanism since
it was intrinsically opposed to them.
In general, Coleridge's views coincided with Wordworth's, though
he did recognise that sometimes oppression could only be toppled by war.
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He reserved his severest criticism for a war that was waged without
principle, but for material advantage - the type of war that Britain
was pursuing in the mid-1790's. In The Destiny of Nations (1796) he
noted, like Wordsworth, that the poor were always the losers in a war,
because they were used for the acquisitive ends of their masters. Even
the most principled conflict had a tendency to degenerate into a more
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mundane contest of ambition and materialism. This is what he feared
might happen in France. In 1796, when the Directory rejected the peace
overtures of Britain, Coleridge warned France that she was in danger of
pursuing the war for acquisitive, rather than republican principles:
If however you persevere in your intentions, will your
soldiers fight with the same enthusiasm for the Ambition
as they have done for the liberty of their Country?^
He foresaw that, if France continued the war in her current spirit of
materialism, she would lose her libertarian impetus and become merely
ambitious. There would be a reversion to despotism as the moral will
necessary for the sustenance of liberty would have withered away.
This, however, was as yet only a warning of the possible and, up to
1798, Coleridge still supported France and her war as long as she
proclaimed libertarian aims. He was still able to invoke France as
'Thee, lamb of God! Thee, blameless Prince of Peace!France was
still identified in his mind as the principal force of virtue in
Europe, and Britain, instead of being arraigned against her, should
have joined her in the fight against oppression.
Wordsworth's greater unease over the war soon made him much more
sceptical about the role of France. While the French were on the
defensive he gave her his support even though war was unpalatable.
From May to July 1794, however, the Republican armies turned to
offensive tactics and even the death of Robespierre failed to bring
this new phase to an end. The short war Wordsworth had expected had
now turned into a more wide-ranging and aggressive conflict. Referring
to the French armies in 1794, Wordsworth later stated:
And now, become oppressors in their turn,
Frenchmen had changed a war of self-defence
For cqe of conquest, losing sight of all
Which they had struggled for ....
.... But, roused up, I stuck
More firmly to old tenets, and, to prove
Their temper, strained them more.^
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Therefore, as early as 1794, Wordsworth had begun to believe that
France was waging a war of conquest'and had forfeited the original
principles she claimed to be spreading abroad. Wordsworth still
maintained his faith in these republican principles; indeed they
became stronger in adversity, but the use of the verb 'strain' suggests
that the tension between theory and practical reality had become much
greater. Support for French principles had ceased to be synonymous
with an unconditional support for French actions. The ideological
end had become divorced from the physical means and Wordworth would now
have to seek out a new context for his political beliefs, independent
of the French and their radical methods.
It is clear then that, well before 1798, Wordsworth harboured
strong doubts and anxieties over the course of the revolution in
France and the methods it had used to promote its ideals. Coleridge
also entertained fears that France might become more acquisitive in her
aims, but he continued to support her in the war, believing that she
was still the best hope for European freedom. He still perceived a
unity of French theory and practice. Therefore, when France invaded
free, republican Switzerland, in 1798, the event had a different, but
analogous, significance for each writer. For Wordsworth, it proved to
be the final, decisive confirmation of pre-existing doubts and it opened
wide the discrepancy between French republican ideals and aggressive
practice. For Coleridge, it was a more immediately traumatic event and
his faith in France never fully recovered, though he continued to hope
that, under Napoleon, France would still fulfil its promise as the
guiding light of republicanism in Europe.
In March 1798 Switzerland was invaded by French armies and the
Helvetian Republic was later formed under the domination of France.
This action not only confirmed France as a belligerent, acquisitive
power, but one that was now openly acting against the very libertarian,
republican principles she had previously claimed to be exporting - for
Switzerland was one of Europe's oldest and freest republics. The initial
horror that overwhelmed Wordsworth, Coleridge and most other British
radicals was heightened by other events of that year. The United
Irishmen had risen up with the help and support of the French and there
was a fear that Britain itself would be invaded. The Government's
repressive measures were tightened with the suspension of the Habeas
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Corpus Act and Charles James Fox, the political leader whom
Wordsworth and Coleridge most admired, talked of retirement. On every
side, freedom and justice seemed to be threatened, the prospects for
peace and political reform at home were confounded and the independence
of their own nation appeared in jeopardy. In this climate of fear and
confusion not only were their remaining hopes in France checked, but
the radical notions, which had been used to justify the French in their
war of 'liberation', seemed fatally flawed.
Although Wordsworth had been more sceptical of French intentions,
the invasion still had a particular and poignant significance for him.
Wordsworth had visited Switzerland on his walking tour of Europe in
1791-92 and the country stood for him as a special holy place. He found
there something approaching an original state of nature where mai\ lived
freely in a brotherly rural community under the sight of God. It
g
symbolised the simple, uncorrupted republic for which Wordsworth yearned.
The invasion of 1798 was, therefore, not just an affront to Wordsworth's
political beliefs, it was an offence against Nature and God. It deeply
affected his emotions and began the process whereby Wordsworth not only
reasoned", but also felt that the French were pursuing an unnatural and
Godless course. He began to identify them and their radical practices
with the forces of immorality. The personal, emotive significance of
9
the invasion imprinted these feelings all the more deeply.
Coleridge's stunned, horrified reaction to the French invasion was
even more immediate and absolute, because his loyalty to her cause had
remained firmer than Wordworth's. Though remaining true to his republican
ideals, he now realised, as Wordsworth had done already, that the French
could no longer be trusted as the guardians and promoters of those
principles. In turning against the French, at this stage, he felt he
was being ideologically consistent with his original beliefs, as the
advertisement to his poem France; An Ode makes clear:
The following excellent Ode will be in unison with the
feelings of every friend to liberty and foe to oppression;
of all who, admiring the French Revolution, detest and
deplore the conduct of France towards Switzerland. It
is very satisfactory to find as zealous and steady an
advocate for freedom as Mr. Coleridge concur with us in
condemning the conduct of France towards the Swiss
Cantons. Indeed his concurrence is not singular; we ^
know of no Friend to liberty who is not of his opinion.
1 A
In conquering Switzerland, a free peaceful brother-republic, France
had turned its back on all its own republican ideals and had forfeited
the trust of her friends in Britain. She was now no better than the
11
despotic monarchies arraigned against her. Coleridge realised that
he had been mistaken ever to believe that liberty could be spread by
war. True freedom was only to be found in Nature. It had to grow
naturally and was never to be achieved through an unnatural force
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such as war. Coleridge had now reached the same point that
Wordsworth had been moving towards for several years; the dissociation
of French radical practice from republican ideals. His despondency
was profound and, for a time, like Wordsworth, he despaired of ever
finding a political method which could change society for the better.
The one hope that Wordsworth still entertained was that the advent
of Napoleon might return France to her original principles. He always
maintained a faith in the power of the individual to effect great change.
This idea owed much to Burke, who believed in the capacity of one
exceptional mail to moralise the world. In The Prelude Wordsworth
1 3
stated that he had believed 'the virtue of one paramount mind' might
return France to her republican ideals. Just as he believed the
Revolution had been ill-served by its earlier leaders like Robespierre,
however, so Wordsworth soon identified Napoleon as another political
saviour who had turned out to be as evil and dangerous as his predecessors.
He realised it was foolish to expect Napoleon, who had only been schooled
in war, to re-dedicate France to liberty and justice. Good statesmen
were not formed in military academies, but were reared on domestic
1 b
affections and moral duties. These were to be values which found
an important place in Wordsworth's future political philosophy. By-
pursuing even more ambitious ends, Napoleon made the prospect of
republican renewal remoter still. Napoleon therefore placed his hope
for the future in the judgement of the ordinary citizen:
Happy is he, who, caring not for Pope
Consul, or King, can sound himself to know
The Destiny of Man, and live in hope.^
If this period saw the end of Wordsworth's remaining hopes in
France, however, it did not see a reciprocal revival of his confidence
in Britain. In 1802 he still blamed Britain for the downfall of
libertarianism in France. If she and her allies had not provoked
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France into war, then the seed of republican liberty would have grown
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more successfully. Pitt's government undermined liberty and justice
abroad, as well as at home, through its use of repressive measures,
1 7
spies and informers. Wordsworth saw little to recommend in the
political actions of either France or Britain - they were both
oppressive, corrupt powers. Nevertheless, as Napoleon's despotic
control and desire for conquest increased, Wordsworth did begin to make
distinctions between the two powers. Whereas France seemed irrevocably
lost, Britain continued to oppose a conquering nation which had actively
crushed freedom in Switzerland. Thus, even if Britain was not a
conscious force for liberty and justice, she was not like France, a
positive force which denied them. Britain retained the potential to
do good and, even if only by default, her position was more admirable.
Addressing Britain, he wrote,
But worse, more ignorant in love and hate,
Far - far more abject, is thine Enemy:
Therefore the wise pray for thee, though the freight
Of thy offences be a heavy weight: ^g
Oh grief that Earth's best hopes rest all with Thee!
Wordsworth was now convinced that, while far from perfect, Britain
was the lesser evil and deserved support in the war, though this view
was qualified by the regret that the only hope for peace and liberty
should reside with such an oppressive power. Although he still
professed faith in republican ideals, the radical methods which the
French had employed to serve these ends, had proved false. After 1798
Wordsworth was to seek a new political basis from which republicanism
could grow more surely.
At first, Coleridge's view of France and Britain after 1798
coincided with that of his friend. After the initial shock of the
invasion had passed, however, Coleridge developed a more considered and
complex response. His poem, Fears in Solitude (1798), reveals his
profound disillusion with the French, and it is critical of Britain's
tyrannical policies, though it also argues that support for Britain
in the war was justified. Britain promoted war in foreign lands, yet
she had never experienced the horrors of that warfare on her own soil.
When British soldiers were killed abroad, the public were anaesthetised
from the carnage by thpir distance from the event and by bland newspaper
accounts which abstracted death and suffering into statistics. In this
16
way, Britain had become a callous, indifferent and oppressive power.
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Its moral feelings and responsibilities had withered away. Coleridge,
however, hoped that the threat of an invasion of Britain in 1798 might
be a chastening experience which would cause her to reflect on past
wrongs and remind her of the moral values which she had so neglected.
By encountering the prospect of war-time horrors which she had made
others suffer, Britain might recover some of her old humane, libertarian
instincts. This increasing emphasis on the need for a more moral basis
to politics was to be an important feature in the revised philosophy
of both Wordsworth and Coleridge in the coming years.
If Britain was temporarily sunk in immorality and repression,
however, the condition of France was even worse: she seemed beyond
redemption. France had not merely forsaken her principles; she now
consciously promoted evil. Coleridge therefore now felt justified in
supporting Britain in what appeared to be a war of self-defence against
an oppressive power: the parallel to France's position in 1793.
make yourselves pure!
Stand forth! be men! repel an impious foe,
Impious and false, a light yet cruel race,
Who laugh away all virtue, mingling mirth
With deeds of murder; and still promising
Freedom, themselves too sensual to be free,
Poison life's amities, and cheat the heart
Of faith and quiet hope, and all that soothes,
And all that lifts the spirit!^®
Coleridge's patriotic instincts had revived and, although he was far
from being uncritical of Britain, she now seemed more capable of moral
good.
It would appear then that the events of 1798 propelled Coleridge
into an ideological position similar to that of Wordsworth's. Fears
in Solitude, however, was written at the height of the invasion scare
and, understandably, Coleridge's patriotic feelings were intense. Once
the alarm subsided, he adopted a more considered view of events. In
the following years his support for Britain waned and his faith in France
recovered. Two factors aided this process: Britain's immoral conduct
in the war and Coleridge's faith in Napoleon.
In his allegorical poem, Recantation, Illustrated in the Story of
the Mad Ox, Coleridge argued that Britain had caused France to become
an oppressive power which now threatened Europe. Like the Whigs,
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Coleridge believed that Britain was responsible for the failure of
Revolutionary ideals, for the terror, and for the subsequent
despotism of France. Instead of treating the infant republic sympathet¬
ically, Britain and her allies had goaded her into excessive behaviour
and, finally, into war. Mistaking the ecstatic idealism of the
revolution for aggressive tendencies, Britain had provoked violence
in France. She had treated France like a dangerous mad ox and, in a
self-fulfilling prophecy, that is what France had become. Goaded into
madness, the ox in the poem kills its master Lewis (Louis XVI), creates
anarchy and bloodshed in the town (France) and destroys the hedges of
its farm (spreads war beyond its national borders). In this way Britain
and the other monarchies (the 'publicans') were the root cause-of all
the war and oppression that had overwhelmed Europe in the 1790's.
The publicans rush'd from the Crown,
"Halloo! hamstring him! cut him down!"
THEY DROVE THE POOR OX MAD.21
In the years between 1798 and 1802, Coleridge became convinced
that Britain, the ultimate source of all the tragedy, was still perpetrat-
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ing this war for her own ends. In his poem, The Devil's Thoughts,
Britain is a land where the Devil feels quite at home: truth is
repressed, war and vice encouraged, the people enslaved and the political
system is corrupted. At the end of the poem this evil land proves too
much even for the Devil and he flees, for safety, back to Hell! When,
in 1800, France desired peace but Britain procrastinated, this view of
Britain as an evil, belligerent power was confirmed in his eyes. Britain
was prolonging the conflict in the hope of economic gain at the expense
of her rival. Whereas Wordsworth, in these years, saw war against France
as increasingly justified, Coleridge believed that only peace could
restore good government in the two countries and that Britain was the
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chief obstacle to this aim. Coleridge's first patriotic flush of
1798 had paled and a more critical stance had been re-adopted.
As Coleridge's hopes for Britain plummeted so his sympathies for
France rekindled. Napoleon was to be a key figure in shaping Coleridge's
political ideology, just as he was for Wordsworth. Coleridge's daughter,
Sara, later testified to Napoleon's importance in her father's thinking:
as the nature of Napoleon's leadership changed so did Coleridge's
2A
allegiance to France and his regard for republicanism. Napoleon's
actions up to 1802, which had so depressed Wordsworth, caused a revival
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of Coleridge's faith in France. He believed that under its new
leader, France did sincerely desire peace. Since her fall from grace
had been initiated by external pressure, the release of this pressure
(through peace) might well see her return to her republican ideals.
Napoleon seemed the embodiment of this promise.
Napoleon proclaimed his desire for peace from 1799 onwards and,
though he had some despotic tendencies, he also showed some signs of
revitalising the early republican spirit of the Revolution. Napoleon
had swept aside the corruption of the Directory and set a more moral
tone. Cautiously, Coleridge commended his work:
Menaced as France is at present, many sincere lovers
of Freedom may perceive, in the usurpation of the
modern Pisistratus,* such temporary advantages as
reconcile them to a temporary submission. Other
measures have been adopted, favourable to morals and
Civil Liberty.25
* A tyrant of Athens (d. 527 BC) who permitted free religious
worship and encouraged the arts and scholarship.
Coleridge's tempered respect grew as he studied the Constitution of
Year VIII which Napoleon had helped to frame with the Abbe Sieyes.
Though far from ideal, the constitution was no consecration of
dictatorial power and even the mock Tribunate still conducted real,
open-ended debates. Thus, there were elements of freedom and vitality
within the constitution which Coleridge regarded as hopeful. The
deomocratic element within the system was still a living force and, in
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peacetime, might well flourish again. This was the promise that
Napoleon's leadership held forth.
Although Napoleon could never be a wholly admirable man, since he
had usurped power in the Brumaire coup, his firm leadership was needed
in France after the anarchy of the mid-1790's. It could also provide
a base from which republicanism could grow more securely. Coleridge
admired Napoleon
in the increasing conviction that it had become good
policy to exchange the forms of political freedom for
the realities of civil security, in order to make a
real political freedom possible at some future period.
Like Godwin, Coleridge saw Napoleon as an aispicious figure, a man of
genius who could reinstate republicanism and freedom on surer foundations.
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Therefore, until 1802, Coleridge concluded that, of the two evils,
France rather than Britain still held forth the greater promise of
realising liberty and a just political system. In this view of the
two countries, Coleridge identifies more closely with Fox than
Wordsworth did. Coleridge was a journalist for the Opposition news¬
paper, The Morning Post, and, although he never subscribed to any party
positions himself, there is no doubt that in his critical attitude to
Britain, his hopes for France, and his admiration for Napoleon, his
views are similar to those of Fox.
The events of 1798 - 1802 had a significant, but different, impact
on both poets. Wordsworth's pre-existing doubts about France were
confirmed and, although he saw little to commend in the policies of
either nation, his sympathies undoubtedly lay with Britain as the
best hope for a freer world. She deserved support in the war. For
Coleridge, the invasion of 1798 was more of an unexpected, disillusioning
blow to his faith in France, though he subsequently recovered some of
his earlier sympathy. Coleridge was also critical of both countries,
but he felt that the spirit of republicanism and liberty was still
alive in the French political system. He wished to see the victory of
neither side, but, instead, a mutual agreement of peace terms after
which France could realise her republican sympathies in a securer, more
orderly fashion. Both poets still professed belief in republican ideals,
but they wished to attain these by less radical, more gradual, means.
They had to be adapted to the existing state of society and be rooted in
its moral values. Wordsworth had detached these ideals from the fortunes
of France and was now ready to recognise some worth in Britain's natural
way of life, her traditional habits and customs. He, therefore, tried
to ground his republican ideals in the countryside of his birth and the
state of man . in that rural society. Coleridge was also to be influenced
by these ideas of Wordsworth, but he increasingly sought a solution in
Christian teaching which knew no national boundaries and which was as
applicable to France as to Britain. Even more important to Coleridge,
than the founding of a republican government, was the foundation of all
forms of government on a basis of moral law and Christian belief.
It is now time to consider how Wordsworth and Coleridge tried to
find a new, more permanent basis for their republican beliefs in the




THE CRITIQUE OF RADICALISM
The failure of France to establish a permanent, stable republic
caused Wordsworth and Coleridge to scrutinise the radical precepts on
which it had been based. They tried to discover why the radical
approach had proved to be such a poor handmaiden to republican ideals.
After 1798 both writers still professed democratic sympathies, but they
searched for a new ideological framework or 'home' where republicanism
could grow naturally and more securely.
In reviewing the history of the French Republic in the 1790's,
Wordsworth and Coleridge isolated a number of aspects in radical
thinking which had proved to be flawed. Firstly, the provenance of the
republic in revolution, violence and passion seemed infinitely regrettable.
The use of force had resulted in a neglect of fellow feeling and moral
values. Secondly, the appeal to abstract reason had proved impractical
and undesirable. In a society where a person had a natural right to
exercise his own reason unrestrained by social or moral duties, selfish,
excessive behaviour would result. Man was an imperfect creature and
his reason could not be relied upon to guide him. Reason itself was
now seen as an abstract, meaningless concept. Thirdly, they were
troubled by the atheistic element in radical thinking. This denied the
essential God-given moral laws which underpinned society and government
and elevated their purpose. Lastly, Wordsworth and Coleridge criticised
the way French radicals had turned their backs on social habits and
traditions. By denying past customs, they divorced themselves from
much that had proved good and useful. By imposing a republican system
on society without regard for its familiar traditions, they had fatally
weakened its basis. The French had been unprepared to accept a radical,
new system that bore little relation to their present social experience.
Wordsworth and Coleridge were to argue that a new political system had
to be carefully grafted on to existing forms in order to grow and flourish
naturally.
These points will now be investigated more fully to chart how
Wordsworth and Coleridge changed from a radical appeal to Nature as the
original state of man, where he could best exercise his pure reason,
to the more Burkean appeal to Nature as the habitual condition of man
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in society, bound by moral laws.
(a) Feeling and Reason
Wordsworth and Coleridge had never been happy with the idea of
using revolution or violence as a means of effecting political change.
Like other British radicals of the time they approved of revolution
theoretically, but were reluctant to countenance its practice except
under extreme circumstances. Although Paine supported revolutionary
action to unseat despotism, he favoured a bloodless coup. John Thelwall,
a radical friend of the two poets, was more in favour of a gradual
transformation of society. Wordsworth and Coleridge welcomed the
overthrow of tyranny in France, but did not endorse the revolutionary
violence by which it was achieved, far less the Terror which followed.
Both poets had hoped that violent tactics would be controlled and used
only sparingly. The need for them would soon wither away as the new
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republic established itself. The Terror, followed by the more aggres¬
sive use of war, however, proved this to be a vain hope. Violence had
destroyed the same republican principles which it had been designed to
serve.
Wordsworth noted how violence, once used, even in a limited way,
tended to escalate and become uncontrollable. Violent revolution was
an un-thinking response to political problems; it enforced change on
society without necessarily addressing or answering the people's real
grievances. In The Borderers (1796) Wordsworth described how the
recourse to violence seldom served its ends, no matter how principled
these were:
Then grasp our swords and rush upon a cure
That flatters us, because it asks not thought:
The deeper malady is better hid;
The world is poisoned at the heart.
At best, violence was a temporary expedient, but, by itself, it could
affect nothing substantial or permanent. Instead, violence tended to
become an end in itself, a substitute for real reform. Wordsworth,
influenced by Godwin, was to turn to more gradual, educative methods
of change which were ultimately more profound and lasting.
Coleridge was a little more willing than Wordsworth to countenance
collective revolutionary action, even though he preferred change to be
3
effected within the bounds of the constitution. In the final Act of
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his tragedy, Osorio (1797), revolution is justified as long as it is
bloodless, limited in extent and pursued in the service of free
principles against intransigent oppression. None the less, by the time
the play was produced for the stage, in 1813, as Remorse, it was this
final Act which had been most altered. By then, revolution was no
longer regarded as a possible panacea for a country's ills; it merely
bred further violence. Reviewing the events of the 1790's Coleridge
concluded that the use of revolution and violence had fatally undermined
republican ideals. Preoccupied with violent means, the French had
neglected their principled ends. Indeed, fine ideals had become a
pretext for the propagation of violence and vice. In 1803 Coleridge
noted how, 'The Name of Liberty, which at the commencement of the French
Revolution was both the occasion and the pretext of unnumbered crimes
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and horrors.' Coleridge came to the same conclusion as Wordsworth,
that the only sure way of realising republican ideals was by evolution¬
ary reform: a means which would serve one's ends rather than compete
with them.
If violent revolution had proved to be an ineffective method for
implementing or sustaining republican principles, however, it was not
the sole cause of failure. The American republic had also been established
through revolution and war, yet Coleridge's hero,Washington,had succeeded
in curbing its violence and the republic now rested on a peaceful,
secure basis. Why, then, had the violence in France become uncontrollable
and had ended in despotism?
Both writers blamed the over-passionate, irresponsible spirit of
the French radicals. After centuries under the yoke of absolutism, the
French had responded to their newly-won freedom in an over-emotional,
unthinking way. Initially, this had been understandable and excusable,
but the violence had proceeded unchecked. A volatile state of competing
interests had resulted, with little thought given to the general moral
good. At first, Wordsworth had been impressed with the joyful exuberance
of the early Revolution. In a letter written during his continental
tour of 1790, he wrote to his sister Dorothy:
We had also perpetual occasion to observe that cheer¬
fulness and sprightliness for which the French have
always been remarkable. But I must remind you that we
crossed it at the time when the whole nation was mad with
joy, in consequence of the revolution. It was a most
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interesting period to be in France, and we had many
delightful scenes where the interest of the picture
was owing solely to this cause.®
Although this seemed, at the time, a perfect image of an ideal society,
Wordsworth realised, as the decade proceeded, that unchecked emotion
was not enough to sustain a free state. Unless a republican system
was rooted in a less volatile, more responsible spirit, it was weak
and easily overthrown or corrupted.
In 1802 he looked back on that early 1790 tour which he had under¬
taken with such hope and he discovered a hollowness in the spirit he
had once admired:
Jones! as from Calais southward you and I
Went pacing side by side, this public way
Streamed with the pomp of a too-credulous day,
When faith was pledged to new-born liberty:
A homeless sound of joy was in the sky.®
The joy of that early republican spirit had found no permanent home.
Based only on the naive and exuberant emotions of the moment, the
republic had proved insecure and was easily perverted by corrupt
leaders such as Robespierre and Napoleon. Early ideals had been grasped
eagerly, passionately, but unthinkingly; they had established no
permanent home in the minds of the people. It was this more reasoned,
responsible attachment that Wordsworth sought after 1779: a stable
context for republican values.
Coleridge also blamed excess of feeling for the failure of the
republic. It has been noted how he symbolised the early Revolution
as an exuberant ox, provoked into real madness by the hostile attitude
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of other European countries. Looking back on the Terror from the
vantage point of 1798, it seemed that republican ideals had been betrayed
and obscured by the passion of the participants:
Though all the fierce and drunken passions wove
A dance more wild than e'er was maniac's dream!
Ye storms, that round the dawning East assembled,
The Sun was rising, though ye hid his light!®
The original promise, or light, of the Revolution had become obscured
by emotional indifference and irresponsibility. Coleridge now believed
9
that the French were 'too sensual to be free'. All restraints, rational
and moral, had been loosened, liberty had become licence and, in the
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midst of anarchy, the seeds of another despotism were sown.
Clearly, both Wordsworth and Coleridge believed the new republic
had proved weak and malleable because it had been adopted in an
overly emotional spirit which had not engaged the people at a deeper,
thinking level. Man had to exercise reason over his passions. The
experience of the 1790's, however, taught the two poets that an appeal
to reason was also fraught with danger and did not necessarily guarantee
the stable, responsible climate in which republicanism could prosper.
Among the new radical thinkers of the 1790's some had appealed to
reason rather than the ancient constitution as the basis for their
reforming principles. In The Prelude (1805) Wordsworth acknowledged
how Godwin's rational beliefs had seemed to offer a more stable basis
for the republic than a reliance on volatile and easily corruptible
emotion:
This was the time when, all things tending fast
To depravation, the philosophy
That promised to abstract the hopes of man
Out of his feelings, to be fixed thenceforth
For ever in a purer element,
Found ready welcome.1®
Although Wordsworth was undoubtedly attracted by the appeal to
reason, he soon saw that a world based solely on rational principles
was not only unimaginable in practical terms, but also undesirable.
Such a world would be a cold, heartless place where individual rights
would take the place of necessary moral duties and fellow feeling. In
A Poet's Epitaph (1798/99), he attacked the self-centredness of the
pure rationalist:
he has neither eyes nor ears;
Himself his world, and his own God;
One to whose smooth-rubbed soul can cling
Nor form, nor feeling, great or small;
A reasoning, self-sufficing thing,
An intellectual All-in-all!
In this image, rational man is uninterested in the feelings of
others and is responsible only to himself. Each man, being his own God,
could act without social or moral restraint. Here lay the origins of
the enormities of the French Terror and anarchy, carried out in the name
of Reason. Abstract reason had not controlled men's passions, as the
radicals claimed it would, because, by making the individual into a God,
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it sanctioned irresponsible behaviour. The idea of rational man being
accorded God-like status, also offended Wordsworth's Christian beliefs
and distanced him further from radical circles. Although Wordsworth
believed that the appeal to abstract reason was as flawed as the reliance
on passion, he could still perceive the worth of reason conjoined with
feeling and dedicated to a moral end. Even his celebrated 'anti-Godwinian'
drama, The Borderers (1796), was not so much a criticism of the use of
reason, as an attack on the appeal to abstract reason which could then
be used to justify gross behaviour. Even although Wordsworth later
came to realise that the use of reason alone did not guarantee respons¬
ible action, it was still to figure largely in his political philosophy.
None the less, as we shall see, it had to be used in a moral spirit.
This was a distinction that Godwin himself was to make in subsequent
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revisions of Political Justice and also in his later novels.
Coleridge met Godwin in 1794 and, for a time, he was influenced
by his ideas. Godwin's apparently anti-religious views formed a barrier
to their friendship, but, in later years, Coleridge prompted the
philosopher to adopt a more openly sympathetic approach to religion and
1 3
the two writers maintained a friendly relationship all their lives.
The most startling evidence of Godwin's early influence on Coleridge
is the scheme he planned with Robert Southey for establishing a Utopian
community based on rationalist principles. In 1794, the prospect of
such a society seemed the ideal answer to the feverish anarchy of the
French radicals. Rather than impose radical change on existing society
as the French had done, Coleridge attempted to set up an alternative
community in America on the banks of the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania
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where he would be near the exiled Dr. Priestly, one of his radical heroes.
In this 'pantisocracy' a small group of men and women would live self-
sufficiently, labouring part of the day in the fields which would be
communally-owned. In this rationalist world of freedom and egalitarianism,
there would be no need for formal government and crime would vanish.
Living in perfect harmony, far away from the corrupting environment of
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the Old World, the ideal of human perfectibility might be attained.
This deeply Godwinian notion of society was evoked by Coleridge in
Religious Musings (1794-96):
each heart
Self-governed, the vast family of love
Raised from the common earth by common toil
Enjoy the equal produce.16
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This partisocratic scheme collapsed mainly because of Southey's
loss of interest, but the concept of such a perfect communitarian
existence remained a potent ideal for Coleridge in the years that
followed. Echoes of it are to be found in his self-sufficient family
life at Nether Stowey and, in the later 1790's, when the Coleridges,
Wordsworths and Southeys lived a closely-knit existence in the Lake
District. The unattainable ideal of a lost Eden also haunts much of
Wordsworth's post-Miltonic epic, The Prelude. After 1794, however,
Coleridge realised that a community based on abstract rational
principles was ill-fitted to the practical realities of the everyday
world. In 1795 he wrote to Southey of pantisocracy: 'it's realisation
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is distant - perhaps a miraculous Millenium." Pantisocracy had failed
because of a lack of will among its participants. The dramatic shift
to a society based on reason had only appealed to one aspect of man's
nature; it had not sufficiently touched his feelings and habitual
affections. By the end of the decade Coleridge's organic view of life
led him to discount any political theories that appealed only to reason
and not to the whole of man's complex nature:
We approve not of that proud philosophy, which
addresses itself to men as to beings of pure intellect,
and would destroy their passions and their affections.
It is unsuited to our nature, and must therefore be
false and dangerous.^®
Like Wordsworth, Coleridge believed that the emphasis on individual
reason in French philosophy had led to a neglect of man's moral nature
and sense of duty. Although reason was necessary to control the passions,
it had to be employed with a feeling for the others in society. Without
this degree of moral restraint, the rationalist principles of the French
had produced the selfish, violent, irresponsible behaviour witnessed
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during the Terror, as well as the moral laxity of the Directory.
By the end of the 1790's, therefore, both writers were prepared
to base their political philosophy in an appeal to the whole of man's
nature: to his reason, to his feelings, but also to his moral duties
to the rest of society.
(b) The Appeal to Nature
Let Nature be your teacher ....
One impulse from a vernal wood
May teach you more of man;
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Of moral evil and of good,
Thai all the sages can.
Perceiving that an appeal to abstract reason or emotion did not
ensure stable or responsible action, Wordsworth and Coleridge sought
a new basis for their political philosophy which would be rational,
and feeling, but also moral. They appealed to Nature both as a
phy s'ical home for their republican principles, but also as an agency
which entwined man's feelings and his intellect, thus helping to produce
a more moral vision of the world. The whole of man's complex nature,
as an individual and as part of the social community, was thus awakened.
It will be argued below that this appeal to Nature was not a Rousseauist
appeal to a pre-social state of nature, but that, after 1797, both
writers' concept of Nature was nearer to that of Burke: the natural
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state of man was to live in civil society.
After living in the West Country and then travelling to
Germany together, Wordsworth, Coleridge and their families took up
residence in the Lake District in 1799/1800. This settlement in the
country does not represent a retreat from politics as much as a retreat
from the disillusioning experience of the radical approach to politics.
The countryside of the lakes did not merely repair their broken spirits
or provide them with a more distanced vantage point on politics, it also
became the new practical home for their political philosophy. If the
countryside appeared to them to be the natural place to turn to in
this time of political uncertainty, perhaps it also held the key to
resolving the problems of society as a whole. Until Coleridge's
departure for Malta, in 1804, the two writers, their famili es, the
Southeys and many visiting friends lived a rural existence that was
close-knit and, at times, socially entangled. In some respects their
life, at this time, resembled a less radical version of Coleridge's
pa ntisocratic ideal. Indeed, their friend, John Thelwall, approved the
hope that one properly united community of like-minded people might grow
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from this informal grouping. They were all interested in libertarian
ideals, democratic systems and aesthetic values. They had also lived
through the disillusionments of the 1790's and, instead of trying to
establish alternative societies, Wordsworth and Coleridge were now more
interested in engaging with the practical realities of existing life.
The society of the countryside seemed nearest to that original, lost
Garden of Eden; a state which had once seemed recoverable in the early
1790's. This community of the Lakes and its values now seemed the most
28
natural state of society.
In the poetry between 1797 and 1804, Wordsworth and Coleridge
compared town and country life in order to demonstrate the superior
virtues and values of rural existence. Following the tradition of
eighteenth century 'Country' ideologies, Wordsworth saw the city as a
corrupting influence. In Michael (1800), the young son, Luke, leaves
the countryside to work in London. Soon city life begins to infect
his free, honest country soul:
Meantime Luke began
To slacken in his duty, and at length
He in the dissolute city gave himself
To evil courses.^
The temptations of the city caused men to neglect moral domestic
responsibilities. People became alienated and all the natural ties
of duty and affection were forgotten. Although London had, at first,
filled Wordsworth with wonder and awe, he soon recognised this to be
a surface charm concealing the true estrangement of urban life:
Above all, one thought
Baffled my understanding, how men lived
Even next-door neighbours, as we say, yet still
Strangers, and knowing not each other's name.
In London, the first truly vast city, the individual was cast
adrift, divorced from the natural bonds of traditional society. Its
pleasures were purely sensual; it contained little of profound moral
25
worth. In London there were few of the traditional habits, feelings
and customs that had been a part of Wordsworth's rural upbringing. It
was not 'natural' life:
And all the ballast of familiar life -
The present, and the past, hope, fear, all stays,
All laws of acting, thinking, speaking man - ^
Went from me, neither knowing me, nor known.
'Natural' life is now identified as that of the secure traditional world
of the rural communities - man as part of a time-honoured social process,
rather than any Rousseauist, pre-societal state of nature.
The image of the city unites all the features of radical society
which Wordsworth now deplored in revolutionary France. The city was
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a 'thickening hubbub' of alienated, self-concerned individuals,
un interested ' in the welfare of their brothers,
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only protective of their own rights. In this morally -
disconnected society it was inevitable that people would tend to
violence and vice in the prosecution of their own interests. The
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'soul's beauty' had been overthrown and in London, that Godless
place, Wordsworth hears for the first time a woman swear. Just as
Paris had been the birthplace of the Revolution's hostility and anarchy,
so cities came to symbolise, for Wordsworth, all the worst aspects of
radicalism, all the faults that had betrayed republican ideals. In
seeking a new home for republican values, it was only appropriate that
Wordsworth should turn to the countryside and to Nature. His 'retiral'
there, was not a retreat from the problems of society, but a turn
towards a new basis for their solution.
When Wordsworth does detect any virtue in city life it is signif¬
icant that it is only at those moments when the forces of Nature seem
still to be alive in the urban environment. In The Prelude Wordsworth
remarked how Coleridge, as a London schoolboy, was able to keep faith
with the benign, moral influences of his country childhood only by
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gazing up at the sky far above the city. Thus, he is redeemed.
Wordsworth himself was able to emerge untainted from his experience of
London only because he had been schooled in Nature:
The spirit of Nature was upon me here,
The soul of beauty and enduring life
Was present as a habit, and diffused -
Through meagre lines and colours, and the press
Of self-destroying, transitory things -
Composure and ennobling harmony.
Wordsworth retains his sense of permanent, traditional, moral values
through the habitual influence of Nature on his life. It will be argued,
later in this chapter, that this emphasis on habit provided the element
of ballast in his politics which the radical, a-historical approach had
denied. Although Wordsworth did acknowledge that London, as an ancient,
national and imperial capital, did inspire a greater sense of awe and
respect than most newer cities, even London could never contain the more
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profound, habitual truths only discoverable in Nature.
Between the years 1797 and 1804, Coleridge was much influenced by
Wordsworth's view of country life vis a vis the city. In Frost at
Midnight (1798), Coleridge used the same image of himself as a luckless,
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city-educated child which Wordsworth used in The Prelude a year later.
30
Coleridge argues that his new-born son, Berkeley, will enjoy far
greater advantages because he is to be reared in the country:
For I was reared
In the great city, pent 'mid cloisters dim,
And saw naught lovely but the sky and stars,
But thou, my babe! shalt wander like a breeze
By lakes and sandy shores, beneath the crags
Of ancient mountain, and beneath the clouds,
Which image in their bulk both lakes and shores
And mountain crags: so shalt thou see and hear
The lovely shapes and sounds intelligible
Of that eternal language, which thy God
Utters, who from eternity doth teach
Himself in all, and all things in himself.
Great universal Teacher! he shall mould
Thy spirit, and by giving make it ask.
Rural existence is here imbued with Christian moral influences and
Nature is the vital channel through which these benevolences can be
imbibed - a channel that is closed to a city-bred child.
Coleridge's perception of the dichotomy between town and county
however, was not as absolute as Wordsworth's and was to diminish as his
friend's influence waned. Although Coleridge lived in the Lake District
at this time, he spent most of the rest of his life in the city or
travelling abroad. He more readily accepted cities as flawed, but
intrinsic, parts of Britain's new society. Cities had become part of
man's 'natural' social state and could not be ignored. In Reflections
On Having Left A Place of Retirement (1795), Nature is a morally
restorative, soothing influence on the Bristol trader, but town life
could not be forsaken. To bury oneself in the sublime countryside,
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'while my unnumber'd brethren toil'd and bled', was to live a dream,
secluded from the realities which faced a growing part of society. He
urged country dwellers not to live an ostrich-like existence, but to
pay heed to the cities and help the people there:
I therefore go, and join head, heart and hand,
Active and firm, to fight the bloodless fight
Of Science, Freedom and The Truth in Christ.
Cities could not be ignored as unnatural excrescences on the face of
humanity. They had to be accepted as part of society, but had also to
be reformed to allow an infusion of the educative, liberating values
to be found in the country.
While Wordsworth's conception of 'natural society* is one distinctly
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rooted in rural existence, Coleridge's definition embraces all of
society - both rural and urban. Both writers however were agreed that
in Nature was to be discovered the fountain of all deep thoughts,
feelings and moral values. Here was located the basis for their
political philosophy. In the two-part Prelude of 1799, Wordsworth
remarked how, despite their different upbringing, both friends had
converged on this point:
Thou, my friend, wast reared
In the great city, 'mid far other scenes,
But we by different roads at length have gained
The self-same bourne ....
.... For thou last sought
The truth in solitude, and thou art one
The most intense of Nature's worshippers,
In many things my brother, chiefly here
In this my deep devotion.3"
But what did Wordsworth and Coleridge mean when they appealed to
'Nature' as the basis of their political ideology? In what way was
their appeal different to that of the radicals in the early 1790's?
In the years after 1797 Wordsworth and Coleridge did not conceive
of Nature in the unrestrained, Dionysian way of Rousseau. They believed
this had led to the licence and anarchy of the Revolutionary era. Nor -
did they adhere to the more mechanical, austere concept of Nature which
Voltaire had held. Although their idea of Nature was mostly original,
it owed something to Burke's view that it was a property which activated
the mind and had sublime qualities. For Wordsworth and Coleridge, the
appeal to Nature involved a reciprocity between the thoughts and feelings
of man and the natural world. When man opened his being to the benign
influences of Nature, or 'communed' with it, he became part of Nature
itself. During these intense moments of being, which Wordsworth described
as 'spots of time' and for which Coleridge used the metaphor of the
Aeolian harp, man's deepest emotions were stirred. These feelings were
not just received passively, but had to be controlled and given
practical direction by the rational faculties which Nature also
enlivened. The action that resulted from such a process was both moral
and habitual. God's laws informed all of natural creation and were
ever-present there and so, in communing with Nature, one imbibed a force
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that was moral in spirit and habitual to all men. Therefore, it can
be argued, in appealing to Nature, Wordsworth and Coleridge were
advocating a basis for their political philosophy that was feeling,
yet rationally controlled, moral and habitual: in answer to the purely
rational, self-interested appeal to Nature that the radicals had made.
The rights which flowed from this philosophical stance would now be more
social, than individual or abstract.
In the early 1790's, Wordsworth had appealed to a Rousseauist
pre-societal state of nature as the basis for his political beliefs.
In this original state man was free to obey the dictates of his reason
and he possessed certain inalienable natural rights. In 1793 he wrote,
Once Man entirely free, alone and wild,
Was bless'd as free - for he was Nature's child.
He, all superior but his God disdain'd,
Walked none restraining, and by none restrain'd,
Confessed no law but what his reason taught, ^7
Did all he wish'd, and wish'd but what he ought.
As we have seen, however, by the end of the decade, Wordsworth found
this purely emotional response to Nature to be dangerous. The unrestrained
enthusiasm of the early Revolution had soon led to excessive passions
and immoral, irresponsible behaviour. The fine feelings inspired by
Nature had to be controlled by the rational faculties, but had also to
be morally directed. They had to serve society as a whole and not
become a licence for any kind of individual behaviour.
Wordsworth described his later move towards a restrained appeal
to Nature that was more social and moral in impetus, in Tintern Abbey
(1798):
- That time is past,
And all its aching joys are now no more,
And all its dizzy raptures. Not for this
Faint I, nor mourn nor murmer: other gifts
Have followed, for such loss, I would believe,
Abundant recompense. For I have learned
To look on nature, not as in the hour
Of thoughtless youth, but hearing oftentimes
The still, sad music of humanity,
Not harsh nor grating, although of ample power
To chasten and subdue.-^®
Here Wordsworth appeals to Nature as a force which leads him to consider
other people. It does not just inspire the unthinking joy of the past,
but must awaken men's minds as well as arouse their emotions. Nature
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must not be passively imbibed, but must be 'half-created' in the minds
which it had activated. In this feeling, but also rational, response
to Nature, Wordsworth had learned to love his fellow man and to think
less of his own individual joys and interests. Through Nature he had
become a social man.
Wordsworth believed that this intense experience of Nature and its
enlivening powers occurred at certain key moments in a person's life
that remained continuing, habitual sources of inspiration. In The Prelude
(1799) he stated,
There are in our existence spots of time
Which with distinct pre-eminence retain
A fructifying virtue, whence, depressed
By trivial occupations and the round
Of ordinary intercourse, our minds -
Especially the imaginative power -
Are nourished and invisibly repaired';
Such moments chiefly seem to have their date
In our first childhood.^
These 'spots of time', when man communed with Nature, inspired his finest
thoughts and feelings and helped to reconcile him to life. Coleridge's
memory of his moral youth had nourished his soul while he stayed in
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London. In this way the spots of time proved to be habitual sources
of inspiration, virtue and restrained, reflective behaviour. Wordsworth
argued that since this was so, an appeal to nature was the best practical
guide for all human action:
being versed
In living Nature, I had there a guide
Which opened frequently my eyes, else shut,
A standard which was usefully applied,
Even when unconsciously, to other things
Which less I understood.^2
But if the thoughts and feelings derived from Nature were to inform
all human behaviour in this useful manner, what were these lessons?
Wordsworth believed that this communion with Nature was primarily
a moral process. When he contemplated natural scenes his thoughts and
emotions were given a sense of moral purpose. In Tintern Abbey he
declared he was,
well pleased to recognise
In nature and the language of the sense
The anchor of my purest thoughts, the nurse,
The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul
Of all my moral being.
34
The essential principles of moral law could be sensed when man
communed with Nature for, in a pantheistic sense, God's Will was present
L\ L\
in Nature, indivisibly: 'Nature's self which is the breath of God'.
This appeal to the moral law discoverable in Nature was an appeal to
a higher law than that of man or the claims of reason. It encouraged
people to look beyond the narrow self-interest of the natural rights
school towards Christian ideals and the welfare of society. It
inspired a sense of duty, justice and love of one's fellow man, as
'Peter Bell', the sinner, discovers when he repents and finds mercy
through God:
His heart is opening more and more;
A holy sense pervades his mind;
He feels what he for human-kind
Had never felt before.^
It will be argued later in the chapter that the rights which flowed
from this moral source were no longer individual, inalienable rights,
but were held commensurate with moral duties and social limitations.
These 'natural' rights were the moral rights of social man.
Wordsworth however still believed that a republican system held
out the best prospect of achieving this moral basis for society. He
believed that republicanism was, in essence, the simplest and most
Christian system of government. In The Prelude (1805) Wordsworth
envisaged the result of a world perfectly schooled in Nature:
and over all
Should be a healthy sound simplicity,
A seemly plainness - name it as you will,
Republican or pious.
In his appeal to Nature, Wordsworth had discovered the ideal,
secure, moral basis for his republican principles.
The appeal to Nature was not, in itself, such a fundamental
element in Coleridge's thinking as it was for Wordsworth. More important
to Coleridge were the laws of God which informed all of life, both natural
and human. These were to provide the essential basis for Coleridge's
political philosophy.
Wordsworth's view of Nature did, however, influence Coleridge at
least initially. In The Eolian Harp (1795), Coleridge conceived all
A7
of animated nature as 'organic harps' which interacted and enlivened
each other. It is an image that parallels Wordsworth's notion of man
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in communication with nature and, similarly, a Divine 'breeze' or
breath informs the whole process. Like Wordsworth, however, Coleridge
believed that it was not enough for man merely to open himself up to
natural influences in this purely emotional way. Significantly, the
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breezes only cross a 'passive brain' , inspire 'idle flitting
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phantasies' and then pass on, undetained. Thus Coleridge suggests
that a feeling response to Nature is insubstantial; it evoked no
lasting or responsible moral spirit. Three years later, in Fears in
Solitude, he argued in similar vein to Wordsworth, that one had to
respond to Nature, not only in this emotional sense, but also ration¬
ally. From this deeper, more considered appreciation of Nature, one's
moral spirit would become inspired. Nature was thus capable of
invigorating man's emotional, rational and moral senses. From Nature,
Coleridge had
drunk in all my intellectual life,
All sweet sensations, all ennobling thoughts,
All adoration of the God in nature,
All lovely and all honourable things.
Coleridge believed that experiencing Nature at this more profound
and lasting level was not only morally inspiring, but also,
seems like society -
Conversing with the mind, and giving it
A livelier impulse and a dance of thought.
Man and Nature conversed together in one organic social process. Thus,
when Coleridge appealed to Nature, it was not to a pre-societal
Rousseauist state, but to a concept that was intrinsically social,
involving all of human and natural society, indivisibly. Just as
Wordsworth had argued that his love of Nature led to a love of his
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fellow man, so Coleridge found in his organic view of Nature a force
which impelled him to love the rest of society. Nature stirred his
54
heart and inspired 'thoughts that yearn for human kind'. Coleridge's
feeling, yet rational appeal to Nature was an appeal to a force which
strengthened and confirmed moral and social values, and it will be
argued that the political rights it guaranteed were similarly moral
and civil.
Coleridge most admired the politicians and statesmen who exercised
their feelings and reason in this way, the one enlivening the other.
Sheridan was praised because he 'has shown himself so eminently qualified
36
55
to feel with reason, and to reason with feeling'. But even more
admirable were those few men, such as Washington, who, by curbing
their emotions with their reason, had reached a higher moral plane,
and were thus fitted to serve the rest of society. Washington was a
living exemplar of Coleridge's idea that all political actions and
systems had to be based on a feeling, yet rational, approach that was
morally and socially directed:
His feelings, constitutionally profound and vehement
(and which if uncounteracted by the majesty of his
views, would have been wild and ferocious), gave him
a perpetual energy; while the necessity of counter¬
acting and curbing these feelings gradually disciplined
his soul to that austere self-command, which informed
and moulded the whole man, his actions, his countenance,
his every gesture .... [Thus] he ripened his intellectual
into moral greatness, intensely energetic yet persever-
ingly innocent, his hope, the happiness of mankind;
and God, and his own conscience, his end!-^
In this way Washington had avoided the excesses of passion or the cold
rationalisation of the French revolutionaries and consequently the
American republic had been established on more permanent foundations
than that of France.
It is evident from this passage however, that the key to Washington's
success was his faith in God, rather than any appeal to Nature. It
was on this issue that Coleridge's view of Nature differed from that
of Wordsworth. Whereas Wordsworth appealed to Nature as a moral force,
Coleridge conceived it to be a door which led to the Will of God
Himself. There was an element of pantheism in Coleridge's idea of
Nature. In Fears in Solitude (1798), he declared that he found
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'Religious meanings in the forms of Nature.' Coleridge however was
never very comfortable with this pantheistic concept because it confounded
his rationally-held belief in one god. Nature fortified his religious
belief and convinced him of the existence of God. Gazing on the Vale
of Chamouni, he exclaimed 'Who would be, who could be an Atheist in
IT O
this valley of wonders?' Nature provided the means by which his
spirit could rise up and, in a state of exaltation, he could contemplate
the Glory of God Himself. Contemplating Mont Blanc, he felt his soul
merge with that of the mountain and rise, like the mountain, to Heaven:
Thou, the meanwhile, wast blending with my Thought,
Yea, with my life and life's own secret joy:
Till the dilatory Soul, enrapt, transfused,
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Into the mighty vision passing - there
As in her natural form, swelled vast to Heaven!
For Coleridge, therefore, the highest appeal was not to Nature but
to God himself as the being who had created Nature and Man, whose
spirit was in each, but who was yet distinct from both. This appeal
to the laws of God was an ever more permanent, meaningful basis for
politics than an appeal to Nature. It had a relevancy that was open
to city dwellers as well as country folk. The radicals had appealed
to their own Rousseauist interpretation of Nature, but the appeal to
God's laws was not so easily corrupted; it was a less equivocal basis
for political principles. The revolutionaries' rejection of God was,
for Coleridge, the chief cause of the irresponsibility and excess that
had undermined the Republic. In his poem, Recantation (1798), concern¬
ing the Revolution, the only man who speaks reason, understands true
principles, 'the man that kept his senses'^, is the Presbyterian sage.
Religion always played a large part in Coleridge's political
thinking. Indeed, his main introduction to republicanism came through
the radical Dissenting group at Cambridge rather than through Paine's
or Godwin's more secular radicalism. After witnessing the Idol-
worshipping of Reason during the Revolutionary era, Coleridge's
political philosophy became more overtly grounded in Christian belief
and moral duty. He felt the rights of citizens were not inalienable,
but subject to moral law. For Coleridge the world was ordered by the
laws of God and so all of nature, human society and government ultimately
had to appeal to these moral laws - an appeal to the God _in Nature
rather than Nature itself. This moral order with its duties, respons¬
ibilities and imperatives could not be violated with impunity. This
is shown most clearly in The Rime of the Ancient Mariner (1798). When
the Mariner shoots the albatross, 'a Christian soul', ^ he disrupts
the moral order of the universe and the vital interdependence between
man and the natural world. He is punished for this act by being
ostracised from society, doomed to live alone, forever repeating the
tale which is a Divine lesson that the rest of mankind must heed. Thus,
an act of the individual, self-governing, will had violated the natural
moral order of society. In a similar position, French radical theorists
had elevated the individual will and reason beyond moral duties and
Christian responsibilities. This, too, had resulted in the destruction
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of society and the neglect of vital religious truths. Coleridge now
views 'natural society' in the Burkean sense of the existing moral
order of society epitomised by the socially and morally harmonious
image of the Church wedding at the end of the poem. Man had to love
and care for his Christian brothers in society and had to respect
the moral unity that bound all men together. In this 'natural' world
view there was no room for individual, inalienable rights. When the
Mariner displays this fellow-feeling, the albatross of guilt falls
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from his neck and he discovers he can pray again.
Coleridge believed that this natural moral order had to form the
basis of Britain's own society and government. These lessons had to
be taught time after time to the nation and so 'the Ancyent Marinere
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came back to his own Country' to tell his cautionary tale. The more
democratic system which Coleridge sought had to be rooted in moral law
and Christian faith. Rather than Wordsworth's individual communion
with Nature, Coleridge stressed the need for a collective dedication
of the whole people to God's teaching. For him this was a more
practical and powerful concept:.
0 Wedding-guest! this soul hath been
Alone on a wide wide sea
So lonely 'twas, that God himself
Scarce seemed there to be.
0 sweeter than the Marriage-feast,
'Tis sweeter far to me
To walk together to the Kirk
With a goodly company.
To walk together to the Kirk
And all together pray.^
In joining together in prayer, in the Church, the natural, moral order
of society is repaired. Through Christian teaching and practice the
people could discover, in a more practical way, the moral principles
which Wordworth believed emanated from Nature. Whereas Wordsworth
appealed to the natural state of man in rural communities as the basis
for his political philosophy, Coleridge appealed to the natural state
of man as part of a Godly community. Although radicals stressed that
man had the potential to do whatever he willed, Coleridge believed man
had the potential to do whatever God willed; a much more profound, but
less abstract capability. And the rights which were thus guaranteed
came attendant with moral and social duties.
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An appeal to moral law, whether discoverable in Nature or in
religion, seemed to be the firm basis which Wordsworth and Coleridge
sought for their political philosophy. It avoided the excesses of
feeling and reason yet it employed both towards moral, responsible ends.
Some of the more moderate radicals however had agreed that man's
rights did derive from God, but, once given, were inalienable. In this
way an appeal to Divine Law could still sanction the type of radical
ideas and practice that Wordsworth and Coleridge had found so destructive
and irresponsible. Both poets, therefore, in common with other conserv¬
ative writers, began to appeal not only to moral law, but to its
habitual usage within British society. This appeal to habit and custom
can be found as a growing theme in their writings between 1797 and 1802,
particularly those of Wordsworth. It will be discussed briefly here
because it had a bearing on their definition of political rights at
this time. It will, however, be explored at greater length in Section
II, which deals with the period after 1802, when the appeal to tradition
was of central importance to their political philosophy.
A political system had to be based in moral law, but it also had
to be adapted to the habits of the society which it was to serve,
otherwise it would prove meaningless to the people and have no
permanent appeal. Wordsworth noted, in The Prelude (1805), how the
French Revolutionaries had ignored this when setting up their republic.
They had appealed to a Rousseauist state of nature and had ignored all
existing habits and customs. The result had not been a responsible,
lasting republic, but unrestrained anarchy:
To Nature the
Power had reverted: habit, custom, law,
Had left an interregnum's open space
For her to stir about in, uncontrolled.
Unless a political system made an appeal to the people's habitual
feelings and customs, it could have no permanent home in their hearts.
It would prove weak and all control would be lost.
In his Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff (1793), Wordsworth had
attacked Burke for attempting to yoke the living to the dead' and for
riveting men to the existing constitution for all eternity.^ Five
years later he still did not wish to retain the existing constitution,
but he did see the value of establishing a republican system in harmony
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with society's existing customs. These old social customs were no
longer seen as restraining shackles but as positive elements which
could provide a firm, practical base from which a republican system
might grow more securely. Although man was born with certain innate
qualities, these were shaped by existing social customs and habits,
and could only be fully realised in a social context. Man's natural
state, in any practical meaningful sense, was therefore the state of
man as shaped by his society and its customs. Man could not remake
himself, as the radicals claimed, because his character was partly the
result of social habits and experience, as were his rights. Wordsworth
explored the role of habit in his Essay on Morals (1798):
our attention ought principally to be fixed upon that
part of our conduct and actions which is the result of
our habits. In a [? strict] sense all our actions are
the result of our habits - but I mean here to exclude
those accidental and indefinite actions, which do not
regularly and in common flow from this or that particular
habit.67
Part of man's 'natural' self were the habits which shaped him. Though
reason was important, it, alone, could not be appealed to for it did
not form these habits. Nor could abstract reason be the final arbiter
of moral worth:
I have said that these bold and naked reasonings are
important over our habits, they cannot form them; from
the same cause they are equally powerless in regulating
our judgements concerning the value of men and things.
This vital role of habit in forming moral judgements had been overlooked
by the radical's emphasis on reason.
Old habits and customs were a particularly important part of
country life. Good moral habits informed the daily life, customs and
folk tales of the country, but not the alienated life of the town.
In The Old Cumberland Beggar (1798-1800), the beggar who wanders the
countryside is himself this kind of living, habitual reminder of
moral spirit:
a record which together binds
Past deeds and offices of charity
Else unremember'd, and so keeps alive
Oy
The kindly mood in hearts which lapse of years.
The country people he meets give the old man charity out of habit rather
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than reason, Their finest feelings are evoked when they see him and
thus their soul is nourished:
[It] Doth find itself insensibly dispos'd
To virtue and true goodness."^
Habit then, was a potent moral force which had to be appealed to as
part of the natural state of man.
Wordsworth believed that Nature was itself the greatest force for
habitual feelings. Nature, being timeless, did not deny habits, but
because it was constant, helped man connect with traditional customs
more easily. It had the power to evoke past feelings and become a
source of ever-present tradition. It contained within it the essence
of the past. The 'spots of time', when man communed with Nature,
were constant sources of habitual moral feeling that defied time and
were recoverable in natural surroundings or through poetry where
their meaning was transmitted into art. They 'retained' a 'fructifying
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virtue' in the mind, these moments were
... those first-born affinities that fit
Our new existence to existing things.
They established the habitual continuum of life. Only when man
was linked to his past, and to the customs of his society, could
stability be achieved and virtue progress. Since the natural course
of life was, therefore, evolutionary and habitual, political change
had to be introduced gradually and had to appeal to the customs of
society before being accepted. Radical, revolutionary change which
disrupted or ignored the habitual fabric of life was unnatural and
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doomed to failure.
Nature therefore was appealed to as a habitual, moral force: the
moral qualities within it were ever-present. More than History,
which was the mere record of famous men and great events, particular
spots of time in Nature had the power to recall fine habitual, moral
feelings and connect ordinary people with the best impulses of the
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past. Nature, as the habitual, moral state of man in society had, by
the turn of the century, become the Burkean basis of Wordsworth's
political philosophy.
In a letter to John Thelwall, written in 1796, Coleridge
described himself as 'a literary-cormorant'; 'I have read and digested
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most of the Historical Writers but I do not like History.
Metaphysics, and Poetry, and "Facts of Mind" ... are my darling
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Studies.' In this disclaimer, Coleridge was referring to History
(as Wordsworth does above) as the factual chronicle of events rather
than the past customs which might contain valuable truths. There is
no doubt, however, that Coleridge did not appeal to habit and custom
as much as Wordsworth did until after 1802.
Coleridge argued that it was possible to learn much from the
experience of the past and that it could be a valuable moral guide.
When its habitual lessons were set against the selfish aims of men,
however, it proved to be a weak force:
Much has been said on the effect of past experience;
but while ambition and vanity exist, the light of
experience, like the lights placed in the stern of the
vessel, illumines only the track, that is already
passed over.76
For experience and custom to be politically useful, they had to be
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appealed to with dispassion , in a rational manner, otherwise selfish
emotions overruled the useful moral lessons to be derived from it.
Unfortunately, people rarely used it in this disciplined, dis¬
passionate manner.
If the experience and customs of the past were weak guides to
present or future action, they could still indicate the value of past
practice and reveal what was important to preserve. If a form had
stood the test of time through habitual usage, Coleridge believed that
it must contain an element of truth that remained alive and meaningful
for each new generation. From his initial hostility to established
forms and institutions in the early 1790's, Coleridge began to appreciate
the value of things which had become habitual - one such was the habitual
possession of land in a family:
Has not the hereditary possession of a landed estate been
proved, by experience, to generate dispositions equally
favourable to loyalty and established freedom? Has not
the same experience proved that the moneyed men are far
more malleable materials??"
Any system that had proved its worth through habitual usage was worthy
of respect, and any new political changes had to be engrafted onto
this basis of custom before they could grow securely. Coleridge showed
an increasing regard for time-honoured customs and institutions and
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for 'the fixed laws in society'. Of these laws, the most habitual
and natural were those of God - moral laws which had proved themselves
ever-applicable to all ages. As we have seen, the morally disrupted
world of the Ancient Mariner is repaired by the time-honoured habit
of walking to the Kirk and praying. Thus, custom, particularly in
the form of habitual moral laws, became an increasingly important
strand in the basis of Coleridge's political philosophy.
Wordsworth's and Coleridge's critique of the radical basis of the
constitution had resulted in an appeal to the moral and habitual
state of man in society - this was his 'natural' state. By the end
of the 1790's both writers viewed man and society in a much more
complex and less idealistic way, and their conception of the philo¬
sophical basis of the constitution changed accordingly. A new republican
system of government had to be rooted in more than a pure, abstract
concept of Nature and it had to make a more direct appeal to society
as it existed if it was to prove lasting and effective. It had to
appeal to man's natural feelings as well as to his reason; it had to
appeal to moral values and duties, not just to individual rights which
were selfish and socially alienating; it had to appeal to man's
habits and time-honoured customs before it could begin to change society.
Wordsworth saw all these elements present in an appeal to Nature. This
was not an appeal, to a primitive state, but to the more Burkean model
of the 'natural' state of man in society, one that was feeling,
rational, moral, and habitual. Coleridge regarded Nature merely as
a window, though an important one, that revealed the Will of God. The
Christian moral laws which informed man's reason and feelings, and
which were habitual to him, were therefore the ultimate source of
Coleridge's appeal.
In response to this more complex appeal, the political rights
which were guaranteed to each citizen also had to be revised. If
the basis for the constitution was no longer rooted in individual
reason, then the rights which were vouchsafed by the constitution
had to be based on man in his natural social state, with all the moral
duties as well as rights that this entailed.
(c) Rights and Duties
In the earlier stages of the Revolution, the French
legislators endeavoured to erect a Government on the
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foundation of personal Rights. This absurd and
impracticable doctrine, the French Jacobins
disseminated with that ardour which novelty and
fanaticism never fail to impart.®1-1
By the end of the 1790's, neither Coleridge nor Wordsworth subscribed
to the new radical idea of individual rights. None the less, they
did not revert to the traditional eighteenth-century radical position
of appealing either to an original contract or to the ancient
constitution as the source of political rights. They argued that
abstract rights were unrealisable and meaningless until given practical
social existence by appealing to the natural state of man in society
as a rational, feeling, moral and habitual creature. Rights could not
be held absolutely for this merely led to personal despotism; they
had to be limited and controlled by the society of which man was an
integral part and this necessarily involved reciprocal duties. In
The Watchman (1796), Coleridge had, indeed, argued that rights were
a species of duty: 'Those duties are called DUTIES which we exercise
towards others; those duties are called RIGHTS which we exercise in
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favour of ourselves.' Each man was duty-bound to consider the welfare
of the whole of society in claiming any rights. In moving from a natural
rights philosophy to an emphasis on social rights and duties, Coleridge
and Wordsworth subtly re-defined the radical rights of their youth,
such as liberty and equality, while maintaining that they still were
faithful to their original principles. Habitual rights, such as the
right to property, were also to enter their political ideology.
In his Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff (1793), Wordsworth had
praised liberty as an individual right, unrestrained except by laws
which had been approved by the rest of society under a republican
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constitution with full adult male suff rage. By the end of the
decade, however, Wordsworth had witnessed how this natural rights
definition of freedom had resulted in the uncontrollable licence and
anarchy of Revolutionary France. Thereafter, following Burke,
Wordsworth argued that liberty had to be limited and controlled by
the moral laws and duties of society in order that it might be
possessed by all in a positive way. Liberty could best be achieved
within the moral, habitual bounds of rural society. In his sonnet,
Nuns fret not ... (1802), Wordsworth described how a regulated social
concept of liberty promoted a more positive, moral sense of freedom
that could be experienced by all. This entailed a certain forfeiture
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of the individual right to follow one's own reason, but, since this
inevitably led to anarchy and then despotism, this unrestrained
type of liberty was self-denying. Just as the nuns find freedom and
moral virtue within the confines of their enclosed convent society,
so did Wordsworth find the same within the confines of the sonnet
form which became a favoured style of Wordsworth during his more
conservative phase after 1800:
Within the Sonnet's scanty plot of ground;
Pleased if sane Souls (for such there needs must be)
Who have felt the weight of too much liberty, gg
Should find brief solace there, as I have found.
Too much unrestrained liberty could be an oppressive weight which
ultimately crushes freedom itself. True liberty was to be discovered
in the space created by just rules and laws. Within the fixed, yet
creatively liberating, limits of the sonnet form and within the
traditional bounds of Lakeland society, Wordsworth discovered a more
positive sense of freedom; a freedom that was practical and enduring.
Coleridge saw his whole life, as poet, journalist and philosopher,
as a crusade to further freedom by the diffusion of knowledge and
truth. The first issue of The Watchman (1796) proclaimed this aim:
84
'That all may know the truth; and that the truth may make us free'.
Once the people had the knowledge to form their own opinions they
could be truly free and exercise sovereignty. He counted himself among
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'the friends of rational and progressive liberty'. Furthermore, in
his Bristol lecture of 1795, The Plot Discovered, he had bitterly
opposed Pitt's Two Acts which encroached so much on individual freedom.
Despite his repeated attacks on repressive laws, press censor ship
and his attempt to set up an unrestrained pantisocratic society,
Coleridge realised that, without some formal limits or moral direction,
the individual right to freedom could soon degenerate into anarchy.
Liberty had to have a moral imperative before it became a positive
force for good:
For what is Freedom, but the unfettered use gg
Of all the powers which God for use had given?
This was not a licence for man to do whatever he willed, but to use
whatever potentialities God had bestowed on him. It was the opportunity
to follow God's will and laws and it entailed responsibility.
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This was Coleridge's ideal of freedom which, however, could not
be realised under any form of government. It could only 'belong to the
individual man, so far as he is pure, and influenced with the love and
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adoration of God in Nature.' This was the purest expression of
liberty - man unrestrained, except by God's laws, which were themselves
the highest form of freedom. After the blows delivered to his ideals
in the 1790's, however, Coleridge became aware that this concept could
never be translated into practice unless it was first adapted to a
society where men were incapable of acting in a purely moral way. This
ideal of liberty had to interact with social circumstances and become
a social right. For Coleridge, abstract principles had no force or
meaning until translated into social practice; this might destroy their
purity, but it did invest principles with tangible life. Liberty had
to be established in harmony with the time-honoured laws and
customs of society.
In one of his Morning Post articles, Coleridge praised General
Washington's 'Will', which provided for the emancipation of his slaves
after his death:
We feel ourselves at a loss which most to admire in this
interesting paragraph, the deep and weighty feeling of
the general principle of universal liberty; or the wise
veneration of those fixed laws in society, without which
that universal liberty must for ever remain impossible,
and which, therefore, must be obeyed even in those cases,
where they suspend the action of that general principle."®
Despite Washington's belief in libertarian principles, he had not trans¬
gressed the laws on slavery while he lived, but through the provision
of his 'Will' he had still ensured the furtherance of the cause of
freedom in the long-term and set an example that would promote future
emancipations. In his more pragmatic approach, Coleridge believed that
the progress of liberty had to be rooted first in society's laws even
if these were antagonistic to its cause. Liberty had to grow from
within current social laws and limitations and eventually inter-fuse
with these. This progress might be slow and difficult in its evolution,
but the freedom gained would be all the more permanent and morally
controlled. Here was not the dangerously unrestrained freedom of the
French Revolution, but the steady infusion of moral law into civil law.
When the fixed laws of society were themselves based on moral principles,
then Coleridge's ideal of liberty would be attained.
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It can be measured how far Coleridge had travelled away from his
original concept of liberty when it is remembered that only five years
before the passage above, he had written, in The Plot Discovered (1795),
that the principle of liberty could never be suspended or surrendered
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because it was then difficult to retrieve. By 1800, liberty, far from
being indivisible, was a social concept that positively required
adjustment, adaptation, even temporary suspension in order to become
rooted more securely in society. Liberty had become a social right,
restrained by civil law, even if, ideally, it should only be limited
by Divine law.
In their radical youth, Wordsworth and Coleridge had stressed the
importance of man's fundamental equality. Both writers remained
interested in the idea of a more egalitarian society, but, as with
liberty, their concept of equal rights was to become more circumscribed.
Most radicals, in the 1790's, acknowledged that there were some
unavoidable differences between people such as intelligence, strength
and talent, but that there was still a fundamental equality between all
men, in a state of'nature and that, in consequence, all men were
entitled to equal rights. Very few, apart from Thomas Spence,
recognised the need for a certain levelling of material conditions
in order to reflect this equality in practice. Most were content with
the idea that any hereditary titles and large differentials in reward
should disappear. Wordsworth's early work reflects this moderate
radical position. In his Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff (1793) he
stated:
Equality, without which liberty cannot exist, is
to be met with in perfection in that state in which no
distinctions are admitted but such as have evidently
for their object the general good.90
Absolute equality in condition was impossible. Society and government
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(described in Godwinian terms as 'at best, but a necessary evil' )
demanded that certain people be given positions of authority and
responsibility and, from these, natural inequalities arose. Wordsworth
tolerated these inequalities as inevitable, but he stressed that the
unequal rewards had to be earned through merit,and positions of wealth
and authority had to be open to all. He attacked 'the unnatural monster
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of primogeniture' by which people inherited these positions and he
attacked artificial inequalities (such as titles and honours) that were
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not earned. Although he did not wish to re-distribute land or wealth,
he did argue that the poor should be given a proper reward for their
labour, which was their property, and that the differentiation between
the classes would thus be lessened. There would then be less of 'that
inequality among mankind which proceeds from the present forced
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disproportion of their possessions.'
Over the next twenty years Wordsworth was gradually to renounce
nearly all of these views. In The Prelude (1805), however, his idea
of equality seems, at first, to have changed but little. Wordsworth
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proclaimed his faith in 'One brotherhood of all the human race'
No matter how ordinary the person, all men were equal in the sight of
God and Nature. The differences in condition between the classes were
merely man-made distinctions which concealed this essential one-ness
of society. He warned against reading books which drew attention to
these surface differences while ignoring the basic equality of mankind:
[They] ambitiously set forth
The differences, the outside marks by which
Society has parted man from man QC.
Neglectful of the universal heart.
By the time Wordsworth wrote his passage however he had come to the
conclusion that, for all practical purposes, the 'natural' state of
man was his habitual social state. Although all people were ideally,
essentially equal, and although this had never to be forgotten, the
man-made, social differences between them were now justified as part
of his natural, social state and as the product of custom.
By the end of the 1790's therefore Wordsworth was no longer so
interested in seeing the fundamental equality of man translated into
social or political terms. The fact that every man had 'his god-like
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hours' and was spiritually the essential equal of all others, was
n o longer seen as an imperative reason for changing society; it
was almost a consolation to the ordinary people for the surface
inequalities they suffered elsewhere in life. It did not entitle
than to equal rights, but it was an inner spiritual comfort for not
possessing them. Moreover, their closer communion with Nature afforded
them moral nourishment beyond the scope of many others. Their inner
equality, which all had to recognise, compensated them for their material
shortcomings. In The Female Vagrant (1798), Wordsworth describes a
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group of beggars the vagrant woman encounters:
My heart is touched to think that men like these,
The rude earth's tenants, were my first relief;
How kindly did they paint their vagrant ease!
And their long holiday that feared not grief.
For all belonged to all, and each was chief."'
The tone of complacency, even romance, is unmistakable in this depiction
of the poor life. Although Wordsworth later reveals that the beggars'
life is not entirely the 'long holiday' it first seems, it is still
clear that the fundamental equality of their state is compensation
enough for their materially inferior condition. Indeed, it even soothes
and restores the feelings of the distressed woman. Fundamental equality,
once an imperative for reducing the artificial, man-made influences of
life, is now a consolation for the lower orders. Their lot is accepted
with happy passivity as part of man's social existence.
Coleridge's conception of equality was, initially, much more radical
than Wordsworth's, or indeed most radicals', with the exception of Spence.
One of the distinctive aspects of Coleridge's paitisocratic scheme was
its e ga.litarianism. Coleridge loved people as his brothers, linked
together in the one great family of mankind. Indeed, in an early poem,
To a Young Ass (1794), concerning a pantisocratic state, Coleridge even
98
addressed this lowly beast of burden as his 'brother' - a point which
possibly inspired Gillray to portray both Coleridge and Southey as asses
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in his celebrated Anti-Jacobin cartoon of 1798, 'New Mor a.lity'. The
pantisocratic plan had been an attempt to put ega litarian ideals into
practice. This entailed not only each person in the community being
given equal rights and the abolition of all titles or distinctions,
but also that all work, wealth and land be communally shared. In
Religious Musings (1794-96), Coleridge envisaged such a world:
Return pure faith! return meek Piety!
The kingdoms of the world are your's: each heart
Self-governed, the vast family of Love
Raised from the common earth by common toil
Enjoy the equal produce.
Coleridge did not recommend the impractical, equal division of land,
but rather its communal holding. He argued that 'An abolition of all
individual Property is perhaps the only infallible Preventative against
accumulation.'1^ In advocating such action, Coleridge went far beyond
what most contemporary radicals would countenance, except for Thomas
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Spence's famous community Land Plan.
Even when Coleridge had given up the pantisocratic plan, in 1795,
he continued to emphasise the importance of equalising people's
condition as well as awarding them equal political rights. Indeed,
he believed that most radicals made a major mistake in underestimating
the need to equalise people's condition before they were given equal
rights. The latter were meaningless and weak without the former:
But you plead, it seems, for equalization, of Rights,
not of Condition. 0 mockery! All that can delight
the poor man's senses or strengthen his understanding,
you preclude; yet with generous condescension you
would bid him exclaim 'Liberty and Equality!' because,
forsooth, he should possess the same Right to an Hovel
which you claim to a Palace.
All claims of bestowing equal rights or forming an egalitarian society
were hollow unless there was, firstly, this equalisation in social
circumstance which could give practical meaning to those rights.
Coleridge's views on equality were grounded in Christian teaching
as much as radical philosophy:
He [Christ] demanded from his Disciples a total
annihalation of all the merely selfish Passions - and
enforced an ardent benevolence and the preservation
of perfect Equality among themselves - he tempted by
no hopes of Wealth or Honour but expressly forbade
them to be-higher or lower than the other.
Coleridge argued that being a Christian necessarily involved the
acceptance of the ideal of social equality and community of goods.
By the late 1790's, however, Coleridge realised that this ideal of
equality (like that of liberty) was incapable of being translated
directly into practice. Although he continued to see every man as his
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brother and he described the war, in 1798, as 'fratricide' , the
failure of the pahtisocracy convinced him that a perfectly equal world,
of rights and conditions, was only possible in some paradisical Garden
of Eden after the Millenium.
Equality, like liberty, was an abstract ideal that could not be
realised in its pure form, but had to work through existing social
norms. In 1800 he remarked with relief how, 'The doctrines of liberty
and equality, in their wild and dangerous extent, were long ago
renounced by the DirectoryEven although Coleridge continued to
hope that the great differentials between people would be reduced, he
now realised that egalitarian principles had to grow gradually from
within society and be conditioned by its laws and customs. In a
Morning Post article of 1800 he remarked how the equality which all
men possessed could be described as 'the subjection of all to the same
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laws.' This did not mean that Coleridge was satisfied that this was
all that was necessary to constitute an equal society, but he did
recognise that this had to be the basic starting point for any future
advance in equality. This greater emphasis on civil equality before
existing laws led Coleridge, in the years thereafter, to stress equal
duties more than equal rights. As we shall see in Section III, he was
still interested in improving the conditions of the poor, but he no
longer sought any equalisation in material conditions. Instead, he
emphasised the equal reciprocal duties of the social classes, duties
which the poor could not perform until their material conditions had
been ameliorated.
Wordsworth and Coleridge continued to argue that liberty and
equality were two essential rights which the constitution had to
guarantee, even although they re-defined both as social or civil rights.
After 1797, however, there was one further right which gained increasing
dominance in their thinking: the right of property. Property rights,
rather than abstract natural rights, now seemed the most secure,
tangible basis for the constitution because they were habitual and
customary to society.
Radicals, such as Paine, attached the right to vote to the person¬
ality of man rather than to his property. Not even Paine, however,
attacked the concept of private property itself. He believed that
there would always be economic inequality in society and an unequal
apportioning of property. He did not attack private property on an
economic basis, therefore, but argued that the propertied should not be
allowed to monopolise political power. Those whose property was their
labour or their wage should also be given a share in political decision¬
making. Thus, even most of the radicals of the 1790's never abandoned
Locke's defence of private property. They had no wish to attack the
economic foundations of society, but by defining property more widely
as including the rights to the fruits of one's labour they advocated
a property-based constitution which was also a democratic political
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system. Property rights were still one of the four basic rights which
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even the new French Republic guaranteed. Wordsworth and Coleridge
were to depart from this idea of property, after 1797, when they began
to argue for political rights rooted in landed possessions.
In his Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff (1793) , Wordsworth followed
the Paineite view of property. He felt that 'the security of individual
property is one of the strongest and most natural motives to induce man
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to bow their necks to the yoke of civil government.' The 'property'
which government protected was not just land, however, but was also the
rewards of labour. Working people were entitled to a share in the
framing of their own government by virtue of this property right. In
many of his poems throughout the 1790's11^ Wordsworth continued to
attack the disproportionate differences between the property of rich
and poor. He criticised the enclosure of land by parasitical owners
and their monopoly of power. Wordsworth had no desire to level property,
though he did favour smaller farms in preference to great estates. He
also suggested that, though ordinary people had no land of their own,
they had a closer affinity to Nature and to the soil than the landowners
and that, in a sense, the land was 'theirs'. They had worked it
habitually from time immemorial and this spiritual ownership conferred
certain rights. Thus, in the poem Goody Blake and Harry Gill (1798),
the sticks, which poor old Goody Blake gathers for her fire from the
land of the rapacious farmer Gill, are more properly hers by right and,
when the farmer tries to arrest her for poaching, she delivers a curse
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which appropriately makes him as cold in body as in heart.
Despite his belief that the rewards of labour constituted a form
of property and that in a more habitual sense the property of the farmers
was also the property of the labourers, Wordsworth's view of property
rights did change after 1798. Property as a landed possession became
more highly prized and became the basis of political rights. In The Last
of the Flock (1798), property in the sense of land and stock is an
important source of virtue and domestic affection for the enterprising
shepherd:
For daily with my growing store
I loved my children more and more.
Wordsworth attacked, here, the Godwinian notion that private property
was the source of all evil and he showed that, as the shepherd is
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gradually forced to sell his property, he becomes a less admirable
person. As his flock diminishes in size, so does his moral sense:
To wicked deeds I was inclined,
And wicked fancies cross'd my mind.
As his property is eroded, all the shepherd's ennobling values are
diminished and his sense of moral duty and domestic responsibility
weakens. Property has become a prime source of the domestic, moral
affections which Wordsworth so admired.
By the end of the decade, it was the proprietors of small estates
who now seemed to Wordsworth the most dependable and responsible
elements in the community, by virtue of the property they owned. It
was this type of land-holding which conferred political rights and
duties. In his letter to Fox in 1800, Wordsworth still declared that
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'the most sacred of all property is the property of the poor', but
this is said in the Christian sense of the poor being the most blessed.
We have seen how Wordsworth regarded their simple moral purity as a
consolation for their inferior status. The few possessions which they
did have were sacrosanct and they had to be protected by their social
superiors, but these possessions no longer guaranteed them a direct
participation in government. In the letter Wordsworth makes clear that
he now regards the independent landed proprietors as the men most
entitled and capable of governing because of their hereditary property
and the patriotic moral spirit which this inculcated:
They are small independent proprietors of land here
called statesmen, men of respectable education who
daily labour on their own little properties. The
domestic affections will always be strong amongst men
who live in a country not crowded with population, if
these men are placed above poverty. But if they are
proprietors of small estates, which have descended to
them from their ancestors, the power which these affections
will acquire amongst such men is inconceivable by those
who only had an opportunity of observing hired labourers,
farmers and the manufacturing poor. Their little tract
of land serves as a kind of permanent rallying point for
their domestic feelings, as a tablet upon which they are
written which makes them objects of memory in a thousand
instances when they would otherwise be forgotten. It
is a fountain fitted to the nature of social man from
which supplies of affection as pure as his heart was
intended for, are daily drawn.1^5
Wordsworth felt that this class of small independent proprietors
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was disappearing as enclosures progressed, and they were now chiefly
to be found in the North of England. In the Lake District, where they
still flourished, Wordsworth had discovered the ideal community which
could serve as a model for the rest of society. This class of men united,
in themselves, all the qualities which, Wordsworth insisted, were
essential to the social and political state. They were a source of
habitual, moral values and domestic feeling and they were in harmony
with their native land and Nature itself. The property which they
owned was a tangible focus for all these fine qualities and served to
make them permanent. Indeed, in the last sentences of the passage there
are strong echoes of Wordsworth's concept of the 'spots of time'. The
ever-present, domestic, moral feelings which are discoverable in Nature
are now most easily recalled and remembered by those who actually own
the land - these small statesmen - rather than by the labourers of the
land. The possession of a small landed property was now the highest
state of 'social man' to which Wordsworth appealed. Wordsworth had now
located 'natural' society in its most ideal form, in the traditional
community of small, hereditary property owners found, quintessentially,
in the Lake District where Wordsworth had been born and later settled.
Property was the permanent centre of all the best rational, moral and
habitual thoughts and feelings of social man. Here, finally, was the
new basis or home for his political philosophy.
By the turn of the century, therefore, Wordsworth had departed
from his original Paineite view of property as labour or wages, as well
as land, in order to argue that only the possession of landed property
could confer full political rights. Landowners, even great estate
owners, were accorded increasing respect in Wordsworth's subsequent
writings. In the many editions of The Female Vagrant, which were to
follow the original, 1798 version, the misfortunes of the heroine and
her father become less attributable to enclosing landlords butare finally
ascribed to 'severe mischance and cruel wrong.jt should be noted,
in conclusion, that this revised view of property rights and of the
landowning class coincides with Wordsworth's own mixing in propertied
society. Indeed, in 1802, Wordsworth was given the Applethwaite estate
near Skiddaw by Sir George Beaumont and so Wordsworth became a member
of that freeholding class he so much admired and, consequently he was
now entitled to vote in parliamentary elections.
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Coleridge's view of private landed property was also to undergo
a transformation in the 1790's. In his pantisocratic phase, Coleridge
had favoured the abolition of private property in favour of communal
ownership. The land not only belonged to the people in essence, but
should also be owned by them in fact. In a sense, therefore, his
pantisocracy was still designed to have a property-based constitution.
This concept of communal land ownership and rights remained an ideal for
some years afterwards, but, since it had proved difficult to translate
into reality, Coleridge turned to a more practical concept of the constit¬
ution based on individual property rights. Between 1799 and 1800 Coleridge
developed this new position on property in response to the recently
framed French Constitution of Year VIII. One of the fatal flaws of the
Republic, throughout its history, was its lack of a firm basis in
property. Without this grounding in property, the French Republic
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would continue to be a lawless, rudderless state. Coleridge now
proposed that political rights should exactly reflect the type of
property distribution that was habitual and appropriate to the nation
at large. The passage where he explores this idea most concisely is
quoted here in full since it sums up so many of the guiding principles
behind Coleridge's political thinking after 17991
The prejudices of superstition, birth, and hereditary
right, have been gradually declining during the last
four centuries, and the empire of property as gradually
establishing itself in their stead. Whether or no this
too will not in a distant age submit to some more
powerful principle, is, indeed, a subject fruitful in
dreams to poetic philosophers, who amuse themselves with
reasonings on unknown quantities; but to all present
purposes it is a useless and impertinent speculation.
For the present race of men Governments must be founded
on property; that Government is good in which property
is secure and circulates; that Government the best, which,
in the exactest ratio, makes each man's power proportion¬
ate to his property. In America, where the great mass of
the people possess property, and where, by the exertion
of industry, any man may possess it in its most permanent
form, this principle may, perhaps, co-exist with universal
suffrage but not in old and populous countries, in which
land is of high value, and where the produce of individual
labour can hardly be large enough to admit of considerable
accumulation. Artificial power must here be balanced
against physical power; and when the physical strength of
a nation is in the poor, the Government must be in the
hands of the rich. ®
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Here Coleridge, the 'poet-philosopher', postpones his dream of
communal land ownership in favour of a constitution grounded in
personal landed property. Each nation had to devise a constitution
which reflected its own peculiar property distribution. Although the
principle of a propertied basis was common to every constitution, there
could be no universal political system applicable to every state because
each nation was distinct in its property distribution. Only in America,
where there was a wide popular distribution of land, could the ownership
of property ever justify universal suffrage. European nations had only
limited amounts of land and these could never be shared out among all
their subjects and so the suffrage there was necessarily also limited.
It is clear from the passage quoted above that Coleridge regarded land
alone as the only real and permanent property which could guarantee
political rights. The possession of rewards and riches were never to
be as important to Coleridge as was property. The accumulation
of money was a materialistic activity unless it
was used to buy property, for only property-holding entailed moral
duties and responsibilities.
In this passage, Coleridge does not merely tolerate inequalities
in property-holding, but makes it the very foundation stone of his
constitution: political power being proportionate to landed wealth.
It should be noted, however, that Coleridge also argued that property
had to circulate, i.e. men of talent and merit should be enabled to enter
propertied society. The right to hold land should be open to all,
through the fruits of one's industry, and not merely be gained by
hereditary right. Thus, Coleridge still acknowledged the potential
for a wider franchise and one that was not confined to a static class
of hereditary landowners. Nevertheless, in this passage, it is the
Burkean idea of the constitution reflecting the existing social hierarchy
that Coleridge emphasises, rather than any radical concept of the constit¬
ution defending inalienable rights and promoting social and economic
change. Although Coleridge wished to see property circulate, he had
no wish to deprive people of their traditional right to inherit land.
This right was the solid bed-rock of the constitution, resistant to
dangerous extremes. It provided a sure foundation for liberty itself
and inspired the loyal, patriotic feelings needed to protect that
11 9
liberty. Although men of talent should be able to buy their way into
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the propertied class, it was the habitual holding of such property
by a family through many generations that was the most steady bulwark
of the constitution.
Thus, individual property rights came to assume the same constitut¬
ional importance for Coleridge as they had for Wordsworth. Property-
holding was the habitual source of moral values and duties that had
withstood the test of time. It promoted patriotic feelings and thus
helped to create a stable society in which liberty could flourish.
It was a vital part of natural society. Coleridge concluded that since
all theories of government founded on abstract natural rights were unrel¬
iable and meaningless, a property-based constitution was the best and
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most practical 'which our imperfect nature can, or ought to expect'.
Accepting the conservative proposition that war was imperfect and could
not be relied upon to exercise his reason in a controlled way, political
rights had to be founded on a securer basis - this was the nature of
man in society, the determining characteristic of which was its unequal
distribution of property.
Between 1797 and 1802 Wordsworth and Coleridge were beginning to
evolve a new basis for the constitution that was formed in response to
the errors which they perceived in French radical theory. Although neither
writer openly professed the influence of Burke on their revised thinking,
that influence was becoming obvious in their new emphasis on moral law,
habit, and property rights and their definition of 'Nature' as the social
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state of man. Although Wordsworth did not acknowledge this debt to
Burke until many years after, when he added 'The Genius of Burke'
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passage to Book VII of The Prelude , his political ideas show distinct
traces of Burkean thought. Coleridge had admired Burke for his earlier
support of the American War of Independence and he had been initially
distressed that Burke had opposed the French Revolution; remarking that
this 'Great Son of Genius' had sided with the Government, 'Oppression's
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hireling crew', even to the extent of accepting a government pension
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in 1795. Coleridge even called the war against France 'His war' (i.e.
Burke's) in recognition of the effect of Burke's attack on the French
Republic. By the end of the decade, however, Coleridge had seen for
himself how so many of Burke's predictions of anarchy and despotism in
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France had come true. He could appreciate how support for the
Americans in their war to recover ancient liberties was not inconsistent
with opposition to the French revolutionaries who had rejected the past.
Burke alone seemed to have anticipated the flaws in radical thought and
in the appeal to reason. Like Burke, Coleridge had come to understand
that man was an imperfect, habitual, social creature and that any
political constitution had to be based on these incontrovertible facts
and not on some ideal, abstract image of man. By 1800, Coleridge was
describing Burke as a 'great man' and hepraised 'the intimate acquaintance
with the general nature of man, and the consequent prescience of
125
Mr. Burke'. J
It needs to be remembered, however, that, until 1802, Burke was a
mostly unacknowledged debt and that the ideas of both writers were still
in a state of transition when it is apparent that, though new influences
are detectable they are not yet fully assimilated, far less consciously
perceived. In practical, political terms both writers tended to side
more with Fox and the Opposition, though the under-current of their
political thought was now beginning to flow in more conservative channels.
For the moment the Foxite Opposition still seemed the best prospect for
initiating the political and social reforms which both writers still
sought and which will be investigated in the next chapter.
In 1797 Wordsworth and Coleridge had set out to discover a new,
more stable context in which to lodge and frame their republican beliefs;
a more permanent home for that kernel of truth to be found in the early
years of the Revolution, but which French radicalism had ill-served.
Their youthful enthusiasm for the abstract, idealistic approach of the
radicals seemed inappropriate for the more complex world they now beheld.
If there was to be effective political change, it had to be introduced
more gradually, in tune with the existing state of society and the
habitual, imperfect nature of man. This entailed an appeal, not only
to man's emotional or rational self, but also to the moral framework
of society, its habits and customs. The rights which flowed from this
appeal were the rights of man as part of society with all the moral
duties and the customary or legal limits which this entailed.. This was
the new context in which any political change had to operate. For
Wordsworth this appeal to social man, to his rights and duties, could
be made in its most ideal form within rural society, particularly that
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of the Lake District. For Coleridge there was no specific physical
home where man's finest qualities were most manifest. They were to be
found wherever people followed Christian beliefs and moral values,
though he did recognise that this was often most evident in rural
communities.
When the two poets had begun this revision of radical principles,
it had still been with the intention of establishing a republican
system of government, only on more secure foundations. Their main aim,
up to 1802, was to discover a new political context for this system.
Trying to work within the current social and political order, and to
change it more gradually, however, necessarily involved accepting some
of the tenets and forms of that society and the consequent modification,
dilution or postponement of republican aims to fit this context.
Until 1802, Wordsworth and Coleridge still favoured political and social
changes, but there was an increasing tension between their appeal to
the existing condition of man and their old republican aims. This was
not to be properly resolved until the period after 1802 when they
embraced the existing British constitution. In the meantime both writers
continued to press for democratic and social changes which should be
gradually, not radically, imposed. It will therefore be argued that,
between 1797 and 1802, Wordsworth and Coleridge advocated a more




Most conservative theorists considered the British constitution to
be the best example of a mixed and balanced constitution. Its three
elements, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, embodied in King, Lords
and Commons, were each perfectly balanced. Patronage and influence
served to oil rather than corrupt this perfect mechanism. The greatest
fear of the conservatives was that this balance would be upset by the
Commons, or democratic element, growing in power and destroying the social
and political order. The older generation of reformers, such as Richard
Price and John Cartwright, challenged this view by asserting that it was
the democratic element which was most in danger. They wanted a
democratically-elected House of Commons to counteract the preponderant
influence of the crown and the aristocracy, though they had no wish to
destroy the monarchy or to tamper too much with aristocratic privileges.
The new radicals of the 1790's took a more extreme view. They believed
that the whole system was in need of thoroughgoing political reform.
This entailed the abolition of corruption and influence, of hereditary
privileges and, most importantly, the setting up of a republic based on
universal adult male suffrage. Few, not even Mary Wollstonecraft,were
prepared to advocate votes for women.
In the early 1790's Wordsworth and Coleridge had supported the
republicans. However in the period after 1797 how did they now regard
the three elements of the constitution and the role of the common people?
Which reforms did they still advocate?
(a) Monarchy and Aristocracy
Wordsworth's and Coleridge's increased regard for moral values,
customary habits and property rights was centered upon those belonging
to the ordinary people or small landowners rather than the higher ranks
of the nobility. Their opinion of the monarchy and aristocracy therefore
did not undergo any major change in the 1790's, though the undercurrents
of a new, more sympathetic attitude beccme discernible.
The execution of Louis XVI in 1793 did not greatly trouble Wordsworth.
He merely hoped that none of Louis' descendants would ever ascend the
throne again and he evinced a general dislike for all monarchical systems
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of government. In his unpublished Letter to the Bishop of LLandaff (1793),
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Wordsworth argued that most monarchical systems tended to be despotic
and had an unstable basis in the capricious whims of the King. The
national interest tended to be forgotten. Even where this was not so,
it was still impossible for one man adequately to fulfil all the duties
of government. For Wordsworth, the only type of government which
secured liberty and ensured that the will of the people (Rousseau's
General Will) was recognised, was a republic.
The office of King is a trial to which human virtue
is not equal. Pure and universal representation, by
which alone liberty can be secured, cannot, I think,
exist together with monarchy. It seems madness to
expect a manifestation of the general will, at the
•
same time that we allow to a particular will that
weight, which it must obtain in all governments, that
can, with any propriety, be called monarchical. They ^
must war with each other, till one of them is extinguished.
In the ten years that followed this Letter, Wordsworth's views on
monarchy were to change little. He continued to see it as a flawed,
usually corrupt, method of government. Its hereditary nature meant
that the calibre of the king was often far below that of his ministers
and that, if it had been submitted to a democratic election, few of
Britain's kings would have been chosen as the man best-fitted for the
job. Britain's contemporary royalty, particularly the Prince of Wales,
seemed to Wordsworth even less responsible and more neglectful of their
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national duties than their predecessors. By the turn of the century,
however, Wordsworth's venom became increasingly directed against despotic
or absolute rulers in general.
Happy is he, who, caring not for Pope,
Consul, or King, can sound himself to know
The destiny of Man, and live in hope.^
The best society was centered upon the people and their welfare rather
than upon one individual ruler. Constitutions which tied their rulers
to that end were the best, but absolute monarchies, devoid of this
principle, were still vehemently attacked by Wordsworth. When Napoleon
was crowned Emperor in 1804 and France returned to a monarchy as absolute
as that of the Ancien Regime, Wordsworth characterised it as 'the dog /
7
Returning to his vomit.'
Coleridge believed that true majesty was more often to be found in
ordinary people than in kings. In his 1794 poem on The Man of Ross, who
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helped the sick and forgotten, the man's moral spirit is more impressive
than any king's:
Richer than Miser o'er his countless hoards,
Nobler than Kings, or king-polluted Lords,
Here dwelt the Man of Ross!®
Monarchs themselves rarely earned the right to be called 'Majesty' for
they were usually corrupt and despotic. Like Wordsworth and contemporary
cartoonists, Coleridge singled out the Prince of Wales for special
opprobrium in this regard. He cast ridicule on the Prince and his
amorous adventures, displaying Prince George and his wife, Caroline,
as silly, pompous and rather pathetic creatures, who, nevertheless, were
destined to assume great powers over people more moral and worthy than
9
themselves.
Coleridge had little sympathy for the demise of monarchies and,
indeed, in Religious Musings (1794-96), he looked forward to the time
when all oppressive rulers would be cast down in apocalyptic fashion,
'as the untimely fruit/Shook from the fig-tree by a sudden storm.
In 1798, when satirically reviewing the execution of Louis XVI, Coleridge
depicted the ox of the Revolution running over Louis and he evinces only mock
sympathy for the king:
Nay, gentle Reader, do not sneer!
I cannot chuse but drop a tear,
A tear for good old Lewis!11
The execution which he depicted is ludicrous rather than tragic, yet the
tenor of the lines suggests that, by 1798, Coleridge believed that,
though Louis deserved to lose his crown, he did not merit the loss of
his head. He was a victim of the uncontrolled madness of the Revolution.
Certainly from this time on, Coleridge was more sympathetic to the
concept of Kingship. He was careful however to draw a distinction
between 'kings' who had little personal power, but were constitutionally
limited, and 'monarchies' which were despotic forms of government:
thank Heaven, it is still our possession, as well ^
as birth-right, that we have a KING, and no Monarch!
Coleridge tolerated the existence of kings, who were circumscribed by
the laws of the land and who took an active interest in the welfare of
their people. He also admired the 'Patriot King' who, while not
constitutionally bound, was still at one with his people. Here, he
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echoed the ideas of Bolingbroke earlier in the century. One man who,
in Coleridge's opinion,had the makings of a 'Patriot King' was
Frederick William II of Prussia. He took an interest in the oppressed
peasantry and tried to meliorate their condition. He made attempts to
subject all classes to taxation and was interested in social change,
even in the face of noble opposition. He had 'a partiality to a system
13
of Reformation', which showed him to be fair, just and mindful of the
popular will. None the less, Coleridge was also aware that even
Patriot Kings had the capacity for turning into despots because there
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were no formal controls on their actions. Only a constitutional
monarch could be trusted and even then Coleridge only tolerated it as
a secondary element in a system that had to be centered on the will of
the people.
Aristocracy was the second element in the constitution that
Wordsworth and Coleridge attacked. Throughout the 1790's, they sided
with the radicals in objecting to the monopoly of power exercised by
the great nobility. They criticised honours, titles and privileges
which were hereditary and had not been earned. Although they attacked
the power of the great aristocracy, they did see the need for the middle
and upper classes to provide a lead in society and in government by
virtue of their long experience and their links with the land. Few
radicals, at this time, wished to hand over government entirely to the
or dinary people and most, like their friend John Thelwall, saw the
need for the uneducated lower orders to be guided by the superior
rationality of the higher classes.
Although Wordsworth saw increasing worth in the smaller landowning
class, he remained much more trenchant in his attack on the aristocracy
than did Coleridge. Much of Wordsworth's antipathy springs from personal
experience. He was born in Cockermouth, a village virtually owned by
the Lowther family of Westmorland. His father John was Sir James Lowther's
'law-agent', they lived in one of Lowther's houses, and part of John
Wordsworth's duties included the task of making sure that local free-
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holders voted for Lowther candidates at election times. William
therefore was raised in a household where the meaning of aristocratic
influence was palpable. When his father died in 1783, there was a huge
debt of £4,000 owing to him from his employer, but the Lowthers did not
repay it. The orphaned family was split up and farmed out to relatives
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on whom they were dependent for a livelihood and an education. This
early experience of the aristocracy had a profound effect on Wordsworth.
It epitomised all their faults - their duplicity, lack of responsibility,
greed and disregard for moral values. It also cast into relief the
contrasting worthiness of the ordinary people and yeomen farmers who
subsequently reared the family. In his poem, Imitation of Juvenal:
Satire VIII (1795), the Lowther (i.e. Lonsdale) family stands as one of
the prime examples of those aristocrats who are immoral, corrupt and
undeserving of their titles and positions:
What has this blessed earth to do with shame?
If Excellence was ever Eden's name?
•Must honour still to Lonsdale's tail be bound?
Then execration is an empty sound.1"
In the same poem, he also attacked how the aristocracy controlled the
legal system to their own advantage; no doubt remembering how the
Lowthers had used the courts to deny the Wordsworth family its legitimate
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claim to the money owed to them.
In his Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff, the aristocracy comes under
sustained attack. Wordsworth castigates titles and distinctions which
are supposed to signify worth, but which more often disguise its complete
absence. He singles out for criticism those hereditary titles and
privileges, conferred in the distant past, which still entitle the family
to hold eminent positions and legislate for millions, no matter what the
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calibre of these later generations. Wordsworth argued that government
offices had to be filled by men who had earned their place. True
ennoblement was derived from virtue and merit, and the esteem of colleagues.
But it was not just the undeserved titles and power of the aristocracy
to which Wordsworth objected, but also their lifestyle and the demoral¬
ising effect this had on the rest of society:
[Nobility] has a necessary tendency to dishonour labour,
a prejudice that extends far beyond its own circle, that
it binds down whole ranks of men to idleness while it
gives the enjoyment of a reward which exceeds the hopes
of the most active exertions of human industry.1^
The profliga;cy of the idle rich undermined the work ethic and demoralised
the real labourers in society who would never gain the rewards which
the aristocracy dissipated after doing nothing. This situation upset
all sense of value and morality in society. Since they had a pre¬
eminent social position, their gambling and immoral behaviour also
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corrupted public manners. This parasitic, amoral element in the
constitution was one of Wordsworth's most compelling reasons for
20
advocating a republic.
Although Wordsworth wrote very little more on the aristocracy
until after 1802, there is little reason to suppose his views had
radically changed. His increasing reverence for habitual customs and
property rights attached itself to those of the small yeoman farmers
and freeholders, rather than to the great landowning aristocracy. The
paying off of the Lowther debt in 1803, however, and his increasing
contact with the aristocracy, was, after 1802, to contribute to a major
reconsideration of the poli-tical role of the landed nobility.
Coleridge also condemned aristocracy, titles and privilege, but not
as resolutely, as Wordsworth. Coleridge attacked materialism and greed
in every form, whether it was the pursuit of money, titles or hedonistic
pleasure. He framed the immorality of the aristocracy within the bounds
of an acquisitive, corrupt age. In one of his earliest poems he
proclaimed,
How false, how vain are Man's pursuits below!
Wealth, Honour, Pleasure - what can ye bestow?
Yet see, how high and low, and young and old
Pursue the all-delusive power of Gold.21
Venality and corruption were not just to be found in aristocratic circles,
nor did a title necessarily connote unworthiness or an abuse of power.
He praised Lord Stanhope, an aristocrat who also supported the democratic
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cause and was a 'Friend of the Human Race'. Just as Coleridge could
see good and bad in both rural and urban societies so, unlike Wordsworth,
he viewed the powers and titles of the nobles more circumspectly. Titles
were an irrelevance beside the more important, deeper crime of oppressing
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the people. It was this that Coleridge attacked.
Although Coleridge did not damn the aristocracy so completely as
Wordsworth, there is no doubt that he did consider them generally the
most corrupt class in society; and as all the more reprehensible because
they held such high positions of responsibility. He especially despised
the superficial, narcissistic social world of the aristocracy. This
artificial decadent society knew little of God, natural thoughts or deep
feelings. In a poem, written in 1799, he hoped that men would,
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violently sweep
These vile and painted locusts of the deep,
Leaving un undebas'd ^
A - world made worthy of its God.
This section of the aristocracy did nothing to justify their existence,
power or wealth, yet they were regarded as the leaders of the nation.
Like Wordsworth, Coleridge was more impressed by people who displayed
natural virtue. This was reward enough; there was no need for titles
and honours if one lived a moral life. Moral worth was an end in itself
and no pretext for further ennoblement. The hallmark of a great man was
his deeds not his title:
-What wouldst thou have a good great man obtain?
Place? titles? salary? a gilded chain?
Or throne of corses which his sword had slain?
Greatness and goodness are not means, but ends!
Hath he not always treasures, always friends,
The great good man? three treasures, LOVE and LIGHT,
And CALM THOUGHTS, regular as infant's breath:
And three firm friends, more sure than day and night,
HIMSELF, his MAKER and the ANGEL DEATH!25
Spiritual satisfaction was the greatest reward for virtue and endeavour,
besides which titles were at best an irrelevancy.
Coleridge did believe, by the end of the 1790's, that despite all
these shortcomings the nobility did have an important role to play in
the political system, even if he felt that their power and direct
influence was 'constitutionally less than that of the popular and
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representative branch'. It has already been noted how, after 1797,
Coleridge showed an increased regard for property rights - not just those
of Wordsworth's small statesmen, but also those of the greater hereditary
landowners. Through their long possession of an estate they had a strong
physical stake in their nation's property and security and thus also in
the constitution:
Our Nobles in England, from the largeness of their
landed estates, have an important stake in the immediate
prosperity of their country; and, from the antiquity
of their families, may be reasonably presumed likely to
associate with it a more deeply-rooted and partial affection.
Just as Coleridge believed that property had to circulate to be a justif¬
iable basis for the constitution, so he believed that these upper classes
had to be more open to the rest of society in order to justify their
position within that constitution. The men of talent whom he hoped would
67
be able to rise up in society and buy property, could thus enter the
'gentleman' class: the lower slopes of the English nobility. Through
this door, which was open to all,the political position of the nobles could
be justified:
... by occasion of their younger children they were
the original founders of an order of Gentlemen among us,
into which order a liberal education and polished manners
have at length the privilege of incorporating any man,
whatever his parental rank might have been; and thus,
by the introduction of a greater social equality among us,
they more than compensate to us for their political
superiority.28
It should be noted that Coleridge has been careful to circumscribe
the power of the nobility even although, in a property-based constitution,
the landed classes had to have an important role to play. The landed
aristocracy had to be open to talented men of all ranks before their
political role could be justified, and that role was itself less vital
than the popular element within the constitution. Although this system
best suited Britain, where there could never be a universal propertied
suffrage and where there was a long tradition of hereditary land-owning,
it has been noted how Coleridge still regarded the American republican
system as an ideal. By 1800, however, Coleridge had aligned himself with
the older, more moderate reformers who did not wish to abolish the
aristocratic element in the constitution, but he still wanted the demo¬
cratic element to be the strongest. Wordsworth, on the other hand, with
his continued attacks on monarchy and aristocracy, still seemed more
sympathetic to republican thinking on these matters up to 1802. It
reamins to be seen how Wordsworth and Coleridge now regarded the common
people and the third element in the constitution: democracy.
(b) The Common People, Democracy and Reform
Through the vicissitudes of the 1790's Wordsworth's and Coleridge's
faith in the common people remained firm. They explained their violent,
anarchic behaviour in France by claiming that they had been betrayed
by such leaders as Robespierre and that radical change had been imposed
on them too suddenly to be assimilated. Both writers still admired the
simple values of the people and when they appealed to the reason, habits
and moral feeling of man, it was common man they thought of primarily.
In the Lyrical Ballads of 1798 and 1800, they also made a conscious
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attempt to identify with a wider class of readership. Their revised
view of the land-owning class however, and their perception that the
uneducated lower orders were easily swayed, led Wordsworth, but
Coleridge even more, to doubt whether the common people were capable
of participating in the governmental process.
In general, Wordsworth defined the true 'people' as those who
worked manually and lived in the countryside: those who were closest
to Nature and to the moral values it inspired. In The Prelude (1805),
he stated:
My first human love,
As hath been mentioned, did incline to those
Whose occupations and concerns were most
Illustrated by Nature, and adorned, ^g
And shepherds were the men who pleased me first.
Here was Wordsworth's ideal - the solitary man who was also part of
rural society and at one with all the virtues of nature. He found in
the society of these ordinary country people a sense of morality, duty
and responsibility not to be found amongst the lower orders of the city,
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who lived among 'the deformities of crowded life'. The true, admirable
common people were only to be found in rural society. In them, Wordsworth
discovered,
a sure safeguard and defence
Against the weight of meanness, selfish cares,
Codr'se manners, vulgar passions, that beat in
On all sides from the ordinary world
In which we traffic. Starting from this point,
I had my face towards the truth.
Even when Wordsworth did show admiration for more industrial workers
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among the common people, as he did with the miners in Peter Bell (1798) ,
they still plied their trade within a rural society. Although they were
divorced from the direct experience of Nature, they still lived in rural
communities rather than the growing urban centres and they partook of
the moral values of that community.
Wordsworth's love for these ordinary country folk was rooted in his
own upbringing and experience. He had absolute faith in their natural
virtue and, in' the Lyrical Ballads (1798 and 1800) he tried to identify
with their thoughts and feelings to an extent that is rare among the
political theorists of the age. In these poems his intention was to use
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'a selection of language really used by men', rather than more classical
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poetic diction. He hoped that in these plainer terms he could convey
how he had discovered in the simple lives of country folk all the most
durable, natural and moral values which ought to underpin society.
Low and rustic life was generally chosen, because, in
that condition, the essential passions of the heart find
a better soil in which they can attain their maturity,
are less under restraint, and speak a plainer and more
emphatic language; because in that condition of life
our elementary feelings co-exist in a state of greater
simplicity, and, consequently, may be more accurately
contemplated, and more forcibly communicated; because
the manners of rural life germinate from those elementary
feelings; and, from the necessary character of rural
occupations, are more easily comprehended; and are more
• durable; and lastly, because in that condition the
passions of men are incorporated with the beautiful and
permanent forms of nature.^
The moral and habitual values which Wordsworth most prized were
therefore to be disovered in their purest and plainest form in the
common people of the country. Being present there, in such a simple
but powerful way, these values stood as more easily understood lessons
for the rest of society. The speech of the ordinary people, which was
plain and unaffected, could communicate these moral truths more readily
than the artificial styles of the upper classes. Their simple mode of
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speaking arose 'out of repeated experience and regular feelings', and
was therefore at one with the stable customs and habits of society. The
common people thus seemed to be at the very heart of Wordsworth's
conception of natural society. In trying to use their speech in his
poems he was not only identifying himself with their lives, but was using
a medium that was also his political message: the need to appeal to the
moral, habitual values inherent in country life and Nature.
Wordsworth's poetry, up to the completion of The Prelude in 1805,
is peopled with the lower orders - labourers, beggars, orphans and widows.
His sympathy and interest is greater than that of most of his contemporaries.
He countered the ruling-class image of the lower orders as ignorant,
immoral and brutal by portraying them as the moral, common-sensical and
feeling heart of the nation. For Wordsworth, they were a sustaining
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source of worth, knowledge and inspiration , and their lives had the
calmness, virtue and order which he wished all society to have:
there I found
Hope to my hope, and to my pleasure peace
And steadiness, and healing and repose
To every angry passion. There I heard,
From mouths of lowly men and of obscure,
A tale of honour - sounds in unison
With loftiest promises of good and fair.
In the society of ordinary country people were to be discovered simple,
universal truths from which the rest of society could benefit.
Although Wordsworth saw ordinary people as a source of moral
strength and an inspiring example to all, this did not necessarily
imply that they could be accorded political power. Without education
they were not always equipped to act on their moral feelings in a
responsible, orderly way. Wordsworth's observation of the anarchy of
the French people in the 1790's had taught him this and so, by the end
of that period, he was turning to another class in society as the most
responsible. As has been argued, in the 1801 letter to Fox, Wordsworth
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addressed 'the small independent proprietors of land' as the most
dependable and morally upright section of the community. They were part
of rural society, in touch with Nature and all its simple, moral values,
yet they had further vital advantages which the common people lacked.
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They were 'men of respectable education .... placed above poverty',
and with a physical stake in their country's welfare and security
through their farms. Thus, they had the requisite education, material
independence, and sense of responsibility that the common people lacked,
but which were vital if the moral values of rural society were to be
translated into durable political practice and into law. These 'statesmen'
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encapsulated all of 'our best qualities', but they also gave them
permanency and bottom. Although the feelings of the ordinary people were
natural and strong, they did not have the same capacity for controlling
these emotions and using them responsibly in the national interest.
Moreover, their material dependence meant that they had to be more
concerned with the exigencies of subsistence. The farms of the statesmen
not only gave them a vested interest in the national welfare, but also
gave them the economic independence which might enable them to make
political decisions in the interests of the entire nation and not be
so easily swayed. Thus, it was the small landowning class which Wordsworth
believed was best suited to power and to realising, in practice, the
domestic values and affections of the ordinary people.
When Coleridge spoke admiringly of the common people, he included
those who lived in the town as well as the countryside. It has been
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argued that he regarded cities as part of natural society and
accordingly he respected those who worked there. Although the ordinary
people of the city were cut off from the benevolences of Nature, this
did not mean that they were evil or should be ignored. In Reflections
On Having Left A Place Of Retirement (1795), he recommende d people
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should take an active interest in the distressed people of the towns.
Coleridge, however, did draw a distinction between townspeople and the
'mob'. The mob was not a purely urban phenomenon, but rather any large
multitude of people which displayed strong, even admirable, feelings,
and which showed little controlling reason. They were-not to be trusted:
'I am one of these who greatly reverence the feelings of a multitude,
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though I have not the same respect for the opinions that excite them'.
This was what Coleridge had found most dangerous in the French revolution¬
aries; they had shown great zeal but their motives had often been
misguided and they were easily led astray.
Although the Lyrical Ballads was planned as a collaborative venture
with Wordsworth, Coleridge soon became unconvinced by his fellow poet's
attempt in the 1800 'Preface' to identify with the people by writing
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in their own language. Coleridge did not believe that such an exercise
was possible, useful or desirable. A conscious simplification of one's
own diction in mimicry of another was itself a species of the artificiality
which Wordsworth had hoped to eradicate. In Biographia Literaria (1817),
he stated, 'I conclude therefore, that the attempt is impracticable; and
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that, were it not impracticable, it would still be useless'. Indeed,
he felt that the most successful of Wordsworth's poetry was that which
used the more elevated style natural to the author. Certainly, Wordsworth
himself had not intended to write any part of his projected philosophical
opus, The Recluse, in the style of the common people, nor, in its major
completed parts (e.g. The Prelude (1805) and The Excursion (1814)), was
he to do so.
Although Coleridge came to the conclusion that this degree of
identification with common people was misguided and of little practical
value, he still regarded them as a central class in society that could
never be ignored. The poorer classes had great inner, spiritual worth
because they were nearest to God. In A Christmas Carol (1799), Coleridge
hailed the Virgin Mary as the mother of God's own Son, but also as a
member of the poorer orders:
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Thou . Mother of the Prince of Peace,
Poor, simple, and of low estate
Jesus, himself, had been born to a lowly carpenter's wife and his
disciples were all to be common men, yet they were nearer to God and
His Word, than all the rich men. Again it was Christian belief which
influenced Coleridge's political philosophy and demonstrated the central
importance of the common people.
Coleridge therefore argued that all good government had to take
cognition of ordinary people since they were blessed by God and nearest
to Christian teaching and moral values. Great statesmen, such as
George Washington, recognised the centrality of the common people to
society and the President always displayed 'a humann ess of feeling, a
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complete union of himself with the mass of his fellow-citizens'. He
understood that government always had to serve the people and identify
with their problems and desires. Ordinary folk were also a fountain of
moral spirit from which all governments could draw strength and resolve:
Washington thought, felt, and acted in and for his
age and Country; the same temperance presided over his
opinions as his actions. He sympathised with the moral
and religious feelings of the great mass of his fellow-
citizens.
The need for governments to recognise the people's wishes as well as
their deep Christian spirit, however, did not imply that the lower orders
were entitled to direct participation in the parliamentary process. By
the end of the 1790's Coleridge, like Wordsworth, had realised the folly
of the ruling class relinquishing the reins of government before the
people had been adequately prepared. First, they had to be educated and
thus learn the responsibilities entailed in government, if the excesses
of France were to be avoided. Although the people were a source of
valuable moral feelings, these could not be realised in practice without
the controls of reason, custom and law. As we have argued, Coleridge
regarded the propertied class as the social group best able to govern
in this more informed, responsible manner.
Since their view of the common people had been modified, what kind
of democracy did Wordsworth and Coleridge favour by the turn of the
century?
„ The democratic ideas of the two poets must be set in the political
context of the day. Although neither now advocated a pure republic,
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their views still fell on the reformist side of the debate on
parliamentary reform. Conservative writers were naturally against
extending the suffrage and supported the constitution as it stood.
The people were believed to be too ignorant, irresponsible and violent
to use power well. Burke argued that events in France showed that
democracy was merely a despotism of the people far worse than that of
the old monarchy because it also destroyed the existing state and
social order. Many British radicals also feared giving the people too
much control. Price and Cartwright, for example, favoured a democrat-
c.
ically elected House of Commons? but one balanced by monarchical and
artistocratic elements. Mackintosh feared the possibility of mob rule
if a republic was formed and argued that the minds of the people had
to be shaped by the middle classes before power could be apportioned.
Only the more extreme radicals such as Paine had favoured a democratic
republic with full adult male suffrage.
Wordsworth's initial idea of a republic is outlined in his Letter
to the Bishop of Llandaff and it displays Paineite thinking. He argued
that a republican government was the best guarantee of liberty. It
contained 'less of an oppressive principle'. Wordsworth believed that
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every individual should have the right to vote, although it is unlikely
that he meant to include women. He felt that a democratic system was
the most pragmatic way of ens u-r'ing an identity of interest between
governors and governed. If men were to acquiesce in the laws of the
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nation then they had to be given a say in the framing of those laws.
In order to ensure that the legislative branch was always in tune with
the wishes of the people, there also had to be frequent elections.
Rotation in office was essential too, so that men did not become
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corrupted by power. The men, who filled these offices, should be chosen
on merit, not wealth, and this was another reason why Wordsworth favoured
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abolishing property qualifications for parliamentary candidates. These
measures, he believed, would promote accountability in office, produce
just laws and guard against extremes. Writing in 1793, he answered
Burke's prediction that the French democratic system would lead to
anarchy and then despotism by arguing that the people would act fairly
and could be counted upon to choose M.P.s wisely if they were only 'left
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to the quiet exercise of their own judgement'. Even although they were,
at -present, in a violent mood this was only a natural, though regrettable,
reaction in France after its centuries of oppression and it would soon
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die away as the republic grew stronger and the sway of reason prevailed.
Wordsworth also argued that the people's lack of education was no barrier
to their participation in government, as Burke had contended. At present,
the lower orders need only be called upon to pick their legislators:
Setting aside the idea of a peasant or mechanic being
a legislator, what vast education is requisite to
enable him to judge amongst his neighbours which is
most qualified by his industry and integrity to be
intrusted with the care of the interests of himself
and of his fellow citizens?^
Indeed, Wordsworth felt that republicanism was itself a force for
extending education. Since it was a more open system, it would be in
the government's interest to keep the people informed and to tend to
their needs, if it hoped to be re-elected. Finally Wordsworth still
recognised the need for an executive branch of government to check or
scrutinise the acts of the legislature. He envisaged this as a minor
role, however, compared with that of the legislative which was the
ultimate expression of the General Will.
Since Wordsworth was to write little more on republican political
reforms until after 1802, it is difficult to assess how his views may
have changed by the turn of the century. What has already been learnt
of his political philosophy at that time, however, as well as some
passages from The Prelude (1805), provide some evidence. His continued
attacks on the aristocracy, monarchy and hereditary titles show that
Wordsworth still favoured a more meritocratic system of government and
that he believed that the heart of that government was the legislative
branch. Patronage and influence were still abhorred and needed to be
eradicated. We have also seen that his belief in reason gaining sway
had proved misplaced. Terror and violence had increased, not diminished,
and the republic had not become the force for public education and moral
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purity that he had once envisaged. Considering this and his great
respect for small independent landowners, did Wordsworth still favour
a republic with universal adult male suffrage?
In The Prelude, Wordsworth looked back over the 'shameful' course
of the Revolution. He proclaimed his continued belief in a democratic
government and he argued that it had been perverted by the base leaders
of the French. Democracy was a 'Creed which ten shameful years have not
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annulled'. If a better leader had emerged, the republic would have
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grown more strongly and effectively. Such a leader could,
Have cleared a passage for just government.
And left a solid birthright to the state.
Wordsworth did not believe that a republican system of government was
intrinsically flawed, but that it had been ill-served by its leaders.
The violence and despotism of the 1790's had not grown from the concept
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of 'popular government and equality', but were attributable to forces
extrinsic to republicanism itself. He also recognised that the
republican experiment had not only foundered because of bad leadership,
but also because the people themselves had proved ignorant and inexper¬
ienced. His 1793 view of their lack of education had been too sanguine
and, in The Prelude, he regretted their 'ignorance/And immaturity'. ^
Although a republican system still remained an ideal, it could only be
successfully implemented when the long history of the people's ignorance
and inexperience had been counteracted. This would take time and could
only be gradually achieved. In the meantime, as we have seen in his
letter to Fox, Wordsworth trusted the small landowners as the most
responsible class; the one most fitted to govern the nation in the
interests of all.
Although Coleridge also considered a republic to be the ideal form
of government, he had always stressed that political change of any kind
had to be preceded by the necessary educational, moral or social reforms.
It has been noted how Coleridge regarded an improvement in physical
condition to be a prerequisite for granting full political rights. From
the early 1790's he had argued that people had to be educated and morally
enlightened before any form of government could be effective:
Without previous illumination a change in the forms of
Government will be of no avail. These are but the
shadows, the virtue and rationality of the People at
large are the substance, of Freedom: and where Corruption
and Ignorance are prevalent, the best forms of Government
are but the 'Shadows of a Shade'. We actually transfer
the Sovereignty to the People, when we make them
susceptible of it.^1
Pantisocracy had been so desirable because it had promised this
type of 'illumination' without the need for any formal government. In
the absence of a pantisocracy, however, the best type of government was
a democracy and later, in this same passage from The Watchman (1796),
he"stated that the aim of the newspaper was to cooperate 'with the
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Patriotic Societies, for obtaining a Right of Suffrage general and
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frequent'. Although the suffrage had to be widened, it could not
include the common people until they had been educated, intellectually
and morally, for this responsible role. Thus, even in his more radical
youth, Coleridge had not envisaged the immediate granting of universal
adult male suffrage.
By the end of the decade, Coleridge had entrusted political power
to the property-owning class. This section of the community was the
best educated, experienced and responsible class and they had a physical
stake in the welfare and security of the nation. Although Coleridge
regarded landed property as the bedrock of the constitution, however,
he was in favour of extending the franchise to those who owned houses,
which he regarded as a different, but legitimate, form of property. In
1798 he attacked those who had voted down Grey's proposals for parliament¬
ary reform which had proposed giving householders the right to vote:
Is not this to declare that the householders of Great
Britain are incapable of chusing their own agents with
common prudence or common honesty; and that their agents
so chosen will not promote the true peace and welfare of
their constituents, unless they are bribed to their duty
by the secret influence of the Crown? Such are the tenets
which they must needs entertain who oppose themselves so
implacably to the cause of national reform and amelioration;
and will the Nation place confidence in the men, who place
no confidence in the Nation?^
Coleridge therefore favoured an extension of the franchise to include
householders as well as the forty-shilling freeholders: an appropriate
reform for a writer who considered both the towns and cities to be
integral parts of natural society.
Although he believed that the franchise had to be based on property,
whether in the form of land or houses, Coleridge still stressed that
society had to be more open in order to allow ordinary people of talent
to gain property. He also believed that a property-based constitution
had to be subject to the will of the people. It had to appeal to their
interests and identify with their wishes. He praised, in government,
'that best and most salutary species of ephorism, the opinion of the
public'.^ ['ephorism' = controlling power or supervision] All the best
forms of government thus had to be grounded not only in property, but
also had to embody the popular spirit and, if there was a monarchy, the
king had to be subject to law and to be concerned for the welfare of his
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people. Even if the people did not have a direct say in the framing
of the laws, their needs and wishes still had to be considered.
Like Wordsworth, Coleridge attacked the bribery, corruption and
influence that was part of contemporary political life. Throughout
the 1790's he opposed the dishonest practices which were part of most
elections because these fed on, and encouraged, the immorality of voters.
This was especially repugnant to him for he believed that the sustenance
of moral values was essential to all good government and society. Instead
of fostering these values, the current system destroyed them. He found
this most evident in the corrupt elections of the pot-walloper boroughs:
• Votes would be collected for the wealthy, indeed, but only as
far as they employed their wealth to the production of
perjury and debauchery in the minds of those, whose
morals are of more especial importance to the well-being
of society.^
But it was not just the corruption of elections that concerned Coleridge,
but also the successful money-grabbing, pension-seeking candidates once
they reached Parliament. They had no sense of responsibility or real
interest in the nation's welfare or in the constitution, but were only
concerned with self-advancement: 'They love the constitution only in
proportion as it gives them power, and the Monarch, as he assists in
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filling their purses'.
Thus, it is evident that, though both Wordsworth and Coleridge had
retreated from the more radical republican views of their youth by the
end of the 1790 s, they were still ideologically closer to the moderate
reforming wing of the Parliamentary Opposition than were other, more
conservative writers. Both still regarded a republican system as an
ideal, though Coleridge maintained it was not a practical goal for
Britain and could only be attained in America where all could own
property. Wordsworth remained more republican in his hopes for Britain
and continued to attack monarch and aristocracy. Coleridge was more
c.
sympathetic to monarchical systems, but argued that all forms of
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government still had to be obedient to 'the collective Majesty'.
Like Wordsworth, and the other more moderate reformers, Coleridge
believed in the need for a powerful legislature, but one that was still
subject to constitutional checks and balances provided by other separate
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bodies. In Wordsworth's view, this legislature had to be comprised of
small independent farmers who were the backbone of the nation. Until
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the lower orders became more educated they were the most dependable class
who could be entrusted with a political role. Coleridge wished to extend
the franchise to householders as well as to more substantial property
owners, but he did not envisage the lower orders having a direct
political role, unless by their talents they could rise in society and
thereafter gain property. Finally, both writers were agreed that the
existing political system was corrupt and in need of reform so that it
would serve the people and not merely the governors themselves.
Although Wordsworth and Coleridge had modified their republican
schemes by the beginning of the new century they still held firm the
belief that the first duty of government was the welfare of the people.
In particular, government had to be concerned with the alleviation of
poverty. This was not only an essential duty but also a vital precondition
for the smooth functioning of government itself, because effective rule
could only rest on the goodwill of the people. In their continued emphasis
on social reform and concern for poverty, they were still in harmony with
the moderate radical circles of the day. They believed these to be the
chief objective of all government, but ones ignored by Pitt's Administration.
Only the democratic system which they favoured could fulfil these aims
completely.
The radicals of the 1790's may have accepted that economic inequal¬
ities were inevitable, but, unlike most conservative writers, they did
not believe poverty itself to be inevitable. It could, at least, be
alleviated. Very few radicals however, sought social or economic reforms
without the prior change in the parliamentary system which dominated
their thinking. Part II of Paine's Rights of Man did recommend some
far-reaching social reforms, but he believed that these could be most
readily realised under a republican form of government. More convention¬
ally, Paine also opposed expensive government and the oppressive taxes
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levied on the poor. Daniel Isaac Eaton believed that only a democratic
government would lower taxes, reform the Poor Law and help the lower
classes to improve their lives. Thelwall similarly believed that every¬
one in the kingdom was entitled to a subsistence living, but that there
had to be a wider franchise before this could be realised. Thomas Spence
was one of the few to emphasise the primary need for a re-distribution
of property before political change could be fully effected. In his
pahtisocratic days, Coleridge had also advocated social reforms as
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essential prerequisites for political rights. Although he abandoned
his communal land policies, Coleridge still believed that the alleviation
of distress and the welfare of the poor were the chief duties of
government. Both he and Wordsworth, in advocating an extended democracy,
saw social welfare as the central political duty of government, as a
general humanitarian concern, and as a vital tool for raising up the
people to a more responsible, moral position in society and government.
All of Wordsworth's major poetry is informed with a deep personal
knowledge of, and sympathy for, the condition of the poor. Although the
Lake District itself was a relatively prosperous farming community,
Wordsworth's immediate neighbours in Grasmere, the Fisher and Ashburner
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families, had fallen on hard times. Moreover, there were always
itinerant beggars and gypsies passing through the area, whom Wordsworth
would help with a few coins, as well as listening to their tales of
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hardship. In his poetry he constantly drew attention to the plight of
the poor and thereby placed it as a central concern for society and
government. The poorest people in the community became the focus for
his finest poetry - outcasts, war widows, orphans, beggars and pedlars
recur often as feeling individuals in their own right, whom society had
traditionally ignored. Using these people as the stuff of the highest
creative art, Wordsworth rendered dignity and importance to the poor
and sought - to elicit society's interest and sympathy. Although Wordsworth
did not offer many panaceas for their condition, his vivid depiction of
that condition brought these marginalised figures to the public's
attention in a feeling response that few radical writers could match.
It is in this descriptive sense and in his promotion of the poor as
the central concern of society and government that Wordsworth's politics
retain much of its radical impulse into the early years of the new century.
Wordsworth argued that poverty was seldom the fault of the individual
as most conservative writers claimed. In The Last of the Flock (1798),
it has been seen how the shepherd still falls into poverty and cannot
support his large family even although he is an industrious, even
enterprising man. He has to sell all his assets and be left with nothing,
before he can even qualify for parish relief. In An Evening Walk (1793),
and then again in The Female Vagrant (1798), the impoverished, anguished
heroines are war widows. Their husbands had died fighting for their
country, but the response of an uncaring society is neglect for their
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widows. Once again their distress is not the result of personal
improvidence. Wordsworth often used this image of the female outcast
or pauper as a potent symbol of poverty. In a society where women
were largely dependent on men for material support, their descent into
poverty was particularly unjust because it was almost always inflicted
upon them irrespective of their own merits. The case of the female
pauper stood as proof that poverty was most often caused by external
circumstance. Poverty was the result of exploitation or neglect by
government and employers:
Send this man to the mine, this to the battle,
Famish an aged beggar at your gates,
' And let him die by inches - but for worlds
Lift not your hand against him.73
It was this use and abuse of the people in society and in war that
impoverished them.
Wordsworth depicted poverty as a struggle for survival involving
constant physical and mental anguish. In this oppressive state all
natural domestic, moral affections were impossible. When people acted
in an immoral or irresponsible fashion this was not so much a cause of
poverty, as its result. As Godwin had argued in Political Justice, it
was external circumstance which conditioned so much of man's life and
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character. In a poetic fragment of 1797, Wordsworth described how a
baker's cart passed by a mother and her family of five. They could not
afford the bread and so it was as if 'there had been/No bread in all the
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land', so completely were they ignored. In a country of plenty the
poor were uncared for and deprived of the sustenance they had a right to
expect. The experience hardens the woman's character and makes her
rebellious:
She said: 'that waggon does not care for us' -
The words were simple, but her look and voice
Made up their meaning, and bespoke a mind
Which being long neglected, and denied
The common food of hope, was now become
Sick and extravagant, - by strong access
Of momentary pangs driven to that state
In which all past experience melts away,
And the rebellious heart to its own will
Fashions the laws of nature.76
A government and society which treated the poor in this way and
neglected their rightful claims to an adequate standard of living bred
a class of people who were divorced from the salutary experiences of
r
that society. They were forced to live 'unnatural' lives, ma^inalised
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from all social habits, traditions and moral values. They created
their own laws rather than obey the natural laws of society. Outside
the usual social norms, they were a potentially rebellious group.
Thus, the social and moral cohesion of society was dependent on every
section of the population having an adequate standard of living: 'The
domestic affections will always be strong amongst men who live in a
country not crowded with population, if these men are placed above
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poverty'. The welfare of the poor was not just a humanitarian concern
for all governments, but a necessary precondition for maintaining the
moral values and social unity of the nation.
Wordsworth believed that the Poor Lawwas totally inadequate as a
response to this challenge. Workhouses and soup kitchens had weakened
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rather than strengthened 'the bonds of domestic feeling among the poor'.
At best, these were palliatives, not real solutions, to the problem:
The evil would be the less to be regretted, if these
institutions were regarded only as palliatives to a
disease; but the vanity and pride of their promoters
are so subtly interwoven with them, that they are
deemed great discoveries and blessings to humanity.
The Poor Law only aided those who had sunk so low that they had no other
hope left; the real solution was to prevent these people falling into
poverty in the first place by giving them a just wage for the work they
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did. The meagre wage (or 'property') of the poor was sacred and it
was the duty of the government to ensure that they were paid a sufficient
wage to live comfortably. The shepherd, in The Last of the Flock, should
not have had to wait until he was destitute before receiving help, but
should have been awarded adequate recompense while in the process of
building up his flock. The poor should not be compelled to remain in
a dependent position all their lives, relying on Poor Laws and the help
of others. It was vital for the dignity and self-respect of every man
that he should himself be able to act charitably towards others. This
fundamental right of each human being was denied to the poor because
they themselves were always consigned to a dependent role in society:
man is dear to man: the poorest poor
Long for some moments in a weary life
When they can know and feel that they have been
Themselves the fathers and the dealers out
Of some small blessings, have been kind to such
As needed kindness, for this single cause,
That we have all of us one human heart.
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All men, therefore, were entitled to an adequate reward for their
labours so that they could live comfortably, act morally and be able to
bestow acts of kindness on others and thus be humanised. In The Prelude,
Wordsworth wistfully recalled how he had believed, in the early 1790's,
that, through the Revolution and the setting up of the Republic this
dream would come to fruition. Addressing his Girondin friend, Beaupuy:
I with him believed
Devoutly that a spirit was abroad
Which could not be withstood, that poverty,
At least like this, would in a little time
Be found no more, that we should see the earth
Unthwarted in her wish to recompense
The industrious, and the lowly child of toil.
And this was all dependent on establishing a republic:
the people having a strong hand
In making their own laws, whence better days
To all mankind.®^
Although by the time he wrote this, in 1805, Wordsworth had seen these
hopes confounded, the goal still remained. Even if he had, by then,
postponed the inception of a republic and placed his trust in a government
run by small land-owners and farmers, Wordsworth still believed that the
alleviation of poverty was their prime political duty. Their strong
regard for domestic moral values and the national welfare ensured that
this type of government would be the most reliable, and best-equipped,
for fighting the poverty which threatened to erode those moral
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affections. Once this had been accomplished, the lower orders themselves
could begin to enter the political process.
The welfare of the poor was also a constant concern for Coleridge,
though he was more interested in causes and solutions than in depicting
the effects of poverty like Wordsworth. Coleridge also argued that the
poor themselves were not to blame for their condition. Instead, he
attacked the government's oppressive taxes and those employers who used
the poor to make war-time profits. The poor were kept in a lowly
condition so that others might grow rich on their misfortune:
The people overloaded and oppressed with taxes and
other misfortunes are called upon to subscribe literally
in defence of their country, and the example set is that
of miserable sums from men wallowing in the spoils of the
public; men whom war pampers, and whose prosperity is
commensurate with the general distress.®^
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Thus, Coleridge argued that the prosperity of the upper classes was
built on the poverty of the people. They were exploited without pity
whether at home or as common-fodder in the war - the servants of an
uncaring nation. Indeed, in his 1795 Bristol Lectures, Coleridge had
argued that war service was regarded by the government as one solution
to unemployment for it excused them from expending effort to find a
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real cure.
Throughout the 1790's Coleridge also attacked those monopolists
and speculators who had thrived in war-time and who had the backing of
the government. They too exploited the poor for their own profit.
They had hoarded grain in order to keep prices high and to make a large
profit rather than sell it at a lower price and so help feed the poor:
We should have supposed, that if bread were cheap,
the only result would be, that the people, who are now
but half-fed, would then have their belly-full, and that
those who have now enough would employ the spare money
in adding to their meals the rarities of beef and mutton.
What the monopolists saw as an opportunity for making extra gain should
have been seen as an opportunity to provide the poor with a better diet.
Like Wordsworth, Coleridge believed that in a land of plenty, the poor
were being denied their rightful share of the national produce. It
should be noted however that Coleridge did waver in his opinion on this
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controversial debate about the grain shortages facing the poor. He
recognised that there were some genuine shortages of food caused by bad
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weather and exacerbated by a rise in population. It was not all
attributable to the actions of the monopolists, though he believed that,
at the very least, they made the situation worse by their selfish actions.'
Coleridge therefore isolated the government, employers and monopolists
as the chief perpetrators of poverty. The government had also contributed,
indirectly, to their poverty, by denying the people an education. Indeed,
in 1796, Coleridge had argued that this lack of education was a deliberate
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ploy to keep the poor in a subservient and submissive position. It
meant that they had no possibility of improving their status or condition
in society. If the poor were denied all the comforts of life and the
means to rise above their lot, they would only ever be ignorant and
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brutish, lacking all those circumstances of life that humanise mankind.
People could not be expected to live for ever in this hand-to-mouth
fashion, seizing only the gratifications of the moment. They needed an
adequate standard of living in order to be happy and so that the moral
and domestic affections could thrive. Otherwise, family bonds were
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severed and they became rivals for their own meals. In these crucial
circumstances even the arrival of a new baby in the family could tip a
household into dire poverty and be a cause for distress rather than
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joy. Thus, Coleridge, like Wordsworth, saw poverty as a morally
debilitating and socially divisive condition. He also could see the
danger that poverty, by loosening moral values, might lead the poor
into crime. In punishing these criminals the government was, in fact,
sentencing people for crimes ultimately caused by that same government's
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lack of interest in the condition of the poor.
The efforts which government did make to alleviate poverty were
inadequate or inappropriate. Like Wordsworth, Coleridge regarded the
Poor Law as a palliative, not a remedy. It murdered the poor by degrees,
giving them just enough to survive, but not enough to live in dignity
or comfort. The Poor Law was not an honourable way of dealing with
poverty but a veneer which hid the real problem:
And what mean these Committees for the labouring poor?
These numerous soup-establishments? These charities so
kindly and industriously set on foot through the whole
kingdom? All these are highly honourable to the rich
of this country! But are they equally honourable to
the nation at large? - Is that a genuine prosperity,
in which healthy labourers are commonly styled 'the
labouring poor' and industrious manufacturers obliged
to be fed, like Roman clients, or Neapolitan Lazzaroni?
This article of 1800, which itself echoes previous lectures and articles
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by Coleridge in 1795 and 1796, reveals the consistency of his opposition
to contemporary measures for helping the poor. The Poor Law merely
salved the conscience of the rich, but it did little to alleviate poverty.
Coleridge drew attention to the fact that labourers and industrious
workers could still, despite their efforts, be sunk in poverty. The
phrase 'labouring poor', used to describe this class,should properly be
a contradiction in terms, but it was all too appropriate. The poor were
no longer a small part of society, they were the labouring class and,
despite their industry, they still suffered the indignity of being
dependent on the charity of the upper classes. This was no true national
solution to the problem of poverty.
Coleridge was equally critical of Pitt's attempt at reform in his
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Poor Bill of 1797, which Coleridge termed, 'that acknowledged abortion -
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that unanswerable evidence of his ignorance'. He regarded it as a
mere patchwork of ideas, incoherent and unoriginal, thrown together
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without any real grasp of the real problems created by poverty.
Coleridge believed that if there was peace, then the economy would
prosper unhampered and the resulting material benefits could be
distributed more fairly so that everyone could enjoy a more comfortable
living. The government had a positive role to play in this, but, under
Pitt, this had been neglected and the social welfare of the nation, which
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was the prime duty of government, had been ignored.
Although Coleridge no longer considered the pantisocratic ideal of
communal property, communal produce and equality of condition to be a
practical way of alleviating proverty and distress, he did believe that
the government had to ensure a fairer reward for the people's labour
and had to care more for the poor. It was their Christian duty to see
that everyone received a fairer share of the fruits of the earth. In a
Morning Post article of 1798, Coleridge enqui red, in rhetorical style,
3. Whether extreme poverty does not necessarily
produce laziness?
A. Whether, therefore, to provide plentifully for the
swinish multitude be not feeding the root, the juices
from which will spring upwards into the branches, and
cause the top to flourish?
5. When the root yieldeth insufficient nourishment,
whether wise men would not wish to top the tree, in
order to make the lower branches thrive?
6. Whether hungry cattle do not leap over bounds?
7. Whether there might not have been suggested modes
of employing two hundred millions of money to more
beneficial purposes than to the murder of three millions
of our fellow-creatures?1®®
In this passage Coleridge counters conservative views of the 'swinish
multitude' (Burke's phrase, used satirically). Coleridge argues that
the poor are not lazy, but should be given better rewards and incentives
for their work. Indeed, if this were done then the whole of society
(the tree, from root to topmost branches) would flourish all the more
strongly. Coleridge also argued that if there was not sufficient wealth
to reward the poor adequately from the existing system, then there would
have to be some redistribution in the economy, taking from the rich (the
top of the tree) to give to the lower orders. The war had been an
unnecessary drain on resources which could have been used more profitably
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to better the conditions of the poor rather than be used for the
slaughter of their fellow man. In question 6, he suggests that, if
something is not done to reward the people adequately, society runs the
risk of disruption. Even out of self-interest, therefore, the government
would be well advised to attend to the welfare of the poor. Indeed,
when this article first appeared in The Watchman, Coleridge recommended
that, in Parliament, at least one week in every month should be devoted
to discussing 'schemes for the national benefit'.^1
But Coleridge always believed in the efficacy of individual actions
as well as the need for government aid. It was man's Christian duty to
be amongst the poor, helping and educating them. Each little individual
act of kindness was worthwhile and was in the true Christian spirit.
He urged that it was man's moral duty to be concerned for the poor and
1 02
distressed, and to help them. Although a truly national solution could
never be achieved until the people received an adequate wage, it was still
possible for each person in the community to act on an individual basis
to further the welfare of all.
Although the philosophical basis of their political ideas had shifted
by the end of the century and they viewed radical methods with a more
critical eye, it is evident that Wordsworth and Coleridge still centred
their politics upon the common people and their welfare. Their idea of
a constitution had been modified to meet the conditions of existing
society; the rights which this constitution guaranteed, were social
rights or duties; their political philosophy was based on morality,
habit and feeling as much as on reason; but they still had as their
goal an extended democracy, purified of corruption, whose most important
function was to serve the wishes, and further the welfare, of the people,
particularly its poorest sections.
The events of 1802, in many ways even more traumatic than those of
1798, were to expose the tensions between the new conservative and old
radical elements in this philosophy. The attempt to evolve a more
democratic constitution from the existing state of society had necessarily
involved the acceptance of some of that society's values. The events of
1802 were to confirm these traditional values as the most cherished and
dependable of all. The Burkean elements, already evident in some of their
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thinking, were to become manifest. In the years after 1802 it was the
existing national constitution which seemed the most perfect and the most
worthy of defence. Wordsworth's and Coleridge's quest for a new home
for their political ideas, begun in 1797, was now to become a journey
back to their own home - the British nation.
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SECTION II
THE DEFENCE OF THE NATION AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1802 - 1818
CHAPTER IV
BRITAIN'S MORAL WAR
Just as the events of 1798 had been instrumental in distancing
Wordsworth and Coleridge from radicalism and in causing them to re¬
define the basis of their political beliefs, so the events of 1802/03
were to help complete this ideological process. The conservative elements
which had already emerged in their philosophy were now to be confirmed
as the most reliable and valuable. As the radical movement went into
retreat for most of the war, Wordsworth and Coleridge found it less
necessary to answer its case and, instead, developed their political
philosophy in response to the views of Burke, who now seemed the most
percipient voice of the previous decade.
Both writers treated the precarious Peace of Amiens as a time of
experiment. It would finally prove whether French democratic ideals only
needed favourable, peaceful conditions to flourish again or if they were
intrinsically weak and flawed. When democracy failed to revive under
Napoleon and the government became more authoritarian than ever, it was
not just Napoleon who was perceived as a disappointment; the republican
system, which had originally set France on this tyrannical course, now
seemed intrinsically flawed and limited. The war, which resumed in 1803,
took on a new moral aspect. Despotic France, and all radical philosophies
emanating from that land, was cast in the role of absolute Evil, while
Britain was transformed into the avenging Angel of God. The course of
the Napoleonic War was to confirm, for Wordsworth and Coleridge, that
the most dependable, stable political system was that which was already
enjoyed by Britain herself. It had withstood despotism for more than a
century; it had ensured liberty and it had proved itself adaptable to
changes in British society. The two writers thus relinquished their
attempt to engraft a democratic system onto existing society and, instead,
with nationalistic fervour and conviction, they embraced that society
and its traditional political system. It seemed the most perfect system
that Britain, or any other nation, could expect to enjoy.
This section will demonstrate how Wordsworth and Coleridge arrived
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at this conclusion and how they defended what they had once attacked -
the national constitution.
Public events during the Napoleonic War helped to shape the
political philosophy of Wordsworth and Coleridge, but the force of
that impact can only be fully understood when weighed against the
personal experiences of the two poets. These years were marked by
private loss and tragedy and, finally, by the disintegration of their
friendship.1
The period started promisingly enough for Wordsworth when he married
Mary Hutchinson on 4 October 1802 (the same day on which Coleridge had
chosen to marry Sara Fricker in 1795). But then, only three years later,
Wordsworth's beloved brother, John, died at sea and this was followed,
in 1812, by the death of two of his children, Catherine and Thomas. The
effect of these traumatic events was compounded by personal anxiety.
Although the Lyrical Ballads had gone through several successful editions,
Wordsworth's wartime writing, such as the Poems of 1807 and the Convention
of Cintra pamphlet, sold very indifferently. The first version of his
greatest work, The Prelude, was completed in 1805, but it was never
published in his own lifetime. Wordsworth (and Coleridge) suffered a
barrage of invective from the influential Whiggish periodical,the
Edinburgh Review, which attacked them on aesthetic grounds, but also for
their political apostacy. These setbacks deeply upset Wordsworth and
they were made worse by his own fears that his creative powers were in
decline. His intense feeling of communion with Nature seemed to have
faded. He believed that he could no longer sense things so deeply; his
'visionary gleam' had dimmed. In his Ode: Intimations of Immortality
(1802-04), he charted his declining powers:
There was a time when meadow, grove, and stream,
The earth, and every common sight,
To me did seem
Apparelled in celestial light,
The glory and the freshness of a dream.
It is not now as it hath been of yore; -
Turn wheresoe'er I may,
By night or day, 2
The things which I have seen I now can see no more.
Consequently, Wordsworth believed he had gained a less illusioned view
of life, but he had lost his old feeling for Nature and, with it, much
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of his earlier optimism and idealism. His political ideas were now also
to be characterised by a greater sense of pragmatism, and the earlier
notion of an improved world was lost.
Amid these disappointments in his life, Wordsworth turned more and
more to the solace of religion. The certainties and traditions of the
Church of England held a new appeal for Wordsworth, as did all the other
established institutions of English life. Wordsworth also found comfort
and friendship among a new circle of upper and middle rank acquaintances
who were mostly government supporters. In 1803 the new head of the
Lowther family paid off his £8,000 debt to the Wordsworth family and,
in the years that followed, Wordsworth became a close friend of the
Lowthers. He accepted a position as Distributor of Stamps for the area,
and, in 1818, he vigorously campaigned for the Lowther candidates in the
Westmorland election. This gravitation towards more congenial,
conservatively-minded friends, is also reflected in Wordsworth's topo¬
graphical progress from the poor, cramped conditions at Dove Cottage
to the greater comforts of Allan Bank and Grasmere Rectory, and then,
finally, to the relative grandeur of his house at Rydal Mount, which was
leased to him by Lady Fleming. The Ambleside gentry, rather than the
Grasmere poor, now formed his social milieu. All these developments
conspired to draw Wordsworth to a conservative view of politics, which
he held with increasing conviction, as he grew older, and became less
tolerant of different opinions. In the midst of personal tragedy and
anxiety, the reliable, time-honoured institutions and verities of the
British constitution seemed like a rock of stability and truth.
These years were, however, much worse for his friend Coleridge.
By 1802, Coleridge's ill-advised marriage had become untenable and,
though he loved his children, he and his wife were unhappy and they
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increasingly lived apart. Coleridge was ill much of the time and had
become addicted to opium. Like Wordsworth, he could no longer feel the
inspiring force of Nature. His creative and visionary powers had waned
and in Dejection: An Ode (1802), he charts his decline in similar terms
to Wordsworth:
Those stars, that glide behind them or between,
Now sparkling, now bedimmed, but always seen:
Yon crescent Moon, as fixed as if it grew
In its own cloudless, starless lake of blue;
I see them all so excellently fair,
I see, not feel, how beautiful they are!
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Coleridge could only see natural forms now, he could not feel their
inspirational force. In the years after 1802, he too was to draw his
inspiration more and more from the powers of organised religion.
5
Increasingly this alone guided and elevated his soul. Similarly he
argued that the constitution could only be securely grounded in the
precepts of religious faith.
The disintegration of Coleridge's poetic powers, after 1802, was
to be more absolute than Wordsworth's. Dejection was one of his last
great poems and, thereafter, he wrote only occasional verse. Realising
that Wordsworth was the greater poet, he left the field to him, in order
to concentrate on prose works, particularly journalism and works on
political philosophy. In The Friend (1809) he stated,
that for some years I have felt and deeply felt,
that the Poet's high Functions were not my proper
assignment ... I am content and gratified, that Spenser,
Shakespeare, Hilton, have not been born in vain for me:
and I feel it as a Blessing, that even among my
Contemporaries I know one at least [i.e. Wordsworth],
who has been deemed worthy of the gift.^
Although Coleridge appears to view this change in a spirit of equanimity,
he still perceived it as another failing in himself. He was depressed
that he had had to abandon the highest art of all, and the indifferent
reception to his political philosophical journal, The Friend, offered
little succour. In this time of uncertainty and the loss of his old
role, Coleridge also sought comfort in the traditional values and
stability of Britain's constitutional system.
Coleridge's visits abroad also convinced him of the superiority of
the British system, as well as the wisdom of waging war against France.
While Wordsworth became even more settled in the Lakes, Coleridge left
for the Continent in 1804 and spent fifteen months in Malta, in the
service of the government, under the governor of the island, Sir
Alexander Ball. There, and in his subsequent wanderings around Europe,
Coleridge witnessed, at first hand, the effects of the war and of
British policy. He gained a knowledge of the European political scene
analfgous to that of Wordsworth in his European excursions in 1790 and
1792. In the fortified harbour at Valetta, the French threat was palpable
and Coleridge gained an understanding of the realities of war. This
helped him identify strongly with the policy of the British government and
it strengthened his nationalistic spirit. In the face of a tangible enemy,
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Coleridge began to cherish his homeland, its government, society and
constitution. Malta proved to be the safe anchorage for Coleridge's
burgeoning conservatism.
The restless wanderings and insecurity of Coleridge's life during
the war did, however, lead him to adopt a less parochial stance than
Wordsworth and cften enabled him to see beyond the limits of Britain's
constitutional structure.
Perhaps the greatest trauma which affected both poets was the
disintegration of their friendship. Wordsworth and Coleridge had begun
the new century closer than ever before, living near to each other in
the Lakes, publishing the Lyrical Ballads and discussing together much
of their political and artistic output. Coleridge was one of the few
to read The Prelude (1805) in Wordsworth's own lifetime and, when he
went to Malta, he carried a hand-written volume of his friend's poems,
7
including the five book version of The Prelude, dedicated to himself.
In the years ahead, Coleridge continued to encourage Wordsworth to compose
a great epic, a philosophical poem - the uncompleted Recluse. Coleridge
also planned a 'magnum opus' which would encapsulate his views on society,
g
government and morality. Thus, the same animus inspired both writers.
During the war years they believed that they had reached the point where
they could express, in final form, their complete political and philo¬
sophical system. Politics formed only one aspect of this attempt to see
life as one interrelated whole: it was to become part of a wider moral
vision of the world.
Although Wordsworth and Coleridge continued to have similar aims
and principles, their friendship was not sustained. Wordsworth's
Convention of Cintra pamphlet and Coleridge's Letters on the Spaniards,
both published in 1809, were the last works on which they closely
collaborated. Strains had already developed between the two writers
after Coleridge's return from Malta in 1806. Wordsworth was shocked
and saddened by his friend's physical deterioration through opium
9
addiction, and Coleridge felt increasingly uncomfortable in the atmos¬
phere of moral rectitude which seemed to pervade the Wordsworth household.
To an extent, Wordsworth's view of Coleridge's fall from grace echoes
his feelings of disappointment and disillusion in the course of the
French Republic. It, too, had ended in failure, decay and immorality.
Wordsworth's rather patronising reactionto his friend's afflictions mirrors
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his change to a more generally paternalistic outlook, and towards an
elitist, morally absolute stance in politics. The final break came in
1810 when these underlying tensions were released as Wordsworth confided
a few disparaging remarks about Coleridge to a mutual friend, Basil
Montague, who subsequently repeated them to Coleridge himself. Although
the friendship was to be patched up two years later, they were never to
be so close again and, it will be seen that, although their political
philosophies still proceeded along similar paths, there was not the same
collaboration or agreement as there had been before. By 1818 Wordsworth
identified much more strongly with the Tory party than Coleridge, who
remained, till the end of his life, the more sceptical outsider who was
readier to embrace social and political change. Wordsworth's increasingly
conventional life in the Lakes led him to accept a settled party position
and a narrower, more parochial stance. Coleridge's alienated life
abroad, and in London, predisposed him to adopt a more independent
position: a philosophy which was more cosmopolitan and dynamic, yet
still essentially conservative.
These personal experiences of Wordsworth and Coleridge coloured
their perception of national events. At the very moment, when the two
poets were in their most depressed state, the ambitious conduct of
Napoleon caused them to renounce their remaining hopes in France and in
republicanism itself. It appeared that Burke's predictions, about the
inevitability of military despotism occurring in France, had been well
founded. Republicanism, which had spawned such a tyrant, had proved to
be a false philosophy and they turned instead to the Burkean defence
of the existing constitution. Their political hopes and ideals turned
homewards and, like the majority of their countrymen, they supported the
government and its war policy. During these years the radical movement
was to decline not just because of government repression or internal
weakness, but because most people, like Wordsworth and Coleridge,
believed that the validity of the conservative case had been confirmed
by the increasingly despotic course of the republican experiment in
France. It was difficult for radicals to sustain affection for republic¬
anism when it seemed to have produced imperial absolutism and military
10
aggression.
Wordsworth had always been more sceptical of Napoleon's pacific
intentions than Coleridge. Therefore, when peace was finally signed in
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1802, Wordsworth entertained few hopes for its lasting success. Far
from being genuinely committed to the Peace of A:m iens, he believed
Napoleon would use it as a breathing space to regroup his forces and
prepare for a further extens ion of his oppressive empire. With France
under his hypnotic sway, Napoleon was a force for evil:
When, looking on the present face of things,
I see one man, of men the meanest too!
Raised up to sway the world, to do, undo.
With mighty Nations for his underlings.1''
Although Wordsworth still believed Britain was far from perfect, she was
the only nation capable of opposing and defeating the evil power of
12
France. Events on the Continent, during the peace, reinforced Wordsworth's
view of Napoleon. The independence of Switzerland was again subverted,
designs were made on Egypt, Syria, the Greek Islands and Malta, and a
French army was maintained in the Netherlands, the origin of the conflict
in 1792. In the face of these provocations, Wordsworth argued that a
resumption of war was the only way of securing a more permanent, stable
peace.
The continuation of Napoleon's ambitious schemes and the failure
of the Peace did not surprise Wordsworth, but merely removed any linger¬
ing doubts he had that the war had been justly prosecuted by Britain
since the French invasion of Switzerland in 1798:
This just and necessary war, as we have been accustomed
to hear it styled from the beginning of the contest in
the year 1793, had, some time before the Treaty of Amiens,
viz. after the subjugation of Switzerland, and not till
then, begun to be regarded by the body of the people, as
indeed both just and necessary; and this justice and
necessity were by none more clearly perceived, or more
feelingly bewailed, than by those who had most eagerly
opposed the war in its commencement, and who continued
most bitterly to regret that this nation had ever borne
a part of it.1^
The change in Wordsworth's political views had already begun before 1802,
but the resumption of France's imperial designs, in that year, did
completely dash any residual hopes Wordsworth might still have harboured.
It hardened his anti-French sentiments and helped him identify, rationally
and emotionally, with Britain's cause in the war. Britain was no longer
seen as the baser of the two evils, but as a positive force against evil.
The events of the Peace removed all Wordsworth's doubts and he committed
himself wholeheartedly to Britain's cause after 1803. His more complex
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view of the conflict had hardened into a stark, morally polarised
vision, which was to have a profound effect on his political ideas.
Coleridge's reaction to the failure of the Peace of Amiens was
much more extreme than Wordsworth's, although the final effect was to
be similar. Unlike Wordsworth, he had continued, up until 1802, to
support the Foxite case for peace in the hope that, under Napoleon,
France would return to the libertarian ideals of the early revolution.
1 A
Coleridge viewed the Peace of Amiens as an 'experiment', which would
finally prove if Napoleon was the harbinger of democracy and social
justice, or merely an ambitious tyrant. The actions of Napoleon during)
the peace proved the latter case, and Coleridge's reaction was one of
stuined horror and profound disappointment. He had ceased to write for
the Morning Post over the Summer of 1802, but, when he resumed in
September, there was a noticeable change in the tone of his articles.
Although he could still be critical of the British government, he mainly
attacked France and Napoleon in a trenchant manner, and campaigned for
an immediate resumption of war against a power which seemed implacably
evil, ambitious and belligerent. Britain had gained nothing from the
Peace, whereas Napoleon had gained time to increase his forces, stealthily
1 5
extend his power and prepare for the resumption of war. Like Wordsworth,
Coleridge came to the conclusion that Napoleon's actions had rendered
war both necessary and just:
What can render a war just, presupposing it to be
expedient, if insult, alarm and danger do not? and
how is it conceivable, that it can be expedient for
a rich, united and powerful Island-Empire to remain in
peace with an insolent neighbour, who has proved to it,
that to insult, alarm and endanger it is both its temper,
and its system? This appears to me the true state of ^
the quarrel between Great Britain and the First Consul.
Coleridge believed that, even although Napoleon's aggressions in
1802/03 were not directed against Britain herself, they constituted part
of a much wider attack on liberty and morality which did involve Britain
and all free nations. Indeed, he argued that the entire French political
system was now inimical to virtue and thus 'any one of these aggressions
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involves the meaning of the whole'. Coleridge fully endorsed the
resumption of war in 1803 as a necessary action to protect, not only
Britain's independence, but also free values throughout Europe. France
now seemed irredeemably despotic and war, therefore, appeared the only
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way of achieving lasting peace. As he often noted, the route towards
an ideal could sometimes only be achieved by using methods which were
contrary in spirit to the original ideal, but which were nevertheless
. . 18
pragmatic.
As always, then, the actions of Napoleon had proved to be instru¬
mental in changing Coleridge's political thinking. His last hopes in
France were destroyed and he now doubted the efficacy of a democratic
system which had produced another tyrant. After 1802 he began to identify
more strongly with the government's policy and attacked his old friends,
the Foxite Whigs, for continuing to oppose war. He started writing for
the gpvernment news paper, the Courier, in 1804. He was grateful that
peace-time events had taught the people about France's true despotic
intentions and had now made most of the nation unanimous in their support
1 9
of the government and its rightful resumption of war. Coleridge was
always to be proud of the fact that he had been one of the first to
recognise the peace as false, and to warn the public of French ambitions.
He later claimed that his articles in 1802 and 1803 had been instrumental
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in awakening the nation and preparing it for a renewal of the war.
Indeed, by 1810, he not only claimed that he had been the government's
most percipient supporter, but also that he had never entertained any
hopes that Napoleon would be the saviour of French liberty - the position
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which he had indeed held before 1802.
The result of the 'experimental' peace therefore was a final confirm¬
ation of Wordsworth's growing doubts about France and a reversal of
Coleridge's previous hopes. Both writers now became supporters of the
government and its war policy. Their patriotic spirit, which had been
restrained by radical sympathies, was now given full rein. They began
to see new worth in the stable, time-honoured British constitution and
praised the nation with a greater moral certainty.
After 1803, Wordsworth and Coleridge supported the British war effort
in a manner that was similar to their support for the French in 1792/93.
They believed it was a defensive war to protect liberty and moral values.
Both writers did recognise, however, that the mere resumption of war did
not automatically make Britain a moral force. Although Britain opposed
the evil of France, this did not necessarily mean that she was a conscious
force for good. As the war progressed, however, Wordsworth and Coleridge
believed that the conflict did indeed improve the morality of Britain
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and convert her into a positive, virtuous force in the world. This was
to be a most important idea for it convinced them that if the policy
of the British government was moral, so must be the traditional
constitutional principles which inspired it and which it protected.
Wordsworth believed that although Britain had shown little sense
of morality in signing the Peace of Amiens with a tyrannical power, her
moral spirit began to revive once war was recommenced in 1803. It was
not, however, until Britain became involved in the Penin'sular Campaign,
that Wordsworth believed she had ceased merely to oppose evil and had
become a conscious, positive force for good. In the course of helping
the Portuguese and the Spaniards to recover their liberty, Britain herself
regained her old moral spirit and virtuous principles. In his pamphlet,
The Convention of Cintra (1809), Wordsworth explained how the war had
taken on a new moral direction for Britain, when she became involved in
the Peninsular Campaign:
from that moment 'this corruptible put onincorruption,
and this mortal put on immortality'. This sudden
elevation was on no account more welcome - was by nothing
more endeared, than by the returning sense which accompanied
it of inward liberty and choice, which gratified our
moral yearnings, inasmuch as it would give henceforward to
our actions as a people, an origination and direction
unquestionably moral - as it was free .... We were
intellectualised also in proportion; we looked backward
upon the records of the human race with pride, and, instead
of being afraid, we delighted to look forward into futurity.
It was imagined that this new-born spirit of resistance,
rising from the most sacred feelings of the human heart,
would diffuse itself through many countries.^
Thus involvement in the Peninsular War moralised Britain and strengthened
her link with the finest traditions of her past so that she could progress
with greater stability and confidence. Just as the French had hoped to
export their libertarian principles in the initial stages of the
Revolutionary War, so Wordsworth believed that Britain would be able
to diffuse her newly-recovered moral spirit and principles throughout
Europe during the course of the war.
By 1809 Wordsworth was convinced that the war had become a moral
crusade. It was not just a struggle against evil, but also a means of
promoting the moral enlightenment of Europe as a whole, including France
23
herself. The despotic designs of France in Spain had vividly dramatised
the moral dimension of the conflict to Britain. In Wordsworth's eyes,
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the war had ceased to be a political or military affair, but was,
essentially, a moral struggle for the soul of Europe, with Britain
cast in the principal role of God's own avenging Angel. Ultimate
triumph would belong to right, rather than might, and it was Britain
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that had been given 'the exterminating sword' of justice. Wordsworth
increasingly saw the conflict in medieval, chivalric terms which
prefigure his feudal-paternalistic view of society and politics in
these years. In this moral crusade, the British army, or knight,
seemed predestined to triumph. Her victory in 1815 is viewed, by
Wordsworth, in his Thanksgiving Ode, as an inevitable outcome:
Have we not conquered? - by the vengeful sword?
Ah no, by dint of Magnanimity;
That curbed the baser passions, and left free
A loyal band to follow their liege lord
Clear-sighted Honour, and his staid Compeers
Along a track of most unnatural years;
In execution of heroic deeds
Whose memory, spotless as the crystal beads
Of morning dew upon the untrodden meads,
Shall live enrolled above the starry spheres.
He, who in concert with an earthly string
Of Britain's acts would sing,
He with enraptured voice will tell
Of one whose spirit no reverse could quell.
Indeed, in the final years of the war, Wordsworth became almost
fanatical in his support of Britain. Far from the pacific stance he
had once upheld in the 1790's, he now gloried in war, provided it was
in the service of just, moral principles. He believed that a martial
spirit was vital if a nation was to be vigilant in defending its values,
independence and freedom:
no people ever was or can be, independent, free or
secure, much less great, in any sane application ^
of the word, without a cultivation of military values.
Wordsworth now regarded a martial spirit as an indicator of a moral
spirit. He also followed the Harringtonian argument that a standing
army was vital to the sustenance of the free, independent nation of
freeholders, which he now favoured. Wordsworth did not merely tolerate
war as a regrettable, but necessary means for defeating the evil of
France, as he had done at the turn of the century. By 1815 he also
gloried in war itself and argued that death in combat was the highest
duty one could perform for one's country:
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Ye slight not life - to God and Nature true;
But death, becoming death, is dearer far,
When duty bids you bleed in open war. '
Death on the battlefield has, here, an intrinsic validity and
nobility which it had never been accorded in Wordsworth's earlier
verse.
Wordsworth was so convinced of the overriding morality of Britain's
war effort, that he sometimes exalted it in rather sickening terms,
as in his infamous Ode: 1815, where the moral ends of the conflict
are superceded by an obsession with its bloody means. The moral
absolutism of Wordsworth's political philosophy, here, attained its
ultimate expression. God used the soldiers of Britain to destro'y Evil
in a final, bloody apocalypse which would restore God's peaceful
kingdom on earth:
But Thy most dreaded instrument,
In working out a pure intent,
To Man - arra yed for mutual slaughter,
- Yea, Carnage is thy daughter!28
In these lines, deleted thirty years later, in 1845, Wordsworth shows
his hysterical support for the British army as the direct agent of an
Old Testament God. He suggests the natural condition of man is
belligerence and the militaristic tone of the poem reinforces the
feeling that Wordsworth now regarded the war not as a means to a
moral end, but as a divine end in itself. Not surprisingly, these
particular lines and Wordsworth's general view of the war caused much
controversy, especially among the younger generation of Romantic poets.
The passage inspired Shelley to write his satirical poem, Peter Bell
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the Third (1819). . Wordsworth not only seemed to have sunk himself
in a nationalistic defence of the war, but also to have, temporarily,
lost his humanitarian spirit. His argument in support of the war was,
no longer, that it had to have a moral end, rather it was that Britain
had become the moral agent of God on earth and, therefore, any cause
she pursued was necessarily moral and just.
In October 1802, when the French army entered Switzerland, the
Morning Post reprinted Coleridge's poem, Fears in Solitude (now re-
titled Fears of Solitude), which had been composed during the
similar events of 1798. Coleridge's alterations to this poem, however,
show that he was no longer just disillusioned with France, but had
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turned decisively against her as an evil power, in favour of Britain's
more virtuous stance. He omitted all but lines 129-197 of the
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original poem, thus removing all the strictures on the low standard
of British morals and government. There emerges, instead, a one-
dimensional, anti-French poem, issued only a few months into the peace,
but calling for Britain to wage war in a morally pure spirit. The
struggle is no longer a balanced one between the two flawed, ambitious
nations fighting an unnecessary, damaging war. Coleridge now sees
the conflict in morally absolute terms. France was an evil, despotic
power and the war against her was, therefore, a moral conflict for the
preservation of Christian principles. The war had become not only
expedient, but also morally imperative:
We shall attempt, therefore, to prove, that on the
presumption of its expedience, the war is morally just;
secondly that it _is expedient, and consequently, that
the war is both just and wise, not only morally, but
likewise politically, just.
Just as Napoleon's leadership had been instrumental in maintaining
Coleridge's hopes in France before 1802, so his subsequent actions in
peace and war played a major role in shaping Coleridge's moral view of
the conflict and in strengthening his patriotism. Coleridge believed
that Napoleon had proved himself to be not only an ambitious, despotic
ruler and an implacable enemy of Britain, but that he was also Evil
Incarnate: the universal enemy of civilisation, freedom and moral
values. He was the Devil himself, waging a war to gain the soul of the
world and he used the French as his evil disciples:
For assuredly against Heaven doth that man wage war,
whose whole career is in defiance of all the principles
which alone give a meaning to our erect form, and entitle
us to look toward Heaven as to our natural and destined
country .3 2
Napoleon threatened the salvation of all mankind and was 'the enemy of
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the human race'. It was Napoleon's threat to moral values, rather
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than his military might, which was ultimately to be feared most.
In Coleridge's eyes, it was the unique Devilish aspect of Napoleon's
leadership which transformed their war into a more universal, religious
struggle between the forces of good and evil.
Like Wordsworth, however, Coleridge recognised that Britain's
opposition to the evil of France after 1803 did not necessarily mean
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that she was fighting for moral values and principles. Coleridge
believed that the Peace of Amiens had failed because it did not address
the fundamental moral issues which Napoleon's tyranny had raised.
During 1802 and 1803 Britain had merely abandoned principle in the
hope of gaining peace at any price - this could never be a true,
lasting peace. Coleridge argued that, thereafter, Britain had to
recover her old moral spirit and positively fight for virtue and not
just respond to a military threat. He claimed that 'there can be no
hope of successful resistance, but in an equal union of all the Virtues
35
of the human character'. Britain had to become morally armed, in a
conscious way, in order to win and secure peace. Like Wordsworth,
Coleridge believed that Britain's participation in the Peninsular
campaign played a major role in reminding Britain of her old moral
values and of the spirit of liberty and the constitutional principles
of the Revolution Settlement which, as we shall see, both poets now
most admired:
the Spanish contest has a separate and additional
interest for Englishmen of genuine English principles:
for if the Peace of Amiens made the Nation unanimous
in its dread of French ambition, it was the noble
efforts of Spanish Patriotism that first restored us,
without distinction of party, to our characteristic
enthusiasm for liberty; and presenting it in its
genuine form, incapable of being confounded with its
French counterfeit, enabled us once more to utter the
names of our Hampdens, Sidneys and Russels, without
hazard of alarming the quiet subject, or of offending
the zealous loyalist.^
Thus, after 1809, Coleridge's view of the war became even more morally
polarised. Britain's traditional constitutional principles, recovered
in this contest and now protected, and adhered to, by the current
Ministry, were seen as a vital contributory element in the nation's
moral ascendancy.
When Coleridge reviewed the course of the war in 1816, he concluded
that it had had its golden side because it had moralised Britain and,
indeed, all of Europe:
as the war tended to moralise the Nation, so did the
Nation succeed finally in moralising the War. On
our exploits by Sea and Land, tho' the annals of
authentic History record none more glorious, will yet
impress the future Historian with less awe, than the
Moral Enthusiasm which with all the constancy and evenness of calm¬
est Reascn called forth and sustained the heroic spirit.37
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The experience of the war had proved to be a reciprocal process
whereby Britain was first reminded of her old moral principles by
the localised struggle in Spain and then proceeded to make the entire
war more positively moral by pursuing Christian goals. What had
started as a particular ised conflict between two powers had ended as
an international moral crusade.
Like Wordsworth, Coleridge never doubted the necessity of armed
conflict as a means of establishing peace and moral values in Europe,
even although he had been a supporter of the Foxite Whig policy in
favour of peace,until 1802. Thereafter, Coleridge decided that
nothing but the complete destruction of Napoleon's power would suffice
because it was impossible to treat with Evil. Coleridge, increasingly,
saw the war as a personalised contest with Napoleon figuring as the
Serpent in the Garden. While it might have been possible to sue for
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peace with France, it was not possible with the Devil himself. In
these exceptional circumstances total war was justified as the only
means of defeating Evil and so repairing the moral fabric of society.
Coleridge, however,did not glorify bloodshed as Wordsworth tended
to do in the final years of the conflict. He did not relish the
need for a martial spirit which he considered unnatural to man, and
he always regretted the need for war itself. The Christian principles,
which he believed were at stake, were the only things which made the
war necessary. Nevertheless, he did, reluctantly, accept the need for
a standing army. In 1795 he had seen this as a threat to liberty;
by the 1810s he regarded it as a bulwark of the nation's independence
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and its traditional liberties. In general, however, Coleridge had
a horror of militarism and saw war as an extremely regrettable course
of action, undertaken only in extreme circumstances when the natural
force of moral persuasion would not avail. In the 1818 edition of
The Friend, he quoted a key passage from his own translation of
Schiller's, The Piccolomini, to this effect:
The way of ancient ordinance, though it winds
Is yet no devious way. Straight forwards goes
The ligh tning's path; and straight the fearful path
Of the cannon-ball. Direct it flies and rapid
Shattering that it may reach, and shattering what it reaches.
My son! the road, the Human Being travels,
That, on which BLESSING comes and goes, doth follow
The river's course, the valley's playful windings,
Curves round the corn-field and the hill of vines,
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Honouring the holy bounds of property!
... There exists
L\ (J
An higher than the warrior's excellence.
The natural Christian course of life was always to be preferred to
the straight, unnatural trajectory of warfare.
It is clear that Wordsworth and Coleridge now regarded the
conflict between Britain and France as a moral contest between Good
and Evil, much as Burke had viewed the war against Revolutionary
France in the 1790s. This observation caused the two writers to change
not only their opinion of the role of France and Britain in the war,
but also to alter their view of these two nations' constitutional
systems. Until 1802 Wordsworth and Coleridge had believed that the
French democratic system had failed because of the violent hostility
and subsequent European war which hindered its progress. The Peace
of Amiens had provided some respite, yet democratic institutions had
not recovered, but, instead, had become the victim of further despotism.
The principles of the early republic thus proved to be weak and
ineffectual and had, in fact, created the conditions whereby tyranny
could flourish. All the predictions of Burke concerning the inevitable
anarchy and despotism which would follow the setting up of a republic
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had proved true. Republicanism itself seemed now to be a flawed
system of government. It had failed because of intrinsic inadequacies
not just because of adverse circumstances. After 1802, therefore,
Wordsworth and Coleridge began to reassess their former regard for
republicanism. Rather than stick to their previous attempt to locate
democratic values on more stable foundations, they began to reject its
principles altogether, as innately flawed, and, instead, they turned
to the ancient British constitution as a model political system.
Wordsworth believed that the coronation of Napoleon in 1804
signalled the willing return of France to the type of despotism she
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had possessed during the ancien regime. Republicanism had proved
weak and insubstantial as a political system. It had not only failed
to produce just government, but had turned France back full circle to
a corrupt absolutism, even more virulent than before. As the
Napoleonic War progressed, Wordsworth became convinced that the
Republic's failure to support liberty in the 1790s, was the fault of
the system itself, rather than the adverse circumstances attending its
birth. In The Excursion (1814), Wordsworth's description of the early
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Republic is shot through with a cynicism which is foreign to the more
nostalgic imag.es in The Prelude. The Republic had initially brought
some freedom, but it had also nurtured a blinkered certainty that
reason could remould the world. It had neglected the traditional and
moral values which Wordsworth now considered to be imperative:
there arose
A proud and most presumptuous confidence
In the transcendent wisdom of the age,
And her discernment ....
An infidel contempt of holy wri^
Stole by degrees upon his mind.
Looking back at the early stages of the Revolution, which he had
once admired, Wordsworth realised that it had not been the blissful
time of his earlier imaginings: 'A golden palace rose, or seemed to
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rise' from the wreckage of the Bastille. Rather the Republic was
only a semblance of just government. Indeed, in The Excursion,
Wordsworth attempted to re-write his own ideological history by
claiming that he had become disillusioned by the Revolution before
45
1793, rather than later. He also chastised the Republic for not
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establishing a government of 'mild paternal sway' when this had
hardly been its intention: this was merely a reflection of the type
of government Wordsworth,himself, now favoured in 1814. Thus, in re¬
interpreting the history of France and his own early enthusiasms,
Wordsworth reveals the extent to which he had jettisoned his republican
ideals and disassociated his former self from them. By 1818 he was
so convin ced of the intrinsic faults of republicanism that he was
able to encourage voters in Westmorland to vote for the Tory Lowther
candidate by warning them of England's fate if it followed republican
principles instead of those of the existing constitution:
Remember what England might have been with an
Administration countenancing French Doctrines
at the dawn of the French Revolution, and
suffering them, as it advanced, to be som with
every wind that came across the Channel!
By 1802 Coleridge had already recognised pure republicanism to
be an inappropriate political system for Europe and he believed that
it could only work in an American context. During the Napoleonic Wars,
however, Coleridge also concluded that the failure of republicanism
could be attributed not merely to adverse external circumstances, but
to intrinsic flaws in its fundamental principles. He, too, began to
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criticise even the early idealistic years of the Republic which he
had once admired.
Under Napoleon, the government of France had returned to
absolutism, but Coleridge believed that this was not just the work of
one evil man, but was part of a longer process stretching back over
the whole course of the Revolution. Republicanism, which emphasised
equal individual rights at the expense of fellow feeling, had inexorably
produced anarchy and then a consequent demand for firmer go\ernnental
control, which had led to despotism. In the following passage, the
Calculator's Progress in the Apocrypha parallels the course of the
French Republic:
there he [the reader] will find THE CALCULATOR'S
PROGRESS from self-confiding philosophy (or rather
psilosophy*) which refuses the aid of all moral
instincts, and laughs at 'the voice within' as a
superstition - his progress, first, to sensuality,
that infallible heart-hardener; and^hence to
oppression and remorseless cruelty.
[* 'psilosophy' means 'slender wisdom']
The philosophy of republicanism had not been disappointed by the
circumstances in which it had to operate; instead, as Burke had
predicted, republicanism had created the circumstances which had led
to anarchy and oppression. It was an intrinsically self-created,
immoral system which had inexorably led to evil. Thus, in The
Statesman's Manual (1816), when Coleridge tried to account for the
failure of the French Revolution, he blamed it mostly on 'the
predominance of a presumptuous and irreligious philosophy'
After 1802 Coleridge increasingly believed republicanism to be
a disruptive doctrine, unsuited to the character of man. In a letter
to T.G. Street of the Courier, in 1813, Coleridge argued that, although
the experience of the Revolution had uncovered the flaws in republicanism,
it had also alerted people to the true political principles of government.
It had demonstrated the need for all political systems to be grounded
in the natural character and rights of man as part of existing society,
rather than in a theoretical state of nature. This also entailed an
adherence to the traditional hierarchical structure of society:
[There were] two great results of the French Revolution,
namely, the volcanic Horrors of governments founded ...
in the mere personality of man, instead of civil rights,
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as property, birth, religion, etc. - and on the
other hand ... the influence, direct and indirect,
of a gradation of all ranks, in the formation and
in the operations, of the actual government in being.
Like Wordsworth, Coleridge tried to tinker with the evidence that
he had once subscribed to a more democratic ideal. In the 1818 edition
of The Friend he went as fer as to reprint one of his 1795 Bristol
Lectures in order to prove the consistency of his views. Although it
is true that Coleridge had never been a Jacob in, he reprinted the
lecture with dozens of embarrassing passages omitted, so that his
early views seemed much less radical than before. He omitted the
famous passage calling for an equality of condition before men could
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become possessed of equal political rights. Shorn of this paragraph,
what followed became a refutation of republicanism as a philosophy
adaptable to the character of man. Whereas Coleridge had once argued
that it was possible to equalise people's condition, and thus make
republicanism an appropriate system of government, he now removed
this possibility and left the bald statement:
the comparable wisdom of political systems depends
necessarily on the manners and capacities of the
recipients.52
Since he no longer mentions that the condition of these people can
be improved, the altered text now suggests that these manners and
capacities are fixed social facts, and that all political systems
had to reflect the ranks, gradations and differences of existing society.
Republicanism, which rested on equal, individual rights, was inapprop¬
riate for this task. In this way, Coleridge tried to suggest that,
even in 1795, he had not advocated the equalisation of people's
condition or a republican system of government.
Wordsworth's and Coleridge's regard for the war as a moral crusade
not only transformed their opinion of France and its early republicanism,
but also caused them to revise their viewsof the British government
and parliamentary opposition. Until the early 1800s both Wordsworth
and Coleridge had boasted that they did not subscribe to any particular
party, but were independent observers of the political scene. There
is no doubt, however, that their views had accorded with the Foxite
Whigs on most matters. After 1803 all this was to change. Since both
writers believed that Napoleon represented Evil itself, they were
107
naturally predisposed to a government which had taken the step of
declaring war against him. Some of the early nineteenth century
Ministries did attract their criticism and the Convention of Cintra
agreement was attacked as a piece of inept statesmanship. It was a
humiliating and needless treaty which had dishonoured Britain and had
53
entailed the abandonment of allies. This was, however, one of the very
few blots on the government's record. As the war progressed and
Britain's moral commitment grew, Wordsworth and Coleridge increasingly
identified the Tory Administration as God's instrument on earth. The
Opposition, which continued to press for peace, appeared more and more
to be the disciple of the Devil, secretly undermining the government's
moral endeavours and acting as the evil agents of France.
Wordsworth gradually became a convert to a party system of
government. He was to argue that one of the chief glories of the
British constitution was the division between the two parties of
Government and Opposition. He justified party in its most ideal form
by arguing:
Conscience regulated by expediency, is the basis;
honour, binding men to each other in spite of
temptation, is the corner-stone; and the super¬
structure is friendship, protecting kindness,
gratitude, and all the moral sentiments by which
self-interest is liberalised. Sucjj is party,
looked at on the favourable side.
This ideal had not been accomplished during the war years because
the Whig Opposition had been power-hungry and had lacked principle.
Wordsworth believed that only the Tory Ministries had adhered to these
party principles and deserved support. In the era when the Whigs and
Tories were just re-emerging as distinct parties, Wordsworth argued
that only the latter constituted a true 'party', with principles; the
Whigs were merely a group, united in their desire for power.
Wordsworth credited the Tory government with Britain's success in
the war. In 1804 Britain stood alone against France and was the sole
upholder of liberty:
that last spot of earth where Freedom now
Stands single in her only sanctuary,DD
This happy, but precarious, state of liberty was due to the Government's
effective prosecution of the war. The 'Tory' Ministry ensured that the
nation was always 'foremost in the field' against Napoleon, 'the
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bold Arch-Despot' of Europe. By the conclusion of the war
Wordsworth was convinced that only the Tory ministry had embodied,
and given direction to the nation's moral spirit. It had also with¬
stood Napoleon more consistently than any other European government.
In his Westmorland Address (1818), Wordsworth looked up to the
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government 'with respectful attachment' and believed that its policies
had proved to be so just, beneficial and moral that anyone who opposed
it in the election not only deserved to lose, but ought to have been
59
prevented from standing! He believed the principles which the
government embodied could be universally endorsed by all right-thinking
people. The war had proved the Tories to be the most patriotic,
principled and moral party, whereas the Opposition Whigs were merely
the weak, unprincipled, unpatriotic friends of the nation's enemy:
[The Tory Ministers had] proved themselves worthy
of being entrusted with the fate of Europe. While
the Opposition were taking counsel from their fears,
and recommending despair - while they continued to
magnify without scruple the strength of the Enemy, and
to expose, misrepresent, and therefore increase the
weaknesses of their country, his Majesty's Ministers
were not dented, though often discouraged: they
struggled up against adversity with fortitude, and
persevered heroically; throwing themselves upon the
honour and wisdom of the Country, and trusting for the
issue to the decrees of a just PROVIDENCE: and for tjajs
determination everlasting gratitude will attend them!
Wordsworth believed that the principles and interests of the Tory
party were also those of the nation. The Tory party alone, venerated
'the happy and glorious Constitution, in Church and State, which we have
inherited from our Ancestors'.^1 The party's success as a government
and the victory it had secured in the war, was a direct result of its
following the true moral principles which Wordsworth now believed to
reside in the existing c«*sti+ation. From the time when Fox had visited
the despot, Napoleon, in 1802, the Whigs had deserted these constitutional
principles and had become untrustworthy and unpatriotic. Wordsworth
thus identified the Tories as the party of truth and morality and
associated them with Nature itself, whereas he characterised the Whigs
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as the party of vice, drawing their support from the immoral cities.
Thus, the war completely reversed Wordsworth's former political
allegiances. When Wordsworth met his old hero Fox, in 1806, months
before the latter's death, Fox is said to have remarked, 'I am glad to
109
see Mr. Wordsworth, that we differ as much in our view of politics as
we do in our views of poetry'. Wordsworth replied, 'But in Poetry you
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must admit that I am the Whig and you the Tory'. In politics, the
reverse was already true.
Throughout the war, Coleridge continued to advocate the need for
an independent, non-party stance in politics. During this time,
however, he also praised the achievements of the government and wrote
for the pro-government newspaper, the Courier. He reconciled these
seemingly paradoxical positions by arguing that if one took an objective,
independent view of events, then one would naturally support the 'Tory'
Ministries and their principles. He believed that the government, alone,
followed Britain's traditional constitutional ideals. Its policy of
pursuing a war against evil was manifestly just and in the national
interest. In these circumstances, the existence of any Opposition, or
any other party, was traitorous: 'all party in the present awful exigence
6 A
is faction in the worst sense of the word'. Coleridge's constant call
for the country to think independently and unite behind true principles,
irrespective of party feelings, was, in effect, a call to rally round
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the Tory Ministry.
Coleridge's view of the Pittites and the Whigs changed swiftly and
dramatically after 1802. As his opinion of Napoleon plummeted, Pitt's
star rose. Pitt's distrust of Napoleon, and his pacific overtures, had
now been proved well-founded. Coleridge therefore revised his opinion
of Pitt and now recognised him as one of 'the greatest men', far above
his contemporaries in percipience and understanding:
He knows his own power, his own superiority, and looks
over all their heads as over chilggen, at objects of
real magnitude and deep interest.
Nevertheless, Coleridge believed that Pitt was still too aloof from the
nation, and therefore he could not rank alongside Washington, who was
£rj
at one with his people. Pitt, however, had now entered Coleridge's
pantheon of great world leaders and Coleridge even went so far as to
retract his former criticism of the Prime Minister in poems such as
z: q
Fire, Famine and Slaughter (1796-98).
As Coleridge revised his outlook on Pitt, so his estimate of Fox
fell. Like Wordsworth, Coleridge was disappointed by Fox's visit
to Napoleon in 1802. In continuing to advocate peace after 1803,
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Coleridge believed that Fox had betrayed his true libertarian
principles and had done his nation a disservice. Coleridge's
charges against Fox echo those made by Burke against Lord Malmesbury's
embassy to France in 1796 contained in his Letters ona Regicide
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Peace (1796). Once again, Burke seemed to be the very model of
percipience. Just as Burke had recognised, when deserting his old
friends, Fox, and the Whigs, so the Opposition new also seemed to Coleridge to be
a group of unprincipled, unpatriotic politicians. They had deserted
the ideals of the constitution for personal power.
Coleridge was not so convinced of the worth of some of the short¬
lived Ministries which held power after Pitt's death in 1806, but he
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did still believe that they were the best the country could expect.
When Spencer Perceval became Prime Minister in 1809, Coleridge was
again able to identify completely with the government and its policies.
Once more, it was personality which strengthened Coleridge's political
views. He saw the honest Perceval as 'not unworthy a disciple of the
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immortal Pitt.' During his Ministry it seemed to Coleridge that
Britain became consciously committed to the moral enlightenment of
Europe. Coleridge's affinity for the Tory Ministry was also increased
in 1811 and 1812 when his own pro-government paper, the Courier, came
under renewed attack from the Whig Morning Chronicle. Coleridge was
drawn into a spirited attack on the Opposition's plans for an early
peace which he believed would destroy the hope of a moral victory
achieved only when Napoleon was utterly defeated. He characterised the
Whigs as dangerous, immoral 'Jacobins': using the term in the same
imprecise, abusive way that he had once chastised Pitt for doing, in
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the 1790s. Perceval's Ministry was now seen, even more strongly, as
the very embodiment of sound moral principles. Coleridge's obituary,
for Perceval, after his assassination in 1812, was a panegyric on the
man, and his party, as the moral guardians of the nation:
We behold a man beloved and revered by all who knew
him: in private life not only virtuous, but even
innocent and exemplary in all the relations of a moral
being, to his god, his country, his family and his
friends ... a man, who equally with our greatest statesmen
since the Revolution, had profoundly studied, and
conscientiously acted upon, the balance of the
constitution ... (who had) a firm attachment to those
principles and institutions religious and political, under
which Great Britain had become the proudest name of history.^3
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Like Wordsworth, Coleridge's unswerving support for the wartime
Tory administrations rested not only on their prosecution of a moral
war, but also on the fact that they defended the traditional values
of British society and her constitution. Indeed, the two functions
were interdependent: Britain's time-honoured constitution was innately
moral and inspired virtuous action. Lord Liverpool's government
proved to be as morally committed as Perceval's and so, in 1817,
Coleridge was able to review the war years and conclude that it was
each successive Tory government's pursuit of traditional constitutional
principles which had ensured Britain's moral supremacy and the victory
of Christian values in Europe. He praised,
those principles on which, amid the bark, yelp, and
howl of faction, the Executive of Great Britain had
preserved their own country, and finally rescued the
whole civilised world from the most satanic enormous
complication of physical, moral,and political calamities
that even visited Christendom.
The events of the war, after 1802, thus had a dramatic effect on
the political affiliations of Wordsworth and Coleridge. The two writers
came to identify with their own nation, the 'Tory' government and its
constitutional principles. Viewed against the moral polarities of the
war, these seemed to represent the forces of virtue and Christian
morality. The equivocations and uncertainties, explored in Section I,
were dispelled in favour of a new political certainty. It now
appeared to Wordsworth and Coleridge that the best political system for
Britain were existing constitutional practices. These had served the
nation well in the past, and continued to do so in the present. While
French republicanism had inexorably led to despotism, and the whole of
Europe had fallen under military oppression, the British constitution
had preserved the liberty of the nation and ensured her moral supremacy.
The stable, reliable institutions and principles of the British
constitution had served the nation well, proving to be as pragmatic,
as they were time-honoured. Wordsworth and Coleridge were, therefore,
to abandon their attempt to democratise the British political system
and, instead, turned to a defence of the existing constitution. The
grounds for this defence were that the constitution was an expression
of the nation state; it was based on traditional principles that had
served the nation well in the past; and, finally, it was still a
pragmatic system suited to present needs.
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CHAPTER V
THE GROUNDS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION
(a) Nationalism
In the 1790s Wordsworth and Coleridge, in common with other
radicals, had been torn between a natural love of country and their
belief in the republican system of the nation's enemy, France. After
1802, both writers had lost faith in France and in republicanism, and
regarded Britain in a new moral light. At last their patriotic feelings
did not have to be restrained and they could identify with the nation
rationally, as well as emotionally. The nation state became the focus
for all their political thought and the traditional constitution, as
an expression of that state, was defended on nationalist grounds.
Since Britain had proved itself to be the agent of God in the war,
anything which was derived from the national experience of such a
virtuous country had to have amoral currency. This section will explore
what Wordsworth and Coleridge meant when they appealed to 'nationalism'
as a justification for the worth of the existing social and political
structure of Britain.
In many ways the modern idea of nationalism was the creation of
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. By 1815, in
GseriwaAJ,
England^and France particularly, there was a developing consciousness
of national problems, institutions and cultures, rather than the mere
patriotic love of country, community or city that had existed before.
A 'nation' is usually understood to be a social group delineated by
certain shared characteristics: race, territory, language, history
and culture; and to be a politically independent country with its own
distinct constitution, social structure, religion and economy. There
is usually also a vaguer national feeling or pride which binds these
elements together. Obviously not all of these need necessarily be
present at any one time for nationalism to flourish, but it does
appear that in the years between 1789 and 1815 these common bonds were
forming or, at least, perceived to be working in harness, for the first
time.
Most of these elements can be found within Wordsworth's and
Coleridge's conception of nationalism and, in many respects, their
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definition of the term is representative of writing on this subject
in the first half of the nineteenth century. Before exploring their
precise definition of the concept, it should be noted that they drew
careful distinctions between nationalism and the appeal to patriotism,
imperialism or cosmopolitanism, each of which appeared spurious to them.
Although Wordsworth and Coleridge wrote copiously on the 'nation
state', the 'spirit of nationality' and on 'national independence*,
they did not actually use the word 'nationalism' (which was coined later
1
in the century. ) The term they use most often is 'patriotism', but
the patriotism mentioned in their work during the 1790s is very different
from the type of patriotism which they came to admire during the Napoleonic
Wars. The former type of patriotism constituted a universal, emotional
feeling or love for one's native land and its people. The latter type is
nationalism, in all but name, for it involved an emotional, but also
rational, attachment to the distinct nation state of England; its land,
people and traditions, as well as its existing constitution. The
distinction between these two types of patriotism needs close analysis
and, to avoid confusion, the term 'nationalism' will be employed to
describe the species of patriotism which preoccupied the two writers
between 1802 and 1815.
Long before 1802, and their adoption of a more conservative brand
of politics, Wordsworth and Coleridge had written much about their
patriotic love of country, but, by this, they meant an emotional affection
for the countryside and the common people who lived in rural areas and
were at one with the land they worked. In The Prelude (1805) Wordsworth
remarks of this time that:
[I] did soon
Become a patriot - and my heart was all ^
Given to the people, and my love was theirs.
This patriotism was a universal emotion which did not necessarily
encompass a similar regard for one's own political state and constitutions.
Indeed, in this particular passage, Wordsworth refers to his patriotic
regard for the French peasants in the 1790s. He loved and trusted them
as much as the common people of England.
This definition of patriotism as a love for the common people,
rather than a distinct nation state, was especially useful in the 179os
for it allowed Wordsworth and Coleridge to claim that they could be
11 A
patriotic yet still support France in the war. Indeed, they argued
that it was the duty of true patriots to support the 'enemy', for
only if France won the war might there arise the opportunity for a
vital practical reform of the British constitution. Coleridge argued
that the hallmark of real patriots was their support for France in
the war.^
After 1802, however, Wordsworth and Coleridge evolved a quite
different view of patriotism. They wrote less about universal,
patriotic feelings and more about the fight for national independence
and the virtues of the nation state and its existing constitutional
A
framework. The old patriotic feeling for land and people still had
a vital role to play within this new conception of nationalism, but
it was not synonymous with it. In an 1809 Courier article, Coleridge
argued:
It is the lot, Sir, of some nations only to be at once
a state and a country. Kingdoms and Empires exist
without a patriotic feeling. But wherever this ennobling
privilege is inherited, every citizen has a power within^
him, of which he himself in ordinary times is not aware.
Patriotism united the nation in an emotional sense and inspired its
citizens beyond the more mundane actions of those people who lived in
states where this patriotic feeling did not exist. As this passage
also implies, however, nationalism was more than just the emotion of
patriotism. It was also a rational force. Wordsworth praised the
'rational patriotism'^1 of the Spanish in the Peninsular Campaign. They
had not just responded emotionally to the French threat, but had also
acted with a reasoned regard for those traditional principles and
institutions of their country that they wished to restore. This was
true nationalism. While patriotism was a useful, but rather vague,
emotional response, befitting the universalist philosophies of the
eighteenth century; nationalism seemed, to Wordsworth and Coleridge,
a more distinct and purposeful expression of a people constituted as
a nation state.
Wordsworth and Coleridge also sought to distinguish between
nationalism and imperialism. Both writers had noted how the French
army, in the early years of the Revolutionary Wars, had claimed to be
exporting libertarian principles and encouraging free, independent
nations to arise in Europe. These nationalist ideals had led, however,
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to imperial ambition and, under Napoleon, the French Empire
threatened to overwhelm Europe. Wordsworth and Coleridge tried to
distinguish between true nationalism and imperialism. Wordsworth
argued that nations had to be left alone to devise their own constitution.
Only if a defenceless country was endangered by invasion, might another
come to its aid - and only then to preserve that country's liberty and
independence. If a nation intervened abroad, as Britain had in Spain,
it had to be for a moral end and not for aggrandisement. In 1816
Wordsworth argued that Britain, during the war, had been a perfect
example of this true nationalist policy in action. Since Britain was
an island, incapable of expanding beyond her coasts, her interventions
abroad were for moral purposes and not for imperial conquest:
The same insular position which, by rendering territorial
incorporation impossible, utterly precludes the desire
of conquest under the most seductive shape it can assume.
Thus, Britain's actions in Europe were truly nationalist. She aided
weaker countries to gain their national independence or to withstand
the threat of national conquest. The opportunity to act in this pure
nationalist way had elevated the thoughts and feelings of her citizens
and strengthened her own national identity:
Such are the privileges of her [island] situation;
and, by permitting, they invite her to give way to the
courageous instincts of human nature, and to strengthen
and refine them by culture.®
Although other countries lacked Britain's geographical advantages, British
nationalism, in all its moral vigour, was the great example that other
nations should emulate. Wordsworth's argument, however, failed to
consider that Britain could still pursue imperial designs eleswhere
in the world. This was a point which Coleridge did not overlook in
his more detailed analysis of the relationship between nationalism and
imperialism.
Coleridge also believed that the nation state had geographical
boundaries beyond which it could not extend too far, without losing
those virtues of nationalism itself: independence and liberty. Distinct
borders were required to preserve the social cohesion and the political
consensus which were the hallmarks of an integrated, secure nation state.
Even France itself, the national centre and force behind Napoleon's
empire, was in danger of losing its sense of nationalism under the imperial
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tyrant:
for the victor Nation itself must at length, by
the very extension of its own Conquests, sink into a
mere Province; nay, it will most probably become the
most abject portion of the Empire, and the most cruelly
oppressed, both because it will be more feared and
suspected by the common Tyrant, and because it will
be the sink and centre of his luxury and corruption.
Coleridge did see hope, however, in the irony that an empire, such as
Napoleon's, which rested on despotism, rather than on national
consensus, could still become a catalyst for nationalism. Ultimately,
Napoleon's imperialist tyranny would cause nationalist feeling to
grow, not ebb away. The actions of the French army in Spain had
revived its old national feeling for independence and liberty.
Although Coleridge had written against the British Empire in the
1790s, his attitude to it changed during his term as a journalist on
the Courier, after 1804. He recognised that it seemed hypocritical
to encourage national independence among European countries under the
yoke of France, whilst also praising the strategic and economic
importance of the British Empire which dominated foreign lands.
Coleridge contended that the British Empire had, however, a more moral
character than the French. Britain's empire had been founded to spread
moral values and civilisation, and not to enslave people or acquire
territories. In The Friend (1809), he linked the two indissolubly:
'the independence of the British Empire and the progressive civilisation
of all Mankind'.1^ Britain had built its empire, not by conquering
existing nations as France had done, but by planting colonies in
primitive parts, or in areas of the world where liberty, moral values
and civilisation were either absent or endangered. Through the agency
of the British Empire these missing qualities would be promoted and,
eventually, the colonies might themselves become fully-fledged nations
with their own distinct social and political structures.11 Whereas the
French Empire tried to crush nationalism and the virtues which flowed
from it, the British Empire was a force for true moral nationalism. In
these precise circumstances imperialism could be justified as an aid
to nationalism.
Wordsworth and Coleridge also limited their definition of nationalism
by exploring its relationship with cosmopolitanism. In the 18th century,
great value had been placed on being a citizen of the world. There was
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an emphasis on universal laws, rights and duties. As the course of the
French Revolution became more violent, however, and its attempts to
extend its universal principles throughout Europe degenerated into an
excuse for imperialism, most of the former radical sympathisers began
to view a cosmopolitan world with universal values as a dangerous and
unattainable abstract vision. The nation state appeared a more stable
and practical basis or home for an ideal society and constitution.
Wordsworth always believed that there was a common humanity at the
root of man's social condition which transcended national boundaries.
After 1802, however, he argued that this universal benevolence and
brotherliness needed a more practical basis which could be best provided
by the nation state. The nation was not an abstract, meaningless concept,
but possessed a particularity that made it cherishable. Only by partic¬
ipating fully in the national group could man's finer feelings flourish
and find practical expression. Through national endeavours, institutions
and laws, man's moral spirit could be realised and grow till it embraced
the whole human race in a spirit of fraternity:
The vigour of the human soul is from without and from
futurity, - in breaking down limit, and losing and
forgetting herself in the sensation and image of Country
and of the human race; and, when she returns and is most
restricted and confined, her dignity consists in the
contemplation of a better and more exalted being, which,
though proceeding from herself, she loves and is devoted
to as to another.1^
Thus, losing oneself in feeling for one's country, as well as in love
for the human race, was a more precise, controlled, but also practical,
way of realising universal, cosmopolitan feelings and values.
Nationalism was not the antithesis of cosmopolitanism, but the educt
through which it could achieve social relevance.
Coleridge was more sceptical than Wordsworth about the value of
cosmopolitanism or of any abstract principle, although his attempts to
13
establish a pantisocracy in 179A had been based on universal ideals.
After the abandonment of this scheme, Coleridge's thoughts turned,
s
gradually, to the nation as the most practical focus for political systems.
He still recognised that the world was composed of 'coordinate nations'
each distinct yet also inter-dependent and occupied partly with universal
concerns. Cosmopolitan values, themselves, however, had little worth
or meaning until filtrated through national forms and feelings.
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The O.E.D. credits Coleridge with the second usage of the term
1 5
'cosmopolitism'(sic) in The Friend (1809) , in which he vehemently
attacked it as a false philosophy. Coleridge argued that nationalism
had greater meaning and value because the nation state had a distinctive
character which could be grasped by all and could inspire them in a
practical sense. It was real to the imagination of its citizens.
Mankind, considered apart from nationality, was too abstract a concept
to be grasped by the imagination, and too empty an ideal to be loved.
It was,
a false Philosophy or mistaken Religion, which would
persuade him [man] that Cosmopolitism is nobler than
Nationality, and the human Race a sublimer object of love
than a People.
To teach the average man to love mankind, instead of his own nation,
was to teach him to love no one but himself.
Although it might seem that the appeal to nationalism was much
narrower than cosmopolitanism, Coleridge argued that it was, in fact,
the more liberal doctrine. Cosmopolitanism was abstract and vague; it
was an idea that led back to the self, and it was an appeal that could
easily be manipulated, just as French universal ideals had proved weak
in withstanding despotism. Nationalism was the more profound, inspiring,
altruistic concept: pragmatic and more genuinely universal in its
concerns. Coleridge believed that, far from restricting or denying
universal feelings and principles, nationalism protected them. Even
great men such as Plato, Luther and Newton, whose work and significance
knew no national boundaries, could only have benefited mankind in this
17
way because they operated from a secure, national basis. Inspired by
national ideals, men's thoughts were raised above the ordinary level
to contemplate higher truths and principles, applicable to all mankind.
Cosmopolitan truths could also find practical expression through national
institutions and laws, and thus universal principles could become more
meaningful and cherishable to society as a whole. Coleridge, therefore,
envisaged a circular, interfusing relationship between cosmopolitanism
and nationalism, wheisby cosmopolitan values were realised in more
pragmatic form through the structures of the nation state and, in the
process, the concept of nationalism was enriched and radiated by
universal principles and feelings. Coleridge phrased it more succinctly:




It is clear that Wordsworth and Coleridge argued that nationalism
was an inspiring force in politics because it united all the finest
qualities of patriotism, imperialism and cosmopolitanism, while avoiding
the excesses of each. Nationalism fed on patriotic feeling, but it was
a more rational and specific force; imperialist tendencies were
avoided by its more moral interest in colonisation; cosmopolitan
principles achieved practical realisation through the medium of the
nation state. The three elements defined the limits within which
nationalism could operate. It is now time to investigate the other
component parts of Wordsworth's and Coleridge's idea of nationalism
which made it such a valuable means for defending the existing constitution
of the nation.
When Wordsworth and Coleridge defended the constitution on nation¬
alist principles they did so because they believed this political system
appealed to man in his natural state, i.e., the state of man in national
society. This society was held together by a spirit of nationalism
which was both natural and benevolent. It comprised a feeling for
the countryside, a belief in the social unity of the nation, an idea
of the nation as an image or state of mind and, finally, a recognition
of the nation as a moral entity. A sound constitution had to embody,
or be inspired by, these concepts.
Since most of the writing, by Wordsworth and Coleridge, on the
nation state dates from 1802 onwards, it is tempting to see their
nationalism merely as a conservative reaction to events abroad. As we
have seen, these certainly crystallised their feelings, but many of the
components of their nationalist belief evolved from the 1790s and were
long in gestation. Their feeling for the national countryside was one
such idea. Even though nations are comprised of a variety of different
landscapes,- usually it is only the topography of one's own local region
that is loved and this becomes, by association, a love for the nation
as a whole. The Lake District became, for Wordsworth and Coleridge,
the quintessential countryside of Britain and the real heart of the
nation.
In their poetry of the 1790s both writers had praised Nature as
the fountain of all fine emotions and moral principles. These virtues,
emanating from Nature, they later saw embodied, and given practical
force, in the spirit of nationalism. Nationalism drew its strength
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from Nature, and a feeling for nature and its virtues was a hallmark
of the true patriot. Coleridge praised Lord Stanhope, who
Hast spoke the language of a Free-born mind
Pleading the cause of Nature! Still pursue
Thy path of Honour! - To the Country true,
Still watching th' expiring flame of liberty!
0 Patriot!1^
The rural landscape of the nation, whether it be England, France or
America was the greatest promoter of patriotic feeling. As Wordsworth
and Coleridge began to appreciate Britain's special moral status in
the war after 1802, they did, however, see particular value in their
own native countryside. Significantly, the opening poem of Wordsworth's
sonnet sequence, Poems Dedicated to National Independence and Liberty,
begins with an image of yearning for his own nation, seen afresh from
a foreign shore. Composed by the Sea-Side near Calais, August 1802
is a poem which celebrates the special virtues of Wordsworth's native
country. He prized the gentle, comforting landscape of England all the
more, when it was contrasted with the bitter disappointment he felt for
France; it seemed a symbol of the nation's stability and worth:
Fair star of evening, Splendour of the west
Star of my Country! - on the horizon's brink
Thou hangest, stooping, as might seem, to sink
On England's bosom; yet well pleased to rest
Meanwhile, and be to her a glorious crest
Conspicuous to the Nations. ®
It was also at this juncture, in 1802, that Coleridge chose to
issue the truncated version of Fears in Solitude (1798), discussed in
the previous chapter. It was shorn of all Coleridge's past criticisms
of the nation and what remained was a hymn of admiration and love for
his native land. The glory of England and her countryside now shone
forth as the one certain truth in Coleridge's mind. While France had
finally disappointed all his hopes, England was now the one, great
consolation which still inspired him and held out the promise of a more
moral future:
How shouldst thou prove aught else but dear and holy
To me, who from thy lakes and mountain - hills,
Thy clouds, thy quiet dales, thy rocks and seas,
Have drunk in all my intellectual life,
All sweet sensations, all ennobling thoughts,
All adoration of the God in nature,
All lovely and all honourable things,
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Whatever makes this mortal spirit feel
The joy and greatness of its future being?
There lives nor form nor feeling in my soul
Unborrowed from my country! 0 divine
And beauteous island! thou hast been my sole
And most magnificent temple, in the which
I walk with awe, and sing my^tately songs,
Loving the God that made me.
Thus, the English countryside acquired, for Coleridge, a special spiritual,
enlightening influence to be found nowhere else. God himself had singled
out the island for divine election. The countryside of the nation,
blessed by God, had become an instrument of God's benevolence and English
nationalism had attained the status of a mighty moral force.
Thus, a feeling for the countryside was an important component
of nationalism and, after 1802, Wordsworth and Coleridge began to stress
how they found the English landscape to be uniquely inspiring. An
emotional attachment to the English country seemed to promote a moral
spirit. When the question of property rights are discussed in the
following chapter, it will also be seen that both writers argued that
it was the landed classes who were most susceptible to this moral feeling
and were able to apply it in a socially useful way. After 1802, they
believed these propertied classes, who had a real, material stake in
the countryside, represented the national interest in its purest, most
stable form. Their sense of nationalism was the most reliable, and it
marked them out as the ruling class.
Wordsworth and Coleridge also appealed to nationalism as a socially
unifying force: a feeling which comprised all the people as one
national unit. In the 1790s, both writers had been attracted to the
national patriotism of the French as a movement which involved all the
people, including the lower orders. Wordsworth and Coleridge were
drawn to the work of Bolingbroke, Montesquieu and Rousseau, who had
begun to identify the national interest with that of the people. The
attempts of French revolutionaries to put these ideas into practice
by forming a truly 'national' government, representing all the people
and their equal, individual rights, had appealed to the republican
22
sentiments of the two poets. They were attracted by the idea, embedded
in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) that the nation
23
was the source of all sovereignty , and, therefore, to represent all
the people in the nation, there had to be a democratic system of
government. Thus, they first came to admire patriotism as a force
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which was intimately linked with democratic politics and as an instru¬
ment which could promote the liberty, equality and happiness of every
citizen no matter how lowly. Patriotism was a worthy spirit because
it was a democratic force: an expression of the equal rights of every
individual in the nation.
After 1793 as the war against France progressed, the cause of
nationalism was appropriated by conservative circles and began to
connote a love of the existing constitution and social structure, as
it had developed over centuries. As we have argued, it was in this
sense that the two poets defined the term after 1802. Nevertheless,
although they no longer advocated nationalism as a democratic force,
they still justified it as a unifying concept which embraced the whole
nation. In his Convention of Cintra pamphlet of 1809, Wordsworth
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described nation states as 'aggregates of individuals', united by
common thoughts and feelings into a family, within which each individual
could reach his highest potential, while yet remaining an interdepend¬
ent part of the whole. When he translated this idea into practical
political terms, however, Wordsworth no longer argued that it necessitated
a democratic constitution. Since all citizens were interconnected as
part of one nation and had social duties to perform as well as rights
to claim, a government could be formed which would function for the
entire nation without necessarily being a national government of all
the people. Wordsworth argued that the landed classes were the natural
rulers of society and were best equipped to govern in the interests
25
of all. Not only did they have a secure material stake in the nation
through their property, which gave them independence and leisure but
they were also the best educated, and politically experienced, class.
Government, in their hands, would ensure that all the nation's interests
were represented by the most responsible class, while avoiding the
risk of the instability or the anarchy of an open domocracy. In this
way Wordsworth was able to support nationalism as a force which united
and involved all the people, but which also dictated support for the
existing, property-based constitution.
Coleridge's argument on these points is very similar to Wordsworth's.
He also described nation states as 'an aggregate of confederated
26
individuals living in a certain district'. The popular basis of
nationalism was vital for Coleridge and to be 'one of the People' was
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the highest praise he could bestow on a national politician,
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reserving it for great statesmen such as Washington. By the turn
of the century, however, Coleridge no longer argued that the
government had to be constituted in a democratic fashion. National
politicians did not have to be directly elected by the people to feel
for them and govern in their interests. They could still be at one
'with' the people while not being 'of' them. Coleridge regarded society
as one interdependent organism bound together by reciprocal rights and
duties. Since each class had a duty to show concern for all the other
classes, it was not necessary that every individual be democratically
represented in parliament in order that government should reflect the
national interest. Indeed, it was not only unnecessary, but impossible,
for, if one accepted social duties, there could be no such thing as
a universal, individual right to sovereignty:
[It was] the acknowledged truth, that in all countries
both Governments and subjects have duties - duties both
to themselves and each other; - that between this
truism and the Jacobinical doctrine of the universal
inalienable right of all the inhabitants of every
country to the exercise of their inherent sovereignly,
there is no intermediate step, no middle meaning'.
Thus, Coleridge also concluded that, though a government had to
represent the wishes and interests of all people in the nation, it did
not need to be, nor in fact could it be, democratically constituted.
A political system which acknowledged the interdependence and bonds
of duty within society would promote a more integrated, morally
responsible and cohesive nation state. Nationalism, founded on the
duties of all, rather than on universal rights, was an altogether
stronger force. Like Wordsworth, Coleridge was to argue that the
existing British constitution best served the national interest because
it embodied the three elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy
in an interdependent relationship. The constitution was grounded in
property rights which gave it stability, and the middle and landed
classes, who owned most of the nation's property, were in the best
position to represent the interests of their workers and tenants in
a secure, reliable way. Having a physical stake in the nation and
its prosperity, the interest of the upper classes was the national
29
interest. Therefore, although the nation was a body made up of all
its citizens, some of the organs of that body politic were more
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important than others, and government was most securely held by them.
Each organ of the nation was, however, still vital to the life of the
whole, and, since the lower orders were necessarily interconnected with
the propertied classes, their interests had to be adhered to and
served. Nationalism, for Coleridge, had to be an expression of the
national organism, as currently constituted, rather than an expression
of all the people. It was a force which was defined by the interests
of its dominant organs, the propertied classes, who were, in turn,
responsible for the interests of the nation as a whole. Thus, national¬
ism was a force which justified the type of property-based constitution
Britain possessed.
Both Wordsworth and Coleridge claimed therefore that nationalism
was an important, reliable force in politics because it was an expression
of all the people constituted as a traditionally defined nation state.
It entailed a regard for the existing political and social structure.
Their definition of nationalism rested on the idea of man's natural
state being that of national society rather than the radical version
which was grounded in an egalitarian state of nature. Both poets also
argued that nationalism was not just an expression of the current
national structure, but that this structure achieved coherence through
an indefinable 'national feeling' which suffused and inspired all its
citizens. Wordsworth and Coleridge were here partly indebted to
Herder's idea that the nation was the end product of a spirit or a will
of the people.
In the sonnet, O'erweening Statesmen have full long relied ...
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(1810), Wordsworth argued that 'from within proceeds a Nation's health'.
The nation had a soul which derived from the collective feelings of
the people - a spirit which animated it and distinguished one nation
from another. Wordsworth believed that if a race failed to live up to
its moral and political principles, as the Germans had done by
to
capitulating^the Rench, then this was because their national feeling,
or spirit, was not sufficiently developed. The Germans had been too
rational and not displayed enough national spirit in the way they had
conducted the war. Unlike the Tyrolese, the Germans had defended their
rights, and based all their actions, on calculated rational principles,
rather than on the national feeling which was needed to animate those
principles. If a nation was to remain strong, united and purposeful,
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it had to cultivate a distinct national feeling as well as act in a
rational way:
What it is but a vain and curious skill,
If sapient Germany must lie deprest,
Beneath the brutal sword? - Her haughty Schools
Shall blush; and may not we with sorrow say,
A few strong instincts and a few plain rules,
Among the herdsmen of the Alps, have wrought
More for mankind at thisuchappy day ^
Than all the pride of intellect and thought?
Thus, a nation had to be bound together by a shared spirit, or purpose,
which was essentially simple and moral. Nationalism was derived from this
collective will of the people to protect their own traditional principles
and institutions.
Coleridge also argued that there was an 'invisible spirit that
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breathes through a whole people' and this united them as one distinct
nation. He differentiated nations, not so much by their actions, but
by this spirit which animated their actions. Even if other national
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characteristics were lacking, or weak, this 'high national sense'
would still help to form and support a distinctive nation:
I hold likewise that the difference of nations, their
relative grandeur and meanness ... are the result of
this spirit: and when this spirit dies, the tree may
indeed stand on by its weight and mechanic equipoise
... it but for the first gust to level it with
the earth.
Coleridge argued that this national spirit was only present in a country
that was organically united and interdependent. He believed the
nation to be a paradigm of the organism of life itself. It was a
living, growing body which was composed of distinct, but interdepend¬
ent parts. It thus expressed, in practical form, the unity, but also
the omneity, of the world. The national spirit, which suffused an
organically composed nation, was, therefore, a product of diverse
thoughts, feelings and actions, which were distinct, butvere also
composed into a national consensus. Coleridge delineated the spirit
of the true patriot in this way:
He will reverence not only whatever tends to make the
component Individuals more happy, and more worthy of happi¬
ness; but likewise whatever tends to bind them more
closely together, as a People; that as a multitude
of parts and functions make up one human body,
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so the whole multitude of his Countrymen may,
by the visible and invisible influences of
religion, language, laws, customs, and the
reciprocal dependence and re-action of trade ^
and agriculture, be organised into one body politic.
Thus, the national spirit, which pervaded the country and helped
to differentiate it from other nations, was born from a reverence for
that country's distinct institutions, laws and customs. The spirit
organised these elements into unified feeling for the whole. The national
spirit arose from the traditional elements of national life, while,
simultaneously, it helped to shape them into an idea of the nation.
When Wordsworth and Coleridge appealed to nationalism, therefore,
they appealed to a force which represented the collective spirit of
the nation. That spirit was based on a reverence and feeling for the
rules and principles of the nation, as presently constituted. National¬
ism presupposed an idea of the nation which could not be constructed
by abstract rationalism, but which could only be meaningfully grounded
in a feeling regard for the nation's traditional values, principles
and institutions.
It will already be evident that Wordsworth and Coleridge ultimately
defined nationalism as a moral force. Nationalism, as a collective
feeling for the land, its interdependent social structure and its
traditional body politic, seemed to be a natural force for virtue.
True nationalism was always seen, by them, both as the product and the
promoter of man's Christian values and principles. The experience of
the Napoleonic wars seemed to prove this point conclusively, since it
was the nations imbued with a true nationalist spirit (i.e., Britain,
Spain and Portugal) which had remained steadfast in their struggle
against the evil of France. Nationalism, as they defined the term,
was an ineluctable instrument of the Divine Will.
Wordsworth and Coleridge both believed the moral nature of nation¬
alism to be analogous to the moral condition of man himself. Wordsworth
linked his own need for moral liberty, freedom of mind and body, to
civil and national liberties. What was morally good and necessary for
the individual must be so for the nation as a whole. Individual moral
standards served as a guide for national ones and, if followed, produced
a more mcral state. In The Convention of Cintra he praised the individual
sense of moral responsibility which the Spanish displayed to each other
and argued that this served as a model for national practice as well:
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I apply these rules, taken from the intercourse
between individuals, to the conduct of large bodies
of men, or of nations towards each other, because they
are nothing but aggregates of individuals; and
because the maxims of all just law, and the measures
of all sane practice, are only an enlarged or modified
application of those dispositions of love and those
principles of reason, by which the welfare of
individuals in their connection with each other, is
promoted. 1
Nationalism, in this sense, could be the most exalted expression of
man's individual morality.
Coleridge also believed that the individual self and the nation
were indissolubly related: the latter, a macrocosm of the former. He
argued that nationalism derived its moral essence from personal morality,
but also that people gained part of their ethical sense from particip¬
ation in national life. The moral spirit of individuals merged to form
the moral consensus of the nation, but, in turn, man's identity was also
shaped by that consensus. There was, therefore, a reciprocal moral
process between nation and citizen. By reflecting the moral influences
of the nation state, man was partly reflecting himself. Coleridge
demonstrated this principle by using a favourite metaphor of the self-
replenishing fountain:
For this is the only permanent fountain of national
grandeur, though by a wonderful circuit, by a sublime
mystery of multifold reaction, the full stream filtrates
down through numberless channels, and by continued gg
attraction, returns to feed and enrich the fountain.
Coleridge recognised, however, that this close relationship between
private and national morality was not tenable in every circumstance.
Although, ideally, the same moral spirit should always prevail, events
sometimes demanded that national reaction be moral in purpose, but not
so moral in present practice. Coleridge explores this in his section
of The Friend (1809-10), "On the Law of Nations":
But in all Morality, though the principle, which is the
abiding spirit of the Law, remains perpetual and
unaltered, even as that supreme Reason in whom and from
whom it has its' being, yet the Letter of the Law, that
is the application of it to particular instances and the
mode of realizing it in actual practice, must be modified
by the existing circumstances."^"
Although national behaviour should try to follow the dictates of private
morality, sometimes national circumstances demanded that the moral code
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be set aside, temporarily, in order to secure the future moral health
of the nation. Sometimes the absolute letter of the law had to be
abandoned to maintain its spirit.
Coleridge argued that nations had to follow this course more often
than individuals. Individual morality was synonymous with national
morality only in essence or spirit. Whereas individuals had a duty not
only to themselves, but also to the state, the nation's highest
responsibility was to its own self-preservation. In extreme cases of
danger, therefore, nations might be forced into actions, which seemed
contrary to the moral code, but which ultimately preserved themselves
and their moral force for futurity. Coleridge emphasised, however, that
this behaviour was only justified in cases of dire necessity. In general,
nations should follow the dictates of personal morality so far as was
possible. He concluded that,
personal and national morality, ever one and the same,
dictate the same measures under the same circumstances;
and different measures only so far as the circumstances
are different.^
Thus, Wordsworth and Coleridge argued that nationalism was a moral
force which was derived from man's personal moral code, but was also
its greatest defender. Endeavours, undertaken in a true nationalist
spirit, were necessarily moral in essence and purpose. Similarly,
institutions and laws which were framed in this spirit, possessed a moral
animus, England's ancient constitution had evolved out of this
nationalist spirit and, as we have seen, Wordsworth and Coleridge
believed that the struggle against Napoleon had revived this spirit and
imbued its every action with moral purpose. The two writers did, however,
consider the potentially evil effects of nationalism. They addressed
themselves to the problem that nationalism might also create conflict
between countries that could be military, economic or political.
Coleridge argued that true nationalism, in the sense already defined,
tended to promote industry, enterprise and healthy commercial competition.
In the process, the bonds between nations strengthened, rather than
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weakened, as their economies grew and prospered in mutual dependence.
Although Coleridge had found little commendable in commerce when he
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delivered his 1795 Bristol lectures, by 1800, he believed that a
healthy commercial system was an indication of a prosperous, happy
nation, even if complete happiness ha-d to be built on more than just
129
economic success:
commerce and commercial prosperity is an accompaniment
and an accessory of a real and national prosperity,
but by no means the essence and self-sufficient
constituent of it.
A successful commercial system helped the nation prosper and this, in
turn, led to further economic growth. Thus, as one nation traded with
another, the prosperity of each increased and contributed to the
happiness of the whole. Coleridge warned, however, that the pursuit
of commercial prosperity could only be the means to an end, which was
AA
the welfare of the people. If it were pursued as an end in itself
then it would lead to conflict within, and between, nations. The
economy, and the country as a whole, had to be run for the good of all
the people, the entire nation. Only if this national interest were
pursued, would the commercial system truly prosper. If, however,
commerce was managed purely for the profit and aggrandisement of a few
traders and businessmen then it would provoke national conflicts and
greed. Eventually such materialism would be self-destructive. A true
nationalist spirit was always moral in character and so when trade was
pursued in this spirit, it benef ited the whole nation and increased
the economic bonds between all nations. As we shall see, Coleridge
feared that the commercial spirit, which was growing fast in post-war
Britain, would indeed threaten to overwhelm the finer, moral spirit of
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nationalism that had prevailed before 1815.
Wordsworth also believed that nationalism, in its true moral aspect,
was a force for harmony, both economic and diplomatic. Once independence
and liberty had been achieved by each nation, there would be a real
opportunity for international accord. As we have argued, Wordsworth
believed that a true nationalist spirit was defined by a respect for
the national integrity of other countries, and it was only imperialism
which led. nations into ambitious and aggressive conduct. When a country,
such as Britain, went to war it was only to defend its own national
identity, or that of other countries, against imperialist attack and
oppression. True nationalism did not provoke war, but was a mighty
guardian of moral principle. Indeed, Wordsworth argued that nationalist
feelings often had a pacific, curative effect. He himself had increas¬
ingly found comfort in nationalist sentiment in his period of
disillusionment around the turn of the century. He had turned for
130
46
consolation, and peace of mind, to this 'sheltering England'.
Coleridge also believed that nationalism could heal internal
divisions and bind everyone in unity. He could envisage a world of
brotherly nations where each country, surrounded by other free nations,
had a greater opportunity to prosper and stay at peace. Through the
agency of international trade, laws and social intercourse, nations
were being drawn together into one system. Since each nation was
increasingly dependent on others, a pursuit of the national interest,
also involved a consideration of the interests of other nations. Thus,
in pursuing its own distinct character, a nation also became more aware
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of 'the needful stimulation and general influences of Intercommunity'.
True nationalism was the hand-maiden of peaceful co-existence and inter¬
dependence. Coleridge understood, however, that this pacific state was
rarely achieved in practice. Even if the bonds between nations were
becoming more palpable, there were always many ambitious men, such as
Napoleon, who would use their nations to create conflict and oppression.
Although true moral nationalism had the potential to raise people up
to a more virtuous, pacific plane of thought, it was often weak in
resisting human ambition. Like Wordsworth, however, Coleridge argued
that true nationalism could never provoke war, though it might impel
the people to defend their nation in a moral cause, or help others
maintain their national identity and freedom. If the true moral spirit
of nationalism prevailed across Europe, such measures would be unnecessary
and each would live in peaceful, respectful co-existence:
Rivalry between two nations conduces to the Independence
of both, cal]s forth or fosters all the virtues, by which
national security is maintained.^®
The Napoleonic wars had acted as a prism refracting the popular,
universal patriotism of Wordsworth's and Coleridge's youth, into a much
more conservative type of nationalism. This new definition involved
not just a love of the land and the people, but also a reasoned regard
for the nation's evolving traditions, institutions and customs, its
interdependent social structure and its propertied constitution. It
was also a fundamentally moral force and was an expression of the collect¬
ive will of the people - not in any democratic sense - but as the will
of the people, being part of a national society, which was traditionally
conceived, stratified, yet also organically linked. They believed that
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this true form of nationalism existed all to rarely in history and far less
often in the oppressed countries of war-torn Europe. Indeed, Wordsworth
and Coleridge concluded that it really only existed, in its complete
state, in England itself. Their definition of nationalism increasingly
became a mere description of the species of nationalism, which they
believed England had displayed in the wars. Instead of England approx¬
imating to their theory of the ideal nation state, the theory itself
was made to fit their analysis of the existing state of England's social,
political and economic structure. By 1815, therefore, they had reached
the conclusion that English nationalism was true nationalism, and the
English state was the ideal state. Although each country had to develop
its own brand of nationalism, consistent with the principles which they
had explored, and attuned to the particularities of its individual society
and culture, England had accomplished this to the subtlest degree.
English nationalism was seen as the archetype for all other nations.
Coleridge expounded this theory in its most absolute form in The
Friend (1818). There, he reviewed the past decades of war and gave a
final estimate of national worth. England was set at the top of a type
of league table of European nations. Although he admired the spirit
of the Spanish, Portugese and Tyrolese, he did not consider them to be
first-rank powers and, therefore, his long comparative study mostly
concerns England, France and Germany. He ascribed to each great nation
a set of defining characteristics and, on nearly every count, the English
were judged superior. One example, 'in respect of intellectual character',






In this characteristic, as in so many of the others he discusses, the
French emerge as the most superficial of the three nations. Their
intellectual qualities are dazzling, even beguiling, but they do not
prossess the profundity, reliability and liberality of the English.
Even the more elitist Germans, whom Coleridge admired as second only
to the English, do not possess the latter's inestimable 'sense', a
quality which was held in common by all the English, in comparison with
the Germans' 'talent' which could only apply to the few. Their character
did not display the quality of sound 'bottom' which was fundamental to
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the English national spirit.
Wordsworth was not as fastidious in his approach to the hierarchy
of nations. Although he regarded England as an example to all, he
adopted a more liberal stance, giving due weight to the Spanish,
Portugueseand Tyrolese when he praised them in The Convention of Cintra
(1809). This difference between the two writers is also reflected in
their attitude to national distinctions within Britain itself. Coleridge
argued that the archetypal English nationalism was not only superior
to other European forms, but also to Scottish and Irish forms. Wordsworth's
view was not so absolute. Although Wordsworth wrote mostly about the
'English' nation, he most often used the term as a synonym for 'British',
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when describing the war effort in Europe. When he wrote of England
as a separate entity, it was usually in an emotional context, when the
distinct English countryside moved him to patriotic feelings. England,
then, was the dearest part of the entire nation and it helped him, by
association, to love it all.
Wordsworth was, however, capable of understanding the similar
attachment that the Scottish landscape could inspire in the Scots.
Indeed, he, himself, was often moved by it. Wordsworth knew Scotland
well and made extensive tours there in 1803 and 181 A, forming a close
friendship with Sir Walter Scott. He loved its countryside and people,
and he revered national heroes such as Rob Roy, Bonnie Dundee and
Robert Burns:
A famous man is Robin Hood,
The English ballad-singer's joy!
And Scotland has a thief as good,
An outlaw of as daring mood;
She has her brave Rob Roy!
Then clear the weeds from off his Grave,
And let us chant a passing stave,
In honour of that Hero brave !^
So, although Wordsworth was naturally drawn to his own land of England,
he could still appreciate that Scottish national ideas, feelings and
spirit were all equally valid and analogous to England's. The same
true and ancient spirit of nationalism resided there as it did too in
Spain and Portugal.
Coleridge, however, had little regard for the Scots or the Irish.
He had accompanied William and Dorothy Wordsworth on their tour of
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Scotland in 1803, but the experience, and the weather, had not been
congenial. Coleridge also suffered much criticism from the Edinburgh
Review and its bitter attacks, its Whiggishness and its Scottishness,
all became associated in his mind. Scottish writers, generally, figured
large in his pantheon of the wrong-minded and unprincipled. He was a
consistent opponent of the philosophy of David Hume and the political
economics of Adam Smith, and he attacked the histories of William
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Robertson and the poetry of Walter Scott. He summed up his view of
the Scots, in a letter of 1816, when he stated, 'The Scotch appear to
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me dull Frenchmen and superficial Germans. - They have no Inside'.
This is an even more damning judgement when one remembers how he
characterised these other nations! The Irish fared no better, in his
opinion:
we are reluctantly compelled to place the main
population of the Sister Island close by, of the
co-partner in the same Empire, and nominally,
at least, sharing the same Laws and Constitution, ,
in the last and lowest rank of the civilised world.
Coleridge admitted that the English had often failed to govern Ireland
well in the past; nevertheless, the Irish themselves had been
mainly responsible for this, because they had placed obstacles in the
path of effective government: especially through their continued
adherence to a 'foreign' power, the Church of Rome, which was alien
to the ancient English constitution and its true established Church.
Thus, for Coleridge, England possessed true nationalism at its
most moral, principled and refined. Irish and Scottish nationalist
feelings were pale or meaningless by comparison. Wordsworth also
revered English nationalism and was naturally most attracted by it.
He did not regard it in quite such a unique way as Coleridge, but he
still believed that it was a particularly fine example of a national
spirit, perfectly attuned to people, land, history and circumstance.
For both writers, the nationalist feelings, which the Napoleonic War
had aroused, implied and entailed a love for the existing political,
social and economic structure of Britain as it had traditionally
evolved since the seventeenth century. Nationalism was thus to be
the first, most emotional, basis for Wordsworth's and Coleridge's
defence of the existing constitution . It was also to be a moral basis
for its defence since they regarded the fundamental characteristic of
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true nationalism to be its moral spirit. Coleridge expressed their
joint feelings most succinctly in the following passage from a Courier
article of 1811. English nationalism involved an admiration for all
aspects of the traditional, interdependent constitution, and was,
itself, a force for national prosperity and Christian virtue. Nation¬
alism bound all in the one consensus, which achieved its practical
expression in the laws, institutions and customs of the constitutional
body politic:
The one Country [i.e. England] has for a century and
a half continued to be of all the nations of
Christendom, the happiest, most prosperous, and
rapidly progressive, in the fitness and steady
execution of its laws, in the diffusion of knowledge
and rational morality, in the vital action and
re-action of its manufacturers, its agriculture, and
its commerce on each other, in the subservience of
all three to its naval supremacy, and of its naval
supremacy and national grandeur to their interests in
return, in the number, respectability, and influence
of its middle class, and in the interdependence of all
classes, and of all modes of property on each other;
in short, in all the elements of a civilised free
State, in all things that at once perfect the organisation*
and secure the growth and vigour of the Body Politic.
(b) Tradition
Wordsworth and Coleridge did not just defend the existing constitut¬
ion on nationalist principles; they also appealed to tradition. The
nation itself was an historically defined state, being, in part, a
summation of all the country's past customs, institutions, and social
and political arrangements. The constitution was, therefore, a product
of the nation's fine traditions. It had withstood the test of time
and could be defended on those grounds. This appeal to the past was
to assume great importance for Wordsworth and Coleridge after 1802,
especially since their conservative philosophy did not have a monopoly
of the moral argument. More moderate reformers were quite capable of
appealing to God's Law to justify a more democratic system of
government, based on the premise that God had created man with certain
inalienable rights. Wordsworth and Coleridge were to respond that God's
Will was only to be found evident, in practical form, in those
traditional customs, reciprocal duties and institutions which were
time-honoured and had served the nation well.
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Interest in the past, particularly in classical or medieval times,
was an important element in the work of most Romantic writers, from
Robert Southey and Walter Scott, to the second generation of Romantics,
such as Lord Byron, P.B. Shelley and John Keats. This was not merely
an antiquarian interest. The appeal to the past could be used either
in a radical fashion to justify reforms, which would return the nation
to some previous golden age, or it could be used in a conservative
defence of the existing nation state as a product of tradition. After
1802, Wordsworth and Coleridge were to employ their appeal to tradition
mostly in the latter sense, and were much influenced by the writing
IT Q
of Burke.
Burke argued that constitutions developed gradually, without human
contrivance or systematic design. They were the product of history
and experience, not the deliberate result of human will or reason.
The British constitution was prescriptive and did not rest on an
original contract, but on the fact that it had existed for time
immemorial. It had withstood the test of time and had for centuries
satisfied the needs and wants of society. The British constitution
had proved itself by the wisdom of human experience, which was a higher,
more dependable test than that of human reason. Thus, any changes made
in the constitution could only be minor adjustments in the evolutionary
fabric, to take account of altered circumstances. Change could only
be contemplated as a means of conserving the true principles of the
past as they related to the present. To attempt innovatory change,
as the radicals wished, would have destroyed the whole structure of
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society and government. Prescription, alone, ensured political and
social stability. The nation state was the subject of this historical
process and, through its evolutionary constitution, it maintained, for
futurity, all the time-honoured principles and forms of its national
past.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the term
'tradition' was often used within the concept of an oral culture.
This conception is certainly evident in the work of Wordsworth, where
there is often a distinct preference for oral culture as opp osed to
over-intellectural, bookish culture.^ Wordsworth's poetry is often
composed of tales told, in narrative form, by country folk. This is
apparent in Lyrical Ballads poems, such as Michael, but is even more
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obvious in works written after 1802; in The Prelude (1805), the 1804
version of The Ruined Cottage and in The Excursion (1814), where most
of the poem is constructed from the conversation of the main
protagonists. Oral culture linked one generation with the next, and
ensured the transmission of the truths of each era, till all became
linked in one historical continuum. The power of these tales lay in
their timeless moral truth rather than their historical veracity.^
In Book XII of The Prelude, Wordsworth argued that one of the highest
means of transmitting these traditions from one generation to the
next was through the medium of poetry. Poets could use these tales
as the stuff of art which would transcend the centuries. He believed
that poets, like prophets, throughout the ages, communicated and were
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connected with each other 'in a mighty scheme of truth' and that
the poet,
hath stood
By Nature's side among the g^n of old,
And so shall stand forever.
Just as in a 'spot of time' one communicated with Nature, and was also
linked to one's own past, so the poet was able to transmute his
experience of the traditions of the past into an art form and, in this
way, he was able to act like Nature itself, recalling enduring truths
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to his reader's attention.
Wordsworth argued that the long traditions, associated with a
particular place, had a power to impinge on the senses and impress the
recipient with the power of the past. While crossing Salisbury Plain,
images of ancient Britons, and the traditional roots of the nation,
were recalled to his mind:
While through those vestiges of ancient times
I ranged, and by the solitude o'eggome,
I had a reverie and saw the past.
He then envisaged an ancient ceremony, which celebrated 'the living
and the dead'.^ In his Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff (1793) he had
attacked the Burkean notion of the living being linked, or 'shackled*,
frj
to the dead. By 1805, he found himself creatively inspired by
exactly this same idea, experienced in natural surroundings, that also
had a specific national connotation. Wordsworth now believed that the
real heart of the nation was to be discovered in these traditions,
which were still relevant and inspirational, and which linked past and
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present in one ever-present whole. This was not just his old regard
for more universal habits, but an admiration for specifically national
traditions.
These traditions were most alive in country areas where oral
tradition was still strong, and where life progressed, over the
centuries, as one continuum. In his Essay on Epitaphs, printed in
Coleridge's The Friend (1810), the country parish Church stands as a
symbol of this national unity; a focus for the nation's finest,
Christian principles and traditions:
Hence a Parish Church, in the stillness of the
Country, is a visible centre of a community of the
living and the dead; a point to which are gg
habitually referred the nearest concerns of both.
Even the churches in the towns did not have this same ancient link
with the traditions of the national past. Only in the countryside,
where there had been continuous settlement over centuries, and where
oral culture was still alive, were these vital links, between past
and present, sustained. These traditions had a moral truth and a
value which were ever-present and, if the generational bonds were
renounced, then the whole fabric of society would be irreparably
ruptured.
The constitution, which was necessarily a political expression
of that society, could not be a written contract, or merely be dictated
by the power of reason, but was a product of the time-honoured national
traditions which linked the living and the dead. Wordsworth described
the right of liberty, which the constitution guaranteed as 'healthy,
matured, time-honoured liberty - this is the growth and peculiar
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boast of Britain'. Britain's constitutional rights and duties had
existed from time immemorial. Their lengthy pedigree made them stronger
and stabler than the more ephemeral, abstract rights which radicals
espoused. Wordsworth believed that Britain had recovered her sense
of these traditional links with the past, by participation in the
Napoleonic wars. Historically, the British were
a people which, by the help of the surrounding ocean
and its own virtues, had preserved to itself through
ages its„Jiberty, pure and inviolated by a foreign
invader.
Wordsworth argued that this traditional regard for moral principles
had sometimes been weak, as the signing of the Treaty of Amiens had
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proved, but that Britain's traditional beliefs had been revived by
helping the Spanish and Portugese to recover their ancient constitutional
rights. Britain could, once more, face her own past and reforge the
generational links between past and present. Participating in the
Peninsular campaign,
we looked backward upon the records of the human race
with pride, and, instead of being afraid, we delighted
to look forward into futurity.^1
Only when the traditional fabric of national life had been repaired in
this way could Britain make progress, secure in her regard for time-
honoured practices and principles.
Wordsworth argued that the best way of ensuring that a nation
followed its traditional principles was by grounding its constitution
in hereditary property-owning. The traditional possession of property,
by British landowning families, had secured the continuance of time-
honoured values and institutions from one generation to the next.
Property was a practical reminder and living transmitter of traditional,
national moral values. By 1818, Wordsworth was able to praise his old
enemies, the Lowthers, as just such a bulwark of tradition and.the
constitution:
the political influence of the family of Lowther in
Westmorland, is the natural and reasonable consequence
of a long-continued possession of large property -
furnishing, with the judicious Nobleman at its head,
an obvious support, defence, and instrument, for the
intelligent patriotism of the Country
Their right to govern and defend the country was, like their right to
their property, prescriptive. Their property was a physical manifest¬
ation of national tradition. Like Nature itself, from which it was
derived, property was an ever-present force which contained within it,
symbolically, the finest traditions of the country. These were passed
on to each new generation of owners; and so those landowners were the
custodians of the nation. A sound legislator needed to have a high
regard for these traditions and for pragmatism, as well as a trust in
God whose moral laws radiated through all those customs which had stood
the test of time. The requisites of a governor were:
an humble reliance on the wisdom of our Forefathers,
and a sedate yielding to the pressure of existing things;
or carry the thoughts still higher, to religious trust
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in a superintending Providence, by whose permission
laws are ordered and customs established, for other
7-3
purposes than to be perpetually found fault with.
Coleridge, perhaps the best-read writer of his generation, had a
wide knowledge of history. The traditions of the past were to play an
increasingly important role in his defence of the constitution. The
past had a living relevance for Coleridge: 'the history of the past is
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the birth-right of every present generation'. It was a storehouse of
true principles which had stood the test of time and was still pertinent
to present-day society. The past was not a burden on the living, as the
radicals had contended, but was vital to the continuance of life.
Coleridge still acknowledged that people did not always draw the correct
lessons from studying a mere historical record of events or even from
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experience, which often involved bitter, false memories. He did
believe, however, that traditions, which had survived the test of time,
provided a source of moral truth and enlightenment. These traditions
sprang from moments in a nation's past, when its moral spirit and
purpose were most engaged and the nation was morally illuminated: 'From
the great aeras of national illumination we date the commencement of
7 f\
our main national advantages'. A sense of this national tradition
inspired patriotism and ennobled man's character, preparing him, and
the nation at large, for the task of attempting great deeds: 'wherever
this ennobling privilege is inherited, every citizen has a power within
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him, of which he himself in ordinary times is not aware'. National
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traditions were a 'united experience', which bound the nation together
and gave it a sense of its own distinct identity and also invested it
with moral purpose.
Coleridge believed that society could not be divorced from its
traditions without it being destroyed, morally and politically. He
remarked how this had happened in Napoleon's despotic empire:
[There had been] the devastation effected in the moral
world, by the violent removal of old customs, familiar
sympathies, willing reverences, and habits of subord¬
ination almost naturalised into instinct. y
Just as reputation was an indicator of a man's worth, so was adherence
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to tradition an indicator of a nation's values. These traditions were
part of man's natural state and the constitution had to be derived from
them. Coleridge, like Wordsworth, believed that one of his most important
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tasks was to remind his readers of these traditional values, and so
play his part in maintaining the moral and historical unity of the
nation. The object of his journal, The Friend (1809-10), was to set
out these traditional principles upon which all society and government
had to rest:
to uphold those Truths and those Merits, which are
founded in the nobler and permangijit Parts of our Nature,
against the Caprices of Fashion.
Coleridge also subscribed to Burke's idea of a community between
the living and the dead: a continuum between present and past. Writing
in the 1818 edition of The Friend, Coleridge argued that, at some points
in her history since 1688, Britain had neglected her traditional values
and had transgressed the links between the generations. He wrote as
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'a lover of Old England' - i.e., a lover of those traditional principles
of government, which he believed the Revolutionary Settlement had secured.
He argued that these time-honoured values had come under attack from
radicals in the 1790s, and then again in the post-war era, and were in
danger of being lost:
the true historical feeling, the feeling of being an
historical people, generation linked to generation by
ancestral reputation, by tradition, by heraldry - this
noble feeling, I say, openly stormed or perilously
undermined.®®
The nation, ever-changing in its constituent parts, was still a distinct
organism held together by those vital generational bonds, which the
hereditarylanded classes did so much to preserve. Shared national
traditions not only underpinned all good government, but also gave
living expression to the idea of the nation itself.
Coleridge's organic view of national life led him to believe that
government should not merely appeal to tradition, but that past and
present had to live, indissolubly, as a unity. There had to be a wedding
between past and present, in the same way as a symphonic development
introduced new themes while also recalling melodies, heard earlier in
the work. These older melodies were necessarily changed by their new
context, but their essence remained and took on a new life:
the musician has reached the summit of his art, when
having thus modified the Present by the Past, he at
the same time weds the Past in the Present to some
Q A
prepared and corresponsive Future.
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In political terms, this meant that Coleridge was readier than Burke
or Wordsworth to embrace a more dynamic conception of the constitution -
as will be explored in the following chapter. Coleridge did not appeal
to tradition per se, but to a constant re-interpretation of traditions
within the present. The essence of tradition was constant, but its
practical realisation was ever-changing. If there was not this
continual re-interpretation of traditions in the present, they would
cease to live and be meaningful in the future. Constitutional arrange¬
ments had to be able to reflect this necessity for constant change,
so that past, present and future could grow as one organic process.
Coleridge believed that the truths at the heart of all traditions
were essentially Christian. When Coleridge appealed to time-honoured
values, he reached out beyond tradition, in the national or political
sense, to the moral laws of God, which attained their purest expression
in the Bible. Traditions, which had survived the generations, had
succeeded in translating Christian values into practice. The Bible
itself was a record of traditions and was the highest, most dependable
source of truth. The traditional moral values expressed in the Bible
were, therefore, the highest source of appeal and national traditions
were merely derived from these Christian truths. Ultimately the
constitution had to be based on these. Coleridge explicated these
ideas in The Statesman's Manual (1816), the very title of which refers
to the Bible as the ultimate source of those truths, which would always
stand the test of time and which were necessary for the guidance of
all politicians and governments. Searching for an antidote to post¬
war discontent and the destructive craving for new things, Coleridge
recommended that government should be more firmly rooted in the
traditional principles of the Bible:
that antidote and these means must be sought for in the
coll ation of the present with the past, in the habit of
thoughtfully assimilating the events of our own age to
those of the time before us. If this be a moral advantage
derivable from history in general, rendering its study
therefore a moral duty for such as possess the opportun¬
ities of books, leisure and education, it would be
inconsistent even with the name of believers not to recur
with pre-eminent interest to events and revolutions, the
records of which are as much distinguished from all other
history by their especial claims to divine authority,
as the facts themselves were from all other facts by
especial manifestation of divine interference. 'Whatsoever
things', saith Saint Paul (Romans XV, A) 'were written
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aforetime, were written for our learning; that we
through patience and comfort of the Scriptures might
have hope.'®5
The Bible, as a source of traditions directly inspired and imbued
with God's Word, was, therefore, Coleridge's highest source of appeal.
Old national traditions contained these Biblical truths and had
adapted them to the distinct character of the nation, but they were
secondary to the traditions in the Bible itself. Moreover, since
God's Word was perpetual and ever-present, the traditions of the Bible
were naturally suited to live within the organic process of life and
be forever relevant. The constitution merely had to give them practical
expression.
(c) Pragmatism
The appeal to the past would mean little if old traditions were
no longer relevant to present-day society; the constitution also had
to be based on pragmatic considerations. The course of the French
Republic had shown the folly of trying to impose a new set of political
values on an unprepared people, without reckoning the practical problems.
After 1802, Wordsworth and Coleridge became fond of contrasting the
practical failure of this republican experiment with the success of
the British political system which was perfectly attuned to the
social structure and needs of the nation. The existing national
constitution was to be defended not only because it had stood the test
of time,but also because it continued to serve the nation well. It
was the most pragmatic system that Britain could expect to enjoy.
Wordsworth and Coleridge drew their ideas on pragmatism from a
long tradition of British empirical philosophy, but the writer they
most admired was Burke. Edmund Burke had been a critic of abstract
philosophy, not because he was against theory per se, but because he
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distrusted its elevation to the status of necessity. His own philosophy
was partly derived from his work as a practising politician, just as
much of Coleridge's thought originated from his work as a journalist.
Burke believed that political systems should be grounded in man as
a social animal, rather than in some putative state of nature. Since
man's social existence rarely ran on purely rational or theoretical
lines, so the nation's constitution had to be sensible of this;
it could not be based on abstract theory, but, instead, it had to be
pragmatic. The British constitution had long served the nation well
1 A3
and had successfully preserved the nation's liberties and had
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ensured prosperity. The key interests of the nation were represented
in government and even the more irrational aspects of the system
(which the radicals termed 'corruption') were to be tolerated because
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they all contributed to the success of the whole. Thus, the
constitution could be justified on pragmatic grounds and only minor,
conservatory changes need ever be envisioned.
In Book XII of The Prelude, Wordsworth charted how his disillusion¬
ment with abstract philosophy had begun in 1796. He had begun to find
comfort in traditional society and in values which had not only stood
the test of time, but were still practical and had a present meaning
and relevance:
my trust
Was firmer in the feelings which had stood
The test of such a trial, clearer far
My sense of what was excellent and right,
The promise of the present time retired
Into its true proportion; sanguine schemes,
Ambitious virtues, pleased me less; I sought
For good in the familiar face of life, _
And built thereon my hopes of good to come.
Wordsworth increasingly thereafter justified political ideas, laws and
institutions not just because they were traditional, rational or moral,
but because they were also pragmatic. Principles only achieved life
and meaning by being adapted to social circumstance; they did not
follow abstract or rational patterns. In The Excursion (181 A), the
Wanderer states:
And in your judgement, Sir! the mind's repose
On evidence is not to be ensured
By act of naked reason. Moral truth
Is no mechanic structure, built by rule;
And which, once built, retains a steadfast shape
And undisturbed proportions; but a thing
Subject, you deem, to vital accidents.^®
Until 1802 Wordsworth had wished to implement republican principles
by adapting them, more pragmatically, to existing social conditions,
but, during the Napoleonic War s, Wordsworth admired only those principles
which had evolved from the national past and were already pragmatically
fitted to contemporary society. Pragmatism was now seen as grounds
for justifying existing constitutional principles, rather than a means
of realising republican ideals. In his Westmorland Address (1818),
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Wordsworth argued that 'Government is essentially a matter of
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expediency* and that all political action and belief had to be
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based on 'conscience regulated by expediency'. On these grounds
he was to support the Lowther candidates wholeheartedly in the
election, not only because of their traditional ties with the area,
but also because they had served the community well on a practical
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level. Anything which worked well empirically had earned its place
in politics and society, and should be retained. The constitution,
which the Lowthers had always defended, was the outstanding example
of this principle in action, for the constitution consisted of the
steady accretion of beliefs, laws and institutions which had not only
survived the test of time, but also continued to prove themselves
pragmatic and true.
Wordsworth also followed Burke in arguing that since the British
constitution served the nation well, radical change should be avoided
in case the whole system was damaged. Any change which was to be
contemplated, had to be piecemeal and conservative, not radical and
innovative. Laws were to be left unchanged, unless they had positively
proved themselves to be harmful: 'Better it is that laws should remain
till long trial has proved them an incumbr ance, than that they should
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be too hastily changed'. The test of pragmatism and experience
showed which parts of the constitution required modification. In
general, however, even those laws which had outlived their usefulness
were to be accorded respect and admiration; they could be allowed to
wither away gradually, in dignity, without any need for surgical
95
operation. To do otherwise might imperil the whole system, for even
a seemingly outmoded law might still have a practical function that
was not immediately obvious. Since the constitution served the nation
so well, each law and part of that system, had a right to remain un¬
changed, unless it proved to be positively obstructive. Each had a
pragmatic role to play in the success of the whole.
The appeal to pragmatism features even more prominently in the
political writing of Coleridge after 1802. In accord with Wordsworth,
Coleridge regarded the British constitution defensible, not only
because it was based on traditional moral values, but because it had
proved to be pragmatic. Coleridge believed that principles only
became meaningful and took on life, when they were translated into
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practice. Any system based on abstract theory was necessarily
meaningless to man and unrealisable. A purely rationalist philosophy,
he argued, appealed to shallow, lazy minds because it offered a simple
set of abstract ideas and did not engage the mind with the more complex
and various practicalities of real life. Rationalist philosophy
ignored all the traditional values and pragmatic considerations which
were features of everyday life and which had to be taken into account
by constitutional systems if they were to work effectively:
By this system the observation of Times, Places,
relative Bearings, History, national Customs and
Character, is rendered superfluous: all, in short,
which according to the common notion makes the
attainment of legislative Prudence a work of difficulty
and long-continued effort, even for the acutest and
most comprehensive minds.
Coleridge believed that this had been one of the chief flaws in
Rousseau's rationalist philosophy - he had underestimated the need to
consider the practical realities of existing society, when seeking to
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apply his theory. His philosophy lacked a pragmatic impulse.
Although Coleridge attacked speculative philosophies founded on
pure reeason, he did believe that pragmatism should always be rooted
in reason. He advocated, 'an enforcement of the absolute necessity of
principles grounded in reason as the basis or rather as the living root
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of all genuine expedience.' Man's reason was a gift from heaven and
should inform all human action. God had not bestowed man with
individual rational rights, but he had created man with a rational
faculty which could only find expression through engagement with the
practical circumstances of life. Thus, when reason formed the root of
expedient behaviour, the resulting action would be moral, and never
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merely calculating or selfish. Conversely, man's reason could only
live and attain meaning, if it found a pragmatic means of expression.
Coleridge summed up the interdependent roles of reason and pragmatism
in The Friend (1809):
That Reason should be our Guide and Governor is an
undeniable Truth, and all our notion of Right and
Wrong is built thereon: for the whole moral Nature
of Man originated and subsists in his Reason. From
Reason alone can we derive the Principles which our
Understandings are to apply, the Ideal to which by
means of our Understandings we should endeavour to
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approximate. This however gives no proof, that
Reason alone ought to govern and direct human beings,
either as Individuals or as States. It ought not
to do this, because it cannot. The Laws of Reason
are unable to satisfy the first conditions of
Human Society ... the proof is wanting, that the
first and most general applications and exertions
of the power of Man can be definitely regulated by
Reason unaided by the positive and conventional
Laws in the formation of which the Understanding
must be our Guide, and y^jch become just because they
happen to be expedient.
All laws had to be grounded on rational principles, but they also had
to work pragmatically within the distinct experience and circumstances
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of the nation state. This was the origin of all just, moral government.
Coleridge also only advocated constitutional change if it was
pragmatic, and conserved the true principles and aims of government,
he identified three justifications for modifications in the political
system:
first, practicable; secondly, suited to the existing
circumstances; and lastly, necessary or at least
requisite, and such as will enable the Government to
accomplish more perfectly the ends for which it
was installed. These are the thr^g2i-nciisPensal:)le
Conditions of all prudent change.
Coleridge believed that the text of expedience was one of the most
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important ways of assessing the worth of a constitutional system.
If the constitution worked well in practical terms, preserving the
nation's liberties and promoting moral government, then it had a right
to remain. The British constitution had proved itself in this way for
more than a century, and Coleridge argued that there was small need for
any immediate changes. Coleridge argued that even moderate reformers,
such as Cartwright and Price, who had advocated change by appealing
back to traditional laws and first privileges, which they believed had
been neglected, still had to prove that these neglected laws would be
expedient in present circumstances:
It is evident, therefore, that the expediency of the
regulations prescribed by them and their suitableness
to the existing j^cumstances of the Kingdom, must
first be proved.
Change could not be justified by an appeal to tradition alone; the
changes had to be expedient. Coleridge further believed that it was
unlikely that if one did appeal to ancient statutes that they would be
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suited to 19th century Britain.1^ Old laws, wrested from their
original social and legal context, would have little pragmatic force.
Change on such inexpedient grounds was inadvisable.
This did not mean, however, that Coleridge was against constitut¬
ional change; indeed, like Burke, he accepted that there had to be
continual change and growth, but of an organic, not an innovatory nature,
in order to ensure that the constitution still functioned in a pragmatic
fashion. Society and constitution were living parts of one great
organic unity which was constantly growing and changing. Each inter¬
dependent part had to grow in harmony with all the others and achieve
meaning through them: 'This must be the case with all organised truths;
the component parts derive their significance from the idea of the whole.'
If change ceased, the whole national organism would die. Thus, although
the present constitution had proved itself pragmatic, there had to be
constant vigilance to maintain its expedience in an ever-changing
world. Coleridge argued that nations, and their constitutions, had to
be much more finely attuned to these changing circumstances than
individuals. The factors influencing an individual were relatively
limited and often the same circumstances were encountered time and again;
but national life was much more various and changeable. Thus, the
national constitution could not be fixed, but had to be sensitively
107
tuned to society's evolution in order to remain pragmatic. As will
be seen in the following chapter, Coleridge's case for constant pragmatic
change was to lead him to adopt a more dynamic view of a totally organic
constitution than Wordsworth, or even Burke. Wordsworth only admitted
the possibility of change in times of absolute necessity. Coleridge's
view of society and the constitution was not so static.
It should be remembered, however, that Coleridge was firmly
r\
opposed to ir^ovatory change. Changes in the constitution were only to
be entertained when their aim was to conserve its fundamental
principles, or spirit, in new circumstances.1*^ Change was necessary
to ensure that the original spirit of the constitution remained alive
and that the political system remained pragmatic at all times: 'The
only fixed part of the Law of Nations is the spirit; the Letter of
Law consists wholly in the circumstances, to which the Spirit of the
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Law is applied.' In this way national principles and moral values
were refracted through the prism of pragmatic laws, and attained life
and meaning for society.
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Finally, it should be noted that, although Wordsworth and Coleridge
were increasingly pragmatic political thinkers, they did not argue that
expedience, alone, justified any political system. A government founded
on such a precept would be devoid of fixed principle or any coherent
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plan. Such a government would be little better than one founded on
abstract reason. A concern for the practical realities of contemporary
society was, however, vital to ensure that the nation's traditional
principles remained relevant. A pragmatic law was not necessarily a
moral one, but a moral truth needed to find pragmatic expression before
it could live.
Before 1802, Wordsworth and Coleridge had increasingly appealed
to the natural state of man in society; thereafter they defended the
existing constitution by appealing to the state of man as a part of a
distinct national civil society. Thus, the constitution of Britain
could be justified because it was an expression of the nation; it was a
product of its fine moral traditions and it continued to be pragmatic.
The constitution was a perfect reflection of the condition of national
man: a creation of God, his country, the past and the present.
It is now time to consider how Wordsworth and Coleridge viewed





Until the end of the Revolutionary War, Wordsworth and Coleridge
had advocated a more democratic, less corrupt, political system which
might gradually be developed from Britain's existing society. Both
writers had still regarded the ordinary people as the fundamental
sector of that society, even if they were not yet fit to govern.
Although Wordsworth and Coleridge accorded increasing respect to the
smaller landed proprietors, they still aimed to attain a more open,
democratic system, involving a much wider section of the population;
the prospect of an eventual democracy was still real, particularly for
Wordsworth. Neither poet had seen much value in the aristocracy or
monarchy, and both had advocated the end of corrupt practices, such
as the patronage and pension system. After 1802, however, the merits
of Britain's existing social and political system became manifest as
the republican experiment of France crumbled before the advance of
despotism. Britain's constitution, and the propertied society it
reflected and served, now seemed the most moral, stable and reliable
that could ever be expected. Wordsworth and Coleridge embraced this
system, in a moral, patriotic spirit, as an expression of national society
and its traditions, and as a pragmatic system perfectly attuned to
current circumstances.
In this chapter, Wordsworth's and Coleridge's revised view of
Britain's long-standing social structure will be explored as well as
their consequent defence of the post-1689 constitutional system and the
rights which this guaranteed.
(a) National Society
Until 1802, the common people had proved to be a focus for Wordsworth's
and Coleridge's political attentions. By the end of the 1790s they no
longer believed that the ordinary people were ready to participate
directly in government, but both writers still believed in the power
of their simple moral feelings. Government always had to attend to
their needs and wishes and, as they became better educated , and were
relieved of the burdens of poverty, more of the lower orders might be
expected to become involved in the political process. Until this had
been accomplished, Wordsworth and Coleridge placed their confidence in
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the class of small property-owners to govern the country wisely,
morally, and in the interests of all.
During the Napoleonic Wars, Wordsworth's and Coleridge's view of
society was to become more overtly Burkean. Edmund Burke had argued
that no section of the population was morally perfect or infallible.
The two writers became more and more aware of the flaws in the
character of the ordinary people, whom they had once so admired.
Although they continued to believe that man was fundamentally equal in
the sight of God, they began to recognise that it was the practical
distinctions between men which mattered most in civil society and which
determined where political power must lie. Wordsworth and Coleridge
argued that the differentiations between the social classes were
inevitable and, on the whole, beneficial. Although they had no wish
to see the lower orders being oppressed, or their material condition
made uncomfortable, they did not wish to raise them out of their social
class. They agreed, with Burke, that the happiness of all classes of
men, was to be found within their individual social groupings, and that
1
hierarchies were natural to the state of man. They came to respect,
most highly, the time-honoured hierarchies of British society which had
served the nation so well, and whose power was reflected in the trad¬
itional form of the constitution. Thus, the whole social focus of their
political philosophy was turned towards the middle and upper classes,
as the natural rulers of the nation.
Wordsworth had always admired and trusted the common people more
than Coleridge. After 1802, however, Wordsworth began to regard all
of human-kind in a more cynical way. He recognised that man everywhere
was imperfectible, capable only of aspiring to reason and morality in
2
his finest moments, but mostly willing to attain much less. He still
admi red the ordinary, brotherly folk of the Lakes, but now Wordsworth
could identify many of the common flaws to be found in all men, mingled
with their undoubted virtues:
born among the hills,
Bred also there, I wanted not a scale
To regulate my hopes; pleased with the good
I shrink not from the evil in disgust
Or with immoderate pain. I look for man,
The common creature of the brotherhood,
But little differing from the man elsewhere
For selfishness and envy and revenge,
111 neighbourhood -folly that this should be
Flattery and double-dealing, strife and wrong.
151
Without denying man's goodness, Wordsworth now showed a greater
appreciation of the darker side of human nature, even if he still
felt that this was less evident in rural areas than in the vice-
ridden cities.
Wordsworth still argued that all men were fundamentally equal in
the sight of God, no matter what one's outward station in life. The
starkest physical reminders of this came at moments of birth and death.
When a man died, all his wealth and distinctions mattered little; his
state was the same as the lowliest man. This served to remind all men
of mankind's fundamental equality. Each man was also endowed, at birth,
with a reason, an imagination, a will and a moral sense, even although
these were not used equally in later life. Nevertheless, this basic
equality existed, and Wordsworth still lamented that there should be
such great inequalities between men in society. In The Excursion (1814)
he continued to argue:
The generous inclin ation, the just rule,
Kind wishes, and good actions, and pure thoughts -
No mystery is here! Here is no boon
For high - yet not for low; for proudly graced -
Yet not for meek of heart. The smoke ascends
To heaven as lightly from the cottage-hearth
As from the haughtiest palace. He, whose soul
Ponders this true equality, may walk
The fields of earth with gratitude and hope;
yet, in that meditation, will he find
Motive to sadder grief, as we have found;
Lamenting ancient virtues overthrown,
And for the injustice grieving, that hath^made
So wide a difference between man and man.
Despite Wordsworth's evident sorrow and his hope that such differ¬
entials might be diminished, he now fully accepted these distinctions
as an inevitable aspect of man's social state. The equation of cottage
with palace implies two analogous co-existent, yet distinct worlds.
The difference between them should not be allowed to become too great,
but each lifestyle is valid in itself and must be accepted as such on
pragmatic terms. In this passage Wordsworth does not lament the
absence of an egalitarian world in material terms, to match the funda¬
mental equality he perceives; he only regrets the increasing absence
of the ancient moral bonds of duty and responsibility, which used to
bind the distinct hierarchies of society together. The hierarchies
themselves were an inevitable and necessary feature of all social life.
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The basic equality of men need only be recognised in moral terms of
mutual responsibility and not in material terms, which would be
impossible to secure.
As Wordsworth mixed in more sophisticated social circles, he lost
some of the close identity of feeling he had had for the common people.
In his post-1805 verse he tended to re-cycle stereo-typical characters
which he had already used in earlier poems, rather than create fresh,
alive people. In The Excursion (1814), in particular, the characters
of the Solitary, Pastor and the Wanderer, which were all originally
based on real people, assume a heavy, emblematic quality. They are
mouthpieces for the author's ideas rather than living characters.
Wordsworth's old feeling for the real life of country folk was disap¬
pearing. Despite this, however, he did still argue that rural life
was, initially at least, healthier and more moral than that enjoyed by
the richer, decadent classes. He believed that since the lower orders
had no privileges and had to make their own way in life, they developed
a sturdier, independent spirit. The only thing which dented this
spirit was their numbing, monotonous life of toil which became a struggle
for mere subsistence:
Toil, daily toil
Secures his vigorous health and tranquil sleep,
But time and custom overpower his soul,
Upon the tablet the bright colours fade,
The Image steals insensibly away,
And leaves a meagre outline in its place,
A ghost, a phantom.
Thus, the common people who have a real moral potential become
overwhelmed by their adverse economic circumstances and lose their soul.
The toiling, labouring life which initially creates their sturdy,
independent character, eventually wears them down and destroys its own
creation. Although Wordsworth believed the effect of this life of toil
could be ameliorated, it could never be altogether erased, but was an
intrinsic feature of being part of a labouring class. Their only
compensation was an early life of sturdy morality and the consolation
of a spiritual life beyond the grave when all were again equal. In
their present situation, however, Wordsworth agreed with Burke in
arguing that their social status had been determined by their birth and
circumstances. Although their circumstances might be improved, there
would always be the need for a labouring class, and the practical
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exigencies of that type of life meant that the common people would
never attain the level of education or the reasoned moral spirit of
the propertied classes. The middle and upper classes were unencumbered
by toilsome work; they could acquire a longer, deeper education and
they were linked to the national interest through their land. Thus,
they had a more stable outlook on life and could exercise their moral
spirit in a less passionate, more controlled, rational manner. As we
shall see, these were the only classes which Wordsworth now believed
were capable of governing the country in a reliable way.
Wordsworth did believe, however, that under certain circumstances,
the innate moral spirit of the common people could flourish naturally,
and be channelled, so that it was of worth to all - in a national struggle.
When the spirit of the nation was aroused to defend its liberty and
independence, the ordinary people did attain a centrality, which was
normally the province of the higher classes. Wordsworth admired the
ordinary people of Switzerland, Portugal and Spain in their struggle
against the French. His respect and faith was based on their concerted
action as a nation, rather than any intrinsic regard for them as ordinary
people. The cause of national independence had released their moral
spirit, but it had also channelled it into useful action. Their sense
of moral purpose which often withered in ordinary labouring life was
revitalised and controlled by the national spirit (itself, innately moral).
Combined as a national force, the common people could be trusted to act
in a just, principled fashion. The strength of the Spanish, in their
current struggle, lay in the fact that their army was the nation itself,
morally elevated by the cause:
The whole Spanish nation ought to be encouraged to deem
themselves an army, embodied under the authority of their
country and of human nature .... The people of Spain,
with arms in their hands, are already in an elevated
mood, to which they have been raised by the indignant
passions, and the keen sense of insupportable wrong and
insult from the enemy, and its infamous instruments.
In pursuing a truly moral, nationalist cause, the common people had again
become the wisest section of the community, capable of instructing even
9
the generals in their moral duty. At such times of national emergency




In praising the ordinary people of Spain, therefore, Wordsworth
was not returning to his old democratic ideals, but merely recognising
that when the people were inspired as a national unity, they could be
trusted. This applied to all spheres of activity. In his 1815 Essay,
Supplementary to the Preface, Wordsworth argued that popular opinion
was no true guide to artistic worth, but the continued approval of the
people, as a historical entity, over many years, was a reliable guide
to value. He said that 'the voice that issues from this Spirit, is
that Vox Populi which the Deity inspires'.11 When the people felt,
thought and acted as a national unity, they became inspired by true
Christian principles. Thus, feelings and opinions of the ordinary
people could be trusted when they were united as a nation in times of
emergency or when they were expressed in the form of a long, traditional
national consensus. Neither of these conditions, however, could justify
their opinions being given direct political expression in normal times.
In their natural social state, the labouring classes were too ignorant,
passionate and easily swayed; their innate moral spirit lacked steady
purpose and control. Wordsworth's view of the common people cannot be
fully assessed, however, until his revised opinion of the upper classes
is examined. After 1802 Wordsworth did not so much lose his sympathy
or humanitarian concern for the lower orders, as turn towards the
landed classes as the most dependable, moral section of society: the
natural rulers of the nation.
Even in the 1790s Coleridge had never sought to identify with the
common people to the same extent as Wordsworth. He had perceived faults
and virtues in every class, although he did believe, on balance, that
the ordinary people were often more worthy and less selfish. After 1802
he still showed great concern for their condition, but became convinced
that they were unfitted for any political role.
Coleridge's Courier articles, Letters on the Spaniards (1809-10),
reveal that he admired the common people of Spain and Portugal in a
similar way to Wordsworth. Indeed, the Letters were designed as a coda
to Wordsworth's Convention of Cintra pamphlet. Coleridge praised the
12
'high-minded Spaniards', fighting for their freedom and independence.
Like Wordsworth, however, he argued that their moral feelings were
derived from a national impulse. Although a moral spirit was inherent
in all men, it had to be released and given a distinct, stable purpose.
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The national struggle of the Spanish had served to moralise the common
people in this way.
It is this national character, which still at the
touch of the native soil renews the strength of the
fallen Antaeus, when thrown to the ground by the
Herculean power of consummate discipline; it is this,
which returns them to the defence of their dear
country, as a wise mother her truant child, gives him
food and rest, and then sends him back to his school.1^
Only when composed as a nation could the ordinary Spanish people be
entrusted to act morally and justly. Nationalism is the source of their
principled sense of purpose, rather than any intrinsic moral superiority.
If, however, these exceptional national circumstances were lacking,
the moral spirit of the common people would lack focus and direction,
and all the inadequacies of their existing social condition would again
become evident. The property of the upper classes kept them more
closely attuned to the national purpose and provided a stable focus for
their moral feelings. Coleridge argued that a great national cause or
struggle did provide a focal point for the feelings of the common people,
but under normal circumstances, without the nationalist spirit to inspire
and guide them, the people often displayed moral and intellectual
ignorance. Until the people were properly educated in sound moral
principles, they could not be appealed to as a source of true considered
judgement and feeling. Until that time, Coleridge feared that there
would be 'noble Structures raised by the Wisdom of the Few, and gradually
1 4
undermined by the Ignorance and Profligacy of the Many.' Thus, the
moral and intellectual shortcomings of the people necessarily debarred
them from a role in the governmental process, even if greater education
held out the prospect of future progress. Government, for the present,
had to be based on the existing social structure and the qualities of
each class within it; this was the only pragmatic system.
Coleridge did still argue that all people were fundamentally equal
and were linked together as brothers. He praised Lord Nelson for
commanding ships where the,
Spirit of affectionate Brotherhood, which linked together
the Hearts of the whole Squadron, will appear not less
wonderful to us than admirable and affecting.15
Coleridge regarded the 'ship of state' in similar terms to Nelson's
fleet. He believed that ranks and distinctions were as necessary in
156
society as on board ship, but the basic equality of all before God
needed to be recognised. As will be argued in Section III, Coleridge
no longer believed that this fundamental equality should or could be
translated into material terms. Coleridge believed that the lives of
ordinary people could be made more tolerable within their existing
class, but argued that they should not be raised to higher expectations.
The existing balance between the classes had proved to be pragmatic and
had to be maintained. Each class had a distinct, vital function, and
any future reforms should merely help them perform these functions more
effectively. He believed that the aim of education was
To preserve, and not to disturb or destroy, the
gradations of society; to catch the falling, not to
lift up the standing, from their natural and native
rank.1°
The fundamental equality of man was thus not translatable into any
meaningful social or political reality, but was an abstract concept.
Nevertheless, within the gradations of existing social ranks, each man
was entitled to equal consideration.
When the war ended in 1815, Coleridge (and Wordsworth) believed
that the moral spirit of nationalism began to disintegrate and the common
people began to revert to their former immoral and ignorant behaviour.
Their finer feelings were no longer inspired and channelled by the
national struggle. Their energies were further dissipated by real
economic hardship and they became a prey again to radical agitators.
Their reversion to more vicious, volatile behaviour seemed only to
confirm the two writers in their belief that the ordinary people, in
natural circumstances, lacked the moral and intellectual qualities
needed, if a role in politics was to be entertained. When the Regent's
carriage was mobbed in 1817, Coleridge remarked that the 'sacred awe',
which surrounded the monarchy, was 'trodden down by the hoofs of the
17
Swinish multitude.' This time, Coleridge used Burke's infamous
expression without his previous irony, and accords it the definite
18
article to suggest that all the lower classes could be categorised
in this way. Although Coleridge still emphasised that the people's
Jacobin behaviour was not endemic, but the result of them being 'ignorant,
1 9
distressed', there is no doubt that their unsuitability for power had
been amply demonstrated. Coleridge had now reached the conclusion that,
no matter how worthy of sympathy and help the lower classes were, the
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real heart of the nation resided in the middle and upper classes.
Indeed, he accorded them the distinction of being termed 'the people'
to differentiate them from the more ignorant, immoral lower classes:
'the higher and middle classes - say rather ... the people at large as
20
distinguished from the mere populace'. We need to turn now to
Wordsworth's and Coleridge's view of these two classes.
The two poets already regarded the middling orders of society with
increased esteem by the turn of the century. This admiration was to
grow stronger during the Napoleonic War. Since 1803 Wordsworth had
been a freeholder and, therefore, it was only natural that he appealed
more and more to the small tenant farmers and lesser property owners
as the essential bulwark of the Constitution. This idea, already
tentatively voiced in his 1801 letter to Fox (discussed in Section I)
was explored at greater length in his Westmorland Address (1818). In
the Westmorland election, he regarded the aristocratic Lowther
candidates as the natural choice for the country community and, to
support his case, he cited that all the worthiest elements in the
community were already agreed. He identified these stable, high-
principled people as the middling class. Indeed, he argued that all
the national Tory candidates had proved their worth by the fact that,
nearly the whole of the leading Gentry; that the
Magistracy - all but a single Individual; that the
Clergy and the Members of the other liberal Professions -
with very few exceptions; and a vast body of Tradesmen
and Manufacturers, and of substantial Yeomen, the
honest Grey-coats of Westmorland, have already declared
themselves of one mind upon this appeal to their judge¬
ments. Looking to a distance, they see the worth and
opulence, the weight of character, and the dignity and
respectability of station, that distinguish the numerous
list of Freeholders resident in London, who have jointly
and publicly testified their satisfaction in the conduct
of our present Representatives.^1
The majority of the middle classes of both town and country approved of
the Tory Ministry. For Wordsworth, this is proof enough of the
Ministry's capabilities because this was a class that could be relied
upon for its sound principles and judgement; similarly, the worth of
the middle classes was confirmed by their support for such an admirable
party.
Although the lower orders possessed a moral potential, Wordsworth
believed it was the middle class which could be relied upon to translate
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their moral spirit into practical reality and use their judgement
wisely in selecting parliamentary candidates. The franchise was only
secure in their hands. As Wordsworth noted, 'the People have ever
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been the dupes of extremes' , and without the focus of a nationalist
cause, they were too easily swayed to be entrusted with the vote or
any political power. The middle class, through their property, had a
strong stake in the nation itself; they were well educated and mindful
of traditional values. Thus, they provided a more stable, reliable
electorate:
the result of this canvass has already shown that a
vast majority of you are proof against assault, and
remain of sound mind. Such example of Men abiding by
the rules of their Forefathers, cannot but encourage
others, who yet hesitate, to determine in favour of the
good cause. The more signal the victory the greater
will be the honour paid to fixed and true principles,
and the firmer our^security against the recurrence of
like innovations.
In his Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff, Wordsworth had trusted the
people with the franchise; now only the middle class were accorded
that right. Wordsworth emphasised his complete identification with
this moral middle class by signing his Address in 1818 as 'A FREEHOLDER'.
His identity with this social group, and their traditional values and
rights, rather than with the common people, had become the determining
characteristic of Wordsworth's political philosophy.
Although Wordsworth included the commercial middle class in his
definition of the class as a whole, his writings still emphasised the
small property owners and yeomen farmers as the most dependable element
within the group. Coleridge, however, singled out the commercial classes
for special praise. He believed that Europe's commercial system was
a force for civilisation. It not only made countries, like Britain,
more prosperous and comfortable, it also maintained a harmonious balance
between countries, by linking them together through trade. Moreover,
this international cooperation promoted a more moral outlook on the
world. The middle class which operated this commercial system was
revered. Coleridge attacked Napoleon, in part, because he had disrupted
commerce and so reduced Europe to,
the wretched state in which it was before the wide
diffusion of Trade and Commerce, deprives its'
Inhabitants of comforts and advantages to which
they and their Fathers had been, for more than a
Century, habituated, and thus destroys, as far as his
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power extends, a principal source of Civilisation,
the origin of a middle class throughout Christendom,
and with it the true Balance of Society, the parent of
international Law, the foster-nurse of general Humanity,
and (to sum up all in one) the main Principle of
Attraction and Repulsion, by which the Nations were
rapidly though insensibly drawing together in one
system, and by which alone they could combine the
manifold Blessings of distinct character and national
independence, with the needful stimulation and general
influences of Intercommunity, and be virtu^ly united
without being crushed together by Conquest.
Coleridge's belief in the centrality of the commercial middle classes
to national and international society is abundantly evident. They were
no less than the lynch-pin of civilisation, justice, social unity and
moral value.
Coleridge also recognised the similar contribution which the rest
of the middle class made to national life. He praised 'the source of
the virtue, comforts and increasing amity of mankind, the commercial
25
and middle classes.' All of the middling orders, whether in business,
trade or agriculture, were agents for the welfare and progress of the
nation. It was appropriate that this admirable class, rather than the
volatile lower orders, should be entrusted with the right to vote.
None the less, it will be argued below in Section III, that Coleridge
did begin to perceive flaws in the commercial classes in the post-war
period, as their pursuit of profit began to overwhelm the finer moral
instincts they had once displayed.
Lastly, Wordsworth and Coleridge considered the role and value of
the upper classes. If the middle class could now be trusted to use the
vote wisely, the ar istocracy increasingly seemed the natural governing
class. A mixture of personal and ideological factors caused Wordsworth
to re-evaluate the landed classes and Coleridge to strengthen the
growing admiration he had already shown before 1802. During the
Napoleonic War both poets concurred with Burke's view that the aristocracy
2 6
were the natural rulers of society. Burke had argued that the great
landed families were a repository of the accumulated experience and
wisdom of the past, and were the trustees for the values of the nation.
They had a hereditary responsibility towards the people and held power
27
in trust for them. This meant that they should not act in a detached
way, although they sometimes had to look to the higher interests of
national principle. They were aided in this task by their privileged,
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independent position and their greater freedom from greedy, selfish
ambition. They were the best educated class and, through their property,
were indissolubly linked to national welfare and security. Thus, they
were the strongest bulwark of the constitution, its liberties, the rule
of law and civil order.
In accepting this Burkean position, Wordsworth's opinions underwent
a great transformation. Just as his personal experience of the aristo¬
cracy before 1802 had helped to determine his hatred for that class, so
28
his contacts with them thereafter caused him to re-evaluate their worth.
In 1803 Sir George Beaumont, patron of the arts and a member of the
local gentry, presented Wordsworth with a small estate at West Applethwaite
near Skiddaw. Wordsworth instantly acquired the political status of
an enfranchised freeholder and, from this point onwards, one can chart
Wordsworth's steady progress into propertied social circles. The
Beaumonts showed Wordsworth much kindness, when his brother, John, died
at sea and their generosity and care caused Wordsworth to reflect on the
moral sensibility of the landed gentry. By 1812 Wordsworth had moved
into the relative grandeur of Rydal Mount; his life had become much
more comfortable and he could appreciate the greater independence that
life among the gentry ensured. His close relationship with ordinary
village life was now curtailed as the Wordsworths moved among a new
circle of richer friends. Wordsworth even dined with his old adversary,
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the Bishop of Llandaff, at Colgarth by Windermere. The two men now had
more to unite, than divide, them politically. In general, Wordsworth's
life had become more sedentary, settled and conservative. Apart from
poetry, he interested himself in landscaping his own garden at Rydal,
and the Beaumonts' at Coleorton - the antithesis of the natural country¬
side which had inspired him in his youth.
It is obvious that this new lifestyle must have predisposed
Wordsworth to the virtues of the landed class, their orderly lifestyle,
their belief in property rights and their general fitness to govern.
It was, however, his improved relations with the Lowther family which
were to prove most crucial in this respect. His original dealings
with them had provoked much of his subsequent hatred of the aristocracy -
now their actions were to have an opposite effect. Apart from settling
the long-standing debt, Lord Lowther gained Wordsworth the post of
Distributor of Stamps for Westmorland, in 1813, just at the very point
when the cost of educating his family was beginning to trouble Wordsworth.
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Although the position was not handsomely paid, it did provide a steady
income.He kept the post until 1842 and then passed it on to his
son, Willy. Now, Wordsworth himself was indebted to the aristocracy and
his friendship with the Lowthers increased. By 1818 the poet was
enthusiastically committed to aiding the Lowther candidates at the
general election. The position also helped Wordsworth identify more
strongly with the Tory government and its policies, since he was now one
in receipt of government patronage. The episode is also revealing in
that it shows Wordsworth accepting a position he had done nothing to
earn, but which he had gained through political influence. This was a
practice he had once condemned, but he was now to defend it as a
necessary lubricant of the constitution.
This volte face did not go unnoticed by his contemporaries, who
attacked Wordsworth for becoming the 'property' of the government and
a toady of the aristocracy. In the 'Dedication' to the 1818 edition
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of Don Juan, Lord Byron attacked Wordsworth as a shabby pension seeker.
In a note appended to the passage, Byron summed up the anger and disap¬
pointment of the second generation of Romantic poets, who now regarded
their one-time hero as a political apostate and a sycophant of the nobility:
Wordsworth's place may be in the Customs - it is, I
think, in that or the Excise - besides another at
Lord Lcnsdale's table, where this poetical charlatan
and political parasite licks up the crumbs with a
hardened alacrity; the converted Jacobin having long
subsided into the clownish sycophant of the worst
prejudices of the aristocracy.
It is not surprising that such attacks from fellow poets, and Edinburgh
Review critics, only served to drive Wordsworth further into the more
congenial, appreciative company of his new friends.
The relationship between political philosophy and private experience
is not, however, so mechanical or one-sided. Although Wordsworth's
new social and political milieu undoubtedly affected his political
sympathies, the fact that he accepted a government position, and aristo¬
cratic favours, shows that he was already well disposed to their
viewpoint. The opportunities he was offered may have been accidental,
but his acceptance was not. Personal circumstances and evolving beliefs
influenced and reinforced each other. The result was a dramatic reversal
of sympathy. After years of castigating the aristocracy, Wordsworth now
expressed his unbounded admiration for their moral qualities and
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political values, and, not surprisingly, presented the Lowther family
as the very paradigm of a natural ruling order.
Wordsworth argued in his Westmorland Address (1818) that 'the
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antiquity of [the] House of Lowther' justified that family in providing
the country with its representatives in Parliament. The Lowthers knew
the district, its people and its traditions, and they had served it well
over the centuries. Through this appeal to tradition and pragmatism,
and by virtue of their propertied stake in the nation, the Lowthers were
best fitted as rulers. As aristocrats, they had vital qualities
possessed by few others:
It must unavoidably happen therefore that, at all
times, there will be few persons, in such a County,
furnished with the stable requisites of property,
rank, family, and personal fitness, that shall point
them out for such an office, and dispose them to covet
it, by insuring that degree of public confidence
which will make them independent, comfortable,
happy, in discharging the duties which it imposes.
The aristocracy was the only class which united all these virtues and
which had the material means to act with independence and principle in
the discharge of their duties. They were the most responsible and
stable class, and the natural choice as the rulers of society.
The two qualities which most marked them out for this role was
their hereditary property and their links with tradition. It was the
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'long-continued possession of large property' which made the Lowthers
ideal representatives of Westmorland. The small farmers and free¬
holders certainly possessed some property, but it was not so great
nor held for so long. They were fit to exercise the right to vote,
but the larger estates of the aristocracy were more permanent and
provided them with a more solid stake in the nation and its traditional
values. The nobility were a stable part of the national fabric and
could be relied upon to defend the country's security and welfare.
Wordsworth had once argued that the workers of the soil were nearer
their country's roots and, in a moral sense, 'owned' the land, but
after 1802 it was the actual, time-honoured ownership of land by the
aristocracy, which counted for most in political, social, and even
moral, terms. The reality and substance of existing social circumstance
o
now carried more value in Wordsworth's political philo^phy, than intangible,
abstract principles. The aristocracy had been transformed, in
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Wordsworth's eyes, into the custodians of the entire nation and even
his revered small farming class owed their security to them. He now
argued 'that some Families must be permanently great and opulent, or
there would be no security for the possessions of the middle ranks,
or the humble Proprietor'.
Wordsworth did recognise that the aristocracy, as governors, could
not ignore the lower orders. They had to be wary not 'to violate their
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wishes and shock their sense of right'. The nobility had to listen to
the opinions of the people and attend to their welfare, even if
Wordsworth now envisaged this relationship more in feudal terms of a
lord tending to his tenants. Even in this respect, the aristocracy were
best suited to aid the nation and ensure that the interest of the people
was noticed:
Opulence, rank, station, privilege, distinction,
intellectual culture - the notions naturally following
upon these in a Country like England, are, protection,
succour, guidance, example, dissemination of
knowledge, introduction of improvements, and all
the benefits and blessings that among Freemen are
diffused, where authority like the paternal, from a
sense of community of interest and the natural ggodness
of mankind, is softened into brotherly concern.
In a united and cohesive nation such as Britain, the virtues and
advantages of the aristocracy helped all of society and ensured the
welfare of everyone. The aristocracy held together 'the frame of society'
by being responsible for all and uniting everyone in their paternal
concern. Their higher status enabled them to act in a more independent
way, but their traditional ties with the land and its people prevented
them forgetting social needs. In Britain where the classes were linked
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by 'respectful attachment' the aristocracy were 'the Friends and
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Benefactors' of the ordinary people, whereas in the divided society
of Ancien Regime France, the privileges of the aristocracy had merely
led to self-gratification and a neglect of social responsibilities.
It is also evident, from the passage above, that Wordsworth had
revised his opinion of rank, distinctions and privilege. In the 1790s
he had argued that these were seldom earned by the aristocracy and were
meaningless compared to the real honour gained by moral behaviour and
thus open to all. In his Answer to Mathetes (1809), however, Wordsworth
now argued that titles, wealth and station were not just important as
rewards, but also as 'modes of power, things that may enable him to be
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more useful to his contemporaries'. They inspired the recipient to
try to accomplish ever-greater achievements which would benefit the
whole of society. These distinctions also inspired the rest of the
nation and, being hereditary, remained a fine example to future
generations. Far from being undeserved, Wordsworth now believed that
such honours were an ever-present source of moral fortitude.
It was only in the post-war years that Wordsworth began to entertain
a few doubts about the actions of the aristocracy. These will be
explored in greater depth in Section III. Wordsworth came to believe
that the nobility were beginning to indulge too freely in speculative
schemes for their own private benefit and so were neglecting their
rightful duties as moral leaders of society. In their pursuit of
commercial and financial ventures, they were apt to forget their essential
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links with the people. Similarly, the poor were suffering more and
more from 'the spread of manufactories and the baleful operation of
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the Poor Laws' and, in their distress, were becoming distanced from
the land, their aristocratic rulers, and the rest of society. The
traditional, moral bonds, from which the nation was forged, were
beginning to weaken and the aristocracy were in danger of abrogating their
responsibilities. Moreover, their political status, which was dependent
on their traditional role within the community, was put in jeopardy. In
general, however, Wordsworth still trusted the aristocracy to re-establish
these traditional bonds which linked society into one nation - indeed,
they were the only class with this capability.
In 1793, Wordsworth had trusted the common people to vote wisely
for middle class representatives; by 1802 the enfranchisement of the
people lay in the future and all his hopes rested in rule by the small
landowning class; by 1818 Wordsworth only entrusted the middling orders
with the franchise while the natural ruling class, the fulcrum of society
itself, was confirmed as the aristocracy.
By the end of the Revolutionary War, Coleridge had come to respect
the whole of the great landed classes more than Wordsworth, even though
he hoped this class would become more open to men of merit. After 1802
Coleridge supported the political usefulness of the aristocracy, but
he became even more doubtful whether their potential for moral leader¬
ship was being fully realised.
Coleridge's fortunes during the Napoleonic Wars were very different
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from his friend's. His annuity from the Wedg wood family, whose
business interests had suffered in the war, was cut to £75. Coleridge
was, to a large extent, dependent on his salary as a journalist on the
Courier and on the money he earned from his books and lecturing.
Supporting a large family, and an expensive drug addiction, meant that
he was never financially secure. Nor was he settled domestically. He
travelled abroad and lived a peripatetic existence in Britain, oscillating
mostly between London and the Lakes. Indeed, for the rest of his life,
Coleridge was never to live in a home of his own, nor did he have any
property, or the right to vote. He also had to suffer the same literary
and political attacks, as Wordsworth, from the Whig Opposition and the
Edinburgh Review. Thus, although he mixed in Tory circles through his
work on the Courier, he was not indebted to the aristocracy. Until 1816,
Coleridge was in many ways a rootless outsider, rather than part of a
comforting group of conservative, propertied friends. It was only in
that year that he settled down to live with the Gillmans, controlled
his opium addiction, and finally became the much-visited 'sage of Highgate'
and a more settled member of the London Establishment.
These very difficult experiences meant that Coleridge never had the
same close affinity to the aristocracy as Wordsworth. Although Coleridge's
politics, after 1802, were undeniably conservative, he was still able to
retain a more critical, less blinkered, view of events than Wordsworth.
This unsettled life was partly a function of Coleridge's own personality
but, increasingly, in the midst of trauma and disruption, he yearned
for the stable, conservative, domestic values which he had rarely ever
known. Thus, while Wordsworth embraced conservative theory and aristocratic
values from a position of close affinity and sympathy, Coleridge also
endorsed these, (in a more sceptical spirit) because they represented
a stability and security he had never been close to, but which he needed.
While Wordsworth's esteem for the aristocracy had been born of personal
contact, Coleridge's admiration was born of a sense of personal alienation.
Coleridge regarded the peerage as an essential part of the British
constitution:
it has been the habit of our mind to think with great
respect of feudal institutions in general, and with an
especial admiration of this particular part of it,
hereditary succession. We regard it, as^gorming of
itself a limitation of monarchial power.
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In order to be effective as a bulwark of the constitution, Coleridge
argued that the peerage could never be allowed to become too large. He
was critical of Pitt's many new appointments to the peerage because he
diluted their power and weakened their role as a constitutional check,
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since they then owed their elevation to the Crown. In advocating a
mostly hereditary peerage in this manner, Coleridge was following Burke's
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1780 ideas on economical reform. Like Wbrdsworth, Coleridge contended
that the hereditary aristocracy had a real stake in their nation's
welfare and security through their long possession of land and their
consequent links with national traditions. The current French leaders,
such as Napoleon, had had no such advantages, and therefore little good
could be expected of their policies: '[They] have no stake in their country,
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no honourable family pride, no natural influence.' Coleridge believed
that the aristocracy were the natural rulers of society and the main
upholders of time-honoured moral values. Their education and experience
meant that intelligent, just, responsible policies could be expected
from them. He praised their 'wealth and rank, which are our best
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attainable securities for (an average at least of) integrity and knowledge'.
Although the aristocracy did not always guarantee these qualities, they
were the class which best served the nation in this respect.
Although Coleridge praised the British nobility, he did not believe
that all aristocracies were equally virtuous; everything depended on
circumstance. Like Wordsworth, he still believed that the old French
aristocracy had been far from faultless. They had cared little for the
common people or the traditional moral values which linked society
together, and which the British aristocracy had done so much to preserve.
Coleridge believed that Burke had been wrong to praise the French nobles
so unreservedly:
The extravagantly false and flattering picture, which
BURKE gave of the French nobility and Hierarchy, has
always appeared to me the greatest defect of his, in so
many respects invaluable work.
Burke had been blind to their lack of responsibility and duty.
Coleridge also criticised other conservative apologists for the
French nobility who had justified their aristocratic privileges as an
inalienable right. Coleridge argued that this was as false as the
radicals' case for the inalienable rights of the people:
167
Theydefended the exemptions and privileges of all
privileged Orders on the presumption of their
inalienable Right to Them, however inexpedient they
might have been found, as universally and abstract ly
as if these privileges had been decreed by the
supreme Wisdom instead of being the Offspring of
Chance or Violence, or the inventions of human
prudence. Thus while they deemed themselves defend¬
ing, they were in reality blackening and degrading,
the uninjurious and useful privileges of our English
Nobility, which (thank Heaven!) rest on nobler and
securer grounds.
The privileges of the British aristocracy rested on the pragmatic basis
that they were useful to society. They also rested on their traditional
propertied links with the nation which ensured that the nobility were
always a force for morality, sound government and national unity.
These were the true grounds for justifying privilege rather than the
meaningless concept of abstract, inalienable rights.
After the war ended, in 1815, Coleridge began to doubt whether
even the British aristocracy were fulfilling their proper role in the
nation state. Now that the moral imperative of the war had subsided,
rational feeling seemed to be weakening and there was a general return
to moral laxity. The post-war climate of money-making and commercial
exploitation had touched even the landed aristocracy and Coleridge
believed they were losing their sense of responsibility to the community
at large. The traditional values of the landed classes should have
been a check on the materialism of the new capitalist spirit: 'Of
the natural counter-forces to the impetus of trade the first, that
presents itself to my mind, is the ancient feeling of rank and ancestry.
The aristocracy, however, now regarded their workers as a means for
making profits, rather than people entitled to their guardianship. In
1832 Coleridge looked back on this post-war period and explained the
resurgence of radicalism and the lower orders' emphasis of rights over
duties, by referring to the upper class's increasing subordination of
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persons to things.
Coleridge perceived the social classes slowly drifting apart and
the old interdependent bonds of responsibility and duty being eroded.
The commercial spirit had poisoned the minds of the aristocracy and
before the rest of society could be morally enlightened, the aristocracy
needed to rededicate themselves to original moral principles:
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But I am greatly deceived, if one preliminary to
an efficient education of the labouring classes be
not the recurrence to a more manly discipline of the
intellect on the part of the learned themselves, in
short a thorough re-casting of the moulds, in which
the minds of our Gentry, the characters of our future
land-owners, Magistrates and Senators, are to receive
their shape and fashion.55
In particular, Coleridge hoped that the upper classes would study the
truths to be discovered in the Bible itself and apply these to society,
as they had traditionally done in the past. Through Christian teaching
they could re-discover the sense of moral duty, which justified their
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privileged status in society. Coleridge, like Wordsworth, did believe
that the aristocracy were capable of spearheading this moral renewal
in society and were uniquely qualified to effect the task successfully,
as they had always done throughout the nation's history.
It has been argued that, although Wordsworth and Coleridge still
believed in the fundamental equality of men before God, this principle
was now less important, pragmatically, than the actual distinctions
between the classes which had arisen over the centuries and were
honoured by time and utility. The two men still sympathised with the
lower orders and wq-b concerned for their welfare. Politically, socially
and even morally, however, the role and importance of the poor had
become marginalised in Wordsworth's and Coleridge's philosophy. Their
material, intellectual and moral condition could be improved, but this
could only be managed effectively within the necessary limitations of
their class. For all practical, political purposes, the middle classes
and the aristocracy had emerged as the true, natural, governing class:
the former as voters; the latter as rulers. Before exploring how
these ideas were to be translated into constitutional form, one final
element in their view of national society needs to be examined since
it had an important bearing on their politics.
Even although Wordsworth and Coleridge believed that each class
had a distinct character and role, they saw them all as one interlinked
social organism. The essential unity of society was a truth which had
to be embodied in the nature of the constitution and in the aims of
government. The political system had to reflect not only Britain's
class structure, but also society as one living organism. This idea
was ultimately to have a liberalising effect on Wordsworth's and
Coleridge's conservative philosophy.
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Wordsworth's ideas on organic society were shaped by his early
pantheistic beliefs, as well as by the influence of Burke and Coleridge.
In Tintern Abbey (1798), Wordsworth argued that, when man communed
with Nature, there was a spiritual presence in all things which linked
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everyone, and everything, into one whole. Sensing this divinity,
man's thoughts and feelings became exalted and inspired. It was a
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moment of supreme truth and moral being. Man was soothed and
morally restored by recognising this harmony at the heart of all human
existence. In the 1790s Wordsworth had seen this social unity in the
pantheistic sense of God actually being present in all living things,
linking them all together:
all beings live with God, themselves
Are God, existing in one mighty whole,
As indistinguishable as the cloudless east
At noon is from the cloudless west, when all
The hemisphere is one cerulean blue.59
In Wordsworth's poetry after 1800, he still recognised the underlying
unity of man and nature, and, in The Prelude (1805), he argued that
'in all things/I saw one life, and felt that it was joy'.^ Although
this sense of 'one life' was a force for moral strength, Wordsworth
no longer believed that God was actually present in all life. God
animated every form and imbued it with 'An active Principle', ^ but
God was distinct from it. There was an essential harmony between the
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world and the individual: this harmony was divine, but was not God.
Wordsworth argued from this that all the classes were inter-linked
in one social unity. When these fundamental links between people were
recognised and were acted upon, then the result was inevitably moral.
Thus, all political systems and laws had to embody this sense of unity:
they were indeed a practical expression of this principle:
the maxims of all just law, and the measures of all
sane practice, are only now enlarged or modified
application of those dispositions of love and those
principles of reason, by which the welfare of individuals,
in their connection with each other, is promoted ....
And so Wordsworth proceeded to praise
those benign elementary feelings of society, for the
preservation and cherishing of which, among other
important objects, government was from the beginning
ordained.53
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All government action had to be informed by a feeling for the unity
of society. Even though the political system was based on property,
the welfare of the whole always had to be considered. The concept
of a nation was the most practical expression of this social unity for
it was a single organism, yet it was comprised of distinct individuals.
Nationalism inspired a moral feeling for the rest of society, but,
by losing oneself in the unity of the nation, the individual was also
capable of discovering his own distinct moral identity and role in
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society. Thus, national society was a single organism which found
expression through its individual parts, but those parts also attained
meaning through the whole.
Wordsworth not only saw national society as an interlinked whole,
but also as a living entity, whose frame remained the same, but whose
component parts changed. If each element did not live, the frame of
society, as it presently existed, would cease to function or be
meaningful:
The vast Frame
Of social nature changes evermore
Her organs and her members, with decay
Restless, and restless generation, powers
And functions dying and produced at need, -
And by this law the mighty whole subsists:
With an ascent and progress in the main;
Yet oh! how disproportioned to the hopes ^
And expectations of self-flattering minds!
Like Burke, Wordsworth believed that the existing framework of society
was ideal. Each class had a distinct character, yet all subscribed to
the good of the whole through the traditional moral links which bonded
British society. This was an echo of all natural forms: 'In nature
everything is distinct, yet nothing defined into absolute independent
singleness.Indeed, Wordsworth even regarded his own poetic oeuvre
as an entity composed of distinct, but interrelated, parts. It will
be argued that Wordsworth regarded the existing political constitution
to be a perfect reflection of Britain's social organism. It had a
traditional, fixed framework, but, within this, its distinct but inter¬
related parts could evolve; thus preserving the life and structure of
the whole.
Coleridge's vision of society was more thoroughly organic than
Wordsworth's or Burke's, for he regarded the universe, and all it contained,
as a totally interdependent organism where every element, and the whole
itself, were in a constant, necessary state of growth and change. The only constant
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was the will of God.
Like Wordsworth, Coleridge had been influenced, in the 1790s, by
the philoaphy of David Hartley. Coleridge had been more interested in
the comprehensiveness of Hartley's vision of society, rather than his
specific arguments on the association of ideas or the need for systematic
inclusiveness. Coleridge read widely in every branch of learning and
perceived an interdependence and unity between all the disciplines of
o
human thought. He was particularly interested in German philo^phy and
the ideas of Lessing, whose ideal of erudition was that man had to
develop a wide knowledge and many interests, for only then could he
discover new connections between all branches of learning. Classical
authors, such as Aristotle and Plato, also exerted a strong influence
on his thinking. Aristotle had argued that the universal and particular,
form and matter, only existed through each other - they had no separate
life. Plato concluded that since everything was interdependent, man
could only reach fulfilment through society; he could not develop his
faculties on his own. Coleridge imbibed these ideas and developed a
theory on the organic nature of society, which was applicable to nine¬
teenth century life. Coleridge believed that the unity discoverable
from the omneity of society was a sign of God's work. Coleridge's own
philosophy has been criticised often for its formlessness, but this was
merely a function of his view that synthesis could never be reached.
Although the world aspired to wholeness, it was in a state of constant
change and could not be reduced to a system, without traducing the
nature of life itself. Society was, therefore, an organic growth where
there was only one constant - this was the animating and unifying spirit
of God which suffused all. The political constitution had to reflect
this central truth.
Coleridge believed that although society was comprised of distinct
individuals and classes, each was dependent on the other in one unified
process of living. A politician who recognised and acted upon this was
the greatest brand of statesman. Coleridge praised Washington's
'associating power', and believed that he displayed 'a humanness of
feeling, a complete union of himself with the mass of his fellow-citizens'.
In this way, every individual had to recognise their part in the social
whole. Although each person had a distinct character, they could not
be considered singly because they only assumed full meaning as part of
a growing whole: 'This must be the case with all organised truths; the
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component parts derive their significance from the idea of the whole.'
Similarly, the whole body was dependent on its organs for life and grew
or changed as they did. Thus, for Coleridge, there was no fixed frame
of society, as Wordsworth had proposed, for society itself was a protean
growth. Society was not a framework sustained by its living elements,
but a vast organism where the whole and its parts (the unity and the
omneity) enlivened and changed each other in a constant process. Through
the constant reaction and interdependence between the whole and the parts,
society gained its life and its shape:
Every power in Nature and its Spirit must evolve an
opposite, as the sole means and condition of its
manifestation: And All Opposition Is A Tendency To
Re-Union ... The Identity of Thesis and Antithesis is
the substance of all Being; their Opposition the
condition of all Existence, or Being manifested; and
every Thing or Phenomenon is the Exponent of a Synthesis
as long as the opposite energies are retained in that
Synthesis.^0
Wordsworth (following Burke) had allowed for growth and change within the
framework of society as a necessary dynamic element which conserved the
whole; Coleridge saw society itself as a process where change was the
condition of life. Organic growth was not merely a means for ensuring
an end; the means was an end in itself.
Coleridge believed that this type of organic society was naturally
moral. Since all people and classes were interdependent and could only
attain full life through each other, it followed that the welfare and
happiness of one's neighbour was also one's own. A Christian moral spirit
was the unifying element which inter-related the individual with society.
The virtue and happiness of each person inter-reacted with that of
others resulting in an additional increase in happiness for society as
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a whole, and each of its members. Any society which was infused by
a true Christian spirit had to have an interrelated social structure;
similarly, a recognition of the organic unity of life predic ated a moral
spirit:
What is of permanent and essential interest to one man
must needs be so to all, in proportion to the means and
opportunities of each. Woe to him by whom these are
neglected, and double woe to him by whom they are withheld;
for he robs at once himself and his neighbour. That man's
Soul is not dear to himself, to whom the Souls of his
Brethren are not dear. As far as they can be influenced
by him, they are parts and properties of his own soul,
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their faith his faith, their errors his burthen,
their righteousness and bliss his righteousness and
his re.ward - and of their Guilt and Misery his own
will be the echo."^
British society and her constitution had to reflect this inter¬
dependence, if a moral spirit was to be sustained. The nation was,
itself, an organic unity; a whole composed of distinct citizens and
classes. Its laws, institutions and traditions were the practical
means of organising all the people into a national unity, a body politic
These constitutional forms reminded people of their dependence on each
other and fortified the traditional, moral bonds which linked national
society into one harmonious whole. The individual spirit was not lost
in this process, but gained a greater distinctness and a sense of moral
purpose through participation in these constitutional forms. Coleridge
believed that British society and her constitution best reflected and
promoted the organic unity of all life. The interdependent social
structure of Britain's class system, as well as the network of her trade
and property, and the inter-relationship between her institutions,
ensured that a Godly moral spirit flowed more surely through British
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society and government than any other country. Coleridge believed
that all Britain's advantages contributed to promote a thoroughly
organic (and therefore, moral) national constitution, unlike any other:
those and the like influences, peculiar, some in kind and
all in the degree, to this privileged island, are the
buttresses, on which our foundationless well-doing is
upheld, even as a house of cards, the architecture of
our infancy, in which each is supported by all.
This was Coleridge's image of a perfect constitution. Government did
nor originate in any contract; it did not have any fixed origin nor
even a fixed framework. The constitution was a growing organism with
living, interdependent parts. It reflected the national organism itself
and changed as society itself changed, in one great living process.
Coleridge further argued that nations themselves were only parts
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of an even greater organism, comprising the whole life of the universe.
The only constant core of truth which united all these organic bodies
(individual, nation and universe) was the Will of God. It linked them
all in one harmonious whole. While Wordsworth appealed to nationalism
as a means of reminding people of the moral unity to be found in society
Coleridge appealed to religion. For Coleridge this was a more profound
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appeal, for religion, itself, informed all true nationalist feeling.
Coleridge did not see the universe as an attribute of God in any
pantheistic sense, but God's power had invested the universe with
life:
I adore the living and personal God, whose Power
indeed is the Ground of all Being, even as his will
is the efficient, his wisdom the instrumental, and
his Love the final, Cause of all Existence; but who
may not without fearful error be identified with the
universe, or the universe to be considered as an
attribute of his Deity."'''''
Thus, the organic unity of society could only be properly appreciated
by exercising one's reason (which was a divinely-inspired faculty) and
by recourse to religious belief. Reason and religion were analogous
yet distinct, powers for understanding the true oneness of life. Reason
helped one consider the universal:
[It] is the science of the universal, having the ideas
of ONENESS and ALLNESS as its two elements or primary
factors. In the language of the old schools, Unity +
Omneity = Totality."''
Reason, however, was only capable of comprehending the Universal in an
abstract sense; religious principles were also required because they
helped one understand the particular and the wholeness that was to be
found in each. Only by using reason and religion could the complete
interdependence and unity of life be understood, and then be realised
in a more pragmatic fashion:
Reason as the science of All as the Whole, must be
interpenetrated by a Power, that represents the concen¬
tration of All in Each - a Power that acts by a
contraction of universal truths into individual duties,
as the only form in which those truths can attain life
and reality. Now this is RELIGION, which is the EXECUTIVE
of our nature, and on this account the name of highest
dignity, and the symbol of sovereignty.^9
The Will of God was discoverable in the Bible, which was the
'Statesman's Manual' and Coleridge believed that the Established Church
of England was a practical embodiment of His Word. Thus, religion was
not only a means of understanding the organic unity of society, but was
also a practical guide for attaining a social structure and political
constitution which embodied this truth. Losing oneself in Christian
teaching, rather than in one's own country, was Coleridge's means for
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realising a truly organic state, with moral purpose. Coleridge still
believed, however, that British society, its Church, and its 'foundation-
less' constitution came closest to translating this organic view of life
i •«. 80into reality.
Wordsworth's and Coleridge's idea of society was similar in many
respects, yet quite distinct. Wordsworth contended that there was a
fixed framework of society, the parts of which were in a state of slow,
evolutionary change. Occasional political changes were required to
reflect these social changes but only in order to conserve the existing
whole. Coleridge's idea of society was more thoroughly organic. Society
was composed of distinct elements, but these parts only achieved life
through their interdependent relationship to the whole, and the whole
only achieved meaning through its parts. Thus, society and the constit¬
ution existed in a constant process of change where the only absolute
constant was the Will of God. Both these philosophies were essentially
conservative. Wordsworth was concerned to maintain the existing social
and political structure in a way which would always be meaningful.
Coleridge also accepted existing society and did not welcome radical
innovations which were foreign to its natural development, but this
existing framework of society and government only reflected an interim
stage in a much greater process of change. Coleridge's idea of society
was more dynamic for the existing social and political structure was
merely a departure point, not an end in itself. The only 'end' was
the process of being. Thus, although Coleridge defended the national
constitution as a perfect system suited to its point in time, it was in
no way fixed; indeed, it was required to change. Coleridge wished to
promote the idea of the constitution as part of the process of a living
body politic.
It is now time to consider how their vision of society and its
classes affected Wordsworth's and Coleridge's perception of national
constitutions in general and their defence of the British model in
particular.
(b) The Form of the National Constitution
The history of the French Republic had turned Wordsworth and
Coleridge against the idea of promoting a democratic constitution,
evolved from within Britain's current political state. After 1802
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republicanism appeared as a flawed system of government, unsuited to
the old nations of Europe. Both writers now adhered to a concept of
the constitution which was securely based in tradition and pragmatic
values. This constitution reflected the social structure of the nation
and the moral links which bound it together. Before examining this
political system in more detail it is necessary to consider whether
Wordsworth and Coleridge still believed that a full democracy was
appropriate for some nations, even if not for Britain.
In the early decades of the nineteenth century very few reformers
favoured a constitutional system based on universal adultmale suffrage.
Only more radical figures such as William Cobbett and Henry Hunt contem¬
plated this form of democracy. In the more conservative climate of the
war years, many reformers, such as Burdett, only advocated the enfranch¬
isement of the propertied middle classes. In his writings on Spain,
however, Wordsworth did seem to endorse democratic values. He was
impressed by the way in which the Spaniards had taken control of their
own destiny by forming local juntas in an effort to govern themselves.
Nevertheless, it will be argued that Wordsworth's support was grounded
in the claims of national expedience, rather than any esteem for
democracy as a political system.
Wordsworth believed that democracy was justified in Spain because
it was the most expedient form of government in the specific circumstances
when their liberties were being usurped by the French. In these exceptional
circumstances, it was only natural for the whole nation to combine against
the common foe. Democratic juntas were the most practical way of
expressing the will of the united people in their struggle for freedom:
The Spaniards became their own masters: and the blessing
lay in this, that they became so at once ... it was thrust
upon them. The perfidy and tyranny of Napoleon 'compelled',
says the Junta of Seville in words before quoted, 'the
whole Nation to take up arms and to choose itself a form
of government ...' - Governments thus newly issued from
the people, could not but act from the spirit of the
people - be organs of their life.®1
In these circumstances of national danger when all the people had been
roused by a new level of consciousness, and when formal government had
been destroyed, local democratic bodies were the best hope for rallying
the nation against the French. Indeed, they were not only sanctioned
on pragmatic grounds, but also by tradition, for Wordsworth drew an
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analogy between the current struggle and the ancient Spanish fight for
freedom against the Moors. In these former times, the people had also
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formed 'legislative assemblies' to counter the Arab threat. The
foundation of the French Republic in the 1790s had not rested on such
secure grounds of pragmatism or tradition. Thus, Wordsworth argued
that, although Spanish democracy was justified by current circumstances,
French democracy had not been similarly sanctioned and had proved
inappropriate.
Wordsworth's enthusiasm for the Spanish juntas should not be confused
with an endorsement of democracy in general. It has already been noted
that, after 1802, Wordsworth fully entrusted the common people only when
they had been roused by some great national cause which united them in
one consensus. He argued that democracy, as the practical embodiment
of such feelings, was only justified under similar circumstances. He
insisted that once the immediate, external threat had passed, power
should revert to the centre, where it was more dependably used. The
traditional parliamentary style of government, the Cortes, would then
resume power:
the cause of the People, in dangers and difficulties
issuing from this quarter of oppression [i.e. Napoleon's
armies], is safe while it remains not only in the bosom
but in the hands of the People; or (what amounts to
the same thing) in those of a government which, being
truly from the People, is faithfully for them ... when
a common centre became absolutely necessary, the power
ought to have passed from the provincial Assemblies into
the hands of the Cortes. ^
Wordsworth was careful to emphasise that this Cortes should be a proper
parliament, representative of all, and not just an oligarchical elite
with the King at its head, for this 'could not be an image of a Nation
like that of Spain.
This type of parliament, which Wordsworth did consider appropriate
for peace-time Spain, was certainly not one based on universal suffrage.
Indeed, his idea, expressed above, that a government in the hands of
the people was the same as one from the people, reveals that, even in
the juntas, Wordsworth may not have considered it necessary to involve
the lower orders directly in their own government. Certainly, once the
moral imperative of the unifying national struggle was over, Wordsworth
did not believe that the people were capable of exercising their vote
responsibly. The ignorance, volatile passions and material circumstances
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of normal labouring life rendered them undependable as a political
class. Parliament had to be composed of legislators who could speak
for the people and be trusted by them, but they had to be men from
the responsible, landed classes:
What then is to be desired? Nothing but that the
Government and the higher orders of society should
deal sincerely towards the middle class and the loggr:
I mean, that the general temper should be sincere.
Thus, it was only in exceptional, usually temporary, circumstances
that democratic forms were justified. Wordsworth very rarely sanctioned
it as a normal kind of government. In The Excursion (1814), Wordsworth
only condoned democracy in those nations where it was pragmatic and
where it had a long tradition; principally, in the small state of
Switzerland where all the people could be represented and where demo¬
cracy was time-honoured.®® On these grounds, Wordsworth no longer
considered America to be a suitable country for sustaining a republic.
When the Wanderer visits America, he is disappointed and soon decides
to leave:
Let us, then, I said,
Leave this unknit Republic to the scourge
Of her own passions.
America was a new country without traditions and, although there were
great stretches of land where everyone could own property, it had
become too vast and variegated as a nation. It was composed of so
many differing social elements, all clamouring for a direct say in
government, that republicanism could no longer control, or reconcile,
all these conflicting passions. It merely allowed them expression and
the result was a type of anarchy that threatened its destruction.
Republicanism could only function well in a much smaller, homogeneous
nation.
When Wordsworth wrote his Westmorland Address in 1818, at the
height of renewed, post-war radicalism, he was able to warn the electors
of the country against the evils of a system that had once been his
ideal. He warned them not to follow the democratic principles which
prevailed in Westminster, where every adult male had the right to vote:
Let not your's be the first county in England, which,
since the days of Wilkes, and after the dreadful
example of France, has given countenance to principles
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congenial to the vice, profligacy, and half-
knowledge, of Westminster; but which formerly wegg
unheard of among us, or knownonly to be detested.
Democracy was alien to the true traditions of the English nation and,
by allowing the expression of all the shortcomings of the lower
orders, it could only bring the country to ruin. It was neither
traditional nor pragmatic, and it promoted immorality. In a large
democracy there could be no stable government, merely a collection of
conflicting passions and ideas. War, itself, tended to be stirred up
by democratic states where the volatile feelings of the people held
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sway, rather than in states with traditional, propertied governments.
Wordsworth believed that no greater evil could befall a country than
the extension of the franchise to the lower orders. Even if only those
who paid taxes were given the vote, this would still lead to a national
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ferment since many of these people were uneducated and easily swayed.
In the midst of the chaos, which any form of democracy inevitably
caused, the people would turn for relief, as they had in France, to
the type of military despotism which promised to restore orderly
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government. Democracy was therefore a supreme national danger.
Coleridge's views on democracy had already been formed by 1802.
He still argued that the degree of democracy in any political system
was dependent on the degree of property-owning in the community. In
discussing 'Government by popular representation', he stated
the great rule and law of which is, that it shall
recede from universal suffrage, as the state of
property in the nation to be represented recedes
from the subdivisions of Agrarian equality.
While holding to this general rule, Coleridge's view of democracy was
r»
to ch^ge in significant ways during the war years. After 1802 he did
not much mention his old argument that a house was also a form of
property which entitled the owner to vote. He did still hope that
landed property would circulate and that men of talent would be able
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to participate in the political process by buying land. Coleridge
changed his opinions most, however, in the case of America, which he
had formerly regarded as the only country where a republican system
of government would be fully justified.
Even though Coleridge still admired the American government, he
began to perceive flaws in its republican system which were beginning
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to emerge with the passing of time. He noticed how rapidly America's
population was growing and how this put a strain on the system
because all the multifarious opinions and interests had to be repres-
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ented in Congress. This inevitably led to friction and conflict in
the government, not to be found in nations with a more restricted
franchise. Coleridge still believed that America, with its extensive
land-holding among all classes required a more democratic franchise
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than would be appropriate in France or Britain, but he began to doubt
whether complete democracy was the answer.
The American case of republicanism placed Coleridge in a dilemma.
The American democratic constitution could certainly be justified by
his old appeal to property rights, but it could not be defended on the
pragmatic or traditional grounds which he now considered so important.
In Britain, the owning of property implied education and a regard for
the traditional moral values of the nation. Although, therefore, only
a few propertied men were represented, the interests of the entire
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nation were best served. America, however, was a new country without
long traditions, where the lowest and most ignorant man could acquire
property. Thus, property-owning in America did not connote the same
traditional, moral values which it ensured in Old World countries.
Coleridge increasingly regarded ordinary Americans as ignorant and
relatively uncivilised: 'The Americans are neither very amiable nor
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very enlightened, as a people.' Despite owning property, therefore,
most Americans still needed moral education and enlightenment, before
they could participate responsibly in the political process:
He alone is entitled to a share in the government
of all, who has learnt to govern himself - there is
but one possible ground of a right toRfreedom, viz.
to understand and revere its duties.
Many Americans were still deficient in this vital quality and were
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need of a proper learned class who could instruct them. Only when
this had been accomplished would full democracy be justified in America
Since society was an organic form, Coleridge realised that there
could be no simple equation between political power and property -
holding without consideration being given to all the other practical
social circumstances of the nation. This is what the American politica
system had failed to account for. America had a fixed, written
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constitution which had worked well in the first instance, when the
country was small and its citizens had formed a compact, homogeneous
group of responsible landowners. As the nation had grown and land-
holding no longer guaranteed an educated, moral outlook, so the fixed
constitution had proved too flexible to change. America's political
system was not sufficiently organic; it did not grow in harmony with
society as the British model did. Coleridge argued that America's
republican constitution had been
elevated from a particular experiment to an universal
model. The word constitution altered to mean a
capitulation, a treaty, imposed by the people on
their own government, as on a conquered army - hence
giving sanction to falsehood, and universality to
anomaly ! ! ! ^0
No constitution, fixed or imposed in this way, could hope to be ever-
relevant to changing society. It had to reflect not only the state
of property, but also the traditional moral and social nature of the
nation. Such a constitution was Britain's 'foundationless' organic
political structure. It reflected the distribution of property, but,
in Britain, property itself reflected all that was best in the nature
of the nation.
The form of national constitution, which Wordsworth and Coleridge
defended, was based on the Revolutionary Settlement of 1689. Conservative
writers, such as Burke, had argued that this mixed and balanced
constitution had preserved liberty, protected property, ensured the
rule of law and upheld the sovereignty of Parliament. It had success¬
fully reflected and maintained the social fabric of the nation, and
any radical attempt to change this finely-tuned mechanism would only
result in the disintegration of existing society. Burke had argued
that the ancient constitution had been re-confirmed, not radically
altered, in 1689 and only minor adjustments thereafter were required
to conserve its vigour. No new political system had been established
in 1689, and none needed to be invented now. The origins of this
constitution were not be found in any pre-societal state of nature nor
was it founded on an original contract, but instead its origins were
immemorial and prescriptive. The British constitution was the fruit
of social experience and the product of history; its principles and
its practices were prescriptive. The Revolution Settlement of 1689 had
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had been a means of recovering and confirming the traditional
principles and liberties of the nation, which James II had subverted,
<2,
not a means to discovering new ones. It had preserved the sovereignty
enshrined in King, Lords and Commons. All this had been accomplished
without violent change and in accordance with prescriptive rights.
The 1689 Settlement had thus been an act of conservation, very different
from the French Constitution of a century later. The men of 1689 had
witnessed a revolution prevented, not made.1^1
It was not just conservative writers who appealed to the Revolution
Settlement of 1689. After a period of retrenchment at the turn of the
century, the radical movement began to revive in the 1810s, although
its views had moderated. After the successful attack on them by
patriotic conservatives in the 1790s, the later reformers mostly
abandoned the natural rights school of Tom Paine and returned to the
ideas of earlier radicals, such as Cartwright, Wyvill and Horne Tooke
who preferred to appeal to history. They increasingly based their
argument for political reform on a return to the principles which had
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been embodied in the 1689 Settlement. They claimed these had been
corrupted in the following century. They argued that the principles,
which underpinned the Glorious Revolution, established the right to
liberty of conscience, resistance to tyranny and the right to choose
one's own government, but that these principles had not been turned into
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practice. In this sense, the work of 1689 had still to be completed
and this justified the need for moderate political reforms.
Wordsworth and Coleridge defended the constitution in Burkean
terms as essentially the same system that had been sanctioned in 1689
and was still serving the country well. Nevertheless, they still had
to answer this new, moderate case for reform which also appealed to the
principles of the Revolution Settlement.
The appeal to the Old Whig ideas embodied in the 1689 Settlement
became an important feature in Wordsworth's writings in the late 1790s.1'
Wordsworth closely followed Burke's arguments in favour of the existing
system and believed that the Revolution Settlement had provided the form
for an ideal constitution, which embodied all the best traditions from
Britain's past. Until 1803, however, Wordsworth believed that Britain
was still not adhering closely enough to these principles. The Peace
of A: miens, signed with a despotic power, revealed that Britain had not
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yet recovered the moral spirit which had been alive in the seventeenth
century and which had prompted the 1688 Revolution. Although he did
not appeal to the Settlement as a justification for specific political
reforms, as the more moderate radicals did, Wordsworth did argue that
there needed to be a return to the spirit of 1689. He admired the
simple, moral uprightness of that earlier era and regarded it as an
example for contemporary Britain:
Great men have been among us; hands that penned
And tongues that uttered wisdom - better none:
The later Sidney, Marvell, Harrington,
Young Vane, and others who called Milton friend.
These moralists could act and comprehend:
They knew how genuine glory was put on;
Taught us how rightfully a nation shone
In splendour: what strength was, that would not bend
But in magnanimous meekness.1
These heroes of Wordsworth, from the seventeenth century, had helped
to establish the national spirit of that age as one of moral rectitude -
a spirit which was lacking in Britain in 1802.
It was not only the moral spirit of this Commonwealth tradition
that was wanting; there was also a neglect of those time-honoured
principles and customs which those men had supported and which had been
encapsulated in the Revolution Settlement. Wordsworth appealed to
the spirit of Milton as an exemplary presence that was needed in Britain
once more. Her people, writers, institutions (civil and religious),
and even the propertied classes, had all neglected their traditional
principles by concluding a peace with tyranny itself.
Milton! thou shouldst be living at this hour:
England hath need of thee: she is a fen
Of stagnant waters: altar, sword, and pen,
Fireside, the heroic wealth of hall and bower,
Have forfeited their ancient English dower
Of inward happiness. We are selfish men;
Oh! raise us up, return to us again;
And give us manners, virtue, freedom, power.
Wordsworth does not invoke the spirit of Milton in these lines in order
to justify the need for reforms in the constitutional structure, as
the radicals proposed, but, instead, he is interested in ensuring that
the existing system is adhered to and functions with the same moral
spirit that was evident in Milton's time.
After Britain resumed war, in 1803, Wordsworth believed the nation
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did recover this moral spirit and the traditional principles enshrined
in the Revolution Settlement were alive once more. The only occasion,
when Britain again faltered, was in 1808 when she signed the Convention
of Cintra with the tyrant Napoleon. Once more, Britain had forgotten
the moral principles of 1689 which had such a long and glorious national
pedigree. These principles had not only found their ultimate, practical
expression in the Revolution Settlement, but were derived from Britain's
ancient past and were ignored at the nation's peril. Wordsworth
reminded the government of,
her long train of deliverers and defenders, her Alfred,
her Sidneys, and her Milton; whose voice yet speaketh
for our reproach; and whose actions survive in memory
to confound us, or to redeem!10^
Despite this lapse, Wordsworth still believed that the traditional
form of the constitution was safe in the hands of the Tory Ministry.
In his Westmorland Address (1818), Wordsworth supported the ministerial
Tory candidates as the true heirs of the Old Whig tradition, which
dated back to 1689- The Whig candidate in the Westmorland election
was Henry Brougham, whom Wordsworth termed an 'ultra-reform' Whig.
Brougham sought changes in the constitution and so he was not a true
exponent of Old Whiggism, as Wordsworth understood the term: a supporter
of the existing constitution framed and fixed in 1689, but based on
even more ancient principles. Brougham, in standing as a Whig, thus
contravened what had once been the ideas of his own party:
The public life of the Candidate who now, for the
first time, solicits your suffrages, my Brother
Freeholders, cannot, however, without injustice to
that Party, be deemed a fair exponent of its political
opinions. It has, indeed, been too tolerant with
Mr. Brougham, while he was labouring to ingraft
certain sour cuttings from the wild wood of ultra
reform, on the reverend, though somewhat decayed,
stock of that tree of Whiggism, which flourished
proudly under the cultivation of our Ancestors.10®
Wordsworth argued that, by 1818, the radical Whigs were anti-constitutional
and the rest of the party were a spent force. It was the Tory Ministry
of Lord Liverpool that best expressed and defended the true Old Whig
tradition and the constitutional principles of 1689.
John Milton was also a key figure in Coleridge's political philosophy.
He too admired the moral spirit of the great poet, that was such an
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example and inspiration to all subsequent ages:
Milton, austere, condensed, imaginative, supporting
his truth by direct enunciation of lofty moral
sentiment and by distinct visual representations,
and in the same spirit overwhelming what he deemed
falsehood by moral denunciation and a succession of
pictures appalling or repulsive.1^
Coleridge believed that the politics of Milton and the Old Whig writers
of the seventeenth century were sternly moral and that it was these
fine principles which had inspired the framers of the 1689 Settlement.
The new Whigs of the 1810s, who wished to reform the structure of the
constitution, he now included under the general terms of 'Jacobins'.
They were the political and moral opposites of these earlier writers.
Even though Milton had termed himself a 'republican', Coleridge argued
that Milton's republicanism was the antithesis of the parliamentary
reform favoured by contemporary Jacobinical Whigs:
Milton became more and more a stern republican, or
rather an advocate for that religious and moral
aristocracy which, in his day, was called republicanism,
and which, even more than royalism itself, is the
direct antipode of modern jacobinism. 1 ^
Coleridge argued that the moral principles, espoused by Milton, lay
at the heart of the constitution which had been re-formed in 1689. In
the final chapter, it will be shown how Milton's advocacy of a moral
aristocracy found an echo in Coleridge's own post-war writings when
he argued the necessity for a 'clerisy' which could re-educate the
people in Britain's traditional, moral and political principles.
Like Wordsworth, Coleridge believed that participation in the
Napoleonic War had effected a moral renaissance in Britain and had
returned the nation to those principles proclaimed by Hampden, Sidney
and Russell.111 Britain had become rededicated to the moral constitutional
principles of 1689 which these men had helped to form. The constitutional
fabric of the nation had been repaired. Coleridge regarded William III
as the political saviour of the nation, while, the constitution, restored
in 1689, was seen as a moral deliverance, as well as a triumph of
time-honoured political truths. The spirit of those times was alive
again:
The Cranmers, Hampdens, and Sidneys; the Counsellors
of our Elizabeth and the Friends of our other great
deliverer the third William, - is it in vain, that these
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have been our Countrymen? Are we not the Heirs of
their good deeds? And what are noble Deeds but noble
Truths realized? As Protestants, as Englishmen, as
the Inheritors of so ample an estate of Might and Right,
an estate so strongly fenced, so richly planted, by the
sinewy arms and dauntless hearts of our Forefathers,
we of all others have good cause to trust in the Truth,
yea, to follow its' pillar of fire through Darkness
and the Desart, even though its hight should but suffice
to make us certain of its own presence.
Since the Revolution Settlement was, in this sense, a summation of the
best of Britain's traditional principles, moral values and laws,
Coleridge agreed with Burke that it could not be considered as a
'revolution' in the modern radical sense. It was an act of national
conservatism and salvation. Writing as a lover of 'Old England',
Coleridge defined the Revolution of 1688 as a
Wise and necessitated confirmation and explanation of
the law of England,_erroneously entitled The English
Revolution of 1688.11^
Like Burke, Coleridge also attacked those moderate Whig reformers
who believed that the present constitution had been perverted and that
there was a need to return to the original intentions of 1689, or to
even more ancient principles embedded in Britain's past. While acknow¬
ledging that their appeal to the past was a stronger basis for their
argument, than the appeal to natural rights, Coleridge still argued
that their case was false:
They wish to bring back the Government of Great Britain
to a certain form, which they affirm it to have once
possessed: and would melt the bullion anew in order to
recast it in the original mould.11^
Coleridge argued that the current political system did already follow
the form laid down in 1689 and was still informed by its ancient principles.
Any modifications which had arisen over the hundred years since then
were not corruptions of the original, but were pragmatic alterations
which enabled the constitution to function in changed circumstances.
Laws which had fallen into disuse, or had been changed, were laws which
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had gradually proved themselves inexpedient. Any attempt to re-enact
these laws in new and different circumstances was wrong-minded because
they no longer had any current social meaning. Old customs and statutes
could only be understood within their historical context. The Saxons
may once have given every 'fhesnan' the right to vote, but it was quite
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wrong for Whig reformers to wrench this term from its original
context and argue that every man who was 'born free' should now have
the right to vote. This was false to the original, much more limited,
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intentions of the Saxons. Indeed, the full meaning of any law was
only revealed by the way in which it inter-acted with the other laws
of its time. To disjoin a law, from this inter-dependent matrix, was
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to falsify its original meaning and spirit.
Coleridge believed that the constitution, established in 1689,
was the most pragmatic expression of Britain's traditional values.
The allowance for expedient change within its framework meant that
the constitution would always remain relevant to the evolving society
of Britain. Coleridge argued that this appeal to tradition and
pragmatism was inherent in the Revolution of 1688 which had produced
the constitutional Settlement of 1689. It had been an event which
combined permanence and progression. The Revolution was,
not more propelled by the spirit of enterprise and
hazard in our commercial towns, than held in check
by the characteristic VIS INERTIAE of the peasantry
and landholders; both parties cooled and lessoned by
the equal failure of the destruction, and of the
restoration of monarchy; it was effected extrinsically,
I say, by the same influences, which, (not in and of
themselves, but with all these and sundry other
modifications) combined under an especial control of
Providence to perfect and secure the majestic Temple
of the British Constitution!11®
11 9
France, which had lacked this 'providential counterpoise' between
permanence and progress, had only ever produced constitutions of
extremes.
Coleridge clearly regarded the constitution, established in 1689,
as an ideal form for Britain, but he still did not regard it (as
Wordsworth and Burke did) as a complete success, requiring only a few
minor, conservative changes to maintain its relevance. The 1689
Settlement had perfectly expressed the constant moral spirit and
traditional principles of the nation, but these had to be realised
in a practical form which progressed as society did. As we shall see,
Coleridge only regarded 1689 as one point in a continuing political
pro cess. Its form still basically suited early nineteenth-century
Britain, but the constitution itself was an organic growth. The
constitution's qualities of permanence and progress ensured that the
nation's principles would be constant, but not necessarily in their
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present political form. There remained the potential for a very
different type of constitution to grow from the existing one, as
society itself lived and grew. This idea will become more evident
as we proceed to discuss Wordsworth's and Coleridge's views on the
existing structure of the national constitution and its potential for
change.
Conservative writers argued that the 1688 Revolution had established
or rather restored a mixed and balanced constitution which still
perfectly served the needs and interests of the British people. It
had achieved liberty, stability and prosperity. This constitution
combined the virtues of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, without
the dangers inherent in any one system. Each of these elements was
perfectly balanced so that no one predominated. Although the represent¬
ative element in the constitution was based on landed property, the
House of Commons, which was the democratic part of the constitution,
still had to represent the interests of the entire nation. Although
the monarchy, aristocracy and the propertied classes had political
and social privileges, these also entailed duties and a responsibility
for the welfare of all. Burke argued that the landed classes were the
trustees of the poor. Thus, even though only a few people were directly
involved in the government of the country, the nature of the mixed and
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balanced constitution ensured that the interests of all were heeded.
There was, however, one outstanding danger inherent in the system.
»
If one element in the mixed constitution achieved undue importance or
began to pull too strongly in an opposite direction to the rest, the
balance of the constitution would be disturbed and consequently the
existing structure of society would be imperilled. Conservatives argued
that the use of patronage and influence was one method for maintaining
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the balance, and oiling the mechanism of the constitution. Man's
imperfect nature needed to be controlled by something more than a mere
appeal to reason. It was necessary to engage man's self-interest -
only then could he be relied upon to give of his best. Thus, conservatives
argued that the use of influence and patronage was one of the best
ways of ensuring good government and maintaining a balance of interest
between the three elements of the constitution. William Paley had
argued that since the Lords had less power than the Commons because
the latter dominated in the raising of taxes, the balance between them
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could only be sustained if the former had some controlling influence
over the latter. Many conservative writers also argued that if there
were not a certain allowance for the exercise of natural and legitimate
patronage, then bribery and corrup tion of a more venal kind would soon
replace it.
This use of influence was one aspect of the constitutional system
which came under increasing criticism from reformers, as radicalism
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began to revive in the closing years of the war. Most reformers had
no intention of remodelling the entire constitution, but they were
concerned by the growth of corrupt practices. During the war, taxes
had increased, the civil and military establishments had grown, and
there had been a consequent rise in the use of influence. While much
of the nation was suffering hardship, government officials and contractors
were prospering. Executive power seemed to be increasing at the expense
of Parliamentary independence and the liberty of the subject. In the
years after 1810, there was sustained attacks on all forms of corruption
by radicals, such as Francis Burdett, who wanted a diminution in
executive power and government patronage. Influence was opposed not
merely on the grounds that it was a perversion of the original form
of the constitution of 1689, but also because of its debilitating
economic effect on the people. Thus, Wordsworth and Coleridge were not
only concerned with defending the traditional balanced constitution,
but also had to respond to this attack on influence, which they now
regarded as an essential element for maintaining political harmony and
stability.
It has already been noted that Wordsworth now regarded the aristocracy
as the natural rulers of society and the landed classes as those best
entitled to vote. The third element in the constitution was the
monarchy which he had attacked so vigorously before 1802. Wordsworth
now praised the monarchy as a vital part (indeed, the keystone) of the
traditional balanced constitution. The Crown symbolised the permanence
of Britain and safeguarded her political system, its liberties, laws
and the Established Church:
Hail to the Crown by Freedom shaped - to gird
An English Sovereign's brow! and to the throne
Whereon he sits! Whose deep foundations lie
In veneration and the people's love;
Whose steps are equity, whose seat is law.
- Hail to the State of England!
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During the course of the war, Wordsworth developed not only a great
respect for the institution of monarchy, but a real affection for
George III, whom he had once scorned. He wrote, with emotion, on the
king's sad state of blindness and insanity in the 1810s and called on
God, the King of Kings, to look kindly on this old man who had cared
so much for his people.
When the Napoleonic Wars ended, Wordsworth welcomed back the
Bourbon king, Louis XVIII, and the other restored monarchs of Europe,
but only on condition that, in future, they looked after their people
in the same Christian way that George III had cared for his. Wordsworth
only favoured monarchies if they were bound by a constitution, so that
their power was balanced and circumscribed by the other elements in the
political system. Wordsworth wanted to see a return to the old Gothic
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virtue of 'King and people pledged in mutual troth'. He was anxious
that the monarchs should not interpret their restoration as an endorse¬
ment of their former absolute rule. They now had to be responsible
and dutiful to their own people:
Be just, be grateful; nor, the oppressor's creed
Reviving, heavier chastisement deserve ^
Than ever forced unpitied hearts to bleed.
Wordsworth believed that the war had not only taught that republicanism
was unworkable, but that absolutist government had also been rejected.
The only constitution, which had served the interests of all its nation,
was the balanced system of Britain. Thus, the future success of the
restored monarchies depended on them adhering to a similar series of
checks and balances, and following the British example.
Wordsworth recognised that constitutional checks and balances ensured
political stability, harmony and the judicious exercise of power:
Looking up to the government with respectful attachment,
we all acknowledge that power must be controlled and
checked, or it will be abused.
These checks and balances did not just need to operate between the three
main elements of the constitution, but also within each element.
Wordsworth, therefore, argued that there had to be a vigorous Opposition,
withinthe House of Commons, which agreed with the governing party on
fundamental national principles, but which was capable of checking the
power and pretensions of the Government, if it became too mighty or
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self-interested. Wordsworth also recognised the need for checks and
balances stretching beyond the constitutional framework into society
as a whole. He believed that it was essential to counteract the growing
radical sympathies of the towns with the more reliable, stable power
of the propertied classes. If these democratic feelings were allowed
to grow and infiltrate parliament, the balance of the constitution would
be upset and the social structure destroyed. Wordsworth argued that
the position of the propertied in government had to be strengthened in
order to counteract and check these dangerous democratic forces. Only
then would the constitutional balance be maintained:
As far as it concerns the general well-being of the
Kingdom, it would be easy to shew, that if the
democratic activities of the great Towns and of the
manufacturing Districts, were not counteracted by the
sedentary power of large estates, continued from
generation to generation in particular families, it
would be scarcely possible that the Laws and
Constitution of the Country could sustain the
1 ?Q
shocks which they would be subject to. ^
Wordsworth contended that the balance and harmony of the constitution
was sustained by patronage and influence. These allowed it to function
more effectively. In the 1790s, Wordsworth had condemned the use of
patronage and influence in government, but, by 1813, he, himself, had
become a beneficiary of that system when the Lowthers gained him the
post of Distributor of Stamps. Although Wordsworth did not condone
bribery, he did come to the conclusion that aristocratic influence, and
the use of places and pensions, were not real corruptions, but devices
for promoting good government and preventing worse types of corruption
flourishing. His most sustained defence of influence, as a moral force,
is to be found in his Westmorland Address (1818), where he uses the
example of the House of Lowther to prove his case.
The Lowther family had represented Westmorland for generations and
Wordsworth defended the influence they exerted in that count y as a
force that was beneficial to all. He claimed that they had used their
influence in the Westminster Parliament to ensure that government plans
for the welfare of the nation were of especial benefit to the people of
Westmorland.1"^ Their influence within the county was justified because
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of their 'long-continued possession of large property'. This ancient,
and close, relationship with the county meant that there was an identity
of interests between the Lowthers and the people of Westmorland. Thus,
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they were perfectly justified in using their influence to determine
who was to represent the county - it could only be for the benefit
of all.
Wordsworth hardly considered the possibility that influence could
be used for oppressive ends or that it might produce inept legislators.
He believed that influence, wielded by the propertied classes, could
only ever be used in the national interest and for moral purposes.
In one passage of his Address he did, hypothetically, consider what
could happen if influence were used for immoral purposes. He agreed
with Burke that, even in these unlikely circumstances, the system of
influence and patronage still had to be defended. The instances of
abuse would be few in number and any change in the system might well
destroy the whole constitutional edifice. A few minor blemishes were
worth suffering if there was a risk of destroying the system, and leaving
the door open for a much more corrupt system: namely democracy.
But, looking at the present constitution and measure
of this influence, you cannot but perceive, Gentlemen,
that if there were indeed anything in it that could
justly be complained of, our duty might still be to
bear with the local evil, as correcting an opposite
extreme in some other quarter of the Island; as a
counterpoise of some weight elsewhere pressing
injuriously upon the springs of social order. How
deplorable would be the ignorance, how pitiful the
pride, that could prevent us from submitting to a
partial evil, for the sake of a general good!1-^
The working of the constitution was a mysterious phenomenon and, even
if it did have some minor faults, these should not be tampered with
in case even these faults proved to be a vital part of the successful
whole. The constitution, held together by bonds of influence, had
proved itself pragmatically and this fact overrode other considerations.
The alternative was to risk destruction and be thrown 'into the arms
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of a flaming democracy!'
In the 1790s Wordsworth had argued that government places should
be filled by people with merit, but that pensions were often awarded
to the undeserving. Now, he defended the place and pension system as
integral parts of the constitution. He still recognised that fitness
for office could not just depend on one's influence, but that there
also had to be evidence of real ability. He believed, however, that
the landed classes were more likely to possess this ability. A system
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which was open only to the talented was dangerous because there was
much spurious talent around, as well as restless ambition and jockeying for
positions. An open system, based on merit alone, produced the chaos,
witnessed in France, without the steadying effect of 'the passive
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influence of property and hereditary rank.' Thus, a balance had
to be struck between a certain amount of necessary ability as well as
the stabilising power of influence which could only be derived from
property and rank:
What one individual has gained by the power of his
connection, and a reasonable degree of fitness for
his office, another may attain with less interest
if his abilities should be greater. This is as it
ought to be. These mixed operations keep things in
a salutary state; thus one power prevents the undue
action of another.
In either case influence was essential because it implied so much
about one's education, experience, and the traditional values
associated with property. Even those with talent still had to acquire
some of the influence which property bestowed, before they could perform
their duties well. It was not just that influence maintained a balance
in the constitution, but also that the values and qualities implied
by the possession of influence made it a strong and useful force in
government.
Since those with influence were usually the best educated class,
bound by their property to the security of the nation, Wordsworth also
argued that the military establishment ought not to be staffed on the
grounds of talent alone. He answered Whig criticisms by arguing that
men of property and influence were needed in the army and navy because
their reliable civic virtues were then interwoven into the military
administration, making it a more formidable nationalist force:
By allowing interest and purchase to prevail to
a certain extent, (though well knowing this cannot
be done without some ill consequences) we inter¬
weave the property of the country with the fabric
of that body which is to defend it; and along with
the property are interwoven the rights, privileges
and liberties of the subject.1 ^6
Although a modicum of talent would always be required to fill these
posts, the patronage system was still the best means of guaranteeing
this. Even though the system had occasional faults it was still to
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be preferred to a meritocracy which could only lead to rampant
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self-interest, inimical to the national good.
Wordsworth argued that the use of influence was a stable means
of operating the constitution. It was peculiarly well fitted to
national circumstances and involved a network of mutual duties and
responsibilities. Since the landed classes were the most important
segment of society, it was only proper that they should have a right
to use their natural influence in government. Their interest was
also the nation's, and so it would be to the benefit of all. Although
the operation of influence had not been part of the original 1689
constitution, it had proved to be a felicitous and pragmatic addition
to the system, which enabled a harmonious balance to be struck between
the three elements of the constitution. It helped to preserve the
original principles of the constitution:
The only question which a practical politician can
tolerate for a moment relates to the degree of this
influence; has it been carried too far? The consider¬
ations which put me upon writing the present note ...
do not require the discussion of this point. The
amicable reader will rejoice with me that, in spite
of mutual shocks and encroachments, the three Orders
of the State are preserved in salutary equipoise,
although the mode of bringing this about has unavoidably
changed with change of circumstances. The spirit of
the Constitution remains unimpaired, nor have the
essential parts of its frame undergone any alteration.
May both endure as long as the Island itself!1®®
Coleridge similarly supported the concept of a mixed and balanced
constitution and, like Wordsworth, he completely revised his views on
the usefulness of patronage and influence. He concluded that influence,
far from being a corruption of the original constitution, enabled it
to live in an organic form.
Coleridge's views on the aristocratic and democratic elements of
the constitution have already been explored. After 1802 his toleration
of those monarchs, who governed in the interests of their people, was
to grow into real admiration. He regarded the king as an essential
feature of the British constitution. He did not, however, favour any
form of absolute monarchy and even opposed the creation of new peerages
in Britain, as this would only enhance the power of the Crown at the
expense of the hereditary nobility. A strong hereditary aristocracy
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was one of the best checks on monarchy. Coleridge only favoured
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the restoration of the Bourbons in France because it was a limited,
constitutional monarchy, on the British model. During the war years,
Coleridge developed a warm affection for the British monarchy and,
particularly, George III. He believed that George had had a salutary
effect on the nation's destiny. His sober dedication to duty had
served as a moral exemplar to his people and had helped them avoid
the evil temptations of the French Revolution:
[of] all the subordinate Causes which acted in
concert with the state of Property [in Great Britain]
to counteract and disarm the temptations of the
French Revolution at its commencement the King's
own private character was, if not the first yet
assuredly in the first class.1^
Coleridge now saw George III, and the monarchy generally, as a virtuous,
stabilising force in British society and politics.
In the war years, Coleridge developed an idea of monarchy that
reached beyond its designated place within the constitution - he
believed the monarchy was an expression of the national idea. When
Fox visited Napoleon, in 1802, Wordsworth had condemned Fox's hypocrisy
and the inconsistency in his, supposedly, libertarian principles.
Coleridge condemned the action because it also did dishonour to George
III and, ipso facto, to the British nation: the two were indissoluble.
Coleridge argued that Fox, who had refused to appear at the British
court, should have risen above party prejudice, or personal dislike
for George III, when he was abroad, and should not have knelt before
Napoleon. In slitting his own king, but honouring a foreign ruler,
Fox was disgracing his nation, because the monarchy was part of the
nation's idea of itself. An Englishman abroad,
no longer knows the names of Whig or Tory. His
king becomes an abstraction in his mind, around which
his best feelings gather. It is the particular man
no longer; it is the Majesty of his Country. What
Mr. Fox could not receive in England, he ought to
have been too proud a patriot to have condescended to
receive in France.
Monarchy had become the focus for the nation's patriotism and it was
a moral inspiration. The king, himself, was only the outer manifest¬
ation of this deeper idea of the nation. The people themselves attained
majesty through the idea of monarchy.
If the king was to fulfil this high calling, he had to be a positive
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moral force, like George III, and he also had to achieve an identity
of purpose and interest with his people, so that all became part of
one national consensus. King and nation were indissolubly linked and
achieved greatness through each other, although all were subject to
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God, the King of Kings. Coleridge saw the entire nation as one
family, made up of distinct members, but still organically united
with the King and Queen as the parental figures. Just as parents
achieved status and importance only through their family, so monarchs
could not be considered apart from their nation. Similarly, the
nation was dependent on them as exemplars,and guardians of its welfare.
Coleridge argued that Queen Charlotte's funeral was much more important
than normal funerals for this very reason:
when in the person of the Departed the name and
Majesty of the Country have -been represented and,
as it were, embodied - where a whole people may
join in giving a religious tenderness to Royalty
by combining with it the Parental Relation, and a
majesty, not unparticipated by ourselves, to the
tenderest of names, while our thoughts and hearts
rise in concert with the Solemn Chaun
organ's swell over our ROYAL MOTHER.1
Just as parent and child only achieved full meaning when considered
as part of one family unit, so the monarchy only found purpose when
caring for its people, and the nation discovered its corporeal identity
in the idea of monarchy. Nation and monarchy found themselves in each
other.
Coleridge thus confirmed the monarchy as an integral element in
the nation and as an important part of the mixed constitution:
The reciprocal dependence of the Crown, the Aristocracy,
and the minor proprietors, on each other, creates and
preserves an unbroken chain of connexion between the
great component classes of a civilised State, highly
conducive to national union, tending moreover to soften
and popularise the manners of the higher ranks, and to
elevate the feelings of those below them.1Z|Zt
Thus, the nation, as an interdependent organism, was best realised in
constitutional form, by the mixed and balanced structure of monarchy,
aristocracy and democracy. Like Burke, Coleridge believed that the
entire nation was adequately represented in this arrangement. Although
the common people had no direct voice in Parliament, none the less the
interdependent nature of society and of the mixed constitution ensured
and the
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that/they possessed a great prudential, as well as moral, Interest
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in its welfare.' Each element had to be cogniscent of the wishes
and interests of the nation as a whole. Coleridge followed the Old
Whig interpretation:
By a constitutional House of Commons, the Old
Whigs meant a body of men, fairly representing
the various interests of the Empire, having
themselves a weighty stake in the public
prosperity, and existing in close sympathy with
the public opinion.
Coleridge argued that this balanced constitution, which involved
the interests of all, produced just laws and sound policy. All the
finest statesmen in British history had risen to eminence and had
brought the nation to greatness because they had honoured this fine
structure. Coleridge argued that Spencer Perceval had become such a
successful Prime Minister because he had adhered to, and worked through,
the balanced system of Britain's constitution:
[He was] a man, who equally with our greatest
Statesmen since the Revolution, had profoundly
studied, and conscientiously acted upon, the
balance of the constitution ... [and showed]
a firm attachment to those principles and
institutions religious and political, under
which Great Britain had become the proudest name
in history.
The series of balances, inherent in the constitution of 1689, had
proved to be a check on despotic ambitions and had produced wise
legislation in the interests of all. The constitution was a self-
righting balance, which was difficult to subvert and which was even
capable of channelling personal ambition into the national interest
through its mixed, but interdependent, structure. The constitution
'not only plants and rears the virtues, which it uses, but directs the
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coldest Self-interests to the public good.'
Like Wordsworth, Coleridge concluded that the constitution could
only function smoothly and effectively, if influence was employed.
His philosophy of life predisposed him to any contrivance which would
further the harmony of the whole. Whereas Wordsworth believed that
the use of influence helped preserve the fixed constitution, Coleridge,
on the other hand, believed that it was the lifeblood of the political
system and thus helped it grow and live organically.
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Coleridge praised the way that, in Britain, influence was not
just cen t red on one person, the monarch, but was also distributed
by the government and the landowning class as a whole. This wide
use of influence was not corrupt, but was, indeed, a guarantee against
corruption, for it ensured that no one element in the constitution
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predominated. Coleridge did acknowledge, however, that influence
could become disproportionately large. A few great aristocrats could
control many boroughs at election time, but he believed that these few
exceptions were worth the other advantages of influence: 'Yet the rule
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holds good, notwithstanding the exceptions.' Removal of these few
blemishes was hardly merited and might well damage the entire
structure, thus ushering in a far more corrupt system. Coleridge
believed that conservative defenders of the constitution should admit
that some types of influence were evil, even though they still had to
be accepted as parts of a successful whole. Honestly admitting this,
could only strengthen their case:
The most prudent, as well as the most honest mode
of defending the existing arrangements, would have
been, to have candidly admitted what could not
with truth be denied, and then to have shown that,
though the things complained of were Evils, they
were necessary Evils; or if they were removable,
yet that consequence of the heroic medicines
recommended by the Revolutionists would be far more
dreadful than the Disease.
Although influence was a flawed system, it was still an intrinsic part
of the constitutional organism. It was the best pragmatic means for
ensuring the constitution worked so well.
The extent to which Coleridge's feelings On places and pensions
had changed, is shown in his altered opinion of Burke's government
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pension. In The Watchman (1796), he had scorned Burke for accepting
this, although he had conceded that Burke possessed many talents and
did merit some reward. Eight years later, Coleridge wrote of that
same pension:
Mr. Burke closed a long, a laborious, and an useful
life in the affluence of a large pension - it could
not be larger than his merits. 53
Coleridge now regarded places and pensions as legitimate rewards for
talent, although he did not countenance their use as a form of bribery
or as a short-term means of buying support. Otherwise, he even
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supported places and pensions when they had seemingly little
practical value. Those positions, which entailed few important,
active duties, could serve as rewards for past service, as well as
present merit. They served as 'an asylum for superannuated or toil-
worn service, and all of them to become rewards for such as had
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laboured long and jealously in subordinate stations'. Thus, even
in this more limited, passive sense, the system was pragmatic.
In general, however, Coleridge defended the use of patronage
as a means for discovering, and raising up, the best man for each
position. Coleridge attacked writers, such as William Cobbett, as
well as the Whiggish newspapers, the Morning Chronicle and the Examiner,
when they opposed the growth in civil and military patronage during
the war years. Coleridge contended that the patronage system in the
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navy had produced great commanders such as Nelson, Howe and Hood.
When Whig writers argued that these men would have risen to eminence
anyway, under a fairer meritocratic system, Coleridge countered by
arguing that the patronage system was not a substitute for appointment
by merit, but a means for bringing taleri forth. It was essential to
fill posts with men who had merit and experience, but Coleridge believed
these qualities were often best discovered through the exercise of
patronage. In a meritocracy the singular abilities and moral worth
of such men might go unnoticed in the competitive struggle of mere
talent:
For the whole argument [of the reformers] rests
on the assumption, that all interest is the
substitute for ability and integrity, and^jagt the
pully to raise and lift them into office.
Coleridge saw patronage as the handmaiden of merit and virtue, not an
alternative to them. Indeed, since the good name of these patrons
rested on the worth of their clients, this provided an added incentive
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for them to choose the best men for the post.
Coleridge believed that the influence exerted within the bounds
of the existing British constitution was the least corrupt of any
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comparable political system in an equally populous country. He
argued that this was only so, if influence was exercised by the most
responsible class, and was employed for the welfare of the entire
nation. Coleridge praised how the Old Whigs, who had framed the 1689
200
Revolution Settlement, had determined these limitations. They had
distinguished,
secret and selfish corruption from legitimate
parliamentary interest; and while they held in
abhorrence the influence obtained from accidents
of personal favour, for selfish and transitory
advantages, and with pledges of indefinite
support, they justified and jealously maintained
that influence in the disposal of patronage, which
accrued to an individual as the representative
of a fixed property and rank, and proportioned
to that parliamentary interest, which by the nature^--
of things attaches to such property with such rank.
Influence exercised by the propertied classes was of benefit to
the entire nation. Their link with the land and its traditions was
a safeguard against the abuse of influence for personal gain or selfish
ambition.
The place and patronage system therefore figures largely in
Coleridge's defence of the constitution. In his view it enabled the
political system to function smoothly and effectively, and produced
legislators of the highest quality. It was a pragmatic system which
had contributed to the universal admiration which the British constit¬
ution enjoyed. Coleridge, however, made even greater claims for the
system. He argued that influence was the lifeblood of the constitution
that enabled it to become an organic process. Influence was the vital
element which kept all the distinct parts of the constitution operating
as one harmonious body politic. Referring to'the Life and Spirit of
our Constitution', Coleridge argued that,
This delicate and difficult Result has hitherto
been effected, and can only be effected by, the
understood and (whenever allied with public
opinion) the irresistible Influence of Parliament
in the Sovereign's choice of his Ministers, by the
complex system of acting Interests and Influences
from the heart of the minutest capillary vessel,
in which system the great Proprietors and the
other powerful members of the two Houses are
themselves only the larger veins and arteries and
those nearest the head-outlets of Patronage.^^0
Influence thus maintained the organic life of the constitution. While
each element retained its distinctiveness, influence ensured their
interdependence. In this way, the operation of influence enabled the
body politic to reflect the organic nature of society with all its
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mutual duties and responsibilities. This ensured that the political
and social system of Britain would function as one harmonious, living
whole. For Coleridge, influence did not so much maintain the political
balance, as infuse the constitution with organic life, so that it
could live, grow and change, as society as a whole did.
Wordsworth and Coleridge were confident that this national con¬
stitution was perfectly fitted to the particular circumstances of
British society and they believed that, in many respects, it was an
ideal from which other nations could learn. In the 1810s, however,
a more moderate radical movement began to revive and there were renewed
calls for specific parliamentary reforms such as an extension of the
franchise. Wordsworth and Coleridge had to respond to these demands
for change in the traditional structure of the constitution. In the
process, both writers also considered whether any major innovation
could ever be justified or whether the constitution had reached a stage
of perfection which only required occasional, minor adjustments to
preserve its original framework.
In his early career Burke had not been opposed to parliamentary
reform on principle, although he had been afraid of its practical
consequences. After the outbreak of the French Revolution, however,
he attacked the need for any major political reform. The French
Revolution had demonstrated the dangers which would occur if new, alien
elements were imposed upon the traditional fabric of the nation.
Britain's time-honoured constitution had successfully preserved her
from a similar descent into anarchy and despotism, and Burke argued
that her political system should, therefore, be maintained'in a condition
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of unchangeable constancy.' Even though minor alterations might
be required occasionally, as social circumstance demanded, these were
only to be contemplated in extreme circumstances and in order to
preserve the existing system. In general, the guiding principle had
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to be the 'ancient permanent sense of mankind'. The deeper changes
which the radicals desired were viewed as dangerous, destructive
intrus i ons, alien to the traditional sensibilities which were
natural to man. An extension of the franchise would only threaten the
ancient fabric of society. The despotism of the masses which would
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eventually be produced, would be far worse than any previous despotism.
These Burkean arguments were to have a major influence on both writers ,
although Coleridge contended that there was a greater potential for
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constitutional change than either Wordsworth or Burke had contemplated.
After 1802 Wordsworth gave up his earlier demand for democratic
reforms within the constitution and began to argue that the British
constitution had reached a degree of perfection in 1689 that precluded
all but minor adjustments. In his Westmorland Address (1818),
Wordsworth defended the existing system against contemporary attacks
by moderate reformers. He attacked Brougham, the Whig candidate in
Westmorland, because of his proposals for constitutional reform. Brougham
had once supported the franchise for those paying any kind of tax, but
now he had moderated his views and proposed a franchise based only on
direct tax. Wordsworth first attacked this position because it was a
desertion of Brougham's original principles. Wordsworth believed that
the Whigs, generally, watered down their true beliefs to make them
more palatable to the voting public. Wordsworth argued that contemporary
Whig precepts were only a dilution of their old republican beliefs:
'no better than a timid plagiarism from the doctrine of the Rights of
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Man'. Brougham's seemingly moderate proposals would soon lead to
radical change and therefore they had to be opposed. A suffrage based
on taxation was inimical to the traditional propertied basis of the
constitution. Wordsworth argued that it was also better to have a few
people enfranchised on a limited, but distinct, propertied basis (as
at present), than have a few disgruntled people from the lower class,
disenfranchised on a spurious, imprecise, innovatory basis such as tax.
Wordsworth feared that a taxation suffrage would merely be the prelude
to universal suffrage since all adults paid some form of tax. This
would inexorably lead to the demise of the existing system and would
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be 'the greatest political evil that could befal the Land!' Britain
would be throwing away the very object she had fought the French to
preserve - her established constitution. Thus, the moderate Whig
calls for constitutional reform did not just have dangerous and radical
implications, they were also fundamentally unpatriotic; they carried
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on Napoleon's evil purpose long after the war had been won.
Wordsworth defended the propertied basis of the constitution.
He argued that the law establishing the property qualifications for
parliamentary candidates, which had been passed in Queen Anne's reign,
was still a wise measure, since it ensured that M.P.s possessed a
substantial stake in the country. He believed that the possession of
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property acted as a surety for principled government: 'such Estate
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may be looked upon as a pledge for his conduct.' Like Coleridge,
Wordsworth came to the conclusion that the amount of responsibility
one wielded in the political system, whether voting or governing,
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was directly proportional to the amount of property one owned.
Only a franchise based on property generated moral government. Only
those who possessed property had the independence of judgement, the
tangible interest in the nation's welfare, and the necessary education,
to enable them to use their vote wisely and morally:
The basis of the elective Franchise being property,
the legal condition of eligibility to a seat in
Parliament is the same. Our ancestors were not blind
to the moral considerations which, if they did not
suggest these ordinances, established a confidence
in their expediency. Knowing that there could be no
absolute guarantee for integrity, and that there was
no certain test of discretion and knowledge, for
bodies of men, the prudence of former times turned
to the best substitute human nature would admit of,
and civil society furnished. This was property;
which showed that a man had something that might be
impaired or lost by mismanaganent; something which tended
to place him above dependence from need; and promised,
though it did not insure some degree of education to
produce requisite intelligence.^
Whig reformers, such as Brougham, were urban outsiders trying to
undermine the traditional, moral basis of the constitution by their
proposals for a non-propertied franchise.
Thus, Wordsworth argued that the constitution had attained a state
of pefection that required no further reforms, only minor adjustments.
The potential for change was very limited. Like Burke, he argued
that things had a fundamental right to remain unchanged until they
had been proved either redundant or counter-productive. Change could
only be contemplated as an act of conservation rather than destruction.
The reformers of the 1810s lacked this natural reverence for things
that existed. Wordsworth likened the constitution to a garden which
was fixed in its general appearance, but which required constant
tending and occasional changes or improvements to preserve its existing
state. As a landscape gardener, himself, this metaphor seemed most
appropriate to Wordsworth:
You have heard of a Profession to which the luxury
of modern times has given birth, that of Landscape-
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Gardeners, or Improvers of Pleasure-grounds.
A competent Practitioner in this elegant art,
begins by considering every subject, that he
finds in the place where he is called to
exercise his skill, as having a right to remain,
till the contrary be proved. If it be a deformity
be asks whether a slight alteration may not convert
it into a beauty; and he destroys nothing till he
has convinced himself by reflection that no
alteration, no dimunition or addition, can make
it ornamental. Modern reformers reverse this
judicious maxim. If a thing is before them, so
far from deeming that it has on that account a
claim to continue and be deliberately dealt with,
its existence with them is a sufficient warrant
for its destruction. Institutions are to be sub¬
verted, Practices radically altered, and Measures
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to be reversed. 1
Thus, for Wordsworth as for Burke, the constitution had a presumptive
right to remain fixed and unchanged. Only minor improvements and
adjustments which conserved this near-perfect whole could ever be
contemplated. Even these minor changes were mostly to be abjured
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because Wordsworth believed they often led to more radical schemes.
The constitution was such an intricately balanced mechanism that even
small adjustments might disrupt its inner workings.
Finally, Wordsworth considered the constitution and its potential
for change, within a general philosophical view of life. Although he
believed that mankind would continue to make some progress, he regarded
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the rationalist state of perfection to be unattainable. In general,
Wordsworth was convinced that man had reached something of a plateau in
human achievement and endeavour. Although society would continue to
produce great men, the very heights of intellect and virtue had already
been attained in man such as Plato, Homer, Shakespeare and Milton.
They had not achieved perfection, but they had reached 'as much of the
divinity of intellect as the inhabitants of this planet can hope will
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ever take up its abode among them.' In the same spirit, Wordsworth
believed that the British constitution was as perfectly suited to
national life as it could ever hope to be; although a few minor adjust¬
ments might be required in the future, a practical ideal had already
been achieved. It combined the permanence of a fixed structure with the
potential for small evolutionary changes within its elements. As such,
it had reached a plateau of excellence.
Coleridge was also opposed to radical parliamentary reform in the
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1810s, but he allowed for the possibility of greater structural
change than Wordsworth would ever have contemplated.
Coleridge attacked radicals who wished to extend the vote to
all adult males. He opposed this proposition because it was based
on rationalist principles. Coleridge contended that abstract reason
was a meaningless basis for any argument. Moreover, even if one
accepted the rationalist premiss, one would then have to give the
vote to women and children, who also possessed reason. Yet radicals
had excluded these two groups from their proposals on the grounds that
they were incapable of using their reason independently. Coleridge
pointed out that the same could be said for the dependent classes of
er\ i1
the poor and infirm, yet the radicals still proposed to,franchise them.
Thus, both in its philosophical assumptions and in its practical
inconsistencies, this radical argument for the reform of the franchise
was false.
Coleridge also attacked the more moderate schemes for parliamentary
reform that had previously been made by Major Cartwright and had been
revived by other war-time writers. Cartwright's more pragmatic case
was that, since laws were applicable to all, they should be assented
to by all, and that people could only be happy if this rule were
adhered to. Coleridge countered this argument, by reminding the readers
of The Friend, that happiness was also dependent on one's condition of
material comfort. If Cartwright concluded that people's happiness was
dependent on an equal right to suffrage, then it must follow that they
had an equal reciprocal right to personal possessions, wealth and
property. Indeed, it was impossible to conceive of one without the
other, Cartwright's ideas necessarily entailed an equalisation or
communalisation of property, if they were to prove pragmatic:
Here then is a legal power of abolishing or equalizing
Property: and according to himself [i.e. to Cartwright],
a Power which ought never to be used ought not to exist.
Therefore, unless he carries his System to the whole
length of common Labour and common Possession, a Right
to universal Suffrage cannot exist; but if not to
universal Suffrage, there can exist no natural right
to Suffrage at all."'^^
Since an equal or communal distribution of property was impracticable
for most countries, so was Cartwright's plan for universal suffrage,
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for the two were interdependent. It should be remembered that
Coleridge, in his pantisocratic phase, had once used the argument
of interdependence for proposing the communalisation of property and
the right of everyone to govern themselves. He had now clearly
changed his mind.
Coleridge regarded universal suffrage as an abstract principle
which, like any similar generality, was fundamentally unsuited to
society because people did not act in abstract ways. As we have seen,
even in America, where there was enough property to justify it, Coleridge
believed that the imperfect people there could not fully accept universal
suffrage. Like all universal principles, universal suffrage supposed
the type of uniform, perfect subjects which were only to be found'in
the Ideas of pure geometry and (I trust) in the Realities of Heaven,
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but never, never, in Creatures of Flesh and Blood'. Coleridge claimed
that even if he did support the idea of universal suffrage, he would
still not have recommended it in present circumstances because the
common people were too ignorant and passionate to use the vote wisely,
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and arbitrate on difficult issues. If it were introduced, it could
only lead to the vice-ridden, selfish governments which F ranee had
experienced in the 1790s. In general, he believed that universal
suffrage had a tendency to represent all the worst aspects of human
178
nature.
Coleridge's opposition to universal suffrage on these philosophical
and pragmatic grounds did not mean, however, that Coleridge was set
against any extension to the franchise. He believed that, as society
changed, so it was expedient to reflect these changes in political
terms. These changes should occur gradually in the political system,
however, just as they did in society. To ensure that they were respons¬
ibly engineered, Coleridge recommended that only the existing
legislature should decide on the nature of the change. He attacked
those reformers who tried to institute change by stirring up extra-
parliamentary activity to put pressure on the legislature. A change in
representation, forced on parliament in this manner, would fatally
destabilise the constitution. Coleridge only admired,
the men of property, who desire real improvements
in the representation of the country adapted to the
exigencies of the times, and who would leave the
specific mode of effecting them to the wisdom of the
Legislature.179
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In this way, the organic relationship between social and constitutional
change could be maintained in a responsible fashion.
It was not just the franchise, but the entire structure of the
constitution, which had to have this potential for change. Coleridge
believed that Britain had produced great men in her past and her
constitution was well adapted to present circumstances, but he did not
believe that the state had therefore reached Wordsworth's plateau of
achievement and would only require a few minor adjustments. He had a
more dynamic end in view: 'We are indeed better off than our fathers
were; but for that very reason we should endeavour that our children
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should be better off than we.' Coleridge did not believe the
constitution needed to be returned to its or i ginal form of 1689, but
he did recognise the constant need to make improvements and additions,
and occasionally recover parts of the constitution abolished by oppressive
governments. It was in this sense that Coleridge termed himself an
advocate of political 'reform'. There had to be a constant renewal of
the existing system which might entail merely the minor adjustments
envisaged by Burke or Wordsworth, but which also might demand further-
reaching changes and additions to the structure itself:
we are believers in the expedience and practicability
of what is meant by REFORM in many and important
instances; though we think the word 'Reform' of lax
and equivocal meaning, and in its proper sense of
bringing back the Constitution to some form or state,
in which it once existed, not only unjustified by the
historic fact, but likely to mislead and inflame. We
demand that which has been taken away from us forcibly
or fraudulently, not without impatience, irritation,
and discontent; while we recommend and ask for
improvement and addition, whether it be a new buttress
to the wall, or only a more secure lock to the pantry,
with zeal and ernestness perhaps, but yet with temperance
and a disposition to hear patiently whatever can be
urged on the other side.1"1
Coleridge's idea of the constitution was of a system that drew
from the past, but was not bound by it; there had to be the dynamic
of growth and change. Even in The Friend, when Coleridge still argued
that the constitution had reached an ideal form which only required
the 'quiet duties' of a cautious gardener, it is significant that he
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used the metaphor of a 'growing tree' to describe the constitution.
Whereas Wordsworth envisaged the constitution as the formal structure
208
of a landscaped garden, with growing elements, Coleridge, on the
other hand, saw it as a single, ever-growing, organism. Coleridge
argued that, although the constitution was rooted in constant moral
principles, its structure had to be in a continual state of change,
reflecting the movement of society. If this did not happen, the
constitution would cease to 'live' for the people. There had to be
'that Adaption to Circumstances, without which its' very Life becomes
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insecure.' Although constitutional change had to occur gradually
inordernot to be destructive, it had to be a constant process in
harmony with society. Moreover, there had to be the potential for
major structural change as well as more particular adjustments. If
the constitution failed to register changes in the ideas and social
structures of the nation, both would perish:
Preclude or suppress Innovation in the utterance
and outward Correspondences, when the Innovation
had already taken place in the mind, faith, and
affections of a Nation - and you substitute
Destruction. To prevent change you must kill or
convulse.1
Change, whether of minor import, was not so much an occasional means
of preserving the structure of the constitution, as a natural condition
of its organic life. The constitution was not a fixed political form,
but part of a social and political process.
In this process, the one co.nstant was the Law of God, which
underpinned all human laws. Just as God had constituted the world,
so a political constitution was a means of re-uniting the people with
God's Will, through their laws. The constitutive act of man was an
____________
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analogue of God's: a means of attaining 'at-one-ness' with his Will.
The qualities of Reason, Religion and Will which God had invested in
the body of man and society, should also be invested in the body politic.
Both bodies thus formed part of one moral organism, and, through
participation in this organic process, the moral nature of man, and
of the state, were realised. They lost their separateness but discovered
their reciprocal, though distinct, God-given capabilities:
There exists in the human being, at least in men fully
developed, no mean symbol of Tri-unity, in Reason,
Religion, and the Will. For each of the three, though
a distinct agency, implies and demands the other two,
and loses its own nature at the moment that from
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distinction it passes into division or separation.
The perfect frame of a man is the perfect frame of
a state.
The constitution of man and the state, invested with qualities by
the constitutive Will of God were all part of one indivisible, inter¬
dependent organism, each realising and fulfilling their potential
through each other.
Unlike Burke, Coleridge believed that permanence and change were
not so much to be held in balance by the constitution as be part of
the same organic, constitutional process. Coleridge's concept of the
constitution was one that embraced change as a permanency; for as
society was constantly changing so must the political system. The
constitution could not simply respond to social circumstances when
absolutely necessary, but had to become an interdependent part of them.
The constitution could not be considered apart from the society it
reflected and served, just as principles could not be abstracted from
their operating circumstances, without losing their life and meaning.
The constitution and national society, in their entirety and in their
multeity of elements, found meaning through each other. Coleridge
summed up his distinction between this idea of a totally organic
constitution and that of a balanced system in an annotation to
Shakespeare's Richard II:
Should we be able to form a system of government,
which should so balance its different powers as to
form a check upon each other, and so continually
remedy and correct itself, it would, nevertheless,
defeat its own aim; - for man is destined to be guided
by higher principles, by universal views, which can
never be fulfilled in this state of existence, - by
a spirit of progressiveness which can never be
accomplished, for then it would cease to exist.
Plato's Republic is like Bunyan's Town of Man -
Soul, - a description of an individual, all of whose
faculties are in their proper subordination and inter¬
dependence; and this it is assumed may be the proto¬
type of the state as one great individual. But there
is this sophism in it, that it is forgotten that the
human faculties, indeed, are parts and not separate
things; but that you could never get chiefs who were
wholly reason, ministers who were wholly understanding,
soldiers all wrath, labourers all concupiscence, and so
on through the rest. Each partakes of, and interferes
with, all the others.
Coleridge's image of the constitution, therefore, was not one of a
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balanced mechanism, where change merely helped to maintain the balance;
it was an organism like man's own body, made up of distinct but inter¬
dependent organs and qualities, growing continuously and enlivening
each other. The body itself was not fixed in permanency, because it
too was part of the process; it grew and changed. Only this type of
body politic could satisfy man's desire and need for intellectual and
moral growth, as well as permanency, that was the right of all
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citizens. This more dynamic vision of the constitution did not just
entail the possibility of changes, great or small, but positively
demanded them as a function of natural social growth. Coleridge argued
that legislators had no moral right to rest easy with the constitution
as it stood, they had to think constantly of the rest of changing
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society. The permanent principles at the heart of the constitution
could only live through continual (though evolutionary) change in
their outward expression.
Wordsworth's model of the constitution had owed everything to
Burke's. It was a fixed structure which allowed for change only in order
to preserve the original balance of the system. In this way, it main¬
tained life. Coleridge's model was more thoroughly organic. The
constitution was not a structure, but an organic process; its elements
were not balanced, but lived through each other interdependently; it
embraced change not grudgingly, but as a constant condition of life;
it was the more liberal, dynamic conception. Both men's ideas of the
constit u tion were, nevertheless, fundamentally conservative. They
acted to preserve moral values and principles and, even when counten¬
ancing change, were not innovatory in spirit. The rights which this
national constitution should guarantee the subject and the duties it
required of government and people, were all essentially traditional
ends. Coleridge's idea of the constitution, as part of a social process,
did lead him, however, to define these ends of government in a more
dynamic fashion than Wordsworth or even Burke.
(c) The Ends of Government
The radicals of the 1790s had argued that governments were
constituted to protect the natural rights of men more effectively than
was possible in a state of nature. The more moderate reformers of the
1810s were content that governments should protect the rights which
they believed had been guaranteed in 1689, but which, subsequently,
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had been threatened or diminished. These rights included a wider
franchise for the people. Conservative writers considered abstract
rights to be meaningless and they believed the 1689 Revolution
Settlement did not secure any further rights than were already
guaranteed at present. They did believe, however, that certain rights
were assured by the constitution and that these were accompanied by
reciprocal duties. These rights were bestowed by the law of the land
and were not inalienable. Burke argued that one's rights as Englishmen,
as part of civil society, were far stronger and more practical than
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the abstract rights claimed by the radicals. The existing constitution
thus guaranteed those rights which were the normal benefits of trad¬
itional social life, and not of any pre-social state of nature; i.e.,
life, liberty and property, the right to live securely under law and
order, the right to a share in the fruits of one's own industry, and
some instruction in life. Burke regarded these as the real rights of
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man. They were all pragmatic civil liberties defined and limited
by the nation's traditional laws and guaranteed so long as they did
not trespass on the rights of others. Governments were empowered to
defend these, but not to extend them unnaturally beyond traditional
social limits. They were not personal rights, such as the reformers
advocated, but were part of the residue of social experience. Since
they only had meaning within a social context, they necessarily
involved duties towards the rest of society.
By the early nineteenth century Wordsworth and Coleridge had become
convinced that the only meaningful rights were traditional, social ones.
Coleridge scorned,
the wild attempt to erect a government on the
hypothetical rights of man, as a creature of
nature, instead of his real and existing privileges,
as a creature of society.^ 92
He echoed Burke in claiming that anyone who attempted to substitute
the abstract rights of man, for their national or civil rights as
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Englishmen, must be mad. The only true rights were those guaranteed
by the laws of the land and its propertied constitution. Similarly
Wordsworth admired the way that the Spaniards eschewed a constitution
based on abstract rights, for one which was based on their traditional
social rights and liberties, even if this did entail their 'prostration'
before Catholicism, that Wordsworth detested. This religious disposition
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was, however, tolerable because it was part of their social
experience and was not an abstract right:
taught by the reverses of the French revolution,
we looked upon these dispositions as more human -
more social - and therefore as wiser, and of
better omen, than if they had stood forth the
zealots of abstract principles, drawn out of the
laboratory of unfeeling philosophists. Finally,
in this reverence for the past and present, we
found an earnest that they were prepared to contend
to the death for as much liberty as their habits
and their knowledge enabled them to receive.
The protection of these traditional, but pragmatic, rights, was
the chief object of any constitutional system.
In The Friend (1809), Coleridge set out all the social rights
which government was duty-bound to protect or promote. Wordsworth
also subscribed to these ends of government and, indeed, the entire
passage is reminiscent of a similar list of rights, outlined by Burke
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in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). Coleridge
divided his list into negative and positive ends, since he argued
that all governments were empowered not only to protect certain
fundamental rights to which all citizens were already entitled, but
also to promote rights which would aid the progress of the people:
What are the ends of Government? They are of two
kinds, negative and positive. The negative ends of
Government are the protection of life, of personal
Freedom, of Property, of Reputation, and of Religion,
from foreign and from domestic attacks. The positive
ends are, 1st to make the means of subsistence more
easy to each individual: 2nd that in addition to the
necessaries of life he should derive from the union and
division of labour a share of the comforts and conven-
iencies, which humanize and ennoble his nature; and at
the same time the power of perfecting himself in his
own branch of industry by having those things which he
needs, provided for him by others among his fellow-
citizens; including the tools and raw or manufactured
materials, necessary for his own Employment .. 3dly.
The hope of bettering his own condition and that of
his children ... (and lastly) the development of those
faculties which are essential to his human nature by the
knowledge of his moral and religious duties, and the
increase of his intellectual powers in as great a
degree as is compatible with the other ends of,social
union, and does not involve a contradiction.
This important passage contains essentially the same rights which
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Burke defended, although, as will be seen in Section III, Coleridge
was to interpret the positive ends of government in a more
progressive, liberal fashion than Burke or Wordsworth. Coleridge
was, however, in agreement with Burke in arguing that these positive
ends were only possible, if they harmonised with the rights of
others. The prospects for bettering the condition of the people was
dependent on this: 'a natural instinct constitutes a natural right,
as far as its' gratification is compatible with the equal right of
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others'. Coleridge was also convinced that the only means of
ensuring this compatibility was through the rule of law. No rights
were personal or absolute and so each had to be limited by law in
order that it might be applied to the whole nation. In this way,
these natural rights became civil rights which were more meaningful
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and pragmatic. Coleridge argued that these civil rights, realised
in a social context, carried attendant duties and had no real meaning
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without them; they were 'interdependent correlatives'. Whereas
the government had a duty to safeguard and promote the rights of its
citizens, each person also had a duty towards every other member of
society, which limited, but also gave life to, those rights. The
ends of government were the promotion of civil rights which were not
absolute or personal, but moral.
This extended passage in The Friend (1809), concerning the ends
of government, was of such importance to Coleridge that he reprinted
it twice in the following decade.The passage also provides a
framework for Wordsworth's views on the subject. In general, both
writers believed that the existing political system well served the
negative ends of government. The Lockean rights of life, liberty
and property, as well as the security of law and order, were upheld
and protected. The final plank in their defence of the national
constitution rests on this premiss, and their arguments on these
points will now be explored. As the Napoleonic War drew to a close,
however, Wordsworth and Coleridge became more aware that the positive
ends of government were not being pursued within the existing system.
In post-war society, the constitution had been allowed to deviate
from its positive ends, and the welfare of the people and their moral
education was being neglected. Unless these ends were pursued,
the other negative ends would soon also be in jeopardy. In Section
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I IT, therefore, these two other ends of government will be
explored. The pursuit of these more positive objectives led
Wordsworth and Coleridge to formulate a more 'liberal' dimension
to their conservative definition of the constitution.
In Section I, it was noted how Wordsworth and Coleridge
attacked the type of unrestrained freedom favoured by the radicals,
which was based on their natural rights philosophy. Thereafter,
both writers had supported a concept of liberty, limited by law and
traditional customs. Like Burke, they believed that liberty had
to be limited in order to be possessed by all. The liberties
guaranteed by the existing constitution were the only true, meaning¬
ful freedoms that the nation could expect or need. As the war
against Napoleon deepened, Wordsworth and Coleridge began to
emphasise the prime importance of national independence as a pre¬
condition of this freedom. For liberty to flourish, the traditional
principles of the national constitution had to be protected,
inviolate, from foreign or domestic attack. Thus, after 1802,
Wordsworth and Coleridge became more concerned with preserving the
security of the nation's political and social structure, than defend¬
ing its liberties, since these were already defined and protected
by the constitution. The independence of the country and the
preservation of its constitution thus became synonymous with the
right of freedom itself.
Wordsworth regarded the war against Napoleon as a contest to
maintain national independence and liberty. Liberty was seen as a
traditional, social right, enshrined in the country's laws and
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institutions. The independence of the nation was, however, a
vital precondition for liberty. Indeed, Wordsworth argued that even
if civil liberties were denied by a domestic tyrant and the country
remained independent of foreign domination, then the concept of
liberty would still remain alive in the hearts and minds of the
people. If the oppression came from without, this would be impossible.
National independence at least guaranteed a degree of personal
freedom which could not be snuffed out:
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For it is some consolation to those who look
back upon the history of the world to know -
that, even without civil liberty, society may
possess - diffused through its inner recesses
in the minds even of its humblest members -
something of dignified enjoyment. But, without
national independence, this is impossible. The
difference, between inbred oppression and that
which is from without, is essential; inasmuch
as the former does not exclude, from the minds
of a people, the feeling of being self-governed;
does not imply (as the latter does, when patiently
submitted to) an abandonment of the first duty
imposed by the faculty of reason.202
Some social writers argued that even national independence was
an inadequate bulwark of liberty if the people were so socially and
economically dependent on the rich. Their material position
therefore had to be improved. Wordsworth argued, however, that civil
rights coupled with national independence constituted all the liberty
that could ever be meaningful to man. Individual independence was
unnecessary - indeed, it was impossible, since the whole of society
was composed as one interdependent whole, where the liberties of
every class were limited and conditioned by the rights of others.
Indeed, Wordsworth argued that, in many respects, the rich were more
dependent than the poor, for they relied on the latter to provide
them with all the necessities of life:
Superadd civil liberty to national independence;
and this position [i.e. that of the radicals] is
overthrown at once: for there is no more certain
mark of a sound frame of polity than this; that,
in all individual instances (and it is upon these
generalized that this position is laid down), the
dependence is in reality far more strict on the
side of the wealthy; and the labouring man leatjg^
less upon others than any man in the community.
In such an interdependent community the only true liberty was civil
liberty, granted by the government and applicable to all.
Individual, independent freedoms were impossible in such a society
and only gave citizens a licence to do as they wished without regard
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for the customs, traditions, laws and moral values of the nation.
These social, legal and moral restraints did not deny liberty but
accorded it practical definition.
In the post-war years, the external threat to freedom had
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disappeared, but Wordsworth believed it now faced assault on the
domestic front. The revival of radicalism, which threatened the
existing structure of the constitution, was also, ipso facto, an
attack on its traditional freedoms. To preserve liberty against
this onslaught, Wordsworth advocated a temporary curtailment of
civil liberties. Wordsworth regretted the need for the repressive
Six Acts introduced by the government in 1819 after Peterloo, but
he regarded them essential for the protection of the constitution
and civil liberty: 'coercive measures have been resorted to, the
unquestionable necessity for which, every friend of this country
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must deplore.' Such a temporary suspension of liberties was vital
for their future survival. In this manner, Wordsworth now defended
the need for repressive measures, similar to the ones that he had
once attacked during Pitt's Ministry in the 1790s. Liberty, being
a civil right, granted by the constitution and protected by the
government, was also liable to limitation, or even temporary suspens¬
ions, if domestic circumstances deemed it pragmatic. The end of
government was to protect liberty not as an absolute right, but as a
social right, defined by the constitution, but subject to expedience.
Coleridge also attacked the radical idea that freedom was an
individual right, allowing man to do as he wished: this merely led
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to a selfish, licentious society. Coleridge believed that freedom
was a gift of God, although he was well aware that the doctrine of
free will could be used by the radicals to support their interpret¬
ation of liberty. Therefore, Coleridge stressed that the free will
had to be controlled. He asserted that Britain was fighting in the
war to uphold 'the power of the insulted FREE-WILL, steadied by the
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approving CONSCIENCE.' The free-will had to be restrained so
that man could operate within a social context. Hence it was to be
controlled by the conscience: a moral faculty which encouraged man
to think of others and not just self.
Coleridge argued that the best way of realising this moral type
of liberty, in practical form, was through the laws of the nation.
When liberty was given practical meaning and life, through the laws
and institutions of the nation, it also provided a foundation from
which the other ends of government could develop. Although liberty
was desirable in itself, it was to be valued chiefly, as a pre-
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condition for all the other rights and advantages the state could
offer. Coleridge, therefore, argued that the radicals were wrong
to be obsessed with liberty as a personal right which overshadowed
all others. The radicals had won over a young audience to their
side, but Coleridge felt sure that conservatives, like himself,
could still convince these 'young Enthusiasts' that,
Liberty was not the only Blessing of Society, and
though desirable even for its own sake, yet that
it was chiefly valuable as the means of calling
forth and securing other advantages and excellencies,
the activities of Industry, the security of Life and
Property, the peaceful energies of Genius and
manifold Talent, the development of the moral virtues,
and the independence and dignity of the Nation itself
in relation to foreign Powers: and that neither these
nor Liberty itself could subsist in a Country so
various in its Soils, so long inhabited and so fully
peopled, as Great Britain, without difference of Ranks,
and without Laws which recognised and protected the
privileges of each.208
Thus, liberty which accorded with the law, customs and structure of
society, was a more practical concept of freedom. It also provided
the circumstances, within which all the other ends of government
could be achieved.
It should be noted that Coleridge believed that national independ¬
ence was conditional on civil liberty. Both he and Wordsworth
argued that freedom and national independence were vitally interrelated,
but Coleridge believed that the former was the more necessary. A
nation with civil liberty not only stood a better chance of
defending its independence against oppression, but such a nation
was also less likely to attack others:
Happy will it be for Europe, if her governors shall
at last perceive, that the more free a nation is,
the less she will be disposed to conquest.209
National independence did help to maintain civil liberties, but
Coleridge acknowledged that true, stable liberty would only be
achieved when nations recognised the degree to which they were inter¬
dependent as well as independent. All the nations of Europe had to
be seen as part of one organism in which each country had distinct
features, but all were inter-related. Each nation necessarily had
an effect on its neighbours: 'what injured any could be of real
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advantage to none.' The liberty of European nations would be
more secure if they recognised this dictum. This did not entail an
end to national rivalries, but merely a recognition that all nations
were connected in one harmonious whole, which precluded animosity
and confrontation. Each nation, like each citizen, had to respect
the rights of others.
Coleridge, like Wordsworth, believed that the liberty of the
nation was intimately dependent on the constitution for its
practical form and protection, and on national security for its
durability. If the constitution was threatened then so was liberty,
for the latter had no meaning without the former. In the post-war
years of discontent, Coleridge also became convinced that the
constitution was in danger of being subverted by a domestic enemy -
the radical revival. He believed that the radical press was partly
responsible for stirring up this unrest among the people against
their constitution. Coleridge regarded freedom as a civil right,
not an absolute one, that was granted to the people and protected
by the government. Coleridge therefore supported the government's
right to curtail or suspend liberties so that the constitution might
be protected from attack. Even though he had long been an advocate
of press freedom, as a bastion of the constitution, he only supported
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its freedom of expression if it was used in a moral cause.
Regretfully, Coleridge now called for a censorship of the press to
preserve the nation's freedoms:
Alas! it is a hard and a mournful thing, that the
Press should be constrained to call out the
harsh curb of the law against the Press!
Although he acknowledged the technical difficulties of distinguishing
between good and evil newspapers, he considered the effort worth¬
while. A temporary curb on freedom would ensure the protection of
the constitution against radical attack, so that liberty could grow
21 3
again, more securely, in the future. Although civil liberties
were defined by the constitution, it was the duty of government to
achieve their practical realisation, and this sometimes entailed a
modification or even a suspension of their original form, to fit
current social circumstances. Like Wordsworth, Coleridge agreed
that the protection of liberty was an important end of government,
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but it was not a personal or absolute right; it was a civil right
granted in accordance with expedience.
Wordsworth's and Coleridge's idea of the constitution was rooted
in the hereditary ownership of property and so the protection of
property rights was seen as another important end of government.
The security of property ensured the stability of the social order,
the rule of law and the preservation of the constitution with all
its liberties. Until the Industrial Revolution had completely
changed the economic basis of society and had eroded the power of
landed elite, the reformers always found it difficult to counter this
conservative defence of property rights. Even in the 1790s, very
few radicals had attacked the concept of private property and
inheritance, although some had favoured a fairer distribution of
wealth. The need for government to defend property rights was,
therefore, not just a conservative theory, but one that was almost
universally subscribed to, even if reformers tended to support it
as an individual right rather than as a support for the existing
constitution.
Wordsworth believed that the government's protection of property
rights was vital for maintaining the social and political status quo:
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'security for property is the very basis of civil society.'
Although Wordsworth supported the rights of hereditary property-
owning, he also argued that property was only held in trust by each
generation. The land had been created by God and was given, in
trust, to the landowners, as the custodians for the people:
The land we from our fathers had in trust,
And to our children will transmit, or die:
This is our maxim, this our piety; ^-j5
And God and Nature say that it is just.
This property, held in trust from God, involved moral duties as well
as rights. Like Burke, Wordsworth believed that people in positions
of power had to be impressed with the idea that they were duty-
bound to act, in trust, for the people at large. Ultimately the
labourers were, themselves, responsible to God, who had formed
2 1 6
society and bestowed the means of their power upon them.
Property rights thus involved responsibilities, just as the
right to freedom had involved regard for one's neighbour's freedom.
Landowners not only had political power, but also had to care
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for their tenant's welfare in a just, considerate and industrious
manner. Since these landowners possessed large estates and were
much in the public eye, it was easier to scrutinise their behaviour
and ensure they were performing their duties as well as enjoying
their rights. In this way, voters could more easily decide who
was fit for office:
Extensive landed property entails upon the
possessor many duties, and places him in
divers relations, by which he undergoes a
public trial. Is a man just in his dealings?
Does he keep his promises? Does he pay his
debts punctually? Has he a feeling for the poor?
Is his Family well governed? Is he a consider¬
ate landlord? Does he attend to his own affairs;
and are those of others, which have fallen* uncj^
his care, diligently and judiciously managed?
Property rights thus entailed duties to the community at large, and
a submission to the scrutiny of the public to ensure that these
duties were performed. For Wordsworth, property rights were not just
the foundation stone of the constitution and the guarantee of all
other social rights. They were also a wellspring of public duty.
Thus, this end of government had a double value.
Coleridge also believed that one of the most important ends of
government was the protection of property rights, since they under¬
pinned the entire constitution. He argued that government itself
had originally been formed to secure these rights: 'The chief object,
for which Men first formed themselves into a State was not the
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protection of their Lives but of their Property.' Coleridge
defended the property rights of the landed classes not because they
were inalienable, but because they were traditional to British society
and had proved prag matic. He praised 'the uninjurious and useful
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privileges of our English Nobility.' The political and social
influence, which property-holding conferred, had proved to be useful
to the country, ensuring government by those most fitted to rule.
Coleridge believed, however, that government was not just framed
to protect landed property. British society was an interlinked
organism where all classes and all types of property (whether landed,
manufacturing, commercial or professional), were interdependent.
The greatness of the nation was to be found 'in the interdependence
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of all classes, and of all modes of property on each other.*
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Although landed property was the most secure, and the landed classes
were the natural ruling class, the other forms of middle class property
were vitally linked to it and also guaranteed rights. The constitution,
though primarily grounded in land, still safeguarded the rights of all
these other interdependent types of property. The nation was strong
against domestic or foreign attack, because of,
the weight of Property, in a nation when the interests
of the various Proprietors, landed, manufacturing,
commercial, and professional, are vitally interlinked,
and under a Constitution by the practice of which
political Influence is paramountly grounded on Property.
The constitution thus guaranteed, to each type of property, political
rights. Even although the rights of landed property were the greatest
of all, the landed classes were also dependent on the other classes in
society, and each had reciprocal duties to perform. The greatest duty
for all these propertied classes was towards the people who had no
fixed property, but who, in an interdependent society, still had an
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interest in the welfare of the nation. Everyone was cared for, even
if the rights of property resided with only a few. Coleridge agreed
with Burke in claiming that this created a strong, secure nation, for if
property rights were more widely diffused, they would cease to be a
reliable bulwark of the constitution. Government was therefore required
to protect the property rights of the few who already possessed them,
although Coleridge still maintained that men of talent should be capable
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of buying their way into property, with its attendant rights.
In the post-war years, Coleridge believed that this relationship
between property rights and the constitution was coming under attack.
This will be further explored in Section III, but it should be noted
here that Coleridge argued that the ends of government, and the ends
of property, which were traditionally synonymous, were in danger of
pulling apart, thus threatening the entire constitutional structure.
Coleridge had argued that landed property was interdependently linked
with commercial property, but that the two were still distinct. In the
1810s, however, Coleridge believed that the distinction of landed
property was beginning to disintegrate as it became infected with the
commercial spirit of capitalism, which he saw invading all spheres of
human activity. Landowners were running their estates for personal profit,
without attending to the duties which necessarily accompanied property
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rights. It was the duty of government to prevent this development
and protect traditional property rights and duties against the spirit
of commercialism. The constitution depended on the matrix of social
responsibilities which were a natural part of a state grounded in
property rights; without this it would perish. Coleridge warned:
That Agriculture requires principles essentially
different from those of Trade, - that a gentleman
ought not to regard his estate as a merchant his
cargo, or a shopkeeper his stock, - admits of an
easy proof from the different tenure of Landed
Property, and from the purposes of Agriculture itself,
which ultimately are the same as those of the State
of which it is the offspring ... If the continuance
and independence of the State be its object, the final
causes of the State must be its final causes.^
Thus, for Coleridge, in the post-war years, the purpose of government
in defending property rights as traditionally conceived, became a
matter of some urgency as the spirit of capitalism pervaded the
propertied classes and threatened to cut the interdependent relationship
between the rights and duties of property, and the constitutional system.
The final, negative end of government was the protection of every
citizen's right to live under the rule of law. The law was, itself,
the reliable guarantee of all the rights already discussed. Conservative
writers argued that, ultimately, the rights which government defended
had to be legal rights and that absolute rights did not exist. All
rights had to be limited by national law so that they were pragmatically
attuned to the society which they served. Social rights were also more
precise and permanent for being defined in law. They argued that the
radicals' emphasis on absolute rights could only lead to anarchy as
each person could then opt to do as he wished. Legal rights, emanating
from the legislature, rather than the popular sovereignty of a volatile
people, were the only reliable rights which could command the respect
of all. For conservative writers, the rights of the individual could
not be placed above the rule of law, without risking the dismemberment
of society. Thus, one of the most fundamental duties of government was
the defence of the rule of law.
For Wordsworth, the rule of law was essential for controlling man's
will or passions and for giving him a moral purpose in life. Only through
the defining process of the law, could man's natural qualities be channel¬
led to good effect, and then he could begin to live a life of truth:
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'Yet for the general purposes of faith
In Providence, for solace and support,
We may not doubt that who can best subject
The will to reason's law, can strictliest live
And act in that obedience, he shall gain
The clearest apprehensions of these truths,
Which unassisted reason's utmost power
PPS
Is too infirm to reach. J
A man who pursued his natural rights, without subjecting them to the
limits of the law, could never achieve this level of distinct moral
purpose, but was merely an anarchic, rudderless, animal. The rule of
law provided the essential framework for all man's finest endeavours
and, therefore, it was at the very root of the constitution. Its
protection was one of the most important ends of government. Laws were
so vital to society that they should be allowed to stand, protected by
government, even when they were no longer immediately useful, so long
as they were not positively injurious. 'Better it is that laws should
remain till long trial has proved them an incumbrance, than that they
226
should be too hastily changed.' They had a presumptive right to
remain and be protected. Respect for the rule of law was paramount and
its defence was one of the government's most sacred duties, not to be
relinquished until the laws had finally proved a liability.
Coleridge also believed that upholding the rule of law was a
fundamental end of government. Man had formed governments to protect
his property, but it was the rule of law which provided the stable frame¬
work within which this could be accomplished. The rule of law provided
security for all the other rights which government guaranteed. The law
gave form to the body politic and kept the organism in a coherent, yet
growing, state. Properly constituted laws were limiting, but not in a
restrictive way: they channelled the qualities and virtues of the
individual and maintained him in a morally purposeful direction.
Through a mixture of guidance and compulsion, it helped realise the
potential in every individual. The rule of law compelled man to think
of others in the social organism: this was not a negation of self, but,
instead, it was a channelling of man's moral feelings which helped him
discover his full identity through others. Only through national laws
could men become distinct, yet also interdependent, parts of the state.
Writing of the rule of law, Coleridge argued that,
all, but the most abandoned men, acknowledge its
authority, and that the whole strength and majesty
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of my Country are pledged to support it; and yet
that for me its power is the same with that of my
own permanent Self, and that all the Choice, which is
permitted to me, consists in having it for my Guardian
Angel or my avenging Fi end! This is the Spirit of
LAW! The Lute of Amphion, the Harp of Orpheus! This
is the true necessity, which compels man into the
social State, now and always, by a still-beginning,
never-ceasing force of moral Cohesion.^27
The rule of law cemented the individual, society and the constitutional
state into one coherent moral organism.
Coleridge argued that respect for the law stemmed from an innate
sense of moral purpose. He disagreed with Hobbes's views that laws
could only be effective, and permanent, if they rested on fear and
force. Coleridge contended the opposite - that there could be no respect
for laws if they were supported only through fear. Reversing Hobbes's
dictum, he claimed that 'without the laws, the Sword is but a piece of
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Iron.* The only effective, lasting laws were those founded on moral
values. Coleridge believed that people only accepted Hobbes's view
because they thought it applied to other people, but not to themselves.
Most people believed that they themselves obeyed the law for moral
reasons and Coleridge argued that what one claimed for oneself should
also be applied to others. Thus, in protecting the right of everyone
to live under the rule of law, government was also defending the collect¬
ive moral purpose of the nation.
The most permanent, national laws were thus based on Christian
principles and they attempted to realise these principles within specific
social circumstances. God's Will was discoverable in the universal laws
which governed all created life on earth, and these universal laws were
then pragmatically adapted to each national organism by the particular
laws of the constitution. In this way, Coleridge envisaged the entire
world as one Divinely created organism, held together by the rule of law
which was itself a practical realisation of God's Will. Laws thus formed
the tissue which maintained the unity of the world and the interdependence
of the parts and the whole. National laws maintained the structure of
the body politic; just as they were reflections of God's laws which
maintained the structure of the human organism.
If then in all inferior things from the grass on the
house top to the giant tree of the forest, to the eagle
which builds in its summit, and the elephant which
browses on its branches, we behold - first, a subjection
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to universal laws by which each thing belongs to
the Whole, as interpreted by the powers of the Whole;
and, secondly, the intervention of particular laws
by which the universal laws are suspended or tempered
for the weal and sustenance of each particular class,
and by which each species, and each individual of every
species, becomes a system in and for itself, a world
of its own.229
In defending the right of everyone to live under the rule of law, the
government was fulfilling its primary duty: protecting the very
structure of the organism of all human life. Although the rule of
law provided this framework, it too was subject to growth and change,
like all the other social rights already discussed - by its participation
in the organic process of the state. Once again Coleridge argued that
the only constant in the constitutional process was the Law of God;
this was the ultimate end which all governments had to defend.
Wordsworth and Coleridge thus completed their defence of the national
constitution by claiming that it provided the best defence of these
negative rights cf the citizen guaranteed by government - liberty,
independence, property and the rule of law. It also encouraged the
reciprocal duties which each of these social rights entailed. As the
war drew to a close, however, both writers perceived that the positive
ends of government were not being so well defended or promoted; i.e.
the right to social welfare and to moral and intellectual instruction.
The existing political system, which they had defended so stoutly during
the war, had neglected these areas of concern which seemed of increasing
importance as a new industrial, capitalistic society began to emerge
in the 1810s to supplant the old, interdependent world. Although they
still defended the basic structure of the existing constitution,
Wordsworth and Coleridge began to recommend modifications and changes
to the system which would take account of the changes in the post-war
world and which would ensure that the positive ends of government were
not forgotten. These necessary alterations, which Burke had not
anticipated, took Wordsworth and Coleridge beyond their conservative
defence of the constitution and re-introduced, into their political
philosophy, a degree of liberal thinking. The Burkean legacy of the
war years had to be modified to meet the exigencies of a new type of
society. This led Wordsworth to accept the existing constitution, but
with a greater emphasis on the more liberal, positive ends of government;
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it impelled Coleridge to promote an idea of the constitution as an
organic process which, while basically conservative in form, was
imbued with a more liberal dynamic of change.
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SECTION III
CONSERVATISM MODIFIED, 1814 - 1818
CHAPTER VII:
POLITICAL ECONOMICS AND THE NEED FOR STATE INTERVENTION
I seek wealth for the sake of freeing myself more
and more from the necessity of taking trouble in
order to attain it. The personal worth of those,
whom I benefit in the course of the Process, or
whether the persons are really benefited or no, is
no concern of mine.1
[Coleridge's characterisation of the employers'
new laissez-faire attitude.]
The post-war world proved to be as disappointing, for Wordsworth
and Coleridge, as the Peace of Amiens had been, more than a decade
before. Both writers had believed that the nation experienced a moral
renaissance during the Napoleonic Wars and that the conflict had united
the people in a renewed sense of Christian purpose. Wordsworth and
Coleridge were convinced that this more responsible spirit would continue
to animate the nation after its final victory over the evil forces of
Napoleon. Wordsworth had looked forward to a post-war world where
traditional society would be re-established, with its old bonds of duty
strengthened by the moral lessons of the war. Coleridge anticipated
the final accomplishment of a truly organic society in which each class
recognised its interdependence with the others, and all grew together
as one great national consensus. As the war drew to a close, these
hopes and assumptions were to be confounded.
In the 1810s the nation was again beginning to fracture. There
was a great revival of political unrest and radical agitation, not seen
since the 1790s. The Whigs and the radical reformers had, at their
disposal, some of the most forceful writers and politicians of the age,
such as Francis Burdett, William Cobbett, Henry Hunt, Jeremy Bentham,
William Hazlitt, Leigh Hunt, Lord Byron and P.B. Shelley. Although they
were not of one accord, they did all wish to see a measure of change in
the structure of politics which Wordsworth and Coleridge had defended.
Apart from the Poet Laureate, Robert Southey, Wordsworth and Coleridge
remained the most famous exponents of the conservative case. They also
had to contend with a rising chorus for reform in the country at large.
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Between 1811 and 1813 there were widespread Luddite disturbances in
the North of England. These were mainly protests over new machinery
and economic conditions, but they also involved a degree of political
2
disaffection. These popular demands for economic and political change
were to increase in the post-war era, as social distress became more
evident. The disturbances greatly alarmed Wordsworth and Coleridge.
They realised that the unity, established by the war, had been much more
ephemeral than they had anticipated. Once the moral imperatives of the
national struggle against France began to loosen, they perceived the
evils of 'Jacobinism' beginning to revive. The return to the traditional,
moral values of the existing constitution now seemed less profound; more
a result of circumstance.
In many ways Wordsworth and Coleridge reacted to the unrest as
their fellow conservatives did. They supported the Liverpool Admin¬
istration and blamed much of the popular discontent on the Whigs and
their attempts to stir up the people against the government. Wordsworth
and Coleridge also believed that radical activities posed a real threat
to public order and discipline, so they supported the government's
repressive measures, such as the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act
3
in 1817. The two writers, however, did not consider these measures to
be adequate solutions to current problems, and they departed from the
conservative case in several important particulars. Firstly, they
were much more convinced that real economic and social grievances did
exist. These were growing with the spread of industrialisation, and
were not just exaggerated by Whig politicians for their own self-interest.
Secondly, Wordsworth and Coleridge believed that some of the middle and
upper classes were partly responsible for this distress. By the 1810s
many businessmen and employers had become infected by the commercial
spirit of the new system of political economy and they now pursued
profits at the expense of their old responsibilities and duties towards
their workers. This new spirit created great material hardship for the
people; it weakened the old moral ties which had bound the nation into
a unity; and, since the constitution was based on moral principles,
Wordsworth and Coleridge believed this materialist spirit was politically
subversive. Lastly, the two writers argued that these real and growing
problems could only be tackled by state intervention to secure the
physical and moral well-being of the people. There had to be a much
greater emphasis on the two positive ends of government: social welfare
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reforms and moral education. While most conservatives argued that
social reforms would only be seen as a sign of weakness by the people
and lead to revolution, Wordsworth and Coleridge argued that a gradual
reform of the people's conditions was the only way to avoid revolution.
The exigencies of wartime had obscured the need to pursue these
positive ends of government. As the conflict ended and a new, harsher
industrial society began to emerge, Wordsworth and Coleridge believed
that there had to be a much greater provision, in the constitutional
system, to ensure the social and moral welfare of the people. In a
society in which the bonds of responsibility were beginning to unravel,
there needed to be a more formal intervention by the state itself, to
ensure that social duties were still fulfilled and that the constitution
continued to live and work for all its citizens and not merely the
ruling class.
This did not mean, however, that Wordsworth and Coleridge had
returned to their old radical sympathies; their political philosophy
was still fundamentally conservative. They proposed only gradual changes
which were primarily designed to enable the existing constitution to
function more effectively and which were to be implemented by the ruling
classes. Nevertheless , they did venture beyond the contemporary
conservative defence of the constitution as it already existed, and
argued for a much more humane, and socially aware, political system.
For Wordsworth, state intervention would enable the traditional principles
and structure of Britain's constitution to be preserved in the changed
circumstances of the post-war world. In Coleridge's more organic view,
he could see how state intervention would conserve traditional principles,
but he could also perceive the potential for future changes in the
constitutional structure as the state tried to find new ways of expressing
these time-honoured verities.
In this chapter, the first of these positive ends of government
will be examined - the need for social welfare. Wordworth's and Coleridge's
diagnosis of post-war grievances will first be explored and then their
advocacy of state intervention.
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Wordsworth and Coleridge argued that there were two important sets
of causes which accounted for post-war distress and unrest: those
associated with poverty and those associated with the new industrial
changes. Both of these threatened the stability of the state.
Poverty was a continual concern for Wordsworth, but by the 1800s
he had come to the conclusion that the poor would always be a feature
of society. God had ordained their lowly situation, but had also granted
4
them some consolations. Wordsworth often adopted a rather sentimental
view of the poor, seeing them as a group of essentially happy people,
5
untramelled by the cares of more complex living. Although rural
poverty could be harsh, the countryside still fostered a moral spirit
which was absent in the dislocated lives of the city poor and this
offered some compensation for their physical sufferings.^ Indeed,
Wordsworth regarded the stoicism, with which the poor bore their lot,
7
as a source of moral inspiration for the rest of society. Nevertheless,
Wordsworth still acknowledged that there was much abject poverty, even
in the countryside, that could be ameliorated, if not entirely eradicated.
He noted that many Lake District tourists marvelled at the picturesque
country cottages of the poor, but Wordsworth admonished them for not
looking deeper and feeling, more profoundly, for the suffering which
was concealed there:
Think what the Home must be if it were thine,
Even thine, though few th y wants! - Roof, window, door,
The very flowers are sacred to the Poor.®
What seemed quaint, was in fact a sparse home, where few of these admiring
tourists would ever have wanted to live themselves. In this way,
Wordsworth could still penetrate the surface charms of poor life and
show the hardships which were masked. Moreover, in this world, where
even insignificant objects, such as flowers, were sacred objects,
Wordsworth was attempting to impress on his readers that even the
smallest acts of charity would have a disproportionately beneficial
effect. Thus, although Wordsworth agreed with Burke that the poorer
g
classes were a permanent part of society, he believed that their
situation could be alleviated in a paternal way and that this was a duty
incumbent on all the ruling classes of society.
As the war drew to a close, it was this aspect of poverty which
troubled him most. Poverty was not so much increasing, as not being
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properly treated. The old individual acts of charity, and the paternal
interest in their plight, were beginning to evaporate and the conditions
of the poor seemed to be ignored. Wordsworth isolated a number of
new factors which had produced this situation:
I am aware how much universal habits of rapacious
speculation, occasioned by fluctations in the value
of produce during the late war - how much the spread
of manufactories and the baleful operation of the
Poor Laws, have done to impair these indigenous and
salutary affections.1®
These developments had broken the old bonds of responsibility that the
leaders of society had always shown towards the poor. Instead of caring
for the poor in the natural way of the past, employers now used their
workers as units of production and paid them little so as to maximise
profits.11 Their duty to care for the poor was forgotten. The Poor Law
had replaced the more natural offices of charity and the paternal concern
which had been part of traditional society. Through all these various
developments, the duties and responsibilities of the ruling class were
either being eroded or side-stepped. These factors explained the
additional distress which the poor suffered in the 1810s, although
Wordsworth acknowledged that matters were also worsened by the great
increase in population. He argued, however, that a population rise
could have been a boon to the nation if only the people had been properly
cared for and educated. In The Excursion (1814) he attacked Malthusian
fears of over-population and contended that a larger nation could yet
lead to increased wealth, as well as provide the empire with colonists
12
who would spread Britain's moral values all over the world.
Thus, Wordsworth argued that poverty caused so much more distress
in the 1810s because the poor were not cared for in accordance with
their habitual right. The poor had become the first victims, as the
moral bonds of the old society began to disintegrate. The presence of
such a large, distressed and increasingly alienated class of people was
alarming for Wordsworth. Although he accepted poverty as an inevitable
fact of life, the new ways in which the people were treated in the 1810s,
meant that the problem of poverty no longer had a localised effect only
on the poor, but also endangered the moral cohesion of society and
the state. Instead of binding the nation together in collective
responsibility, the new treatment of the poor promised to tear the
nation apart and so also endanger the constitution. It was obvious to
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Wordsworth that government would now have to intervene to ameliorate
the condition of the poor and repair the old bonds of responsibility
on which society depended. This was now one of the most important
ends of the state. Wordsworth advocated government,
by just dealing towards all orders of the state,
so that, no members of it being trampled upon,
courage may everywhere continue to rest immovably
upon its ancient English foundation, personal
self-respect; - by adequate rewards, and permanent
honours, conferred upon the deserving.^3
Until the poor received more adequate wages and were cared for responsibly,
they would continue to become a brutalised and alienated group. They
would also be more easily stirred up against the government by the self-
interested radicals and Whig Opposition. Thus, to preserve the harmony
and cohesion of the traditional social and constitutional structure,
Wordsworth recommended state intervention to help the poor, rather than
measures to repress them.
Coleridge's analysis of the growing distress of the poor in the
1810s was more detailed, and more profound, than Wordsworth's. As early
as 1795, Coleridge had recognised the need for all the people to be
adequately cared for, otherwise their moral health, as well as their
1 4
physical condition, would be imperilled. Nevertheless, his diagnosis
of the nature of poverty was to change as his political philosophy
became more conservative. In Conciones and Populum (1795), Coleridge
1 5
had urged that people 'should plead for the Oppressed, not to them.'
When he used a variant of this phrase, in 1814, the change is significant:
now he advocated 'pleading for the poor and ignorant, not haranguing to
1 6 ——
them' The concern for their well-being is still evident, but he no
longer believes the people's distress was caused by government oppression,
but by poverty and a lack of education. The problem for the people
17
was now identified as moral and economic, rather than political.
Their exploitation was to be at the hands of employers not government.
Thus, when Coleridge investigated the rise in popular distress and
unrest in the 1810s, he was anxious to exonerate the government from
responsibility. The Opposition claimed that the government was to blame
for the poverty of the people. William Cobbett argued that the war had
caused needless expense. He claimed that people objected to rises in
the Poor Rate when, in fact, this was necessitated by the poverty caused
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by high government expenditure, an enlarged war-time bureaucracy and
18
government corruption. Coleridge argued that there had not been a
disproportionate rise in government places and that they were super-
1 9
fluous to the controversy on the real causes of poverty. He believed
that the issue was only being raised as a pretext to attack the
government. Indeed, Coleridge contended that Britain had fared well,
20
economically, because of the war and that artisan wages had risen.
He was convinced that the standard of living was higher in Britain than
in other countries, including America, and that even agricultural
21
labourers were better off. Coleridge also attacked Cobbett's claim
that the high taxes needed to pay for the war, and to finance sinecures,
were a major cause of distress. Coleridge argued that the level of
tax was unimportant; what mattered most was the sum of money left to
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each individual after tax had been deducted. He asserted that, looked
at in this way, most people did have sufficient to live on after being
taxed; though Coleridge conceded that the current tax system did tend
to favour, too much, those who were already rich, rather than those who
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were most productive. The abolished Income Tax had been a fairer system.
Coleridge contended that Cobbett and the Whigs were deliberately,
and falsely, blaming the government for the current level of poverty,
in the hope of gaining political advantage. He also accused the
Opposition of exaggerating the sufferings of the poor in order to turn
people against the government. Instead of their pretended sympathy
for the poor, the Whigs were 'well-wishers only to the continuance of'
24
their miseries.' They realised that the longer people were in misery
and were kept complaining, the greater was the likelihood of the nation
turning to the Whigs as the only alternative government. In 1811
Coleridge argued that the Whigs had exaggerated the bread shortages and
blamed them on government-backed monopolies. Bread riots occurred,
as a result, in Nottingham when, in fact, Coleridge claimed there really
had been a shortfall in the harvest. Using the ignorance of the poor,
the Whigs had stirred up discontent for their own political ends:
They would, without remorse, convert an increase of
price into absolute dearth, in the hopes of goading
ignorance into riot, and snatch the last morsel from
the poor man's lips in order to make him curse the
Government in his heart.^5
The only point on which Coleridge and Cobbett agreed in this debate,
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was that the ordinary people were misguided in blaming the new
machines for their distress and unemployment. Both writers agreed
that, although causing initial dislocation, the new machinery would
26
create work and bring the nation prosperity.
Nevertheless, the subversive actions of the Opposition did not
preclude the presence of real grievances in the 1810s. It is at this
point, as with Wordsworth, that Coleridge departs from the normal
conservative diagnosis of post-war problems to acknowledge that the
poor had real and growing reasons for their suffering. Even when
Coleridge agreed with conservatives that the poor were often improvident
in their use of money, he was careful to emphasise that this was not a
their hardship that they would seize on any gratification as some kind
Although Coleridge did not believe that the war itself was to
blame for increased poverty, he did argue that the awkward transition
from war to peace had caused problems. Coleridge was one of the first
modern political writers to recognise that such periods in a nation's
history were often times of social and political dislocation, with
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economic booms and slumps. The transition to peace had resulted in
the discharge of soldiers and the run-down of war industries which had
led to high unemployment and poverty. These factors were also being
experienced by the other nations in Europe and the total effect was
a spiral of depression:
For it may easily happen, that the very same change,
which had produced this depression at home, may from
equivalent causes have embarrassed the countries in
commercial connection with us. At one and the same
time the great customer at home wants less, and our
customers abroad are able to buy less. The conjoint
action of these circumstances ... cannot but occasion
much distress, much obstruction, and these again in
their re-action are sure to be more than doubled by
the still greater and universal alarm, and by the
consequent check of confidence and enterprize, which
they never fail to produce.^
In this important passage, Coleridge again displays his acute
appreciation of economic change by describing the action of a depression,
in ite modern sense, as an inter-linked sequence of economic difficulties
which produces accumulating decline. This post-war depression was




especially traumatic because it followed a period of unparalleled
innovation and growth. Coleridge rightly regarded it as an important
cause of poverty and distress. He believed that the only way of
escaping this spiral of depression was through an act of moral will."^
The government was best placed to intervene and instil this new sense
of purpose, as well as help the poor who had had to bear the brunt of
the depression.
Coleridge:concluded this Lay Sermon analysis of poverty by
emphasising that it was not the action of any one of these factors that
was vital, but the interraction of them all. By introducing false
grievances into an already critical situation, the Whigs had added
disproportionately to the general suffering. They had further demoralised
the poor by suggesting that the causes of their hardship were unnecessary
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and could easily be removed by government. Coleridge's own analysis
of the causes of poverty was complex and, in many respects, far-sighted.
He considered a blend of economic, social, political, moral and psycho¬
logical factors, real or exaggerated, which all worked in concert to
produce a whole of suffering greater than the individual parts. Although
he did not side with the radicals, he was equally critical of the
conservatives for failing to recognise the true grievances of the poor
and ignoring their need for help. These sufferings had become
particularly acute in the new post-war world and he urged government
to help them. He was concerned to enlarge the social vision of
conservative writing and was anxious that fellow conservatives should
feel for the poor, recognise the extent and depth of hardship in British
society and realise that this poverty was not self-induced:
Alas! I have more than once seen a group of
children in Dorsetshire, during the heat of the
dog-days, each with its little shoulders up to its
ears, and its chest pinched inward, the very habit
and fixtures, as it were, that had been impressed on
their frames by the former ill-fed, ill-clothed and
unfuelled winters. But as with the Body, so or still
worse with the Mind. Nor is the effect confined to
the labouring classes, whom by an ominous but too
appropriate a change in our phraseology we are now
accustomed to call the Labouring Poor. 2
Adam Smith, whose writings Coleridge despised, had coined the phrase
33
'the labouring poor'. Burke had criticised the use of this term by
arguing that only those incapable of labour and earning their own living,
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could be described as 'poor'; the rest were improvident. In accepting
the term here, Coleridge seeks to remind fellow conservatives that the
term is now sadly appropriate. For in the post-war world, workers and
paupers were no longer naturally exclusive groups. Poverty was not a
function of improvidence, as conservatives argued, but an affliction
suffered by many industrious, responsible workers. In this way, Coleridge
tried to widen the scope of conservative thinking into more liberal
channels.
Wordsworth and Coleridge also identified other, more general,
changes in British society that contributed to the suffering of the
people. These were the forces of industrial change, urbanisation and
the new spirit of capitalist enterprise, which had all been developing
for some time, but the full effect of which was now to be experienced
in the 1810s. Wordsworth and Coleridge argued that these new forces
created physical hardships for the people and lowered their moral spirit
and sense of values. They also believed that the Industrial Revolution,
unless it was regulated, had revolutionary, political implications.
By challenging and disrupting the traditional moral values and the
interdependent social structure of Britain, it could threaten the
constitution of the state which was based on these. These new economic
developments had not been so noticeable in the time of older conservative
theorists, such as Burke, and, therefore, in analysing these changes
and advocating state reforms which were still consistent with constit¬
utional principles, Wordsworth and Coleridge were widening conservative
theory to meet the challenges of a new era.
For Wordsworth, rural life was the most natural type of existence
and, consequently, he was horrified by the increasing urbanisation of
British society. Country life preserved all the domestic values which
Wordsworth revered. Despite its many hardships, a life lived in the
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midst of nature still had the power to soothe and inspire. Its
consoling powers were needed even more urgently in the troubled 1810s
than at any other time. In the interdependent rural communities, all
the people were linked together by reciprocal bonds of duty and interest
and, no matter how hard life became, they still had the moral support which
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was natural to the country villages. Townspeople had no such consolations.
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London was still the only city that Wordsworth respected. This
was because it had a long history and its environs spilled out into the
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countryside, admitting a few of the benevolenr.es of nature. Even when
he showed appreciation of the city's centre, it was often because it
reminded him of natural scenes. Thus, the great, deserted, snow-
covered roads around St. Paul's recalled, to his mind, the fields of
38
the countryside. The city was rarely judged on its own terms and, as
it expanded, Wordsworth found even less to admire. London, like all
cities, now appeared to have little real depth or substance to its life,
unlike the countryside with its rich traditions and profound values:
A man is supposed to improve by going out into the
World, by visiting London. Artificial man does; he
extends with his sphere; but alas! that sphere is
microscopic; it is formed of minutiae, and he
surrenders his genuine vision to the artist.^9
The famed cosmopoli't an breadth of London was, in fact, shallow and
valueless, and lacking in the spiritual depth of the countryside. London
society was vain and self-interested and, Wordsworth argued, it was,
therefore, an appropriate place for the devious politicking of the
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radicals to flourish. Indeed, Wordsworth associated urban society,
generally, with the new growth in radicalism; he believed it was the
natural breeding ground for false, subversive doctrines.
The new cities of the industrial age worried Wordsworth even more
than London. They lacked its few redeeming qualities for they had
no history and they were vast blights on the landscape, where nature
had no admission. They were dark, gloomy, man-made monsters, without
even London's noble structures to lift the spirits. They were thus the
antithesis of Nature; they were rapidly destroying the countryside and
its traditional lifestyle. These new cities were guilty of 'hiding the
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face of earth for leagues.' They brutalised natural feelings and
alienated one class from another so that the old interdependence of all
ranks of men in one community was broken. Neighbourhoods now divided
classes, rather than brought them together in one whole. Man became so
isolated that not even God was there.
he truly is alone,
He of the multitude whose eyes are doomed
To hold a vacant commerce day by day
With objects wanting life - repelling love;
He by the vast Metropolis immured,
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Where pity shrinks from unremitting calls,
Where numbers overwhelm humanity,
And neighbourhood serves rather to divide
Than to unite. What sighs more deep than his,
Whosenobler will hath long been sacrificed.^
Urban life destroyed all the old links, moral responsibilities and
social relationships of traditional existence. The result was not the
solitary, spiritual communion between God and man, but alienated a-
social man; the very antithesis of the idea of social man on which the
whole of Wordsworth's political philosophy was based. Thus, Wordsworth
feared the force of urbanisation not merely as an evil, alternative to
rural life, but as its rival and destroyer. Unless the growth of
cities could be curtailed and traditional moral values be re-asserted
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there, they would break the entire social and political structure of
Britain.
The vast horror of these new cities had been occasioned by industrial
changes within the economy, and these, Wordsworth abhorred. His attention
was first caught by the transition from the old domestic system of
textile manufacture to the new factory system. The old method of
spinning and weaving had been done in the home and had involved all
the family. This had served to unite the family and sustain those
domestic values that Wordsworth considered to be central to traditional
life. Moreover, the trade was an integral part of rural existence.
Now, Wordsworth lamented the decline of this trade and all the values
it encapsulated:
The pastoral muse laments the wheel - no more
Engaged, near blazing hearth on clean-swept floor,
In tasks which guardian angels might approve
Friendly the weight of leisure to remove,
And to beguile the lassitude of ease;
Gracious to all the dear dependencies
Of house and field - to plenty, peace and love.
The spinning wheel was soothing: man and machine became one, and there
was a pride and pleasure in the work. It was a harmonious part of
natural life that helped to while away some leisure hours. This rather
sentimental notion of a subsistence trade, nevertheless, reveals how
Wordsworth believed a machine should only be tolerated when it became
an integral part, and served the time-honoured values, of rural life.
The great machines of the new factories, however, destroyed this
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harmony and all the values associated with it. In The Excursion (1814)
Wordsworth remarked on how the new industries pitted man and machine
against each other:
I have tried to mark
A new and unforeseen creation rise
From out the labours of a peaceful Land
WelLding her potent enginery to frame
And to produce, with appetite as keen
As that of war, which rests not night or day,
Industrious to destroy.^
The machines which powered these factories were not the servants of man;
they had become their masters, their god. Although the war against
Napoleon had been won, machines were now waging an even more dangerous
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war against traditional British life and values.
Wordsworth did emphasise, however, that he was not opposed to the
new technology itself. Wordsworth had always been interested in
scientific discoveries. He owned his own microscope and was a friend
of the inventor, Humphrey Davy. Wordsworth believed science could
broaden the scope and interests of man's mind and develop his faculties
to the full. It was 'a support/Not treacherous, to the mind's excursive
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power.' The discoveries and inventions of science were only valuable
assets, however, as long as they served 'the cause/Of order and
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distinctions.' Wordsworth was, therefore, not opposed to the new
machines if they served traditional rural society, only if they challenged
its structure and values. It was the manner in which the machines had
been used which most troubled Wordsworth.
Wordsworth detested the factory system because of the incessant,
spiritually-numbing work it required of people. The system treated its
workers as mere tools in the mechanical process, rather than as human
beings. The unremitting toil of the factory brutalised the people,
destroyed their health and crushed their moral spirit. The natural rhythms
of life had been replaced by the tyranny of factory shift work, continued
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all through the night. The normal flow of village life governed by
Godly Nature had been superceded by the unnatural, regimented life
dictated by the new machine-gods. Man was sacrificed on the altar of
Industry and Profit:
Our life is turned
Out of her course, wherever man is made
An offering, or a sacrifice, a tool
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Or implement, a passive thing employed
As a brute mean, without acknowled gment
Of common right or interest in the end;
Used or abused, as selfish may prompt ...
... - Not for these sad issues
Was Man created; but to obey the law
Of life, and hope, and action.
In these circumstances, man's moral nature was traduced. Pride in one's
work, moral thoughts, self respect, and all finer feelings, were
obliterated by the factory system. As these values were destroyed so
would be the constitution which was dependent upon them.
Wordsworth argued that old moral values were being replaced by a
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new set of vulgar, material values based on profit and self-interest.
He believed that the person most responsible for this change was Adam
Smith. His false philosophy of political economics had been adopted
by employers, and even some landowners. As a result, the new machines
which were potentially useful, had been introduced extensively, in a
laissez-faire spirit, with a care only for increasing profits, not
serving the people. Wordsworth did acknowledge that Smith and his
followers, had intended to make the nation more prosperous, but their
system had only enriched the few at the expense of the many. In The
Prelude (1805) Wordsworth attacked 'statists' (or political economists)
such as Smith. He discovered,
Ambition, folly, madness, in the men
Who thrust themselves upon this passive world
As rulers of the world - to see in these
Even when the public welfare is their aim
Plans without thought, or bottomed on false thought
And false philosophy; having brought to test
Of solid life and true result the books
Of modern statists, and thereby perceived
The utter hollowness of what we name
The wealth of nations.
The last line, which alludes to the title of Smith's book, is used
ironically by Wordsworth to emphasise his point that while the nation's
total wealth, in material terms, may have risen, this wealth was concentrated
in a few hands only. Smith's theories had increased the material wealth
of a few employers, but the welfare of the nation as a whole, both
material and moral, had been neglected in the process. This empty,
morally bankrupt philosophy with its new religion of Profit had overturned
all social virtues. Wordsworth argued that now material possessions
conferred dignity and worth, rather than solid moral qualities:
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- We must run glittering like a brook
In the open sunshine, or we are unblest:
The wealthiest man among us is the best:
No grandeur pow in nature or in book
Delights us.
In particular, Wordsworth lamented the loss of the simple, moral
life which had flourished in England in the seventeenth century, and
which he had believed would be revived after the war was over. The new
laissez-faire economic system eroded these domestic values and destroyed
family life. Wordsworth regretted the disappearance of,
The old domestic morals of the land,
Her simple manners, and the stable worth
That dignified and cheered a low estate.^
Homes were deserted for factories, and there was little time for communal
family life. Children were forced out to work, away from their parents'
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influence; their health was ruined and their senses prematurely dulled.
Thus, the traditional family unit was beginning to fragment and Wordsworth
believed that, as this happened, the whole social and political fabric
of the nation would also begin to unravel. The combination of urban¬
isation, industrialisation and the new laissez-faire attitudes thus
posed a serious threat not only to the moral and physical health of the
nation, but also to its inter-linked social structure and balanced
constitution. These were subversive forces and Wordsworth was to recom¬
mend that the government, as the only responsible agent left, had to
address itself to the social welfare of the nation. This was not only
a humanitarian duty and an end of government, but it was also a
necessary measure to preserve the social and political state.
Coleridge accepted urbanisation and industrialisation more readily
than Wordsworth, but he was even more opposed to the excessive commercial
spirit which had poisoned the mind of the nation. Rural life was not
central to Coleridge's existence, even though he valued it greatly.
He believed that town and country were complementary, not antagonistic,
parts of the social organism; each had distinct qualities. He was
much impressed by the way in which the Germans had been able to introduce
aspects of nature into their towns, with little parks and tree-lined
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streets. This was an inter-fusion of town and country, which he
believed could be emulated in Britain. It combined the natural growth
and virtues of Nature, with the shaping hand of man. Although Coleridge
was distressed by the new industrial cities of Britain, he accepted them
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as part of the new emerging society and only wished for their improve¬
ment. He did not concur with Wordsworth that the only true society
was rural, and that industry should only be tolerated if it served that
society. Coleridge argued that industrialisation, and the cities it
spawned, had a validity of their own, even if there were severe flaws
which had to be rectified.
Coleridge was a percipient observer of the great urban and industrial
changes which were taking place, and the disruption they caused to the
old social and economic order:
Bristol has, doubtless, been injured by the rapid
Prosperity of Liverpool and its superior spirit of
Enterprise; and the vast machines of Lancashire have
overwhelmed and rendered hopeless the domestic Industry
of the Females in the Cottages and small Farm-houses
of Westmorland and Cumberland.
Coleridge was convinced, however, that these developments also brought
great long-term benefits. The new expansion in trade and industry would,
in time, act as a beneficial stimulant to all sections of the community.
He was certain it would,
act as a stimulus on the producing Classes, and this
in the most useful manner, and on the most important
branches of production, on the Tiller, on the Grazier,
the Clothier, and the maker of Arms. 8
Short-term dislocation and unemployment would soon be transformed into
positive growth. Coleridge, therefore, praised the construction of new
roads, canals and docks, the expansion of villages into towns, and the
increasing constellation of satellite cities around London. These
developments, along with the rise in population, were all welcome signs
of Britain's social and economic health and vigour. Coleridge believed
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that these would soon contribute to the increased prosperity of all.
Since Coleridge was such a stout advocate of these new economic
developments, it might be expected that he would also embrace the spirit
of enterprise capitalism which had partly inspired them. To an extent
this was true, for Coleridge had great regard for the enterprising and
commercial spirit of British entrepreneurs. He saw the expansion in
trade, particularly, as a civilising influence in the world.^ Neverthe¬
less, Coleridge could not accept the extremes to which this new economic
system was taken in the pursuit, and worship, of Profit. He believed
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that industrialisation had to serve the interests of all the people,
not just the employers. As the war drew to a close, Coleridge began
to notice how manufacturers, buoyed up by their recent war-time profits,
were now becoming obsessed with the pursuit of gain as an end in itself.
It was this self-interested abuse of a system, which had the potential
to help all, that most troubled Coleridge. Like Wordsworth, he
characterised the new acquisitive spirit as the worship of a false
god. Indeed, Coleridge believed this worship of materialist fetishes
to be one of the predominant characteristics of the new age. He argued
that now people tended,
to break and scatter the one divine and invisible life
of nature into countless idols of the sense; and
falling prostrate before lifeless images, the creatures
of his own abstraction, is himself sensualized, and
becomes a slave to the things of which he was formed
to be the conquerer and sovereign. From the fetisch
of the imbruted Africa to the soul-debasing errors of
the proud fact-hunting materialist we may trace the
various ceremonials of the same idolatory, and shall
find selfishness, hate and servitude as the results.61
Thus, shallow, materialist values of the present were supplanting the
profound Christian values on which society had always been founded.
Man was becoming a slave to Mammon.
Coleridge blamed the provenance of this new idolatory on the works
of Adam Smith and his disciples. His theory of political economy had
encouraged people to disregard national welfare in a headlong pursuit
of personal wealth. Personal and public morality were neglected and
workers were reduced to mere beasts of burden:
I dare affirm, that few superstitions in Religion have
been so extensively pernicious to the intellectual and
moral sanity of this Country and France, as those of
(so called) Political Economy ... [it] implies the
utter contempt of all that distinguishes or rather
that forms the chasm, the diversity in kind, between
man and beast.^2
Adam Smith's system was supposedly based on 'free' principles : free
trade, free competition and free labour. Coleridge argued that Smith's
definition of freedom echoed that of the radicals: it was an abstract,
unlimited concept which resulted in licence. Just as he believed
radical principles led to despotism, so did Smith's laissez-faire
system, for it merely accorded employers the licence to deal with
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their workers in whatever way they felt it, in order to increase
profits. These new economic despots reduced all the natural variety
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of human life to 'abstractions' and 'technical calculation'.
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People were treated 'as parts of a mighty system of machinery.' But
Coleridge argued that people were not things, and could not be treated
in this despotic fashion without their soul being imperilled and the
whole moral fabric of the nation disintegrating.
Thus, Coleridge regarded this new, inhumane, commercial spirit as
another species of radicalism. It was based on the same type of
abstract principles, and had resulted in the same type of despotism.
Coleridge also argued that this new spirit was a genuine revolution
since he believed that all revolutions were necessarily followed by a
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decline in national morality. Just as the French had been an external
threat to the British constitution, so this laissez-faire system was a
similar domestic threat to it, which had to be countered in the same
vigorous way. Coleridge was concerned that people should be treated
and cared for as human beings, not things. While discussing the way
in which Highland Landlords cleared tenants from their estates, destroy¬
ing time-honoured communities, to make way for more profitable sheep
farming, Coleridge remarked: 'Man, I still think, ought to be weighted
not counted. Their worth ought to be the final estimate of their value.
Coleridge was in favour of a system of moral economy, rather than
political economy.
In his Lay Sermon (1817), Coleridge investigated why this commercial
spirit had become as pervasive and excessive. His conclusions are
important because they predicate the type of solutions he was to
recommend. He argued that the commercial spirit, so worthy in itself,
had become excessive because the counterweights which should have held
it in check had proved weak. Coleridge blamed the current distress on:
the OVERBALANCE OF THE COMMERCIAL SPIRIT IN
CONSEQUENCE OF THE ABSENCE OR WEAKNESS OF THE
COUNTER-WEIGHTS; this over-balance considered
as displaying itself, 1. In the COMMERCIAL WORLD
itself; 2. In the Agricultural: 3. In the Government:
and, 4. In the combined Influence of all three
on the more numerous and labouring Classes.
Although the materialist spirit had originated in the commercial world,
Coleridge argued that it soon affected all classes, because it had
gone unchecked. Whereas Wordsworth was much more concerned by the
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the effects Smith's theories would have on the morals of the common
people, Coleridge saw evidence of the new spirit in every class,
including the once dependable landowners. By the term 'government',
Coleridge also included the entire ruling class, temporal and spiritual,
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both inside and outside Parliament. They had neglected the positive
ends of the constitution which ensured the people's welfare. Lastly,
the ordinary people themselves were affected by the system, not
because they too had sold their souls to the god of Profit, but because
their moral values and spirit had been crushed. Thus, Coleridge believed
the commercial spirit had poisoned every level of society.
Coleridge identified a number of factors which had been weak in
restricting this new spirit and which now needed to be strengthened.
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The first was 'the ancient feeling of rank and ancestry'. The old
reverence for heredity and tradition, that would normally have countered
the current pursuit of gain, had become infected by the commercial
system itself. Coleridge saw signs that personal wealth was becoming
more estimable than ancestral status. Even amongst the titled them¬
selves, there was evidence that they were abandoning 'the maxims of
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ancient prudence', in favour of the more vulgar values of money.
This was an idea which was probably derived, in part, from Coleridge's
reading of Harrington's Oceana (1656), in which a similar fear is
expressed.^1
The second weak counterweight to the commercial spirit was the
lack of philosophical and moral education not only among the public
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in general but also the ruling classes. This meant that the nation
became easily attracted by the superficial charms of materialism, and
more serious, profound values were neglected. The third factor, closely
related to this, was the decline in religion in Britain during the
1810s. Coleridge believed that the practice of religion was vital for
detaching people from worldy things and guiding them to a more spiritual
understanding. He argued, however, that Christian teaching had become
too simplified and had neglected the profound truths which had to be
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considered more deeply. Thus, religion had also become infected with
the superficiality which was a hallmark of the commercial spirit. This
religiousand moral decline will be discussed at greater length in the
following chapter.
Coleridge was, therefore, more interested in strengthening these
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elements and counterbalancing the commercial spirit, rather than
trying to restrict its growth or making it serve traditional rural
society as Wordsworth desired. Wordsworth saw the new economic devel¬
opments as a rival form of society set to destroy the 'natural' state
of the nation. Coleridge accepted the growth and development of the
new economy as a complement to traditional society, but one which needed
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to be balanced with a similar strong regard for older principles.
These time-honoured Christian values would serve to humanise and
moralise the developments taking place. Whereas Wordsworth wished to
retain the structure, as well as the principles, of traditional society,
and only tolerated industry if it served this purpose; Coleridge was
more interested in retaining traditional principles and then investing
them into the new structure of industrial life. In this way, he
believed that, not only would the economy be run more humanely, but it
would also prosper even more in material terms and the whole nation
would benefit in the success. Both visions of the future are more
liberally inclined than most contemporary conservatives would contemplate,
but Coleridge's concept is the more dynamic and progressive; it
accepts the need for an organically growing structure.
Coleridge feared that if the state did not intervene to secure
the social welfare of the people and the moral education of the nation,
the country would soon be run on strictly utilitarian, materialist
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lines. As employers subordinated people to things, so the common
people would also be encouraged to substitute rights for duties. In
this way, the whole traditional fabric of the nation and the constitution
would be rent asunder by the commercial spirit, rather than be benefited
by it. Years later, at the height of the Reform Bill agitation in
1832, this was a fear that Coleridge found borne out by events. The
revolutionary implication of capitalism, which neglected moral
responsibility, was now fully realised as the common people demanded
7
political rights with no mention of duties. In the 1810s, however,
Coleridge still believed there was a possibility of countering this
hard, materialist spirit which threatened constitution and state. He
argued that it was now the function of the government to intervene and
fulfil its constitutional duty of providing for the social welfare of
the nation.
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State intervention on social issues was not much favoured by
radicals or conservatives. The reform movement, which had revived in
the 1810s, was more moderate than that of the 1790s, and was more
interested in limited political reforms, and in issues which had been
common in the eighteenth century: high taxation, monopolies and
corruption. Only a few of the more independent radical writers, such
as Cobbett, discussed the plight of the distressed in any detail. Tory
writers were even less concerned with changes. Burke's interest in
haumanitarian reform had waned in the 1790s and latterly he had
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favoured a mostly non-interventionist theory of government. For
Burke and most conservatives, government was constituted mainly for
security from foreign enemies, to preserve law and order, and to prevent
evil, rather than attempt to intervene in order to help certain sections
of the community in a positive way. Indeed, some followers of Malthus
believed that too much was already being done to help the poor, with
the consequence that the population continued to grow.
Wordsworth and Coleridge do not fit into either of these groups.
They were more socially concerned than most Tories and more interested
in evolutionary reforms than the radicals. By the end of the war,
however, both had become convinced that the state needed to intervene
on matters of social welfare and they believed that this had to be a
vital and growing feature of the constitutional system. Nevertheless,
they advocated social reform for very different reasons to Cobbett's.
They believed that if the constitution served the people well, they
would hold its traditional principles in greater affection and respect,
as well as have their hardships ameliorated. Thus, social reforms could
help the constitution live and retain its meaning for all the citizens;
whereas Cobbett recommended reform in order to change the constitutional
system, as well as help its citizens. Wordsworth and Coleridge hoped
that social conditions could be improved so that the people would once
again become receptive to those old moral values which were in danger
of being lost or overbalanced. Nevertheless, it will be argued that
although both writers were concerned to retain these traditional values,
Coleridge was less concerned, than Wordsworth, to retain or regain the
old pre-industrial structure of society. Wordsworth emerges as a
humanitarian Tory; Coleridge is perhaps the first true liberal-conservative.
Wordsworth believed that, just as ordinary people were naturally
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interested in helping each other, so should governments adopt a
humane interest in the welfare of society. He praised 'those benign
elementary feelings of society, for the preservation and cherishing
of which, among other important objects, government was from the
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beginning ordained.' Since all persons in society were tied together
by bonds of love and responsibility, the government had to act on
these principles and ensure that the people were cared for. This was
Wordsworth's ideal of true government: 'These are the sympathies which
prove that a government is paternal, - that it makes one family with
79
the people.' It was this type of humane paternalism which was lacking
in the 1810s; this positive function of government had been neg lected.
Wordsworth presented the Lowther family as an ideal example of this
r
paternalism in action at both a local and national level. They were
caring, responsible landlords, who, when elected to Parliament,
similarly ensured that the welfare of their constituency was attended
to by government. Wordsworth described Lord Lowther as a man,
who, by his influence with Government, may facilitate
the execution of any plan tending, with due concern
for general welfare, to the especial benefit of
Westmorland.80
The Lowthers were a glowing example of state paternalism in action;
working for the welfare of the nation at large, as well as for the
people of their own constituency.
Wordsworth believed that if the existing constitution and social
structure were to remain intact, these positive, humanitarian ends
of government had to be followed. It was the duty of the state to deal
justly with all its citizens and ensure that none was oppressed by his
condition. In the inter-linked society of the past, it was natural
for the people to be cared for responsibly, but until these old bonds
were renewed, the state had to take a more active role and continue to
be vigilant. Moreover, if the constitutional system ensured that the
people's welfare was promoted the people would be less likely to
question its worth and relevance, and their affection for the system
would increase. Wordsworth, therefore, recommended that government
should ensure that the people received an adequate reward for their
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labour and were able to secure a comfortable standard of living. This
was not to raise the ordinary people above their current social status,
but rather make them more content and easy within their existing class.
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The structure of society would thus be confirmed and strengthened,
rather than challenged.
Although Wordsworth clearly favoured fair and adequate wages, he
was not very specific in outlining other reforms which might be
necessary. In general he favoured returning, as far as possible, to
a more paternalistic, even feudal, world, where master and worker
were bound by ties of duty and responsibility, and where the disruptive
effects of the new industrialism had hardly impinged. Wordsworth still
had hopes that this traditional state of society with all its
attendant moral principles could thrive again, despite the damage that
the new changes had done to its fabric:
sufficient vitality is left in the Stock of ancient
virtue to furnish hope that, by careful manuring,
and skilful application of the knife to the withereg^
branches, fresh shoots might thrive in their place.
One of the chief aims of state intervention therefore was to restore
society to its previous traditional, mainly rural state. This required
re-establishing the old social bonds by curtailing the new developments
in industry, which fractured the nation, socially and morally, as well
as fulfilling the constitutional duty of caring for the poor and
distressed, just as they had once been looked after naturally in the
more responsible society of the past.
Wordsworth's aim was not so much to make the new industrial society
more humane and acceptable, but to attempt to retard its growth altogether
and return to the rural lifestyle of the past. He did not understand,
as Coleridge did, that the economic and industrial developments comprised
a new and permanent force within society that could not be stopped:
they were part of the natural society of the future. Wordsworth, instead,
lamented the passing of a time when machines were unknown and all work
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was carried out in natural surroundings. In the character of the
Wanderer, Wordsworth sympathises with the wish to banish forever the
'wisdom' which brought about the new industrial age and which caused so
much misery:
Oh, banish far such wisdom as condemns
A native Briton to these inward chains,
Fixed in his soul, so eagerly and so deep;
Without his own consent, or knowledge, fixed!




Nevertheless, Wordsworth did realise that once factories had been
introduced, there was little chance of removing them completely, even
though this would have been preferable to him. In 1843 Wordsworth
reviewed the preceding thirty years since he had written against
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machines in The Excursion. He was pleased that factories had not
invaded the Lake District, but had flourished only in lowland areas, where
coal was to be found. Thus, his home area still retained something of
the rural arcadia which he regretted the rest of the country had lost.
His ideal remained a rural society. Nevertheless, he praised the state
legislation which had attempted to ameliorate the worst conditions of
the new industrial system, although he lamented that so little had been
accomplished. Clearly, having accepted the reality of factories, he
welcomed state intervention to improve them. Wordsworth could see that
a few machines might help man and relieve him of some of the toil which
had habitually sapped his energy and spirit, but he believed their
growth had not been sufficiently checked or regulated, and all their
potential for good had been crushed by their excessive and amoral use
36
in industrial development. Machines could only be tolerated if they
served the traditional, essentially rural, life and values of the nation,
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and were used in a moral fashion. Thus, although Wordsworth welcomed
the way in which Parliament had tried to reform the factory system, he
still desired the growth of industry to be restricted altogether, not
just humanised. Even in 1843, he concluded that it was still not too
late to stunt the growth of this new industrial society. This is what
state intervention should really have aimed to do, rather than making
factories more bearable and so encouraging further growth.
Wordsworth concluded his survey by delivering a warning to legislators
that their efforts regarding industry had been misplaced and that unless,
even as late as 1843, they restricted the new developments, all the
Wanderer's fears of a totally immoral, divided society and a broken
constitution, would soon be realised:
I cannot forbear noticing the strenuous efforts made
at this time in Parliament, by so many persons, to
extend manufacturing and commercial industry at the
expense of agricultural, though we have recently had
abundant proofs that the apprehensions expressed by the
Wanderer were not groundless.®®
Wordsworth also believed that government needed to reform the admin¬
istration of the Poor Law. He argued that the Poor Law did little to
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alleviate the real causes of poverty, but merely deprived people of self-
respect and independence. Wordsworth was convinced that only government
intervention could help:
May they exhibit in treating this momentous subject, a
tenderness of undeceived humanity on the one side, and
a sternness of enlightened state-policy on the other!
Thus, and thus only, can be checked immediately, and,
in due course of time, perhaps removed, an evil by which
one claim and title is set in array against another, in
a manner, and to an extent, that threatens utter
subversion to the ancient frame of society!
This is the heaviest burden that now lies upon England!
Here is a necessity for reform which, as it cannot
prosper unless it begin from a Government and the upper
ranks in society, has no attraction for demagogues and
mob-exciting patriots.®^
The Poor Law was evil because it set the claims of the poor to a decent"
wage and standard of living against those of the rate-payer who objected
to subsidising labourers' wages when farmers should have paid them
adequately in the first place. In this way the old dependencies and
reciprocal duties, on which society depended, were gradually being pulled
apart and class was being set against class. Poor Law reform did not
interest radical demagogues, Wordsworth claimed, because they rejoiced in
this fragmentation of the old society which would lead to a break-down
of the constitution. Wordsworth, however, saw reform as vital, and
advocated that government should ensure that only those who were totally
dependent were given help through the Poor Law. Secondly, he proposed
that those people, who were in employment, should be paid adequately,
thus relieving the burden on the rates, restoring their self-esteem, and
repairing the old moral fabric of society. But they were still not to
be raised outwith their class.
In these different ways, Wordsworth hoped that the state would begin
to intervene to secure the social welfare of the people. This was a
traditional, paternal duty prescribed by the constitution, which had
been neglected in recent years. As distress and discontent rose in the
1810s, and a new, evil type of industrial society began to emerge,
Wordsworth argued that this governmental duty must assume an enhanced
place in the constitutional system. Governments, now, had to become more
socially concerned not merely to help the people but in order to protect
the existing constitution, and its principles, as well as maintain the
structure of society in its traditional form. The final area, in which the
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government had to intervene in order to counteract the new industrial
society and restore the nation to its previous state, was in the field
of moral education. This will be investigated in the final chapter.
Coleridge had always been interested in social welfare and
educational provision for the ordinary people. In the 1790s these had
been proposed as a necessary prelude to awarding the people equal
political rights. The aim then had been to effect an evolutionary change
in the constitution. By the 1810s, Coleridge still believed these reforms
were necessary to improve the lives of the people, but they were now
seen more as an end in themselves, a fulfilment of the existing constit¬
ution's duty. Nevertheless, Coleridge's interest in these positive ends
of government was more extensive than Wordsworth's. Although he argued
that social and moral reforms were vital for maintaining the traditional
principles of the constitution, he did not view them as a means for
preserving the structure of the state unchanged. Social and moral reforms
would enable the national organism to grow and change, without losing
touch with the time-honoured principles which underpinned its life.
Social reforms would not curtail the new industrial society, but make
its conditions more comfortable so that people would be capable of acting
upon the traditional moral values of the nation.
Coleridge always had great faith in the ability of individuals to
transform society. Most of these figures were political leaders such as
Washington, but Coleridge also revered the work of social reformers who
had done much to improve conditions, even when the people themselves had
little understood their work:
What have not Clarkson, Granville Sharp, Wilberforce,
and the Society of Friends, effected for the English
Nation, imperfectly as the intellectual and moral qn
faculties of the People at large are developed at present.
As the industrial and material conditions of the people improved, so would
the beneficial effects of social reforms, such as these, accumulate and
spread more quickly. Coleridge believed that every individual could play
his own part in this process; each small contribution, adding to the
success of the whole. If man became actively involved in the welfare of
his neighbour, there was no limit to the good which could be done.
The government, however, had the biggest role to play because it
could intervene at national level. Coleridge deplored the Malthusian
disregard for the sufferings of the poor. He characterised the typical
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Malthusian as someone who believed that 'he who would prevent the
Poor from rotting away in disease, misery, and wickedness, is an Enemy
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to his Country!' For Coleridge, an increase in population demanded an
increase, not a decrease, in the need for the state to help. In contrast
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to Malthusian doctrine, he praised the 'parental character' of the
town governments in Germany. Coleridge believed that the government was
constitutionally bound to ensure that all citizens were adequately
equipped and rewarded for their work, had the means to a comfortable
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subsistence, and had the hope of improving their own condition.
Coleridge was to argue that this entailed continual state interest, and
intervention, in social concerns. This function was increasingly
necessary as society itself was experiencing so many different changes
and it could no longer be assumed that the people's welfare was being
attended to in the natural way of the old interlinked society. The state
now had to fill the gap left by irresponsible employers.
Coleridge wished to recover the cause of social reform as an issue
which conservatives could wholeheartedly pursue. He believed it had
become too identified with radical politics and was now tainted with
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their violent, extremist methods. Coleridge contended that conservative
writers were wrong to believe that a few necessary social reforms would
lead to demands for more change, and then result in public disruption.
Their policy of repression was short-sighted because it assumed that the
only way to deal with social discontent, and the rise of radical agitation,
was by its suppression. Instead, there had to be more attention paid to
the very real grievances of the people. Coleridge attacked those conserv¬
atives who believed,
that as the Peace of Nations had been disturbed by the
diffusion of a false light, it may be re-established by
excluding the people from all knowledge and all prospect
of amelioration. 0! never, never 1^5
Gradual, evolutionary reforms to improve the education and material
condition of the people would not challenge the traditional constitution,
but help to bind a happier people to it, so that it could grow and flourish
as society did. To repress the people was only to invite the very same
disruptive response which the conservatives feared.
Coleridge regarded state intervention as the moral antithesis of
the selfish, Materialistic spirit of the new political economy, for it
recognised a duty to other people, and it was concerned with welfare rather
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than wealth. It was thus a moral antidote to capitalism. He addressed
the ruling classes in these terms:
If you possess more than is necessary for your own
wants, more than your own wants ought to be felt by
you as your own interests. You are pacing on a smooth
terrace, which you owe to the happy institutions of
your country, - a terrace on the mountain's breast.
To what purpose, by what moral right, if you continue
to gaze only on the sod beneath your feet?"
The people were thus entitled, as a moral and constitutional right, to
the care and concern of the ruling classes. They were also entitled to
a fair share in the profits which accrued from their employment. Workers
were not merely things, used as the means to an end, but were involved
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in a process which entitled them to a share in that end. For employers
to think only of themselves and their profits was unchristian.
Coleridge argued that government intervention would not only bring
benefits to the economy, but also to the state itself:
I feel assured that the Spirit of Commerce is itself
capable of being at once counteracted and enlightened
by the Spirit of the State, to the advantage of both.9®
The new economy would be moralised and made to serve the interests and
welfare of all the nation. In the process, the state would acquire a
greater spirit of enterprise and become more involved in the social
organism. The state would be more dynamic and progressive. Thus, Coleridge
did not want to use the state to curtail the new industrial developments,
as Wordsworth did, but he wished the government to humanise them, and
enlighten the population so that industry could grow with a sense of
moral purpose. This was the state's Christian, as well as constitutional
duty and it was a constant requirement.
Coleridge was also much more specific than Wordsworth in the reforms
he favoured. To counteract poverty, he recommended the abolition of
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lotteries which encouraged impecunious behaviour ; he believed that men
should hold off marrying until they were thirty years of age, when they
could better afford it""^; he advocated investment in the most active
areas of the economy and he encouraged people to turn to new trades such
as canal-building1^1; and, finally, he favoured reform of the Poor Law
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which he regarded in a similar way to Wordsworth. He was also interested
in other social issues, such as the harsh punishment given to criminals
255
and the continuance of slavery. Nevertheless, there was one social
issue which attracted Coleridge's concern more than any other: the
conditions inside the new factories. His extensive writings on this
issue provide ample proof that Coleridge was a firm advocate of state
intervention, but also that he accepted Britain's social and economic
changes as organically linked to the natural life of the nation. These
changes merely required to be more harmoniously attuned to the
traditional moral values of the country. State intervention had to become
an important and growing element in the constitutional system. These
ideas reveal Coleridge, in his own age, to be a uniquely liberal
conservative theorist.
Coleridge had first mentioned factories in his Lectures on Revealed
Religion in 1795, when he recognised their economic value, but also
regretted their evil effects on the workers and on the dirty, pestilential
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tcwn s which they spawned. Coleridge was convinced that factories were
not inevitably evil, but, by improvement, they could become a boon, not
merely to the national economy, but also to the workers. Coleridge
became actively involved in the cause of factory reform in 1818, at
exactly the time when Wordsworth was actively campaigning for the Tories
in Westmorland. Sir Robert Peel's Bill, introduced in February of that
year, was designed to restrict the working laws of children to eleven
per day, excluding meals. Coleridge read about the Bill in The Courier,
but he feared that the public had not been adequately prepared to accept
the measure - ncr had proper parliamentary arrangements been made for
1 04
its passage. Coleridge wrote a long article for the newspaper supporting
the measure and then, at Peel's request, he produced at least two pamphlets
on the issue. Factory reform was to preoccupy Coleridge over the next
year and this reveals his positive commitment to state intervention.
It is also an interesting episode in Coleridge's career for Peel's request
shows the influence and status Coleridge now enjoyed as a political
theorist and journalist.
In his Courier article, Coleridge used his considerable literary
talents to construct a heavily ironic, sardonically hunourous piece,
supposedly opposing the bill on the grounds that there was,
the necessary comfort, health and happiness, inherent
in the present system of management in the many factories,
which, like oaks, have attained their perfection by
slow advances.1 ^5
256
The bizarre analogy betweli factories and oaks served to highlight what
r-
Coleridge believed to be the main deficiency in the factory system.
Factories had not grown gradually as part of the organism of the state.
Thus, the system lacked the moral spirit which would naturally have
grown with this process. It was, therefore, the government's task to
invest these traditional values into the system through liberal reforms.
The moral struggle waged against Napoleon now had to be extended to
the domestic front.
In his pamphlets, Coleridge attacked those who argued that there
was no need for government action because it would interfere with the
right of free labour. As we have seen Coleridge believed this to be a
meaningless, abstract right, which involved no reciprocal duties and
which merely allowed employers the licence to treat their workers as
tools.1^ The state had to curtail this 'freedom' and impel employers
to take account of their moral duties. Coleridge also attacked those
who claimed that there was no precedence for state intervention and that
it was dangerous to initiate one. He argued that state intervention
1 07
was not against 'the principles and spirit of the British Constitution'.
The constitution made allowance for the need to intervene to ensure that
the claims of the individual were compatible with those of the commonwealth,
and thus the legislature could limit activities which were only benefiting
1 OB
a few, while proving injurious to many. Although such instances were
rare, Coleridge was able to cite the abolition of the slave trade in
1 09
1807 as an example of state intervention. Nor did Coleridge believe
that Peel's Factory Bill would necessarily lead to a clamour for further
reforms; although he believed many were justified. Coleridge sensed that
if Peel's modest measure was not granted, the demand for much greater
11 0
radical reforms would become overwhelming.
Thus, Coleridge defended intervention on the grounds of experience,
pragmatism, and morality, and he argued that it was sanctioned by the
constitution. He then claimed that the state was the only body capable
of intervening effectively and nationally on such social issues. He
doubted whether the masters themselves could be left to administer reforms
whe.n most of them were only motivated by 'the keen stimulants of immediate
profit1.''1'' They were uninterested in humanitarian reforms which might
undermine this end, and even if they could be persuaded to shorten hours,
would probably compensate by reducing wages. Since the employers had
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abrogated their sense of moral responsibility, the government was seen
as the sole agent capable of action: 'such evils cannot be removed
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without the aid of legislative authority.' This Christian and
constitutional duty was not just confined to the issue of factory
reform, but applied to all measures which were as well justified,
morally and pragmatically:
If they [i.e. other reforms] are equally just, if the
grievances that justify them are as heavy, and if the
proposed remedy be attended with no great inconvenience,
in God's name let them be conceded!1"^
Although Coleridge only advocated gradual social reform, it is clear
that he did see state intervention as a permanent duty of government,
especially in the new post-war industrial world. To those radicals who ,
argued that such gradual reforms were too limited to be of any use,
Coleridge answered that, although the present reform was indeed modest,
it was a solid start, which would have a greater chance of being
accepted than the wholesale reform some of them desired. He attacked
the idea 'that we are to do nothing of what we can, because we cannot
11 4
do all that we would wish.' Coleridge believed that there was a middle
course between Owenite Utopian schemes, and the conservative view that
11 5
nothing should be done. He argued that Owen's views were too extreme.
They would have little chance of being implemented at national level,
and, even if they were, they would be too innovatory and would therefore
disrupt society. Small, gradual reforms would be more acceptable to
both employers and workers.11^ They would preserve social continuity and
prove more permanent; they could then be enlarged upon, later, as
circumstance demanded. This was Coleridge's ideal for prudent, practical,
effective state intervention. It marked him off from both the conservat¬
ives and the radicals, but it prefigures the type of social reform which
was to become common later in the century.
After finishing his pamphlets, Coleridge continued to follow the
debate in Parliament and may even have produced further pamphlets which
have not come to light. Certainly, his correspondence shows his continuing
interest as well as his increasing despair. When the Bill was halted in
the Lords by the Scottish Earl of Lauderdale, Coleridge bitterly attacked
him, not only for his action, but also for being Scottish and, therefore,
linked, in Coleridge's mind, with the hated Adam Smith and his system of
117
political economy. Coleridge believed that the Bill had been killed
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by a group of capitalists in the Lords, who were intent on extorting
all the profits they could and exploiting the people in the process.
Coleridge increasingly saw the new breed of capitalists as the evil foe of
society, of the constitution and of all moral values:
Whether some half score of rich Capitalists are to
be prevented from suborning Suicide and perpetrating
Infanticide and Soul-murder is, forsooth, 'the most
perplexing Question . ...'118
The only force which could arrest this small, but growing power of evil,
was the state. It should, however, be noted that Coleridge was not a
kind of early Socialist thinker: he viewed the emerging economic
divisions in society in moral terms, rather than in a class context.
By 1819 Coleridge had worn himself out campaigning for the Factory
Bill. He now believed that Britain was inexorably producing its own
type of slave - the factory workers. This was a blot which made even
Coleridge doubt his old faith in Britain's superiority as a free nation
and as an upholder of moral values. In this Notebook entry, his
depression and doubts are palpable:
Feby. 25, 1819. Highgate: after reperusal of my
inefficient yet not feeble Efforts in behalf of the
poor little white slaves in the Cotton Factories. -
ButfstillJ are we not better than the other Nations
of Christendom? Yes - perhaps - I don't know - I dare
not affirm it. Better than the French, certainly!
Mammon versus Moloch and Belial. But Sweden, Norway,
German, the Tyrol. - No.9
The confident assertion of Britain's superiority, found in his national
tables in The Friend only a year before, had now evaporated. It was not
just the materialistic, exploitative nature of capitalism which filled
him with dread, but also the fear that there was not even the moral will
to effect the remedy of state intervention. The efforts of 1818 had
failed and, when the Cotton Factories Regulation Act was finally passed
in 1819, it was an even feebler piece of legislation; only limiting
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children's hours of work to twelve a day. The reason for Coleridge's
obvious depression lies in the fact that the battle for factory reform
symbolised, in his mind, a larger moral fight for the traditional values
of Britain. It was the reluctance of the rulers of society to intervene
legislatively and ensure that these values continued to live in the new
industrial world which so depressed Coleridge. The failure of such a
modest, worthy, reform measure signified a larger failure in the national
259
political system to change organically with society, and ensure the
continuance of time-honoured moral principles. The need for state
intervention seemed evident to him, but the moral will of the governing
classes was weak and afraid of change. Coleridge, therefore, advocated
the need for a system of moral education to instruct and enlighten, not
merely the people, but also their rulers, in what were their duties
and responsibilities. For social reform to take place, this primary need
had to be addressed.
Although it is clear that Wordsworth and Coleridge agreed that the
constitutional system had to provide for a greater degree of state
intervention in social welfare issues, it is also obvious that Coleridge
regarded this enlarged and growing function of the state in a more
progressive way. Wordsworth supported paternal reforms which would help
the people, by restricting and cutting back industrial growth and by
attempting, as far as was possible, to preserve the traditional society
of rural England. Coleridge, however, did not advocate reforms which
would preserve the nation's traditional lifestyle, but rather its time-
honoured values and moral principles. Reforms would ensure that these
old values and duties would continue to live and grow in the new sociey
of the industrial towns. This positive end of the constitution was not
to preserve the nation from social and economic change, but to promote
these by ensuring that they were realised in accordance with the nation's
traditional principles and Christian values. In this way the national





direct palliatives indeed may, and have been,
applied; but as remedies, even the wisest
legislative measures can only have an indirect
operation, and are themselves but a more
august species of moral influence.1
At the deepest level Wordsworth and Coleridge believed that the
problems of post-war Britain could only be dispelled by the moral
education of the people. Social reforms would alleviate their physical
hardships and better enable the people to act in a responsible manner,
but only a process of moral enlightenment could teach them where their
duties lay. The provision of a national system of education which did
not just teach academic skills, but also moral values, was the final,
but most important, end of government. The new individual society and
its commercial spirit presented the nation with a challenge which was
not just social or economic, but was, at heart, moral. Economic change
had brutalised the people and encouraged the ruling class to think in
terms of material gain, rather than moral responsibility. An extensive
programme of national education was required therefore to right this
imbalance and to restore the traditional, reciprocal bonds of moral
duty that had always served to bind the nation together. Wordsworth
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and Coleridge no longer beloved that it was the function of education
to prepare the ordinary prople for an assumption of power, as they had
advocated in the 1790s; now education was seen as a bulwark of the state
and as the source of the moral principles which underpinned its
constitution. Once again, however, it will be argued that Coleridge
was more concerned that education should maintain the organic, growing
nature of the state than it should preserve its exact, unchanging shape.
The state's failure to institute a national system of education
was, therefore, the final and most important respect in which the
constitution was deficient. Wordsworth and Coleridge now regarded
educational provision as the most vital function of any government and,
to a degree, their own political philosophy resolves itself, finally,
into a programme of moral enlightenment. Coleridge was convinced that,
of all the ends of government,
The defects of our Constitution (in which word I
include the Laws and Customs of the Land as well as
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it's scheme of Legislative and Executive power)
must exist, therefore, in the fourth, namely the
production of the highest average of general
information, of general moral and religious
principles, and the excitements and opportunities
which it affords, to paramount Genius and heroic
power, in a sufficient number of its' Citizens.
These are points in which it would be immorality
to rest content with the presumption, however
well founded, that we are better than others, if
we are not what we ought to be ourselves, and not
using the means of improvement.^
Wordsworth and Coleridge had both believed the Napoleonic War to
be a moral crusade and the battle of Waterloo in 1815 should, therefore,
have been a definitive moral triumph and not just a military victory.
As we have seen, however, the morally unified, responsible society,
which they had expected to emerge, failed in fact to materialise.
Instead, the nation seemed more divided and morally debased than ever
before. It was the perception of this failure that impelled both
writers to advocate their educational schemes with a greater sense of
urgency than ever before.
At first, the discontent and unrest of the 1810s did not crush
Wordsworth's hopes that the various classes of society were drawing
3
nearer each other in a spirit of mutual responsibility. But, as the
disturbances contiaued, Wordsworth realised how easily the people were
incited into riotous behaviour because of their lack of education and
the brutalisation of their moral feelings caused by the factory system.
The true, long-term solution, he argued, was not to repress the people
further, but to begin to educate them so that they would become more
virtuous and responsible:
- The discipline of slavery is unknown
Among us, - hence the more do we require
The discipline of virtue; order else
Cannot subsist, nor confidence, nor peace.
Thus duties rising out of good possest
And prudent caution needful to avert
Impending evil, equally require
That the whole people should be taught and trained.
So shall licentiousness and black resolve
Be rooted out, and virtuous habits take
their place; and genuine piety descent,
Like an inheritance, from age to age.^
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Now that the unifying and moralising effect of the war was
waning, Wordsworth recommended that its beneficial influence had to
be continued in peace by more permanent, formal means. A state scheme
of education would maintain the ever-nee.dfu 1 struggle against
5
ignorance and immorality. In 'these troubled times' of unrest,
Wordsworth believed that education was vital for restoring order by
dispelling ignorance and by teaching the traditional moral values which
humanised, and linked one age to another in a single continuum.
Wordsworth urged that this educational role should be one of the chief
aims of all peace-time governments:
Now, when destruction is a prime pursuit,
Show to the wretched nations for what end
the powers of civil polity were given.®
Thus, the turbulent decade of the 1810s convinced Wordsworth of the
primary need for a system of education, not only for the knowledge and
values it could impart, but also as a means of social control.
Coleridge had similarly expected that the war would prove to be a
permanent lesson in moral education; this was to have been the war's
' 7
golden side'. Nevertheless, as the war ended, divisions in society
reappeared and he noticed how the people, in their ignorance, were
easily swayed by the propaganda of the radicals and the Whigs. The new
industrial system had demoralised the workers and their masters were
made selfish. The end of the war witnessed a general release from
moral restraint and a loosening of the national consensus, rather than
the expected inauguration of a golden age of morality. Perhaps the
external Evil had been vanquished in 1815, but the domestic evil was
growing more vir ulently than ever before. For Britain to attain true
moral salvation, the battle for virtue still had to be waged; this time
within the nation itself:
Peace has come without the advantages expected from
Peace, and on the contrary, with many of the severest
inconveniencies usually attributable to War. 'We
looked for peace, but no good came: for a time of
health and behold trouble. The harvest is past, the
summer is ended, and we are not saved.®
In this mood of disillus ionment, Coleridge began to review the
course of the war and he concluded, regretfully, that the nation had
not been so thoroughly moralised by the conflict as he had once believed.
263
There had not .been a true, spiritual change in the hearts of the people
or in the rulers of society. He believed that even the government
was implicated in this moral failure, although the ministers were less
culpable than other sections of the community. Although the government
had led the country into a just war, it had been more concerned with
the expedience of defeating an evil foe, than following the light of
moral truth that was to be discovered in the bible:
What however is achievable by the human understanding
without this light, may be comprised in the epithet,
KEV^(TfOVdoi[a vain industry]: and a
melancholy comment on that phrase would the history
of human cabinets and Legislatures for the last
thirty years furnish!9
Although Coleridge still supported the Tory Ministry as the most
reliable upholder of Britain's political values, he did now recognise
that its motives for conducting the war had not been so purely Christian,
as he had once believed.
When even the superficial moral influence of the war had ended,
Britain again lapsed into more selfish ways. In the notes for a
projected article in 1823, Coleridge contrasted 'the paradisical Morality
of the English People' until 1815, with 'their only not universal
Devilry from 1817 to 1823.'^ Coleridge found this lack of principle
evident at every level of British society. Unlike Wordsworth, who
was mostly concerned with the ignorant behaviour of the common people,
Coleridge believed that the brutal and materialistic spirit of the new
industrial age had infected every section of the nation. Even though
he believed that the more Godless, radical doctrines of the 1790s had
been disposed of, he still found no 'real diffusion of sound thinking
in the nation at large.'1^ Coleridge argued that even many of the
ruling classes, who defended the constitution, based their case on the
fallible grounds of reason and common sense, rather than on immutable
moral principles. Until they began to understand its moral premiss,
the constitution would not be safe:
The articles of our Church, and the true principles
of government and social order, will never be effectually and
consistently maintained against their antagonists' till the
champions have themselves ceased to worship the
same Baal with their enemies, till they have cast
out the common Idol [i.e. common sense] from the
recesses of their own convictions, and with it the
1 P
whole service and ceremonial of IDOLISM.'^
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For Coleridge, this moral failure of the ruling classes was much
more important than the ignorance of the people because, ultimately,
the people could only be instructed by the higher classes. Thus,
Coleridge recommended that the upper classes had to be re-educated in
their moral duties and the people had to be educated in academic skills
as well as moral principles. Only then would social order be maintained,
the moral unity of the nation be preserved, and the constitution would
be free to live and grow. At present, however, Coleridge believed that
'a vicious and ignorant population was a magazine of combustibles
1 3
left roofless.' Coleridge thus recommended a state scheme of national
education, not just as a constitutional duty, but also as a matter of
expedience in the troubled post-war era.
Before examining their specific educational schemes, it is
necessary to explore how Wordsworth and Coleridge defined the nature
and function of 'education' within the context of current ideas. Most
political thinkers, at this time, were interested in education because,
implicit in every theory of education, there is a political vision of
how the world should ideally be constituted. Even in the 1790s few
radical reformers in Britain had advocated constitutional change without
some eductional provision for the lower classes in order to prepare
them for an enlarged political role. In that decade, Wordsworth and
Coleridge had argued that the republican experiment in France had been
undermined by the fact that the people had not been properly educated
1 4
to assume power. Radicals, however, wished to use education to teach
people their rights and to prepare them for government; insofar as
conservatives were interested in education, they believed its function
was to teach the people their duties and to fit them for their existing
role in the constitution. Although Wordsworth and Coleridge had
initially favoured education in the radical sense, after 1802 they
increasingly gravitated towards a more conservative definition. They
do not fit in easily here either, however, because both writers believed
that education had to impart academic knowledge as well as moral
principles. Moreover, in the 1810s, most conservatives were fearful
of most schemes of popular education because they were convinced that
a more educated public would demand an increased social and political
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status and would become unfit for their time-honoured role. In
pressing for a national educational scheme, Wordsworth and Coleridge
were, again, extending the limits of conservative thinking into more
liberal spheres.
Wordsworth was influenced by a number of educational schemes in
the 1790s, each of which he was ultimately to reject. Godwin's concept
of national education seemed too abstract in it formulations. Wordsworth
came to reject the idea of human perfectibility and, with it, Godwin's
idea that education would lead to a perfect world through the triumph
of reason over error. For a time, Wordsworth was also impressed by his
friend, Thomas Wedg wood's scheme for 'necessitarian' education.
Wedg wood argued that if a child was carefully instructed, he would,
necessarily become exactly what his teachers wished. Wordsworth, however,
soon found this to be a rather mechanistic ideal: 'instruction', rather
than true 'education'. Wordsworth's own mature ideas, on the definition
of 'education', began to develop as he wrote The Prelude, between 1799
and 1805. This great work was, itself, an account of the poet's own
education through Nature, and James Chandler has recently argued, in
convincing manner, that, in its early five-book form, The Prelude was
probably concerned solely with Wordsworth's ideas on education and it
was then naturally expanded to deal with his subsequent political
development.1^
Wordsworth attacked the rational, educational schemes of the French
'philosophes ', such as Lakanal. He found their ideas abstract, arid
and too intellectualised. Wordsworth had always regarded pure book
learning as 'a dull and endless strife',1^ which taught one little of
real life or nature. Seeing some tourists pass through the Lake District,
reading about the area, but not actually looking at their surroundings,
Wordsworth exclaimed,
There are twenty-four letters, and these ye can read;
But Nature's ten thousand are Blanks in your sight.
Then throw by your Books, and the study begin.17
In The Prelude an extensive part of Book V is devoted to attacking this
rational system of education, based on book-learning rather than on
18
Nature. This type of instruction produced a child who was well-read,





The inside of the earth, and spell the stars.
20
The result was not a child, but a 'dwarf man' : a creature who had
none of the natural innocence of a child, but, instead, could 'read
21
lectures upon innocence'. This creature could reason and dissect life,
but he had no true feeling for his fellow man, nor any creative imagination.
He had no sense of the oneness of the world of man and nature; no moral
sensibility. Tnis type of superficial instruction was fundamentally
22
self-centred.
Posited against this morally-bankrupt type of education, Wordsworth
advocated a schooling in Nature. The rest of Book V is dedicated to
this form of education:
This verse is dedicate to Nature's self^
And things that teach as Nature teaches.
This might seem to indicate that Wordsworth subscribed to the educational
theory propounded by Rousseau in Emile, published in 1762, but in fact,
it is this type of natural education which Wordsworth attacks in The
Prelude. It has been argued already that Wordsworth, by 1800, regarded
'nature' in the Burkean sense, referring to man's natural social state.
Thus, when Wordsworth recommended a schooling in Nature, he did not
mean Rousseau's original state of nature, but rather the current state
of traditional, rural society. Whereas Rousseau believed that exposure
to social life, with its institutions and prejudices, was not part of
nature, but stifled the natural development in a child, Wordsworth saw
the traditions and customs of rural life as a natural part of social
life. These, therefore, had to form a vital element in the educational
process of any child who was to live in that society.
Wordsworth's definition of the educational process was one which
comprised a love of nature, a schooling in social customs and moral
values, and, finally, a degree of intellectual instruction. Communion
with nature lifted the soul and a boy reared in the midst of the country
would develop a much fuller emotional and spiritual life. A feeling
for natural forms helped one appreciate the unity and harmony of
24
existence, and helped one understand the greater, universal truths.
Nevertheless, this was not a sufficient education for it would produce
only an unrestrained, passionate child, unable to be at home in the
world of other people. Thus, Wordsworth also praised the customs taught
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to him by his mother:
she who was the heart
And hinge of all our learnings and our loves
... she, not falsely taught,
Fetching her goodness rather from times past
Than shaping novelties from those to come.2®
Although his mother died young, it was from her that Wordsworth first
learned of the past and the traditional benevolences to be discovered
there. It was from her, too, that he imbibed domestic, moral values;
a schooling in moral principles which he later depicts the village
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church as continuing. A natural schooling had to include an education
in the values and customs of the community.
Lastly, Wordsworth did not omit book-learning. Although he was
opposed to a purely intellectual type of education, centred on books
alone, Wordsworth recognised the importance of knowledge which could
only be gained from reading. Book V of The Prelude was entitled
'Books' and, in it, Wordsworth showed how books had enlivened his own
imagination and feelings, so that he could consider things beyond the
everyday world. He did not mean to praise arid text books, but rather
those books which lifted the spirit and quickened the creative
faculties; works, such as The Arabian Nights, or great poetry which had
the power to move and instruct as nature itself did. These were the
types of books Wordsworth had discovered, and learned f rom, in his
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father's house at Cockermouth. As the child grew older, there would
be more formal tutoring, using less fabulous books, and, involving
more study of the world as it actually was. This completed Wordsworth's
ideal of the natural education of social man:
- I mean to speak
Of that delightful time of growing youth
When cravings of the marvellous relent,
And we begin to love what we have seen;
And sober truth, experience, sympathy,
Take stronger hold of us; and words themselves
Move us with conscious pleasure.2®
Thus, the concept of education, which Wordsworth evolved in
writing The Prelude, was a schooling in the traditional rural society
of the time; in its knowledge, experiences, traditions, moral values,
as well as its feeling for nature itself. In this way, each person
would become better fitted for the world and be able to assume his role
in society, responsibly and knowledgeably. The ultimate function of
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education was, therefore, to enable man to fulfil his position
in the existing social and constitutional system. This was even more
necessary in the restless 1810s, than ever before. Wordsworth
advocated,
imparting knowledge, civil, moral, and religious,
in such measure that the mind, among all classes
of the community, may love, admire, and be prepared
and accomplished to defend, that country under whose
protection its faculties have been unfolded, and its
rules acquired.^
In answer to conservatives who feared popular education would lead to
social and political change, Wordsworth supported it as a bulwark of
the existing constitution and the moral values and traditions on which
it was based.
In Conciones a.d Populum (1795), Coleridge had argued that the
people's unrest was caused by their ignorance and their material
30
hardships, neither of which had been attended to by government. Until
this was done, the granting of equal political rights would be mean¬
ingless and ineffective. The people's political judgement would be
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worthless until they had been given more knowledge. Thus, like
Wordsworth, Coleridge had originally supported the idea of popular
education as a necessary preliminary to political reform. Nevertheless,
by the 1800s, Coleridge had also rejected the radical concepts of
Rousseau and Godwin, and he now defined the nature of education in more
conservative terms. He believed that education would enable people to
fulfil their role in the social and political system more knowl edgeably
and responsibly; but that role was necessarily growing and changing
within an organic constitution.
Coleridge advocated a system of education that was 'natural' in
the Burkean sense; one that prepared man for living in the existing
social state. But, since Coleridge regarded both country and urban life
as natural, he was not so much concerned with Wordsworth's need for a
schooling in natural surroundings. Education had to be based on the
social experience and traditions of the nation as a whole. He believed
that education could serve to remind people of their local attachments
and help bind the nation together rather than leave it divided by
32
ignorance and false prejudices. Coleridge did not see the teaching
of reading and writing to be the end of popular education, but rather
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its means. Education was fundamentally a process of social and moral
learning, and these faculties of reading and writing were merely the
means of producing citizens who could think and act responsibly, and
with knowledge. The teaching of basic literacy was mere 'instruction',
not 'education'. Coleridge, therefore, conceived education to be a
process whereby man'sfbculies, and his morality and reason, were devel¬
oped, but then fashioned towards the specific social role that the
individual was likely to assume in later life. Following the ideas
of Dr. Bell, which will be investigated later, Coleridge argued that
education:
consists in educing, or to adopt Dr. Bell's own
expression, eliciting the faculties of the Human
Mind, and at the same time subordinating them to
the Reason and Conscience; varying the means of
this common <^d according to the sphere and
particular mode, in which the Individual is likely
to act and bcome useful.34
In this way an education system would ensure that each person was
more capable of performing his full social role. Moreover, Coleridge
was to recommend this type of education, not only for every class, but
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for all females, as well as males. He believed that education could
improve the moral and intellectual condition of all people within their
particular rank in society, but only in a very few instances did he
ever envisage education raising individuals out of their class altogether.
A system of education was to be implemented so that the social and
constitutional state could function more effectively as one harmonious,
interdependent organism. This entailed each class being trained to
fulfil its duties to capacity. Coleridge argued that the function of
eduction was,
To preserve, and not to disturb or destroy, the
gradations of society; to catch the falling, not
to lift up the standing, from their natural and
native rank.36
This passage, however, was written about the specific function of
Coleridge's old school, Christ's Hospital, which educated the children
and orphans of poor middle-class parents, who would otherwise have sunk
below their allotted station in life. Although it basically expresses
Coleridge's views on the function of education, it should not be taken
as his final statement on this issue. He did recognise that, in an
organic society, the education of all classes would not merely preserve
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the existing structure, as Wordsworth contended, but also cause it
to grow and change. Coleridge attacked conservative writers who argued
that the anarchy in France in the 1790s had been caused by giving the
people too much knowledge. Coleridge argued that the problems had been
created by not giving them enough. Coleridge believed that ordinary
people in the 1810s were now thirsting for knowidge and that this
legitimate desire had to be fulfilled by the government. If the
ordinary people were given knowledge, and were not just instructed in
their moral duties, then there would not only be less discontent, but
the people would be able to undertake an enhanced, more responsible
role in the community. Thus, education would not just enable people
to fulfil the role of their particular rank in society, but that role
itself would become more important to the state:
shall I address myself to those, who think that as the
Peace of Nations has been disturbed by the diffusion of
Knowledge, falsely so called, and the excitement of
Hopes that could not be gratified; that this Peace may
be re-established by excluding the People from all
Knowledge, all Thought, and all prospect of Amelioration?
0 never, never! Reflection, and stirrings of Mind,
with all their Restlessness and all their Imperfections
and Errors, are come into the world. The powers that
awaken and foster the Spirit of Curiosity and Investigation,
are to be found in every Village; Books are in every
Cottage. The Infant's cries are hushed with picture-books;
and the Child sheds his first bitter Tears over the
Pages which will render it impossible for him, when a
Man, to be treated or governed as a Child. The cause of
our disquietude must be the means of our Tranquillity:
only by the fire, which has burnt us, can we be
enlightened to avoid a repetition of the Calamity.
Coleridge still believed education to be a preparation for fulfilling
the role of one's rank in society, but that society was an organism
and one's role in it was a living element. In this passage he shows
how education was part of that dynamic organic process, which would
necessarily change society. The growing thirst for knowledge would
ensure that the next generation would no longer be treated or governed
as children. The implication is that, through education, the people
would gradually attain an enhanced, more responsible role within the
nation. Theywould still be a distinct class, or element, within the
organic constitution, but, through their schooling, they would have
grown in importance. Thus, Coleridge's definition of education's function
was not to preserve the existing social and constitutional system as
it stood, but to be a living organism, in which each class would learn
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a distinct role and one which could also grow and change over time.
It is a much more liberal, and progressive, concept than that of
Wordsworth's or Burke's.
Between 181A and 1818 Wordsworth and Coleridge devised programmes
for these types of educational provision, that would be implemented
by the state as one of the most vital of all its constitutional duties.
There are a number of distinct features which are common to both
schemes. Firstly, Wordsworth and Coleridge were interested in enacting
clearly-defined plans which would be applicable to the whole nation.
Their more informal ideas of the past were now superceded by precise
programmes because the urgency of the post-war situation demanded an
immediate, engineered assault on the growing ignorance and moral
debasement of the people. The Church of England was to play an important
role because it seemed to them, the practical embodiment of the
religious principles which were so lacking in the country at large.
Since it was also one of the pillars of the constitution, its involvement
in education would serve to bind the people more closely to the
institutions of the state. Thus, the two writers were to favour the
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'Madras' system of education propounded by Dr. Andrew Bell, which
was based on Anglican doctrine, rather than the rival non-denominational
system, set up by Joseph Lancaster.
It also becomes clear, in the post-war years, that Wordsworth and
Coleridge were increasingly addressing a middle and upper class reader¬
ship, who were to institute the educational reforms. The old ideal of
self-discovery and individual learning, while still important, was
insubstantial as a basis for a national educational plan, especially when
the people's spirit had been so lowered by the new economic system.
Thus, the two writers urged the higher ranks to take the initiative in
educational planning. Coleridge differed from Wordsworth, however,
in believing that the upper classes had to be re-educated first in
moral principles. Their burgeoning materialist spirit had to be
countered by reminding them of their old moral responsibilities to the
rest of society. Only when this process had begun, Coleridge argued,
would the upper classes be capable of educating the rest of the population.
Through their two schemes of education, Wordsworth and Coleridge hoped
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that the nation would become morally enlightened, that ignorance would
be gradually diminished, and that everyone would be re-dedicated to
the moral values and principles underlying the social and political
state.
After the Lyrical Ballads' experiment of writing in the language
of ordinary men, Wordsworth's work, in the 1810s, was increasingly
written for an upper class readership, in a style which could only be
fully appreciated by them. The Excursion (1814), which contained his
mature reflections on education, was written in a highly philosophical
style and his Westmorland Address (1818) was composed for 'the
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consideration of the upper ranks of Society'. Although he also planned
to write other 'brief Essays, in plain and popular language ... for the
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understanding of the lower orders' , these were never written. In a
similar way, Coleridge failed to compose the third Lay Sermon , in 1817,
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which was to have been aimed at a similar readership. Both instances
reveal how central the upper classes had become to Wordsworth's and
Coleridge's own educational purpose. The two writers realised that
their schemes only had a chance of being implemented if they were
initiated with the willing cooperation of the governing classes.
Wordsworth wished the ruling classes to establish, immediately, a
national educational scheme. His previous reliance on the forces of
nature, combined with the traditonal schooling from parents and parish
was insufficient, of itself, to combat the new industrial society and
its values. In the final book of The Excursion (1814), written in the
wake of the Luddite riots, Wordsworth proclaims the need for state
intervention:
0 for the coming of that glorious time
When prizing knowledge as her noblest wealth
And best protection, this imperial Realm,
Wnile she exacts allegiance, shall admit
An obligation, on her part, to teach
Them who are born to serve her and obey;
Binding herself by statute to secure
For all the children whom her soil maintains
The rudiments of letters, and inform
The mind with moral and religious truth,
Both understood and practised, - so that none,
However destitute, be left to droop
By timely culture unsustained; or run
Into a wild disorder; or be forced
To drudge through a weary life without the help
Of intellectual implements and tools;
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A savage horde among the civilised,
A servile band among the lordly free!
This sacred right, the lisping babe proclaims
To be inherent in him, by Heaven's will,
For the protection of his innocence.42
This important passage reveals Wordsworth's belief that education
was the God-given right of every citizen. It was also a constitutional
duty incumbent on all governments; just as the state could expect
the obedience of the people, so the people could expect a system of
education provided by the state. By such means the essential equation
between duties and rights could be maintained. All children, of whatever
status, were to be taught basic literacy, as well as religious principles
and moral values. The result would be a more self-disciplined,
responsible people, less likely to cause social disorder. Their
everyday existence would be heartened, eased and civilised. This
system would thus achieve a basic minimum moral and intellectual
standard across the nation and would enable each citizen to undertake
his social role to the best of his abilities. Wordsworth believed
that the state had to act as the parent of the nation and had to provide
for its education as though the people were its own children. Wordsworth
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referred to the 'State's parental ear', which listened to the people's
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need for education, and the 'mother's heart' which he hoped would
respond to the plea.
This education system, instituted by the state, was to teach the
doctrine of the Church of England. Wordsworth argued that this would
not only ensure a sound moral instruction of the people, but would
strengthen their regard for the state, of which the Established Church
was an important bulwark. In a note referring to the need for a statutory
educational policy, Wordsworth proposed his ideal scheme:
The discovery of Dr. Bell affords marvellous facilities
for carrying this into effect; and it is impossible
to overrate the benefit which might accrue to humanity
from the universal application of this simple enging,-
under an enlightened and conscientious governement.
Bell's system, . initiated in Kendal in 1797, made use of pupil
monitors and mutual instruction, and was based on Church of England
teaching. Wordsworth was attracted by the monitorial methods because
they inculcated a regard for interdependence and reciprocal duties.
Wordsworth believed that schools organised on these simple, innately
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moral lines, could have a disproportionately good effect. They would
not be pretentious, over-intellectualised places of study, but would
4 b
teach the people moral values and enlighten the entire nation.
Wordsworth also argued that if this system was instituted all
over the country, it would create a happier, more unified nation.
Just as the national struggle against Napoleon had united the land in
a spirit of moral purpose, so now in peacetime, a system of national
education could achieve the same on a more permanent and profound basis.
As each citizen was educated in his moral responsibilities, so the
traditional, interdependent structure of the nation would be repaired
and its constitution strengthened. If similar schemes for moral
education were adopted by the other countries in Europe, Wordsworth
envisaged how every nation in the continent would become internally
unified, happier and more contented. If this was accomplished then
there would be the real prospect of a more harmonious, less war-like,
Europe:
if that ignorance were removed, which breeds
Within the compass of their several shores
Dark discontent, or loud commotion, each
Might still preserve the beautiful repose
Of heavenly bodies shining in their spheres.
If Britain implemented the national scheme of education, which Wordsworth
recommended, then this would serve as an example to all, and it would
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be the first step towards a more united, peaceful Europe.
Wordsworth believed that there was an urgent need for the
government to act quickly and set up Bell's system of moral education.
This was an action which could not be delayed for, in the 1810s,
Wordsworth was convinced that the constitution, and its principles, was
under heavy attack from radicals, Whigs and capitalist employ ers, and
was being undermined by a general weakening in the moral spirit of the
people. Thus, a national educational programme needed to be
implemented immediately to repair the traditional bonds of state and
constitution. This scheme could not be introduced in a piecemeal
fashion, but had to be conducted at national level by the government
itself so that the whole country could then unite around its old ideals
and political system. Only then would the constitution live for all
the people again and the nation be moralised. Addressing the government
with this sense of urgency, Wordsworth pleaded:
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- Vast the circumference of hope - and ye
Are at its centre, British Lawgivers;
Ah! sleep not there in shame! Shall Wisdom's voice
From out the bosom of these troubled times
Repeat the dictates of her calmer mind,
And shall the venerable halls ye fill
Refuse to echo the sublime decree?
Trust not to partial care a general good;
Transfer not to futurity a work
Of urgent need. - Your Country must complete
Her glorious destiny.^9
Wordsworth did realise, however, that the state's task would not
be easy and that it would take a long time before the people were morally
instructed. This passage from The Excursion, expressing the ideas of
the Wanderer, evokes a response from a gentle Lady, who doubts the
feasibility of such an idealistic vision of a moralised nation:
When he is speaking, I have power to see
Even as he sees; but when his voice hath ceased
Then, with a sigh, sometimes I feel, as now,
That combinations so serene and bright
Cannot be lasting in a world like ours.
Here, perhaps is an acknowledgement by Wordsworth himself that, although
his vision of a morally educated Britain was a beguiling prospect, it
would not be easy to realise it in the practical world. It is signif¬
icant, however, that the Lady's more cynical strictures are, themselves,
cut short, by shouts of joy from two boys, tripping down the field
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towards the little group. It is an image which suggests that the
world can be happy and virtuous, and that the Wanderer's plans for
educating such children as these could create a more harmonious society;
at least, the attempt had to be made. The reversal of the country's
moral decline would, however, be slow and gradual. In an essay, a year
later, Wordsworth conceded, 'Neither individuals nor nations become
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corrupt all at once, nor are they enlightened in a moment.' Nevertheless,
for the state to survive, moral education was vital.
Wordsworth ended The Excursion with an invocation from the Priest
to God, calling on Him to ensure that the Word of God would be spread
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throughout the world. Wordsworth believed the Bible to be the greatest
educator of all and, in these final passages, he reveals how his
educational scheme, and indeed his whole system of politics, was merely
a part of one great crusade of moral enlightenment. Education ensured
a moral basis for the constitutional system, and the constitution
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was yet a further means for realising God's laws in a pragmatic form
suited to each distinct nation. Moral truth was the greatest knowledge
of all; the whole purpose of human life. Moral truths were understand¬
able to all, no matter what one's station in life, or what one's
intellectual capacities. Wordsworth praised G,od,
Whose love, whose counsel, whose commands, have made
Your very poorest rich in peace of thought
And in good works; and him, who is endowed
With scantiest knowledge, master of all truth
Which the salvation of his soul requires.5^
The access to moral truth, which was available to all, remains the
last vestige of Wordsworth's egalitarian ideals; a consolation to the
poor, or dispossessed, who may be unequal inevery other aspect of their
lives. In social and political terms, Wordsworth's educational scheme
was designed to alter very little: a civilising agent in the lives of
the common people, but more importantly, a confirmation of the existing
British state and constitution which he believed to rest on Christian
principles. Morally, however, the people would be enlightened and be
given access to those God-given truths, whose knowledge was the right
of all. Despite the fact that Wordsworth, ultimately, sought only
moral change - and even then it was as a reversion to that of a previous
age, the seventeenth century - he was still ahead of most current Tory
thinking. He believed that a basic level of moral and intellectual
education was the right of all; that the state was constitutionally-
bound to provide this in a national system; that such a programme of
instruction was a more effective way, than repression, of controlling
the people and binding them to the state. If one considers these ideas
in relation to his thoughts on social welfare, and also against his
conservative defence of the constitution in the Westmorland Address (1818),
then W.ordsworth still emerges as a Tory, but one of a distinctly
paternalistic and humanitarian kind.
In the 1810s Coleridge also developed a distinct plan of education,
similar in many ways to Wordsworth's, but involving the moral instruction
of the entire community; the ruling classes as well as the lower orders.
In the 1790s he had praised individual efforts to teach religious
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principles, but, while not belittling personal responsibilities, he
came to realise that a national system of education would be more
effective in combatting the rampant commercial spirit of the post-war era.
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This state scheme would be based on the religious principles of the
Church of England. Religion, for Coleridge, was not merely to be the
most important subject taught, but was itself a method of teaching:
it could not be divorced from life, but was part of the living process,
Coleridge believed that the Established Church provided the best,
practical embodiment of religious thought. It was the custodian of
the nation's religion and a bulwark of the constitution and state.
Thus, education based on Anglican teaching would not only provide the
most meaningful form of moral instruction, but would also bind the people
to the state and its organic constitution. Coleridge, therefore,
regarded free-thinking not so much as a mark of liberty and tolerance,
but as an escape from any real religious commitment. He attacked all
systems of education which were free-thinking and not based on adherence
to fixed religious beliefs:
In every other thing that is taught fixed principles
are inculcated, but in religion, which more than any
other thing, requires the inculcation of principles,
children are to be left to judge for themselves!56
This was Coleridge's principal objection to the non-denominational
system of education set up by Joseph Lancaster. His scheme was based
on abstract religious ideas which, Coleridge argued, were incapable of
being grasped until embodied in a specific form, like that of the
57
Established Church. Education grounded on these abstract principles
would create a generation unversed in meaningful moral values, and
this would soon undermine both the constitution and the Church which
upheld and depended upon these values. Thus, Coleridge argued that the
Lancastrian scheme was merely a species of Jacobinism which similarly
endorsed abstract rights with no concern for attendant duties. Coleridge
claimed that, in Lancastrian schools, prejudice against the rich was
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encouraged by always characterising them as an oppressive class.
This educational system also used harsh methods of discipline which,
far from being effective, tended to harden the hearts of the children
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and to brutalise them. Coleridge argued, in his notes for an education
lecture, in 1808:
No boy who has been subject to punishments like these
will st^nd in fear of Newgate, or feel any horror at the
thought of a slave ship!°0
Thus, in all respects, the Lancastrian system of education was radical and
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subversive in intent. It disregarded national traditions and duties
in favour of free, unrestrained rights and in this way created a
potentially vicious and socially disruptive generation. It seemed a
danger to constitution and state.
Coleridge clearly viewed the educational systems on offer in a highly
political, as well as moral and religious, context. He believed that
it was vital for the constitutional health of the nation that the
government intervene to stop the spread of Lancaster's plans, and promote
those of Dr. Bell. The latter's programme was grounded in Church of
England principles and it endorsed the traditional values of the nation.
Bell's use of older pupils to instruct younger ones also meant that moral
responsibilities were not merely learned but also lived, in the educational
process. This appealed to Coleridge's sense of human experience existing
as an organic whole, in which every individual lived interdependently.
On the purely pragmatic level, Coleridge supported Bell's scheme because
it would dispel people's ignorance and prove to them that their current
grievances were unconnected with government policies. It would show
that they had been deceived by the radicals and the Opposition. Thus,
future discontent and unrest would be avoided:
What then is wanting? Not the repeal of Taxes; but the
encreased activity both of the Gentry and Clergy of the
Land, in securing the Instruction of the lower Classes. A
System of Education is wanting, such a system as that
discovered, and to the blessings of thousands realized,
by Dr. Bell, whom I never am or can be weary of praising,
while my Heart retains any spark of regard for human nature
or of reverence for human virtue! A system, by which in
the very act of receiving knowledge, the best virtues and
most useful qualities of the moral Character are awakened,
developed, and formed into habits.^1
Like Wordsworth, Coleridge was aware that such a system would take
some time to implement and so, in the interim, he praised the work of
Bible Societies which distributed books amongst the poor and ignorant.
Although he did fear that these societies were not sufficiently grounded
in Anglican doctrine, he still believed that they filled a gap in knowledge,
until a more truly national system could be instituted. They also
prepared the ground for such a scheme to take root and flourish. The
moral education, which they provided through their Christian texts, was
a necessary corollary to social reform, for while it did not actually
diminish material hardships, it gave the poor a consolation which
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ameliorated the worst effects of their condition. Coleridge praised
Bible societies,
who exert their attentive powers in dispersing the best
of books, the comfort of the comfortless, and the poor
man's infallible receipt to make poverty itself a mine of
imperishable wealth.62
As Wordsworth had also argued that the knowledge of moral truth was the
right of all, no matter how lowly. The spread of these truths through
the Societies, and ultimately through Bell's scheme, combined with the
effect of social reforms, would create an interdependent programme of
action to raise the spiritual and material condition of the distressed.
Coleridge was extravagant in his praise of Bell's scheme. He
described it as 'an especial gift of Providence to the human race' and
~~~ ~~
as 'this vast moral steam-engine'. Coleridge did, however, realise
that, in the post-war world, Bell's system was not sufficient to ensure
the moral education of the nation. He still envisaged it as a 'necessary
6 A
part of the great process' , but he recognised, as Wordsworth did not,
that other measures would have to be taken before it could be effectively
implemented. Coleridge argued that the upper classes were also in need
of moral education. The new rraterialist spirit of capitalism had weakened
their sense of Christian duty. Unless they were also morally educated,
there would either be no will to institute Bell's system or the educators
themselves would be lacking in the requisite, sound moral principles:
But I am greatly deceived, if one preliminary to an
efficient education of the labouring classes be not the
recurrence to a more manly discipline of the intellect
on the part of the learned themselves, in short a thorough
recasting of the moulds, in which the minds of our Gentry,
the characters of our future Land-owners, Magistrates and
Senators, are to receive their shape and fashion.^5
In this way Coleridge conceived of education in a more liberal way than
Wordsworth, embracing all of society in one great process of moral change
and enlightenment. This was not an educational scheme to be paternally
imposed on the lower orders, but one in which the minds and hearts of
the leaders of society also had to be re-educated, in order to effect
a change in the spirit of the nation as a whole. The entire national
organism had to become involved in the educational process and, in this
way, the moral and organic nature of the constitution would be confirmed
and would live for the nation.
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Coleridge recommended that the re-education of the ruling classes
should commence with a return to the fundamental principles of the Bible,
which they had been neglecting. The first of his Lay Sermons, dedicated
to these classes, was called The Statesman's Manual: The Bible the Best
Guide to Political Skill and Foresight (1816). The Bible was the
essential grounding for all the moral values which inform political and
constitutional practices. Coleridge believed that, since the moral
decrepitude of the present age was so great, the ruling classes would
have to begin their education with the most basic Christian principles:
The very terms of ancient wisdom are worn out, or (far
worse!) stamped on baser metal: and whoever should have
the hardihood to reproclaim its solemn Truths must
commence with a Glossary.^
The truths contained in the Bible were not abstract, but had a living
reality and practical application which could be readily understood and
f\7
acted upon. Anglican teaching came closest to realising it. Once the
upper classes had been taught these truths again and began to live them,
then they could begin the instruction of the rest of sociey until the
process of enlightenment was complete.
The problem remained of finding a means of initiating the process.
Coleridge believed that the re-education of the upper classes could be
accomplished by the efforts of a relatively few learned men in society.
In The Friend (1809) Coleridge hoped that about a hundred such men could
combine together and begin the task of spreading more virtuous and moral
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habits. Indeed, he was convinced that his own journal would appeal to
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this learned class, 'a sufficient number of meditative minds', who
would provide the nucleus for the re-education of the whole of society.
Since The Friend had set out to elucidate true moral and political
principles, Coleridge felt sure that his subscribers, taken from the
upper and middling classes, and the clergy, would heed his advice and
recall others in their ranks to these truths. This concept of a permanent
learned class, or 'clerisy', who were the moral educators of the nation
and the guardians of its constitutional principles, was an idea which
was to be fully explained in Coleridge's last political work, On the
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Constitution of the Church and State (1830). Although he first described
—
this group as a 'clerisy' in 1821, the concept is already apparent in
Coleridge's thinking by the time he wrote the two Lay Sermons (1816-17).
The Statesman's Manual (1816) was addressed 'exclusively ad clerum;
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i.e., (in the old and wide sense of the word) to men of clerkly
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acquirements, of whatever profession'. Coleridge defined this clerisy
as an elite group within society, composed of the most learned men of
every profession, but particularly the theological. In a Burkean sense
they were to be responsible for the continuity of civilisation in all
its highest forms: in the pursuit of moral, philosophical, artistic,
religious and political truth. This small class of people was deemed
to be capable of restoring the intellectual and moral health of the
nation. Coleridge argued for,
the importance of a philosophic class, and of evincing
that it is of vital utility, and even an essential
element in the composition of a civilised community.'J
The clerisy tried to comprehend the totality and omneity of the
world, and were capable of perceiving that the only constant in the
social organism was the Word of God. Thus, Coleridge argued that only
this group was capable of counteracting the prevailing commercial spirit
and reminding the ruling classes of their true moral, political and
intellectual role in the community:
An excess in our attachment to temporal and personal
objects can be counteracted only by a pre-occupation
of the intellect and the affections with permanent,
universal, and eternal truths.^
Indeed, Coleridge believed that the clerisy not only had to act as a
counterbalance to the materialistic spirit in the upper classes, but
also within the Church of England itself. Coleridge argued that the
Established Church had weakened, along with the general decline in
religious temper. The Church needed to recover the intellectual depth
of religious enquiry which it had displayed in the seventeenth century.
Only when its vigour and spirit had been revived, could the Church fully
enter into a national plan of education. The country would then achieve,
by more formal means, the type of national moral education it had
naturally received in former days. As Coleridge stated in his Notebooks:
from the reign of Henry the 8th to James the second's
Abdication, no Country had ever received such a national
education.'5
Coleridge's great scheme of education, therefore, began with the
duties of the clerisy; and he included himself and Wordsworth in this
elite, as theorists and poet-philosophers. Through their literary,
linguistic and philosophical interests, these two writers were best able
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to comprehend the moral and political truths to be discovered in the
words and actions of men. Their published works would then disseminate
these ideas to a wider readership and, in this way, Coleridge and
Wordsworth would play a major role in beginning the educational process.
The clerisy, as a whole, would promote the intellectual and moral
enlightenment of the entire nation by first re-educating the higher
classes in the Biblical truths which were fundamental to the state and
the constitution. As this proceeded, Bell's scheme would then continue
the process of education and enlightenment so that all classes would
benefit. Although the concept of a clerisy was basically elitist, it
was open to all men of great talent, and the final aim was the liberal
one, of educating all. Coleridge's plans recognised the moral failings
of every class, each dependent on the other, and the consequent educational
proposal was one which attempted to create a morally interrelated nation
at every level. Coleridge believed that the society which emerged
would be a single growing organism. Each class would form a distinct
element within this organism, but through moral and intellectual
education, each would gain the potential to grow, so that even the role
of the lower orders might be enhanced as time progressed. The constitut¬
ion, which was both a reflection and an instrument of the social organism
would, therefore, be maintained and strengthened as a living force.
The moral education of society was not just the most important end of
government, it lay at the very heart of Coleridge's philosophy for it
ensured a growing, changing state and constitution, while maintaining
the constancy of traditional principles. The structure of Coleridge's
constitution allowed for the continuing process of change, but the principles
remained fixed and these were the Word of God. It is a political system
of conservative permanency liberated by organic change, all in the
service of God.
Coleridge ended A Lay Sermon with an eloquent passage which summed
up all these hopes for Britain's future and which underlined his conserv¬
ative regard for the constitution, but also his liberal belief in
organic reform. It is a plea for government to attend to those
constitutional duties it had neglected, but which were now so vital:
industrial reforms and national education. It is a plea for a more
religious, humane and responsible society. Although every act of
individual charity was necessary and welcome, the state now had to adopt
a more interventionary role in a society increasingly complex, divided
283
and demoralised. The idea of the constitution which emerges is one
derived from time-honoured principles, but employing new means of
realising them: a constitution, traditional in essence, but enlivened
by a moral, liberal impulse. These are all far-reaching ideas to emerge
from the mind of a conservative theorist of this time, and they extend
conservatism into new, more liberal areas of thought. They are ideas
which distinguish Coleridge from contemporary Tories who urged
repressive policies, and from Wordsworth who defended the form of the
constitution as it stood, but urged a more paternal eye. Coleridge's
constitutional system realised its fixed traditional principles through
constant organic change. Twenty years after confronting the dilemma of
how society could improve and grow, yet conserve what was best, Coleridge
arrived at his mature judgement on how change could be squared with
permanence, without one destroying the other: liberal conservatism.
Our manufacturers must consent to regulations; our gentry
must concern themselves in the education as well as the
instruction of their natural clients and dependents, must
regard their estates as secured indeed from all human
interference by every principle of law, and policy, but
yet as offices of trust, with duties to be performed, in
the sight of God and their Country. Let us become a
better people, and the reform of all the public (real
or supposed) grievances, which we use as pegs whereon to
hang our own errors and defects, will follow of itself.
In short, let every man measure his efforts by his power
and his sphere of action, and do all he can do! Let him
contribute money where he cannot act personally; but let
him act personally and in detail wherever it is practicable.
Let us palliate where we cannot cure, comfort where we
cannot relieve; and for the rest rely upon the promise
of the King of Kings by the mouth of his Prophet, 'Blessed
Are Ye That Sow Beside All Waters.'76
In many respects, Wordsworth's and Coleridge's views on moral
education unite all the strands of their political philosophy. The ideas
of permanence and change, individual responsibility and state intervent¬
ion, the ancient constitution and experience, national cohesion and the
reciprocal duties of each distinct class, natural society and the organic
state, moral values and established religion: they are all present in
their plans for this last, but most important, end of government. At
the deepest level, their two political philosophies resolve themselves
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into systems for the moral enlightenment of the nation, for ultimately
both writers believed that true political values were always moral in
principle. To provide moral education was to create a more Christian
nation from which good government naturally flowed.
In the twenty years since 1797, when they first became firm friends,
Wordsworth and Coleridge had travelled far from their original radical
principles. Although they still retained something of their old
idealism, by 1818, it had assumed a moral, rather than a purely political,
form. During that period they had wrestled with, perhaps, the most taxing
issue which can ever confront a political theorist: how to fashion a
constitutional system suited to a nation experiencing unprecedented
change in every facet of its existence? As they scrutinised and re¬
assessed the temper of that age, Wordsworth's and Coleridge's responses
became necessarily complex and changeable. Three distinct, yet deeply
inter-related, stages of political development have been discerned, but
ultimately, their final stance emerges as a blend of the two earlier
phases; a basic conservatism, leavened by some of the liberal impulses
which had survived from their more radical period. The difference between
the two writers lies in the degree and nature of the change which they
were willing to contemplate in this essentially conservative system.
Wordsworth's reaction to the changes all around him was to cling
ever more strongly to traditional rural society, the ancient constitution
and its principles, while acknowledging that the new economic system
had to be cut back and its hardships had to be ameliorated by a more
paternalistic, socially-concerned, government. In this way he hoped
to preserve the Burkean concept of constitution and state, by implementing
the limited type of prudent and pragmatic changes, for which Burke himself
had allowed. Coleridge's idea of the constitution was more progressive.
Sensing the permanency, and the potential worth, of the new industrial
society, he had no wish to stunt its growth. Coleridge accepted change
as the essential condition of man and government, and he believed that
only the Laws of God were fixed and constant. Whereas Wordsworth was
anxious to preserve both the state's structure and principles, Coleridge
was more concerned with the latter. These permanent God-given principles
had to find a practical form suited to society and, since the social
organism was constantly growing and evolving, moral permanence could
only be achieved through gradually changing forms. Thus, the new industrial
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society had to be accepted, but imbued with time-honoured moral
values and, in order to accomplish this, the nature of the political
state had to change in sympathy with society; all were part of the
same organism of life, past, present and future. In advocating state
reforms, Coleridge was not shoring up the old constitutional system
against change, but allowing its traditional values to live through
change: permanence through progress. If Wordsworth emerges as a
paternal, humanitarian Tory, Coleridge invested Burkean conservatism
with organic life in aneffort to meet the challenges of a new, growing
society: he liberalised conservative theory.
By 1818 the political philosophies of Wordsworth and Coleridge
had assumed their definitive state. Wordsworth wrote little else on
political issues and, in his later years, he became more of an establish¬
ment figure. Nevertheless, even in the 1830s, he was still avidly
interested in political ideas and in gradual reforms which might
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preserve the old, more humane society of the pre-industrial era.
Coleridge was still to publish one other major political work: On the
Constitution of the Church and State (1830). The role of the clerisy
was explored there, at much greater length, but the book has little of
substance to add to the political theory which Coleridge had already
developed by 1818. Through their interest in social reform, both writers
were to anticipate the enlarged role of the state during the Victorian
period and, in many ways, their combined work foreshadows the future
development of the Tory party as it began to adopt more liberal policies.
It was, however, Coleridge's more dynamic brand of liberal conservatism
which was to have the greatest impact on the long tradition of British
conservative thought. J.S. Mill was to nominate him, along with Bentham,
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as one of the two great seminal minds of their age. Nevertheless,
it is important to remember that the interest which both Wordsworth and
Coleridge showed in the inter-relationship between politics and morality,
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